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Abstract: 
 
 This dissertation examines how German-American and German-Canadian 
Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County, Ontario, constructed their ethnic 
identities from the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 to 1970. Did German 
Lutherans understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth 
preserving? What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic 
identities? It argues that German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods 
constructed a hybrid identity that sought to balance their competing ethnic, religious, 
racial, and national identities. It charts their experiences negotiating discrimination during 
the Second World War, their efforts to bring German immigrants to North America 
through lobbying for immigration policy changes, and their struggles to resist pressures to 
assimilate throughout the postwar period. Contrary to popular assumptions, German 
Lutherans did not abandon their ethnic identities during the twentieth century, but rather 
continued to practice a German ethnic identity within the ethnic boundary zones of their 
churches. They continued to justify speaking German as a theological necessity, formed 
alliances with new German refugees and displaced persons to continue their ethnic 
traditions, and resisted exclusionary mainstream Anglo-Canadian and American 
nationalisms by advocating for a pluralistic understanding of their past through cultural 
and commemorative events. 
 
 By drawing on developments in critical race theory and whiteness studies, this 
dissertation argues that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for 
understanding how German Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. While it was 
controversial during and after the Second World War to openly identify as German, 
German Lutherans successfully mitigated these stigmas through their white privilege and 
ability to form political alliances with white government officials. Moreover, German 
Lutherans maintained an ethnic identity because they excluded other immigrants and 
racialized North Americans from attending their congregations by supporting Jim Crow 
segregation. By keeping their churches white, they were also able to keep their churches 
“German.” This study urges immigration historians to look more closely at how 
whiteness and ethnicity in the twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one 
another.  
 
 
Keywords: German Canadians, German Americans, St. Louis, Waterloo County, 
Whiteness, Race, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Canada Synod, North American 
Lutheranism, Transnationalism, Second World War, Cold War Immigration, Displaced 
Persons 
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A Note on Terminology 
 
  Scholarly terms used to define ethnicity and race are often problematic due to the 
imprecise and subjective nature of both identities. Many racial and ethnic labels fail to 
capture the fluidity of each of these identities. This study discusses German-speaking 
Lutherans in Canada, the United States, and Germany. Generally, I use the term “German 
Lutherans” as an all-encompassing and less cumbersome term to refer to the German-
American and German-Canadian Lutherans that lived in St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
When referring to only one of these communities, I specify their nationality with the 
hyphenated term. “German Lutherans” does not refer to people living in Europe unless 
otherwise specified in the text. 
 Critical race theorists employ a wide swath of terms to refer to the different 
“races” they study. In his critical examination of white culture, Richard Dyer describes 
how many of these terms, such as “nonwhite” or “people of colour,” are problematic 
because they reinforce troubling power relations wherein “white” is normalized and those 
outside of this category are othered.i As a result, I use the term “racialized” Canadians 
and Americans to refer to nonwhite people, out of recognition that white people are not 
yet racialized in North American society. I have also elected not to capitalize racial labels 
such as “white” or “black” to better reflect the descriptive nature of these terms and 
reflect their artificiality.ii
                                                        
i Richard Dyer, White (London: Routledge, 1997), 11. 
ii Other scholars have decided to capitalize “White” alongside other racial categories such as “Black” or 
“Asian.” Respectfully, I have chosen the opposite approach as I feel it better conveys the artificial nature of 
racial categories, whereas capitalization makes them more concrete. See Sharron A. Fitzgerald and Alicja 
Muszynski, “Negotiating Female Morality: Place, Ideology and Agency in Red River Colony,” Women’s 
History Review 16, no. 5 (2007): 677. 
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Introduction: Race, Religion, and Ethnicity in St. Louis and Waterloo County, 1939-
1970 
 The outbreak of yet another world war in September 1939 generated significant 
anxiety among North America’s German immigrant communities. Those of German 
heritage recalled the discrimination and harassment the Great War created in their 
communities and they worried that another war would place their safety in jeopardy once 
again. C.H. Little, a Lutheran professor of theology in Waterloo County, Ontario, grimly 
greeted the news of the Second World War’s beginning: “The die has been cast, hell has 
broken loose, and we are in a world war again.” The outbreak of war was not a time of 
patriotism for Little and his peers. Instead, he believed the war was “a tragedy beyond all 
calculation…undoubtedly dark days are ahead of us here in Canada.”1 A few weeks later, 
German-American Lutherans in St. Louis, Missouri, echoed Little’s concerns. The 
Reverend Rudolph Meyer, pastor of St. Louis’s oldest Lutheran church, prayed “that our 
beloved country will enact a neutrality law that will not entangle us in the European War. 
We have not forgotten the heartaches of the [last] World War.”2 Although separated by 
the Canadian-American border, German Lutherans in both Waterloo County and St. 
Louis worried that another war with Germany would make them feel like outsiders in 
their communities once again. 
 A fear that they would become strangers in their new North American homes 
characterized much of German immigrant experience in the mid-twentieth century. 
Described by one historian as a period of Anglo-conformity, German immigrants worried 
                                                        
1 Laurier Archives (hereafter LA), Carroll Herman Little fonds (hereafter CLF), C.H. Little to Candace 
Little, 27 August 1939. 
2 Concordia Historical Institute (hereafter CHI), Missouri – St. Louis Congregations Collection, Trinity 
Lutheran Church Bulletin Box, Bulletins Folder, Trinity Bulletin, 17 September 1939. 
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that their culture, language, and ethnicity would make them outcasts in Canada and the 
United States.3 The Second World War prompted North Americans to associate German 
culture with Nazism and opened German immigrants to accusations of disloyalty. Even 
after the war concluded in 1945, Canadians and Americans still connected the German 
people with Nazi war crimes and favoured restricting the number of German refugees 
who could migrate to North America.4 These stigmas and negative associations 
disproportionately impacted German immigrants of the Lutheran faith. Many Canadians 
and Americans considered Lutheranism an inherently Germanic religion due to its 
historic ties to Martin Luther and its traditional popularity in modern Germany. Although 
North American Lutheran groups had few, if any, direct political ties to Germany, 
nativists worried German Lutherans harbored a secret loyalty to Germany instead of their 
Canadian and American communities.  
 How did German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans combat these 
negative stereotypes surrounding their ethnicity and faith? Did German Lutherans 
understand their ethnicity as an identity to overcome, or as an identity worth preserving? 
What role did religion and race play in how they constructed their ethnic identities? This 
dissertation aims to answer these questions by drawing on two case studies. It examines 
how the German Lutheran communities in St. Louis, Missouri, and Waterloo County, 
Ontario, debated their ethnic identity from the beginning of the Second World War in 
1939 to 1970. It argues that German Lutherans in these two communities maintained a 
German ethnic identity despite the challenges that controversies such as the Second 
                                                        
3 Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta (McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1982), 8-11. 
4 Angelika Sauer, “A Matter of Domestic Policy?: Canadian Immigration Policy and the Admission of 
Germans, 1945-50,” Canadian Historical Review LXXIV, no. 2 (1993): 251; Alexander Freund, “Troubling 
Memories in Nation-building: World War II Memories and Germans’ Inter-ethnic Encounters in Canada 
after 1945,” Histoire sociale/Social History 77 (2006): 145-147. 
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World War and postwar associations with Nazism posed. German Lutherans did not 
“lose” their ethnic identities during the mid-twentieth century, nor did they completely 
assimilate into mainstream Canadian and American society. This dissertation contends 
that German Lutherans created a hybrid ethnic identity that attempted to reconcile their 
German heritage with their nationality and religion. They crafted an ethnicity that 
acknowledged both their German roots as well as their new status as citizens of Canada 
and the United States. While German Lutherans closely identified with their ethnicity and 
faith privately within their communities and churches, they found that appealing to 
broader racial and religious identities as white Protestants and Christians helped them to 
mitigate the discrimination they faced in the public sphere. By performing this careful 
balancing act, German Lutherans were able to maintain a distinct ethnic identity during a 
period that stressed Anglo-Canadian and American conformity.  
 
Debating Assimilation, Hybridity, and the German Ethnic Identity 
 
 This dissertation is not the first historical study to examine the extent to which 
German immigrants in North America maintained a distinct ethnic identity. The search 
for a German ethnic identity sits at the crux of the literature on German immigrants in 
Canada and the United States. The majority of historians who have examined the 
experiences of German immigrants in North America generally conclude that they 
assimilated into mainstream Canadian and American society during the twentieth century. 
It would be repetitive to describe in detail every historical study that makes this argument, 
but it is important to recognize the pervasive nature of this interpretation of German-
 4 
Canadian and German-American history.5 Historian Angelika Sauer remarked upon this 
interpretation in 1998, arguing that previous German-Canadian scholars imposed a “very 
specific yardstick against which to measure” the assimilation of German immigrants. This 
tendency to emphasize German assimilation, she argued, dominated the literature to such 
an extent that it appeared as though historians seemed motivated exclusively by their 
search for the “Ideal German” immigrant that always fell short of their expectations.6 
Historians often found that German immigrants had little attachment to their homeland in 
Germany; they rarely promoted the German language among their children; they were 
largely invisible when compared with other North American ethnic groups.7 By 
measuring German immigrants against the broader pattern of ethnicity in twentieth-
century North America, historians concluded that German immigrants abandoned their 
former ethnic identities and embraced assimilation into mainstream culture. 
 The First World War featured prominently within the scholarly discussions of 
German immigrant assimilation. Historians focused disproportionately on mainstream 
hostility in Canada and the United States towards German immigrants. They argued that 
this hostility caused German immigrant groups to abandon their German ethic identity. 
                                                        
5 There are many case studies that explore communities of German immigrants at the city, state, or 
provincial level that make these claims from the 1970s to the 1990s. See Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of 
Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974); Peter 
Hessel, Destination: Ottawa Valley (Ottawa: Runge Press, 1984), 117,127-128; Brenda Lee-Whiting, 
Harvest of Stones: The German Settlement in Renfrew County (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1985), 258-261; David W. Detjen, The Germans in Missouri, 1900-1918: Prohibition, Neutrality, and 
Assimilation (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 184; Heinz Lehmann, The German 
Canadians, 1750-1937: Immigration, Settlement & Culture, trans. Gerhard P. Bassler (St. John’s, 
Newfoundland: Jesperson Press, 1986); Werner Bausenhart, German Immigration and Assimilation in 
Ontario, 1783-1918 (Toronto: Legas, 1989), 37.  Leslie V. Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity: The 
German Question in Chicago, 1914-1941 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990); Gerhard P. Bassler, The 
German Canadian Mosaic: Today and Yesterday: Identities, Roots and Heritage (Ottawa: German-
Canadian Congress, 1991); Arthur Grenke, The German Community in Winnipeg, 1872 to 1919 (New York: 
AMS Press, 1991). 
6 Angelika E. Sauer, “The ‘Ideal German Canadian’: Politics, Academics and the Historiographical 
Construction of German-Canadian Identity,” in A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities, 
ed. Angelika E. Sauer and Matthias Zimmer (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 227-233.  
7 Sauer, “The ‘Ideal German Canadian’,” 227-288.  
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Historians Leslie Tischauser and Frederick C. Luebke, for example, described the 
hardships that German Americans encountered during the Great War. They explain how 
Germans continued to speak their language at their clubs and churches, and kept German 
flags throughout cities with large German-immigrant populations.8 The entry of the 
United States into the war in 1917, however, transformed these earlier displays of ethnic 
identity into signs of their “disloyalty.”9 As a result, historians argued that the war 
resulted in the “disappearance” of the German language and culture in American life.10 
Canadian historians have echoed this narrative of cultural loss. The decision of Berlin, 
Ontario, to change its name to Kitchener, after the famous British military commander, in 
1916 is one of the most frequently cited examples of identity loss among German 
Canadians. Historians concluded that Berlin/Kitchener’s German identity “thus died” 
symbolically and practically after the name change.11 These historians also pointed to the 
closure of German ethnic clubs, the elimination of the German language press, and the 
public assaults on the German language as evidence for the disappearance of a German 
ethnic identity. According to these historians, German immigrants wanted to avoid 
discrimination in the future and therefore assimilated into Canadian and American 
society. According to Sauer, the historiography of 1970s to 1990s led to the “image of 
German Canadians as permanent victims.”12  
                                                        
8 Tischauser, The Burden of Ethnicity, 6, 17, 36-37; Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty, 157-159, 225. 
9 Tischauser, 39, 45-46. 
10 Luebke, 309-311, chapter ten more generally. 
11 John English and Kenneth McLaughlin, Kitchener: An Illustrated History (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1983), 110-117, 130. 
12 Sauer, 232. Although less prominent than in previous decades, historians still occasionally portray the 
two world wars as destructive, despite several calls within the field to move away from the singular 
importance placed on the wars. See for example LaVern J. Rippley, “Wisconsin German-Americans and 
World War I: Wisconsin ‘The German-American Homefront’,” Yearbook of German-American Studies 50 
(2015): 129-150; Gregory Kupsky, “‘We, Too, Are Still Here’: German Americans in St. Louis, 1905-
1941,” Missouri Historical Review 103, no. 4 (2009).  
 6 
 The victimization thesis Sauer identified remains resilient within the 
historiography, despite recent advancements in the field that no longer focus 
disproportionately on the world wars.13 By the early 2000s, historians focused less on the 
wars and instead explored the social and cultural lives of German immigrants by using 
oral histories, transnationalism, and whiteness studies.14 This emphasis shifted the 
literature towards discussions of immigrant agency and away from identity loss. When 
historians did discuss German ethnic identity, however, they remained focused on an 
immigrant group that lost its distinct identity. Historian Russell Kazal argued that German 
Americans in Philadelphia articulated a white racial identity during the interwar years in 
place of a German ethnic identity. His work highlights the informal alliances that formed 
between German and Irish Americans to “protect” their neighbourhoods from black 
newcomers purchasing or renting homes near theirs. In doing so, Germans responded to 
these new arrivals by moving to other parts of the city, thereby dissolving their ethnically-
                                                        
13 Several scholars should receive credit for revising the previous emphasis on the wars. See Matthew D. 
Tippens, Turning Germans into Texans: World War I and the Assimilation and Survival of German Culture 
in Texas, 1900-1930 (Austin: Kleingarten Press, 2010); Barbara Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity: 
Listening to German North America, 1850-1914 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010); Petra 
DeWitt, Degrees of Allegiance: Harassment and Loyalty in Missouri’s German-American Community 
during World War I (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). Lorenzkowski’s arguments, in particular, are 
expanded upon in Benjamin Bryce, “Linguistic Ideology and State Power: German and English Education 
in Ontario, 1880-1912,” The Canadian Historical Review 94, no. 2 (2013): 207; Mario Nathan Coschi, “‘Be 
British or be d-d’: Primary Education in Berlin-Kitchener, Ontario, during the First World War,” Histoire 
sociale/Social History 47, no. 94 (2014): 330-332. 
14 The edited collection A Chorus of Different Voices did a great deal in shifting the literature towards an 
exploration of German immigrants rooted in their social experiences. See the various essays in Angelika E. 
Sauer and Matthias Zimmer eds., A Chorus of Different Voices: German-Canadian Identities (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1998). For other studies more concerned with social experience of ethnic identity 
retention see, Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Alexander Freund, “Troubling Memories in Nation-building: 
World War II Memories and Germans’ Inter-ethnic Encounters in Canada after 1945,” Histoire 
sociale/Social History 77 (2006): 129-155; Hans Werner, Imagined Homes: Soviet German Immigrants in 
Two Cities (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2007); Pascal Maeder, Forging a New Heimat: 
Expellees in Post-War West Germany and Canada (Göttigen: V&R unipress, 2011); Alexander Freund ed., 
Beyond the Nation?: Immigrants’ Local Lives in Transnational Cultures (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2012). 
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homogenous neighbourhoods.15 Kazal described how German newspapers and 
organizations decried these losses and legitimized their entitlement to these areas as 
“white” or “old stock” Americans. Germans joined a broader community of “white 
Americans” instead of reverting back to their traditional ethnic ties.16 Historian Pascal 
Maeder argued that German refugees and displaced persons gradually lost their German 
ethnic identities after the Second World War. Maeder examined how postwar associations 
with Nazism deterred German immigrants from actively maintaining a German identity. 
Instead, they “adopted a Eurocentric immigrant identity” with other European immigrants 
on the basis of their shared status as displaced persons.17 Historian Hans Werner 
described a similar scenario in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Postwar German immigrants in 
Winnipeg benefitted from Canada’s “history of accommodating itself to a diversity of 
ethnic groups” and eventually “came to feel at home” as “Canadians.”18 Although 
historians on both sides of the border do not focus on the “destructive” nature of the 
world wars as their predecessors did, the emphasis on assimilation continues to perpetuate 
the notion that German immigrants assimilated or lost their ethnic identities throughout 
the twentieth century. These scholars do not demonstrate how adopting new “old stock” 
or “displaced person” identities reshaped their German ethnicities. Although they succeed 
in demonstrating that German immigrants adopted these new identities, they do not 
demonstrate that these identities completely eclipsed their old German ethnic identities.. 
 Historians of German immigrants are also some of the staunchest advocates for a 
history of immigration that focuses on assimilation. Although assimilation has fallen out 
                                                        
15 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 248-250; 223-226. 
16 Kazal, Becoming Old Stock, 3, 6. 
17 Maeder, Forging a New Heimat, 220-222, 232. 
18 Hans Werner, Imagined Homes, 223-227 
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of favour among immigration and ethnic scholars since the 1980s, historians of German 
immigrants continue to argue for the importance of assimilation in North American life. 
In 1995, Kazal defined assimilation as: 
processes that result in greater homogeneity within a society…They may operate within different 
arenas, with groups, for example, drawn together in terms of culture, or intermarriage, or shared 
political institutions, or shared elements of identity, such as class consciousness. And they may 
operate to varying degrees within and across different arenas…I find it most useful to define 
assimilation in the immigrant context as referring to processes that generate homogeneity beyond the 
ethnic-group level. Such processes bring different immigrant ethnic groups, or their members, 
together in any number of arenas, creating common ground among them, or between them and a 
socially dominant group. Thus understanding assimilation requires understanding how ethnic groups 
relate to one another within the larger society.19 
 
Unlike the social historians of the 1980s and 1990s that focused on closely-knit 
immigrant groups preserving their language and identities, Kazal believed assimilation 
still offered a valuable framework through which to understand immigrant life in the 
United States. He argued that social historians too often “neglect, deny, or minimize 
assimilation’s role in eroding” ethnic identities.20 Historians of German immigrants in 
Canada have since echoed Kazal’s assertion to renew the emphasis on assimilation in 
their work. In the Canadian context, Werner argued that while the notion of a culturally-
constructed ethnic identity helps explain the attitudes of third and later generation 
immigrations, “the concept of assimilation still offers explanatory power for first-
generation immigrant behaviour.”21 Thus, the idea of the “assimilated German 
immigrant” remains a powerful narrative within the current literature.  
 This dissertation rejects the assimilation model in favour of a definition of 
ethnicity that is flexible and constantly changing. I demonstrate that adopting new 
                                                        
19 Russell A. Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American 
Ethnic History,” American Historical Review 100, no. 2 (1995): 438-439. 
20 Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation,” 437. 
21 Werner, 9-10. Werner defines “integration” somewhat more liberally, stating that integration includes 
“adjustments made by both the host society and an immigrant group that reduce the tensions of difference 
to make these tensions no longer distinguishable from other processes of social and cultural change in that 
society.” 
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identities as “old stock” or “Canadian” identities reshaped German ethnicities, rather than 
erasing them. Sociologist Milton Gordon defined an ethnic group as “a group with a 
shared feeling of peoplehood.”22 While perfunctory, this simple definition masks the 
complex processes that shape and mold ethnic identities. In an influential 1992 article, 
Kathleen Neils Conzen and others argued against “ethnicity as primordial (ancient, 
unchanging, inherent in a group’s blood, soul, or misty past).” They argued instead that 
ethnicity functions as “a process of construction or invention” that could change and 
adapt over time. Although rooted in lived experience, ethnicity is “reinvented in response 
to changing realities both within the group and the host society.”23 This framework 
acknowledges that ethnic identities occasionally weaken, but can later recover and 
become more pronounced as social and cultural contexts change.24 The definition of 
ethnicity as a mutable identity in flux provides this study’s methodological foundation. 
 Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski’s scholarship on German-Canadian and German-
American identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries builds on the idea of 
an “invented” or “performed” ethnic identity. By examining German communities in 
Waterloo County, Ontario, and Buffalo, New York, Lorenzkowski reveals the “invented” 
nature of her subjects’ ethnic identities by employing the concept of hybridity. She often 
describes her subjects with a hyphenated “German-Canadian” or “German-American” 
label. In contrast to other historians, however, she does not use the hyphen as an indicator 
of loss or a compromised ethnic identity. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s observation that 
hybrid cultures “must learn to inhabit at least two identities, to speak two cultural 
                                                        
22 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins 
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1964), 24. 
23 Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, 
“The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic History 12, no. 1 
(1992): 3-5. 
24 Conzen et. al., “The Invention of Ethnicity,” 5. 
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languages, to translate and negotiate between them,” Lorenzkowski suggests that the 
hyphen denotes “a space of cultural interaction” between German immigrants and their 
host society that produced a new hybrid identity. This hybrid or hyphenated identity 
reflected both their ethnic and national identities.25 Lorenzkowski applies this framework 
most clearly to her discussion of the German language. She describes how German 
immigrants in late nineteenth century Waterloo County and Buffalo spoke a “local 
German” dialect that combined English phrases and syntax with the German language.26 
While previous historians viewed the lack of “pure” German as a sign of assimilation, 
Lorenzkowski argued that hybridity better encapsulates how German immigrants 
perceived their linguistic abilities as a valid compromise that recognized their ethnic 
heritage and North American circumstances. In this sense, Lorenzkowski’s hybrid 
German-Canadian and German-American communities align with what Homi K. Bhabha 
calls “partial culture” or “culture’s in-between,” wherein the “connective tissue between 
cultures…[is] bafflingly both alike and different.”27 This study builds on Lorenzkowski’s 
analysis of hybrid identities in German immigrant communities, albeit later in the 
twentieth century. Against the backdrop of another world war, the Cold War consensus, 
and an American and Canadian nationalism that stressed Anglo-conformity, German 
Lutherans had to craft an “in-between culture.” This dissertation examines the process 
whereby German Lutherans constructed a hybrid ethnic identity during a time when 
identifying as both “German” and “Canadian” or “American” seemed incompatible. 
                                                        
25 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 214. Lorenzkowski quotes Hall in Sounds of Ethnicity, 42. 
26 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 44-47, 77.  
27 Homi K. Bhabha, “Culture’s In-Between,” in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Pauldu 
Gay (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 54. 
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 In order to better understand how German Lutherans constructed a hybrid identity 
in the mid-twentieth century, I look at Lutheran churches as an “ethnic boundary zone.” 
In his influential 1969 essay, anthropologist Fredrik Barth described how ethnic groups 
maintained distinct identities by constructing “boundaries” in which to separate 
themselves from mainstream society and practice their unique culture. Ethnic groups, he 
argued, should be recognized by “a membership which defines itself, and is identified by 
others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other(s).”28 Lutheran churches 
functioned as important ethnic boundaries where German immigrants defined both their 
ethnicity and faith. Physical markers as well as cultural practices demarcated the church 
as an ethnic boundary, both in the eyes of German Lutherans as well as Anglo-Canadians 
and Americans. For the first half of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches in Missouri 
and Ontario generally consisted of German immigrants and their descendants. These 
“immigrant churches” bore several markers of difference that distinguished them from 
their Anglo-Canadian and American neighbors. Most churches had German-language 
signs displayed in their yard, and Lutheran pastors routinely preached in German.29 
Examining Lutheran congregations as an ethnic boundary creates the possibility of 
locating the voices and perspectives of German immigrants. As historians Royden 
Loewen and Gerald Friesen suggest, looking at ethnic boundaries “probes [the immigrant] 
imagination, seeks to understand their vocabularies, retells their stories. And it subverts 
the notion of hapless victim of assimilation.”30 In this sense, examining ethnic boundaries 
                                                        
28 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 11. 
29 On Lutheran churches as immigrant churches, see Carol K. Coburn, Life At Four Corners: Religion, 
Gender, and Education in a German Lutheran Community, 1868-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas Press, 1992).  
30 Royden Loewen and Gerald Friesen, Immigrants in Prairie Cities: Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth-Century 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 4. 
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are vitally important for the history of German immigrants who have thus far been 
characterized as assimilated. For many immigrant communities, places of worship 
“provided the immigrants not only with a focal point of social interaction, but a world 
view, a cosmology that explained the costly migration, a belief system that ordered their 
worlds.”31 Churches operated as sites where German Lutherans gave meaning to their 
lives in North America, and their records provide a way in which to understand how they 
constructed a hybrid ethnicity in the company of their fellow coreligionists and ethnic 
community. 
 By placing the Lutheran church and its institutions at the center of this study, the 
voices and perspectives of Lutheran pastors appear most frequently. For German 
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, pastors operated as religious, ethnic, and 
community leaders.32 My focus on pastors as “ethnic elites” or “ethnic brokers” follows 
the methodological approach of other Canadian immigrant historians who have 
increasingly returned to the study of so-called immigrant leaders. Historians Lisa Rose 
Mar and Aya Fujiwara both argue for the importance of studying ethnic elites as a way to 
examine immigrant history from “the middle, from neither top-down nor a bottom-up 
perspective.”33 Examining history from “the middle” allows historians to examine “the 
constant interplay between mainstream and ethnic communities.”34 By looking 
specifically at Chinese-Canadian elites who “brokered” labour contracts between poor 
Chinese workers and Anglo-Canadian businessmen, Mar suggested that “a new view of 
                                                        
31 Loewen and Friesen, Immigrants in Prairie Cities, 13. 
32 This was common in many immigrant communities, but particularly true of German Lutherans. See 
Coburn, Life At Four Corners, 5. 
33 Lisa Rose Mar, Brokering Belonging: Chinese in Canada’s Exclusion Era, 1885-1945 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 4. 
34 Aya Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 5. 
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the boundaries between the Chinese and Anglo worlds and the political interactions 
between them” emerges.35 I employ the term “ethnic broker” to refer to German Lutheran 
pastors who acted as cultural intermediaries between their ethnic followers and Anglo-
dominated host society. As Fujiwara notes, “ethnic elites were groups of people who 
discovered their role as intermediaries between Canadians and their ethnic people.” These 
elites “knew about the histories, politics, and languages of both Canada and their 
respective homelands” and used their influence so to help their followers “maintain their 
in-between identity and comfortably live in Canada.”36 Born primarily between 1880 and 
1910, the German Lutherans in this study consisted of a mix of individuals born in 
Germany who later migrated to North America, as well those born in Canada and the 
United States whose parents or grandparents migrated during the mid-nineteenth 
century.37 This generation of Lutheran pastors not only acted as spiritual leaders in their 
communities, but also emerged as ethnic elites that tried to reconcile their immigrant 
status with their Canadian and American realities. 
 My usage of Lutheran churches as an ethnic boundary and Lutheran pastors as 
ethnic brokers unfortunately replicates some of the power structures of these institutions 
throughout this work. Lutheran archival records tend to favour the voices of pastors and 
all-male church councils at the expense of Lutheran laypeople and women. I am 
conscious of historian Mary Todd’s assertion that it is both “remarkable and tragic” that 
Lutheran women appear so infrequently in historical studies. This has wrongly 
perpetuated the assumption that “women’s roles have been marginal at best” within the 
                                                        
35 Mar, Brokering Belonging, 4. 
36 Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity, 3, 5. 
37 Biographical entries at the Laurier Archives and Concordia Historical Institute are particularly useful in 
establishing the genealogies of prominent individuals examined in this study. 
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church.38 Yet, this study hopes to show that Lutheran women are not as unrepresented in 
the archive as is often assumed. I have endeavored to highlight when the viewpoints of 
Lutheran women and laypeople diverged from those of their ethnic elites in an effort to 
create a more complete portrait of how German Lutherans discussed their ethnicity. I 
have therefore attempted to display the diversity of opinion within these German 
Lutheran communities, even if the voices of ethnic elites still dominate. 
 Moreover, the ethnic elites examined in this dissertation held beliefs that modern 
readers will both approve and disapprove of. The pastors profiled in this study often 
emerge as early advocates of a “multicultural” nation wherein linguistic and ethnic 
differences are not only tolerated, but also celebrated and encouraged by all North 
American citizens. A desire to be accepted by mainstream Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-
American society motivated ethnic elites to support pluralistic ideas of belonging and 
acceptance. Yet, many Lutheran pastors also supported the unequal status-quo facing 
North American women and racialized people. Male pastors maintained patriarchal 
gender norms within their congregations and often made sexist comments or assumptions 
about Lutheran women, and downplayed their essential contributions to the church. 
Certain pastors also openly supported Jim Crow segregation, disparaged black activists, 
or ignored the unequal living conditions of many of North America’s racialized 
communities. Rather than interpreting German Lutheran support for ethnic diversity and 
support for patriarchal and racist norms as contrary behaviour, this study interrogates 
these differences to demonstrate how these ideologies worked in concert. Celebrations of 
ethnic and religious diversity did not necessarily extend to an acceptance of racialized 
                                                        
38 Mary Todd, Authority Vested: A Story of Identity and Change in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 6. 
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others, and male ethnic elites predicated their authority on subservient and agreeable 
followers. These pastors were complex figures, and this dissertation aims to untangle and 
explain their seemingly contradictory behaviour. 
 This dissertation argues that this particular generation of German Lutherans 
crafted a different ethnic identity than the nineteenth century German “pioneers” and the 
post-1945 German displaced persons. This generation actively grappled with the hybrid 
identities highlighted by Lorenzkowski. I argue that they constructed an ethnic identity 
that sought to reconcile their competing ethnic, national, and religious identities 
throughout the mid-twentieth century. German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity in 
several ways. First, the German language remained an important marker of identity for 
many practicing Lutherans in this study. Language emerges as an important subject of 
discussion in this dissertation more broadly, as scholars in ethnic studies have affirmed 
that language consists of “societally linked human codes, as well as the attitudes, 
behaviors, functions, and usage conventions” that define a community. In particular, 
ethnic studies scholars pay attention not just to the standardization of immigrant 
languages, but also the “internal within-group evaluation of varieties” of syntax, word 
choice, and frequency of use. Through observing how and when immigrants speak their 
native language, scholars can gain better insight into how immigrants dialogued with their 
ethnicity.39 In this sense, I examine the pastors that preached sermons in both English and 
German, and the congregants that maintained a strong belief in conducting important 
worship services and celebrating holidays in the German language. Lutherans placed a 
particularly high importance on speaking German at church, as they believed that in order 
                                                        
39 Joshua A. Fishman, “Sociolinguistics: Language and Ethnic Identity in Context,” in Handbook of 
Language & Ethnic Identity, ed. Joshua A. Fishman and Ofelia Garcia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), xxiii-xxiv. 
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to truly practice Martin Luther’s teachings, they needed to speak, write, and read, 
religious writings in the same language Luther used. Situated in a North American 
context, speaking German developed an ethnic importance as community elites used it as 
a way to retain markers of ethnic difference. While speaking German may have lost its 
practical conversational usage in the public sphere by the early twentieth century, 
Lutherans continued to speak German as an integral component of their religious lives.40 
 Moreover, Lutheran churches provided German Lutherans with a private space to 
voice their ethnic sympathies with Germans in Europe outside of the purview of the state 
and Canadian and American society. They expressed their ethnicity by resisting Canadian 
and American attempts to vilify the German people, both during and after the Second 
World War. Within their churches German Lutherans could articulate their fears 
surrounding the Second World War and lament the hardships postwar German refugees 
faced without being labeled as Nazi sympathizers. They also resisted Canadian and 
American nationalisms that often alienated them as a result of national emphases on 
Anglo-pioneers, British traditions, or “American” founders that rarely recognized North 
America’s immigrant populations. By the mid-twentieth century, German Lutherans in St. 
Louis and Waterloo County tried to expand these cultural narratives by incorporating 
their experiences as immigrants into the pre-existing national mythologies. Their 
expressions of ethnicity were not rooted in political connections to the “homeland,” as 
with other North American ethnic groups.41 Ultimately, they constructed a hybrid 
                                                        
40 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 213-216. 
41 Connections to the “homeland” remain an important theme in ethnic histories and are often used by 
historians to show how immigrants practiced their ethnic identities after migrating. See for instance, 
Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of 
Memory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Frances Swyripa, Storied Landscapes: Ethno-
Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010), chapter 5; 
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ethnicity rooted in flexibility. It allowed members of the community to be openly 
“German” at church, but to argue for their status as “Canadian” or “American” when in 
contact with government officials or nativists in times of uncertainty. Thus, German 
Lutherans sought to construct an ethnicity that gave voice to their unique experiences as 
immigrants as well as recognizing their “new” homes in Canada and the United States. Its 
flexibility helped German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County create a single 
hybrid identity out of their varied ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds.  
 In suggesting that German Lutherans maintained distinct ethnic identities, this 
study is not implying that these immigrant communities did not also identify as 
Canadians and Americans. However, identifying with national labels defined by 
citizenship does not mean German Lutherans assimilated or stopped practicing their 
ethnic identities. As Lorenzkowski reminds us, German immigrants have a history of 
wearing their ethnicity or nationality “as a mantle to don when it fit the occasion.”42 Nor 
does this dissertation suggest that German Lutherans practiced the same ethnic identities 
as the German immigrants of the mid-to-late nineteenth century. It is not advocating for a 
long unbroken pattern of ethnic identity and behaviour. Instead, it suggests that a sense of 
being German remained important to Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, even 
when their ethnicity acted as a barrier that separated them from mainstream North 
American society. Moreover, this study does not explore how German-Canadian and 
German-American Lutherans maintained their ethnicities through cultural and symbolic 
expressions, such as food, dress, parades, and other manifestations of “folk” or “festive” 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Aya Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 132-139. 
42 Lorenzkowski, Sounds of Ethnicity, 215. 
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culture.43 It is not overly concerned with how ethnicity manifested via the home, clubs, or 
labour, as many of these themes have been addressed elsewhere.44 Instead, it looks at the 
ways in which ethnicity informed how German Lutherans responded to issues such as 
wartime discrimination, immigration policy, Lutheran theology, and other debates of both 
national and local importance. In this sense, I follow Royden Loewen’s footsteps in an 
attempt to understand how immigrants understood their ethnicity “not of a statically 
conceived way of life…but rather a constantly renewed experience that was recreated 
every day and every year.”45 By looking at these prominent debates in St. Louis and 
Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities, it sheds light on how these groups 
made sense of their ethnic identities and the resulting “cultures they created.”46 My goal 
is to highlight how ethnicity continued to inform the worldview and perspectives of 
German Lutherans living in St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
 
Transnational Histories of St. Louis and Waterloo County 
 
 North American historians of ethnicity and immigration have frequently employed 
a transnational approach in their scholarship. Although “transnationalism” has several, 
                                                        
43 See for example Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Ethnicity as Festive Culture: German-America on Parade,” in 
The Invention of Ethnicity, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); April R. 
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Accommodation and Community in a Frontier City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Linda 
Schelbitzki Pickle, Rural German-Speaking Women and Their Families in the Nineteenth-Century Midwest 
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Canadian Ethnic Studies 41-42, no. 3/1 (2009-2010): 1-26. 
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Rural Disjuncture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 9. 
46 Kathleen Neils Conzen, “Making Their Own America: Assimilation Theory and the German Peasant 
Pioneer,” German Historical Institute Annual Lecture Series 3 (1990): 7. 
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occasionally competing, definitions, migration historians Benjamin Bryce and Alexander 
Freund define transnational approaches as examining “the flow and circulation of people, 
ideas, and objects within a region that is not contained by national boundaries and 
national historiographies.”47 A transnational approach better reflects how their subjects, 
primarily immigrants and their descendants, maintained global ties and connections that 
expanded beyond national borders.48 Transnationalism remains a useful framework for 
this reason, and holds particular promise for the study of German immigrants. Because 
the literature on German immigrants continues to stress assimilation and the formation of 
national identities, a comparative approach allows me to examine whether Canadians and 
Americans of German heritage continued to interact with one another on the basis of their 
ethnicity across the forty-ninth parallel.49   
 Comparative studies are most effective when symmetry exists between the two 
points of comparison.50 To this end, I focus specifically on German Lutherans in 
Waterloo County, Ontario, and St. Louis, Missouri. Both immigrant communities trace 
                                                        
47 Benjamin Bryce and Alexander Feund ed., Entangling Migration History: Borderlands and 
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their origins back to philanthropic groups in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Pennsylvania. The German Company and the Deutsche Ansiedlungs-Gesellschaft each 
sponsored German immigration and purchased lands in what became known as Waterloo 
County and St. Louis respectively.51 These small German settlements later expanded 
significantly in the 1830s and 1840s, as Lutherans fled religious persecution in the 
various German states and made new homes in North America. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, both Waterloo County and St. Louis had reputations as German settlements and 
the two communities continued to grow as a result of family and chain migration. They 
developed cultural institutions such as German-language newspapers and clubs that 
articulated and enhanced their reputation as centers of German culture.52 By the early to 
mid-twentieth century, Germans constituted the largest ethnic group in both St. Louis and 
Waterloo County. Germans composed nearly twelve percent of Missouri’s population, 
and twenty percent of all St. Louis residents identified as either first or second-generation 
German immigrants. Kitchener established itself as the German capital of both Ontario 
and Waterloo County, with almost half of its residents claiming German ancestry by the 
Second World War.53 Their reputations as German cultural centers continued to attract 
German immigrants to settle in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the postwar 
period.54 
 St. Louis and Waterloo County also emerged as important centers for Lutheranism 
in the American Midwest and central Canada. Both communities acted as the official 
headquarters of a major Lutheran synod. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
                                                        
51 English and McLaughlin, Kitchener, 1-8; DeWitt, 10. 
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headquartered in St. Louis, was founded in 1847 due to the efforts of C.F.W. Walther, a 
“Saxon Lutheran” immigrant who arrived in St. Louis in the 1830s. Walther cooperated 
with other Lutherans in the Midwest to establish conservative Lutherans into a single 
organizing body, or “synod.” As its first president, Walther opened a “log cabin” school 
that later became the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis.55 Likewise, the Canada Synod 
made its headquarters in Waterloo County as a result of the high concentration of 
Lutherans in the area in 1925. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, established in 1911, was 
the first of its kind in Canada and trained the majority of the Canada Synod’s pastors. The 
important roles these two seminaries played in developing North American Lutheranism 
ensured that many Lutherans had some connection with St. Louis and Waterloo County 
even if they were not born and raised in the cities.56  
 The German Lutheran populations of St. Louis and Waterloo County both 
experienced periods of anti-German discrimination during the First World War. Shortly 
after the war began in 1914, nativists in each community attacked public displays of 
German heritage in the cities. Under the guise of patriotism, civic leaders in St. Louis 
embarked on a campaign to  “make St. Louis 100 percent American.” These leaders 
renamed various German-language streets and buildings with more suitable Anglo-
American ones.57 The process of eliminating such obvious markers of ethnicity also 
occurred in Waterloo County. In 1916 the city of “Berlin” voted to rename the city 
“Kitchener” in order to demonstrate their loyalty to Canada. German Canadians who 
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opposed the patriotic name change had their homes vandalized by members of the local 
militia and other nativists.58  
 Incidents of violence occurred in St. Louis and Waterloo County throughout the 
First World War. Shortly after 1914, members of the local militia in Waterloo County 
toppled a small statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I and threw it into the nearby lake. The police 
recovered the bust and placed it in the Concordia Club, one of Waterloo County’s largest 
German ethnic associations. In 1916, however, another group of soldiers broke into the 
building and stole the statue once again. Soldiers ransacked the Concordia Club and 
burned its contents in an open fire in the street. Military officials did not publicly blame 
the soldiers for their vandalism. Instead, they accused local German residents of inciting 
the soldiers’ anger.59 Although German-Americans avoided such acts of discrimination 
early in the war thanks to American neutrality, they too experienced harassment once the 
United States formally entered the war in 1917. Local police in St. Louis acted with force 
against German-American clubs that they suspected acted as meeting grounds for enemy 
activity. Police raided prominent German ethnic clubs and investigated the loyalty of club 
leaders.60 
 Strong anti-German sentiment in Canada and the United States often manifested 
in religious forms. German immigrants saw clear links between their ethnicity and faith, 
and Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans did as well. Even though Lutheranism in 
North America did not share political connections with Germany, anti-German “patriots” 
rarely made this distinction. They singled Lutherans out in particular because their 
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religious texts were recorded in German and the majority of Lutheran churches offered 
their services in German. They saw Lutheran churches as threatening places of 
subterfuge. Since Lutheran pastors preached in German to people of German ancestry, the 
general public feared that pastors encouraged their congregants to carry out acts of 
sabotage against the war effort by hiding pro-German messages within their sermons.61 
The German ethnicity of St. Louis and Waterloo County residents placed their loyalties in 
doubt; their Lutheran faith exacerbated such concerns. 
Although the war threatened the use of the German language in both communities, 
efforts to completely eliminate it failed at both the congregational and state/provincial 
level. In 1919, Missouri was one of many American states to attempt to ban German 
language education in public, private, and parochial schools. Theodore Graebner, a 
professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, responded by joining a coalition of other 
German-American leaders to lobby Missouri’s state committee on education to allow 
religious instruction in German. Graebner and his colleagues succeeded and the bill was 
defeated. As a result, Missouri did not follow the example of other states where German 
instruction was banned in public and private schools following the war.62 Waterloo 
County’s German language programs also recovered from the war. By the 1930s, several 
ethnic clubs sponsored a German school in Kitchener where young people could continue 
to learn the German language.63   
Despite the resilience of these German-speaking communities, historians continue 
to cite the increased use of English among German immigrants as an example of their 
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assimilation during and after the First World War. The number of German services 
conducted within the Missouri Synod as a whole dropped from sixty-two percent prior to 
the First World War to forty-six percent in 1926.64 While a noticeable decrease, these 
statistics imply that almost half of the Missouri Synod still used German regularly. This 
hardly suggests the destruction or elimination of a German language and identity as a 
result of the war. Pastors in particular played a key role in encouraging their congregants 
to continue speaking German.65 Perhaps more significantly, the Sunday schools at these 
churches also offered their services in German, providing congregants an opportunity for 
their children to speak and learn the German language. Moreover, radio stations 
sponsored by the Missouri and Canada Synod broadcasted German language sermons and 
programs in St. Louis and Waterloo County well into the 1930s.66 While the First World 
War left its mark on these German communities, Lutheran churches were still preserved 
as German institutions that reinforced their pre-war ethnic identities.  
Although separated by the Canadian-American border, the German Lutheran 
communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County experienced similar political, social, and 
cultural conditions that make them worthy of comparison. Each community formed as a 
part of the migration from Protestant religious groups fleeing the German states to new 
ethnic and religious enclaves in North America. They faced similar levels of 
discrimination during the First World War on the basis of their ethnicity, and proved 
determined to recover from these losses during the interwar years.  
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Lutheranism as a “Lived Religion” 
 
 This dissertation draws upon a “lived religion” framework in order to recognize 
the ways Lutheranism constituted an important component of the German-Canadian and 
German-American ethnic identity by the mid-twentieth century.67 Scholars of “lived 
religion” eschew a religious history that focuses exclusively on high-ranking church 
leaders and theological developments in favour of focusing more on how religion 
informed the daily lives and lived experiences of religious people. They maintain that 
religion has historically shaped people and their discourses not only inside places of 
worship, but also in in social, cultural, and political spheres.68 The lived religion model 
builds on anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s understanding of religion as source for groups 
and individuals to gain “conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations between 
them.” Geertz argues that “religious concepts spread beyond their specifically 
metaphysical contexts to provide a framework of general ideas.”69 It is therefore 
important to have a close understanding of Lutheran theology, as it inevitably shaped the 
social and cultural experiences of its practitioners outside the explicit confines of the 
church. 
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 Lutherans are Christian Protestants that trace their origins back to Martin Luther 
and the Reformation in 1517. Luther advocated for reforms of the Christian church in the 
16th century that remain essential components of twentieth century Lutheranism. First, the 
concept of “justification by grace alone” was and continues to be a distinguishing marker 
of Lutheranism. Luther believed God offers humanity salvation freely through faith. This 
concept stands in contrast to Catholic or Anabaptist faiths, which teach that salvation can 
be achieved through performing good deeds and acts.70 Lutherans also place great 
emphasis on “Word and Sacrament,” essentially a belief that God reveals himself to 
humankind through the Bible, baptism, and communion.71 Lutherans recognize the 
Augsburg Confession (1530) and the Book of Concord (1580) as their primary 
theological texts. While the interpretation of these core beliefs continues to be debated 
between conservative and liberal members of the North American Lutheran community, a 
shared agreement in the importance of these beliefs unites them under the “Lutheran” 
label.  
 This dissertation seeks to use the lived religion perspective in order to demonstrate 
how Lutheran theology often shaped how Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
constructed their ethnic identities. While many aspects of Lutheran theology played a role 
in shaping these communities, several specific components played a particular role in 
determining how German Lutherans negotiated their ethnicity. Luther’s concept of the 
“two kingdoms” or “Romans 13” was one of the most important theological tenants for 
Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Based on Christ’s teachings that Christians 
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should “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are 
God’s,” Luther believed that church and state should be kept separate. As Romans 13 
stated that “every soul be subject to the governing authorities,” Luther argued that God 
granted the church the right to rule over spiritual affairs while the state ruled over civil 
and legal affairs.72 Disagreements over how strictly Lutherans should enforce this 
theological belief became a key point of contention between pastors and their congregants 
in the mid-twentieth century. Discussions of Romans 13 and the separation of church and 
state appear frequently in this study, because German Lutherans often interpreted state 
intervention in religious affairs as a threat to their German ethnicity. The debate 
surrounding “unionism” or “unity” in the Missouri Synod is another instance of theology 
shaping ethnicity. Unionism became an effective shorthand in Missouri Synod circles to 
refer to the official merger or cooperation with other Lutheran bodies that did not practice 
the same conservative Lutheranism. The Missouri Synod believed that, unlike their liberal 
peers, they practiced a “true Lutheranism” that worshiped the inerrant Bible, a belief that 
the Bible was undisputedly God’s word. Cooperation (or “union”) with liberal Lutherans 
threatened to dilute their conservative doctrine. Throughout most of the twentieth century, 
synod leaders believed they could not unite with other Lutherans if they did not first 
achieve doctrinal unity. This emphasis on keeping “pure doctrine,” or Lehre, helped 
shape their German ethnicity. In order to ensure that their doctrine remained unaltered, 
theological works and sermons needed to be conducted in German, the same language 
used by Martin Luther. Speaking and writing in German proved the most effective way to 
ensure that theology was not diluted or altered through translation.73 This study focuses 
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on Lutheran theology as expressed through Romans 13, unionism, and Lehre in order to 
understand the relationship between ethnicity and faith. 
 The emphasis on lived religion holds particular promise for the study of North 
American Lutheranism. Few professional historians have examined the history of North 
American Lutheranism, especially when compared to the thriving historiographies of 
other ethnic and religious groups such as Irish Catholics or Mennonites.74 The standard 
works on North American Lutheranism were published mainly in the 1960s and 1970s in 
what historian Mark Granquist called the “golden age” of Lutheran history. These 
histories, often published by synod-sponsored publishing houses and written by men 
associated with the church, produced a teleological narrative of church growth and synod 
mergers. Historians have criticized the Missouri Synod, in particular, for its synod-
sanctioned histories that frame Lutheranism’s history as “celebratory” and “triumphalist.” 
As recently as 2000, historian Mary Todd commented that the Missouri Synod’s tendency 
to support a version of its past free of conflict or theological debate has created a vacuum 
wherein “no scholarly, holistic history of the Missouri Synod” exists.75 These histories 
focused largely on prominent Lutheran synods and institutions, and did little to reflect the 
social and cultural attitudes of Lutheranism’s practitioners.76 As many of these histories 
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were originally published to coincide with anniversaries and centennial events, they often 
took a celebratory and uncritical tone.77  
 Few scholars have challenged or revised these standards texts from the 1960s. In 
Canada, Lutheran history has been written by religious scholars who briefly contextualize 
the history of Lutheranism in Canada before moving onto an analysis of contemporary 
Lutheranism.78 In the United States, however, a small body of scholarship in the last 
fifteen years has started to examine the social and cultural histories of American 
Lutheranism that often critique their subjects. Mary Todd and James Burkee both criticize 
the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology and politics, thereby challenging the 
Missouri Synod’s oft-repeated claims that their theology is untouched by modern 
influences.79 In a biography of a Missouri Synod pastor, Kathryn Galchutt critiques the 
ambiguous or hostile responses of the Missouri Synod towards the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1960s.80 These works shift the historiography on the Missouri Synod 
away from whiggish celebrations of the synod’s past towards a more critical examination 
of its history. The few other works by professional historians that examine German 
Lutherans tend to do so alongside German Mennonites and Baptists. These historians 
inadvertently portray the religious identities and theological differences among their 
subjects as incidental to their German ethnicities, rather than demonstrating the central 
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connection between faith and ethnicity.81 This dissertation only examines the experiences 
of Lutherans in order to best capture the important links between ethnicity and faith, and 
recognizes that Germans of different faiths may have constructed different ethnic German 
identities than Lutherans. It represents one of the first social and cultural histories of 
Lutheranism in Canada and seeks to continue the revisionist efforts of American scholars 
of the Missouri Synod. 
 
The Importance of Whiteness 
 
 Race also shaped how German Lutherans constructed their ethnic identities in the 
mid-twentieth century. This dissertation is indebted to the field of “whiteness studies” 
that emerged as a result of the belief that, like ethnic identities, race is a social construct. 
As sociologist Vic Satzewich states, race “is not something that is, but rather something 
that is socially created, negotiated, and reproduced.”82 At its core, race does not reflect a 
biological or epistemological truth, but is rather a “social category into which people are 
sorted.”83  
 American historians in the 1990s began employing this approach in order to 
demonstrate “how diverse groups in the United States came to identify, and be identified 
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by others, as white – and what that has meant for the social order.”84 Pioneering works by 
David Roediger, Noel Ignatiev, and Matthew Frye Jacobson suggested that immigrant 
groups such as the Irish arrived in the nineteenth century as racialized others and 
gradually fought to become recognized as white.85 Other immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, meanwhile, migrated to the United States later in the nineteenth century 
and occupied an “in-between” or “not quite white” status in the American racial 
hierarchy.86 These immigrants, including Greeks, Italians, and Poles later found 
acceptance as “white” during the Second World War. Historians emphasize that a broad 
range of forces during the war coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North 
America viewed “World War II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.”87 Nazi 
Germany’s racism shook American faith in scientific racism and subsequently prompted 
Americans to view tolerance as a key component of their national identity.88 These “white 
ethnics” remained content to simply identify as “American” until the mid-1960s and early 
1970s. Jacobson argues that the Civil Rights Movement, alongside “the emergence of 
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multiculturalism,” created a “white ethnic revival” that caused Americans to once again 
identify with their ethnic heritage.89  
 Although often praised for forcing historians to recognize race as a social 
construction, these foundational texts have since been critiqued by other scholars who 
believe that transformation from ethnic to white identities “was a more complex process” 
than historians of whiteness might indicate.90 Thomas Guglielmo, for instance, has argued 
that Italian immigrants arrived in the United States as “securely white” and did not go 
through the ethnic-to-white process that the 1990s scholarship often assumed.91 Other 
critics suggest that historians like Ignatiev and Jacobson occasionally conflate American 
perceptions of the Irish constituting a distinct race with also being “nonwhite.” Just 
because the Irish faced hostility, does not necessarily mean Americans perceived them as 
racial outsiders.92 These critics do not dispute that American nativists discriminated 
against European immigrants. They are not, however, convinced that they faced 
discrimination on the basis of their race. Peter Kolchin and Eric Arnesen, for example, 
point out that whiteness studies generally neglect the role religion played in forming 
racial identities.93 As a result, historians examining ethnic groups like the Irish may 
conflate anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States with the assumption that the Irish 
were not white.94 
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 I address some of these concerns in this dissertation by paying particular attention 
to the way the ethnic and religious identities of German Lutherans interacted with broader 
ideas of race and whiteness. Although German Lutherans faced discrimination as a result 
of their ethnicity and religion, it does not mean that they were somehow “not white.” If 
the transformation from ethnic-to-white is more complicated than historians previously 
thought, then subsequent works on whiteness must consider whether “after World War II, 
did a white identity dominate or did the prevalence of national identities persist and, if so, 
for how long?”95 This study aims to answer this question by looking at how a German 
ethnic identity continued in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside their racial 
identities as white. The two identities co-existed, and they did not practice either “ethnic” 
or “racial” identities exclusively. German Lutherans actively maintained German ethnic 
and white racial identities simultaneously throughout the mid-twentieth century, even 
during the “ethnic reverie” of World War II and the 1950s and 1960s.96  
 The study of whiteness in Canada is underdeveloped relative to the large body of 
American scholarship.97 Historians James Walker and Constance Backhouse provide 
several explanations as to why this is the case. Walker suggests that Canadians perceive 
themselves as “tolerant of racial and cultural diversity” and believe they “possess a 
history of equal treatment towards all” in contrast to their American neighbours.98 
Backhouse agrees, suggesting that Canada’s proximity to the United States allows 
Canadians to portray themselves as “raceless” in contrast to the Black-white racial 
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animosity in the United States. This “ideology of racelessness,” is a part of the Canadian 
national mythology that has been unwittingly replicated within Canadian 
historiography.99 The limited scholarly discussion of whiteness in Canadian history has 
thus far focused on the nineteenth century.100 When Canadian historians discuss “race” in 
the twentieth century, they often refer to Canada’s indigenous, black, and asian 
populations rather than white Canadians. Race in the Canadian context, Backhouse 
argues, “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to marginalized 
groups.”101 However, the “whiteness” of Canadian nativists and politicians discussed in 
these studies has not yet faced the same level of scrutiny.102 In short, Canadian historians 
have yet to racialize white Canadians. Migration scholars occasionally make note that 
certain immigrant groups benefitted from their racial status as white, but such sentiments 
are generally applied as self-evident adjectives rather than as fully analyzed.103  
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 While whiteness and white supremacy had practical and tangible effects on the 
daily lives of North Americans through systems like segregation, this dissertation also 
examines how whiteness was expressed at an ideological and cultural level. Whiteness 
encompassed more than simply “a location of structural advantage, of race privilege.” As 
Ruth Frankenberg makes clear, whiteness is also “a ‘standpoint,’ a place from which 
white people look at ourselves, at others, and at society” as well as “a set of cultural 
practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed.”104 This last definition is particularly 
important, as German Lutherans in St Louis and especially Waterloo County rarely 
explicitly articulated a “white” racial identity. By the mid-twentieth century, whiteness 
achieved such a normative status that it rarely needed to be directly articulated.105 Daniel 
Coleman refers to this as the “paradox of white normativity,” wherein whiteness is 
paradoxically “so obvious that it remains unexamined” in literary and historical texts.106 
In his survey of Canadian literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Coleman 
locates several allegorical figures upon which Canadian authors relied to personify the 
Canadian nation. He notes that the “Loyalist” and “British Settler” are two of the most 
common symbols used in Canadian literature and culture. The arrival of the Loyalists in 
Ontario (then Upper Canada) after the American Revolution later functioned as the 
province’s foundational myth. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Loyalists occupied a place of cultural, historical, and literary prominence in Ontario that 
scholars have since referred to as the “Loyalist Tradition.” This tradition praised the 
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Loyalist “pioneers” for creating a society in Ontario that was devoted “to the British 
Crown and Empire,” alongside their “elite social origins, and a conservative social 
vision.”107 Coleman argues that through repeatedly using the image of the Loyalist, 
Anglo-Canadians “gradually reified the privileged, normative status of British whiteness 
in English Canada.”108 These narratives had a political purpose for their Anglo-Canadian 
authors. As the Loyalists and their descendants were not native to the land they occupied, 
stories of Loyalists and other settlers “pioneering” an “untamed wilderness” helped 
settlers feel entitled to land that actually belonged to the area’s indigenous peoples. By 
coding this process as a peaceful, nation-building, and a sign of progress, settlers could 
ignore their own history of violently displacing indigenous people.109  
 While this cultural analysis of the Loyalist Tradition through a racial lens may 
seem tangential, it illustrates the way in which whiteness often operated invisibly within 
the social and cultural lives of North Americans. The story of the Loyalists is an 
inherently white narrative, even if it never directly states so.110 This dissertation argues 
that German Lutherans in both St. Louis and Waterloo County engaged with national 
mythologies like the Loyalist Tradition as a result of their whiteness. A clear example of 
the inherent whiteness contained in settler stories is the so-called “pioneer myth” in 
Waterloo County. Labeled as such by historian Geoffrey Hayes, the “pioneer myth” 
emerged in Waterloo County in the early 1920s. Hayes describes how the pioneer myth 
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started as a result of the discrimination Waterloo County’s German population faced 
during the First World War and the wave of Canadian nationalism that the war produced. 
After the war concluded, Anglo-Canadians across the country erected monuments and 
memorials to honour soldiers who died during the war. These memorials portrayed fallen 
Canadian soldiers as heroic figures, who sacrificed their lives for a just Christian cause 
that helped establish Canada as a nation.111 German Canadians in Waterloo County could 
not participate in this process because their wartime experience was not categorized by 
unity and patriotism, but rather by ethnic tension and discrimination. Yet, local German 
Canadians could also no longer publicly celebrate the German traditions of “Berlin” 
without reliving the discrimination they endured during the war. German Canadians could 
no longer “be loyal to both Germany and Canada,” and therefore needed to craft a new 
public identity in which to help their community recover.112 
 The pioneer myth helped German Canadians accomplish this goal by creating a 
new origin story that focused on the community’s immigrant origins instead of its modern 
industrious German identity. William Breithaupt, a prominent German-Canadian 
businessman who opposed the Berlin name-change during the war, initiated a series of 
commemorative events during the late 1910s and 1920s that tried to integrate Waterloo 
County’s foundation within the broader narrative of Ontario’s history.  Breithaupt used 
the pre-existing mythology surrounding the Loyalists in Ontario to his own advantage. He 
sought to shift Waterloo County’s identity away from its strict German reputation by 
emphasizing the community’s own pioneers, just like other Ontario communities, through 
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novels, plays, and other commemorative acts.113 Breithaupt illustrated these themes most 
obviously with the erection of the Waterloo Pioneers Memorial Tower in 1926. He 
erected the large nineteen-meter high tower alongside the graveyard of Waterloo 
County’s first European settlers in order to commemorate their role in “settling” and 
“pioneering” the community. The many speeches at the tower’s unveiling sought to 
elevate Waterloo County’s original German settlers to the same important level as the 
Loyalists by similarly praising them as honest, thrifty, and for their ability to overcome 
the “the forces of nature.”114 While speakers compared their pioneers with the Loyalists, 
Breithaupt ensured that the audience never lost sight that these original pioneers consisted 
of German settlers. Breithaupt reminded listeners that their Germanic origins was no 
cause for concern, however, as these pioneers were peaceful agriculturalists absolutely 
loyal to Britain just like the other Loyalists.115 One speaker commented that “we often 
hear the expression ‘The builders of Canada,’ referring to the statesmen who laid the 
foundation of Government…but let us not forget the men and women who left their 
homes in other lands to come to Canada. They were just as truly entitled to the name 
‘builders of Canada.’”116 By situating Waterloo County’s history in the context of the 
Loyalists, Breithaupt hoped to normalize his community’s German origins within the 
broader culture of the province. Breithaupt advanced the “pioneer myth” so that German 
Canadians in Waterloo County could express a form of ethnic pride that English-
Canadian society found acceptable. Their ancestors may have been German, but they 
were also the “nation-building pioneers” that Anglo-Canada celebrated as well. 
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A similar pioneer myth existed in St. Louis, albeit with American terms 
substituted for the more Canadian-British “Loyalist” figure. In 1938-39, the Missouri 
Synod celebrated the centennial of the original German Lutheran settlers who traveled 
from Europe and settled in Perry County, located just outside St. Louis.117 The pending 
centennial prompted a flurry of retrospective “histories” produced by prominent pastors 
within the synod.118 These publications constructed a founding myth centered on the 
original generation of Saxon settlers and their religious leader, C.F.W. Walther. Although 
they recognized that the “entire background of the people was European, German, 
Saxon,” they often described the group as religious “pilgrims” to better liken their own 
origin story to that of the United States more broadly.119 When they discussed the 
Missouri Synod’s founding, synod leaders stressed the “democratic” origins of the Saxon 
immigrants. To one commenter, the Saxon immigrants embodied “the Missouri ‘show-
me’ spirit which they had imbibed” after living in the region for only a short time.120 Just 
like Waterloo County’s pioneer myth, the story of the Saxon Lutherans in St. Louis 
allowed the modern German Lutheran community to stress its immigrant character within 
an American or Missourian framework. 
 While stories about the Loyalists and other “nation builders” do “not overtly call 
for the subordination of people of colour,” they still convey a narrative “about the 
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triumph of the white races” in North America.121 These state-sanctioned narratives are 
“not politically neutral” and contain important racial implications, even if those who 
produced the narratives did not explicitly state so.122 If settler stories had the impact of 
normalizing the presence of white colonizers on indigenous lands, Breithaupt’s pioneer 
myth helped normalize the presence of German-speaking people in Waterloo County. 
Rather than an “other” feared during wartime, the pioneer myth helped explain the 
presence of German immigrants by using a language Anglo-Canadians clearly understood 
and accepted: pioneering and nation building. Even the very notion of the “pioneer” was 
coded as white, and typically male, in the early and mid-twentieth century. While German 
people could be “pioneers,” Anglo-Canadians often portrayed asian immigrants as 
temporary “sojourners” and not “settlers,” despite living in Canada for several 
generations.123 Thus, racialized immigrants could not access the same coded terms and 
mythologies available to German Canadians on account of their whiteness.  
 By examining the implicit racial implications of mythologies like the pioneer 
myth, this dissertation argues that whiteness played an integral role in allowing St. Louis 
and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities to maintain their German 
ethnicities in the mid-twentieth century. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran 
religion placed German Lutherans as outsiders due to their associations with Nazism and 
the enemy, whiteness provided a powerful social currency that allowed German 
Lutherans to appear as nonthreatening. Whiteness allowed German Lutherans to establish 
common cultural bonds with Anglo-Americans and Canadians by stressing their own 
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histories of settlement, pioneering, and civic duty that were unavailable to racialized 
peoples. Religion played an equally important role in this process. While Lutheranism’s 
German associations and theological peculiarities created distance between them and 
other North American Protestants, German Lutherans used a broad based “Christian” 
identity to advocate for their membership in Anglo-American and Canadian communities. 
This dissertation builds on previous critiques in the field of whiteness studies by looking 
at how ethnicity, race, and religion intersected and helped German Lutherans maintain 
their ethnic and religious traditions as a result of their race. It is not a study of how 
Germans “became” white, but rather how whiteness helped create the conditions for their 
ethnicity to survive and thrive. 
 
Organization and Format 
 
 This study begins just prior to the Second World War in 1939 and ends in the 
early 1970s. I have selected these dates for two reasons. First, previous histories of 
German immigrants generally frame their studies around either nineteenth century 
German immigrants or post-1945 German refugees, but rarely both.124 The pre-1945 
studies generally end in the 1930s under the assumption that the German ethnicities of 
their subjects had by that point faded. The post-1945 studies typically focus exclusively 
on the postwar immigrants without detailing their interaction with German immigrants 
from an earlier timeframe. Beginning this study in the mid-twentieth century allows a 
better exploration of how this particular generation of German Lutherans maintained their 
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ethnic identities beyond the Second World War and subsequently interacted with a new 
generation of immigrants. Second, this study ends in the 1970s primarily because of the 
cultural and religious changes that occurred in that decade. Historians generally 
conceptualize the 1970s as a period of “ethnic revival” in the United States and as period 
of official multiculturalism in Canada. The rise of both trends likely changed how 
German Lutherans discussed or “performed” their ethnic identities. For North American 
Lutheranism, the 1970s saw a rise in the ecumenical movement in the Canada Synod, and 
a return to conservative rather than moderate leadership in the Missouri Synod. This study 
does not end in the 1970s under the premise that the German ethnicity of its subjects has 
faded, but rather out of recognition that enough changes within St. Louis, Waterloo 
County, and Lutheranism occurred that its subjects probably began to conceptualize their 
German ethnicity in different ways. 
 This dissertation argues that this generation of German Lutherans maintained a 
German ethnic identity in seven main chapters. The first two chapters examine how 
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County responded to the rise of Nazism in 
Germany in the 1930s and negotiated their way through the Second World War. By using 
records produced by Lutheran congregations, chapter one argues that the Lutheran 
churches emerged as spaces of intense debate during the war where pastors, the church 
elite, laymen, and Lutheran women debated how to reconcile their German ethnicity 
during yet another war that associated their ethnicity with “the enemy.” Chapter two 
draws on the diaries and letters produced by Lutheran pastors to chart the numerous 
strategies ethnic elites employed to downplay their German ethnic identities in favour of a 
common Protestant and white identity that mainstream North American society deemed 
acceptable. Both chapters examine how congregants disagreed with their pastors and 
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remained steadfast in their belief that the church should continue functioning as an ethnic 
space or boundary. 
 Chapters three and four both examine how German Lutherans reengaged with 
their ethnicities following the war by showing a renewed interest in Germany. The 
devastating impact of six years of war left Germany in shambles, and German Lutherans 
in St. Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help their “fellow” Germans recover 
from the war. Chapter three examines the extensive relief campaigns initiated by the 
Missouri and Canada Synods to raise money, food, and clothing, for their German 
coreligionists across the seas, all while pastors lobbied the Canadian and American 
government to admit thousands of German displaced persons and refugees. Chapter four 
follows several ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods to West Germany on 
their “missionary” endeavors to provide relief to impoverished German Lutherans. These 
visits “home” provided an opportunity for German Lutherans to reengage with their 
ethnic identities as Germans after having to downplay them during the Second World 
War. Both chapters demonstrate that a German ethnic identity continued in these 
communities by examining their renewed interest in Germany as the birthplace of their 
heritage and faith, as well as their ongoing obligation to help those of the same ethnicity 
and religion overseas. 
 Chapter five and six examine how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County responded to the new waves of German and Lutheran displaced persons (DPs) 
and refugees following the war.  Chapter five in particular looks at how the German 
culture of Lutheran congregations and St. Louis and Waterloo County more broadly 
provided an inclusive atmosphere for German DPs to maintain their own ethnic identities. 
German DPs benefitted from the established German-English traditions in their 
 44 
congregations that still functioned as ethnic spaces. Although Anglo-Canadian and 
American segments of St. Louis and Waterloo County tried to assimilate these 
newcomers, the hybrid traditions that existed in both communities complicated their 
ability to integrate DPs. Chapter six looks at how Lutheran DPs from Latvia, Estonia, and 
Finland challenged the German traditions of Lutheran congregations by advocating for 
their own linguistic and ethnic traditions. Lastly, chapter seven examines several cultural 
and commemorative activities in the postwar decades where German Lutherans mediated 
their ethnic and religious identities to the Canadian and American public. Rather than 
showing signs of assimilation, these commemorative events once again highlighted the 
hybrid German-Canadian and German-American identities of St. Louis and Waterloo 
County. 
 These seven chapters revise and build upon two portions of American and 
Canadian historiography. First, this dissertation shifts the scholarship on twentieth 
century German ethnic identity away from an emphasis on assimilation. It challenges the 
contention that German immigrants in the twentieth century abandoned their ethnic 
identity or assimilated into mainstream North America. Ethnicity played an important role 
in determining how German Lutherans responded to questions of war, immigration, 
religion, and national belonging. Secondly, the ability of German Lutherans to maintain 
an ethnic identity during the mid-twentieth century should cause historians to think 
closely about the relationship between ethnicity and whiteness. For German Lutherans in 
St. Louis and Waterloo County, there was no “ethnic revival” in the 1970s, for they never 
ceased practicing a German ethnic identity. German Lutherans maintained their at times 
controversial ethnic identities as Germans precisely due to their racial status as whites. 
German Lutherans did not “become” white and shed their ethnic identities. The legacies 
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of white privilege and supremacy in North America ensured that their whiteness provided 
enough social and cultural currency to negotiate and maintain a German ethnic identity 
during a period of intense Anglo-Canadian and American conformity. In exploring this 
process, I urge historians to look more closely at how whiteness and ethnicity in the 
twentieth century reinforce, rather than replace, one another. 
 German Lutherans in North America faced many challenges throughout the 
twentieth century that threatened their ability to maintain German ethnic identities. Wars 
with Germany and associations with Nazism often placed German Lutherans at odds with 
their Canadian and American host societies. Yet, German Lutherans demonstrated 
remarkable flexibility in adapting to these crises. Historians, however, have not always 
shown the same flexibility in studying these German immigrants. Although they may not 
have continued the exact same ethnic and religious traditions of their nineteenth century 
forebears, German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis continued to practice 
their German ethnicities within the ethnic boundary of the Lutheran church. Their ability 
to appeal to a broad Protestant identity and their membership in the white race allowed 
them to navigate potential conflicts with their host societies and ensured that ethnicity 
remained a potent force in the lives of German Lutherans well into the 1970s.  
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Chapter 1: The Language of Loyalty: Lutheran Churches as Ethnic and Patriotic 
Spaces during the Second World War 
 As another world war approached, German-Canadian and German-American 
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County were once again concerned with how the 
public perceived their communities. Pastors and congregants of a certain age recalled 
memories of the First World War when “patriotic” Canadians and Americans targeted 
them as a result of their German ethnicity and similarities to “the enemy.” These 
memories sparked anxieties about another war with Germany generating discrimination 
that would target their communities and make them outsiders once again. By 1938, 
German Lutherans on both sides of the Canadian-American border had to prepare 
strategies to respond to waging another war with Germany. They had to convince the 
public that they were loyal to Canada and the United States or risk discrimination once 
more.   
 The onset of the Second World War provoked intense debates within Lutheran 
congregations on how Germans could reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national 
identities during a war that made these identities seemingly incompatible. Should the 
ethnic traditions of their church be sacrificed in order to appear “loyal” and “patriotic” to 
the Canadian and American publics? To what extent should the separation of church and 
state be temporarily blurred to demonstrate cooperation and loyalty during wartime? 
German Lutherans answered these questions differently depending on their gender and 
status within the church. Pastors and their church councils, often composed of elite men 
from the community, believed they needed to transform the ethnic culture and space of 
their congregations to avoid discrimination. This chapter describes how ethnic elites 
initiated a number of reforms in the late 1930s and early 1940s that sought to construct an 
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image of German Lutherans as loyal. They supported eliminating German-language 
services at their churches; they used patriotic symbols like flags; they emphasized their 
national American and Canadian identities over their local German ethnic identities. 
However, this chapter also examines how laypeople resisted these patriotic reforms. 
Rejecting the patriarchal leadership of their elites, they opposed efforts to remove the 
German traditions from their churches. German Lutheran women contested what they 
perceived as the militarization of their churches by hosting social events that advocated 
for peace. They defended their right to protest the war on the basis of Lutheran theology. 
As a result, the Second World War divided these communities into two camps consisting 
of cautiously pro-war pastors and anti-war laypeople. 
 The wartime debates between pastors and their congregants provide a window 
through which to view how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in St. 
Louis and Waterloo County constructed their ethnicity in the mid-twentieth century. This 
chapter argues that German Lutherans expressed their ethnicity by voicing anti-war 
sentiments. They resented mainstream Canadian and American attempts to vilify 
Germany and, consequently, the German people. Once the war began, however, pastors 
and other elite members of the community quickly sought to suppress these sentiments 
and instead viewed their ethnicity as a possible target for anti-German discrimination. 
Their ethnicity became a liability that made them vulnerable to the same attacks that 
occurred during the Great War. If not suppressed, it could provide grounds for internment 
on the suspicion of disloyalty. It would hamper the larger project of the German 
community being accepted into the North American world. Laypeople, however, viewed 
their religious traditions as explicitly tied to the German language and fought to preserve 
them within the church, even during the dangers of wartime. The German language was 
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integral to their faith and they would not let the dangers of wartime prevent them from 
speaking their language.  
 This chapter argues that the divisions and debates within these two German 
communities over wartime accommodation reveals how Lutheran congregations 
functioned as important ethnic boundary zones. As historians Royden Loewen and Gerald 
Friesen suggest, ethnic boundaries can reflect “the inner workings of ethnic community 
adjustment” and “their shared symbols and systems of meaning.”125 The war prompted 
German Lutherans to confront whether symbols like the Canadian and American flags 
truly “belonged” within the ethnic boundary of the church, and whether the German 
language hindered their ability to live peacefully in North America. Lutheran churches 
became contested space during the war, as ethnic elites sought to regulate their ethnicity 
while laypeople fought to preserve it. Rather than fitting neatly into narratives of 
assimilation or cultural maintenance, I suggest that these wartime debates highlight the 
dynamic hybrid identities of German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans. They 
struggled to reconcile their ethnic, religious, and national identities. The resulting contest 
between pastors and laypeople helped solidify a hybrid culture wherein Lutheran 
churches came to embody the hyphenated German-Canadian and German-American 
backgrounds of their inhabitants. 
  
Anti-War Sentiment and the Response to Another Conflict 
  
  
 German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County watched anxiously as the 
Nazis rose to power in Germany during the 1930s. There was little sympathy for the 
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extremist fascist response that elevated Adolf Hitler to power. Nazi Germany was not 
necessarily “their” Germany and therefore the rise of Nazism did little to inspire diasporic 
feelings of belonging. Many German Lutherans did, however, worry that they might 
become the targets of anti-German rhetoric or violence. This shared German ethnicity 
meant that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County initially resisted mainstream media 
attempts to vilify Hitler and the German people. Their Germany ethnicity shaped their 
sense of solidarity with the German people, even as their Canadian and American 
nationalities prevented them from embracing Hitler or Nazi policies throughout the 
1930s. 
German Lutherans in the Missouri and Canada Synods responded differently than 
other Americans and Canadians to the rise of fascism in Germany: they expressed an 
instinctual sympathy towards Germany’s economic and political plight. The Treaty of 
Versailles unfairly punished Germany and they attributed many of the country’s problems 
to the British, French, and American desire to punish Germany following the Great War. 
C.H. Little, a professor of theology at Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote that he was “so 
disgusted with the propaganda that is going on” that portrayed Germany as power-hungry 
and militaristic. He believed Germany’s current dilemmas were “the result and offshoot 
of the unfair treaty of Versailles,” and not the German people.126 Lutheran periodicals like 
the Canada Lutheran and Lutheran Witness, both controlled by the Canada and Missouri 
Synod’s leadership respectively, reported positively on Hitler’s initial economic reforms 
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in Germany in the early to mid-1930s. They hoped to see Germany continue its recovery 
from the harsh dictates of the 1919 peace.127  
These cultural sympathies with the German people rarely translated into direct 
political action. Attempts by the Third Reich to establish pro-Nazi organizations 
disguised as ethnic clubs within St. Louis and Waterloo County failed throughout the 
1930s. The Nazi-led Deutsche Bund Canada tried to organize cultural events alongside 
Waterloo County’s German-Canadian ethnic clubs, but most of the clubs refused to 
participate if the Bund was in any way involved.128 A subsequent pro-Nazi rally in August 
1933 on Kitchener’s King Street was met with an organized counter-protest. The crowd 
booed and insulted the pro-Nazi transplants until the police finally escorted the Bund 
members away.129 German Americans in St. Louis, meanwhile, ignored Nazi agitators in 
their community. By the mid-1930s, the vast majority of Third Reich sponsored clubs had 
already left St. Louis due to an obvious lack of support from the local German-American 
population.130 Open displays of sympathy towards Germany and the Nazi regime faded as 
news of Kristallnacht and other anti-Semitic atrocities reached North America in 1938. 
The Missouri Synod’s flagship newsletter, the Lutheran Witness, stopped reporting on 
Germany entirely.131 While initially sympathetic towards Germany, both communities 
recognized the dangers with being associated with Nazis in North America.  
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Although few German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County politically 
supported Nazi Germany, their German ethnicities did lead them to adopt anti-war 
positions in the late 1930s. German Lutherans largely viewed the outbreak of war in 1939 
as a result of British and European policies, rather than a result of Nazi Germany’s 
militarism. Little believed that the “British policy of interference in European continental 
affairs” and its desire to “dominate or police” German affairs was the primary reason why 
the world was once again at war.132 John Behnken, the president of the Missouri Synod, 
agreed and pointedly blamed Britain going to war with Germany. Britain and its allies, he 
believed, did not want to stop Nazi aggression. Instead, the war resulted from the 
competing political ideologies in Europe that provoked governments to “constantly fly at 
each other’s throats.”133 These sentiments existed among laypeople in each synod as well. 
One laymen in St. Louis claimed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “connived with 
England and they grabbed up all of the gold undoubtedly so Germany couldn’t 
trade…Churchill said that Germany should be crushed as she was getting too strong 
commercially.” Europe’s general hostility towards Germany meant the United States had 
“no business getting into the war.”134 While not motivated to directly participate in pro-
German or pro-Nazi political activity, elites and laypeople in the Canada and Missouri 
Synods expressed German sympathies as a result of their ethnic identities at the beginning 
of the war.  
The outbreak of war in 1939 was a major blow to members of the German 
Lutheran communities that previously witnessed discrimination during the Great War. 
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With the world at war with Germany again, it seemed logical that their communities 
would again face discrimination. Memories of the Great War loomed large in Little’s 
approach to the new conflict. He worried that Canada would undergo another 
conscription crisis that would force his four sons to go fight overseas and become 
“cannon fodder.”135 Shortly after the war began, he promised to make few comments on 
the conflict, because “censorship of all letters will again occur” and any criticism of the 
war effort was liable to place him in a “concentration camp.” He decided that keeping 
“mum” on wartime issues was the best policy.136 Little had good reason to fear the revival 
of anti-German discrimination. Pastors throughout the Missouri Synod feared that “war 
hysteria and [a] false notion of patriotism” already made them outsiders in their 
communities. One St. Louis pastor recalled that nativists burned down his church and 
eventually forced him to leave town due to his German heritage during the Great War. “I 
see it all coming again,” he confided to synod-president John Behnken.137  
It did not take long for Little and Behnken’s concerns to become reality. Behnken 
received several threatening anonymous messages delivered directly to his home during 
the war’s early years. One note stated ominously that “WE UNDERSTAND YOUR 
ORGANIZATION UPHOLDS GERMAN SERVICES. YOU THEREBY FURTHER 
GERMAN PRINCIPLES. WE DO NOT CARE FOR THEM.”138 Such threats led the 
editors of the Lutheran Witness to respond that “during the first World War the most 
shameful outrages were suffered by law-abiding citizens of the United States. These 
insults and outrages were committed not by foreigners but by their fellow-citizens. 
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Churches were painted yellow, pastors were driven out of their parsonages, innocent 
citizens were maligned…And the same species of intolerance and tyranny is raising its 
head even now.”139 Members of the Canada Synod agreed. One pastor wrote that the war 
stimulated Anglo-Canadian “suspicion, greed, [and] injustice” that promoted “racial 
hatred” towards Germans and their culture.140 The generation of German Lutherans who 
witnessed discrimination during the Great War feared anti-German attacks would happen 
again. 
Lutheran pastors generally worried about wartime discrimination more than 
laypeople. During the First World War, anti-German Canadians and Americans 
deliberately targeted Lutheran pastors and churches as “enemy” institutions. They 
believed that Lutheran churches essentially acted as a space for Germans to meet and plan 
acts of sabotage against Canada and the United States. They often singled out pastors as 
community leaders who allegedly hid pro-German sentiments in their German-language 
sermons. Some of the most publicized acts of discrimination in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County involved physical attacks on Lutheran pastors. These pastors faced imprisonment, 
internment, and occasionally had to flee the city or face further assault.141 With the onset 
of another war, pastors recognized that they would once again be vulnerable to anti-
German “patriots.”  
As they perceived themselves to be particularly vulnerable, pastors and synod 
leaders made the decision to downplay their German heritage and the ethnic traditions 
associated with their church for the duration of the war. The German sympathies Behnken 
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once voiced, for instance, dissipated once the United States declared war on Germany in 
December 1941. Behnken sent a telegram to Roosevelt stating that he wanted to “assure 
you of our prayers in this hour of national emergency” and to “pledge to you the loyal 
support of our people in the defense of our country.”142 Likewise, John Reble, the 
president of the Canada Synod, sent telegrams to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and 
other government officials to stress the Canada Synod’s “willingness to share in the 
sacrifices and demands that may be required of us as loyal British subjects.”143 Unlike the 
Great War, Behnken and Reble did not intend to give the government any ground upon 
which to accuse them of disloyalty. Behnken published a copy of the telegram in the next 
edition of The Lutheran Witness and Reble published a copy in The Canada Lutheran to 
quickly spread news of the synod’s new position on the war. Both synod leaders 
published their telegrams largely as a political strategy to deflect any criticisms that the 
Missouri and Canada Synods were unpatriotic. During the First World War, the Missouri 
Synod’s leadership made few public comments on the war effort, which only served to 
heighten nativist accusations that Lutherans were not patriotic. Behnken and Reble 
published their telegrams so as to not make the same mistake again.   
 Privately, Behnken confessed that he also published the telegram in order to “set 
some of our people to thinking along those [patriotic] lines.”144 Pro-German sentiments 
among the synod’s laity could jeopardize the loyal image he wished to cultivate for his 
community. He and other synod leaders combined their efforts in order to dissuade 
members of the synod from expressing pro-German sentiments and to encourage them to 
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embrace wartime patriotism. The editors at The Lutheran Witness scolded their German-
American readership for constituting “the [most] severe critics” of the war. With the 
United States officially at war by the end of 1941, the editors warned their readers that 
“the time for such utterances is now past.” They urged all members of the synod to either 
enlist in the armed forces or purchase war bonds in order to demonstrate their loyalty to 
the government.145 Behnken agreed, and hoped that the warning would set “people’s 
thinking aright.”146 Anti-war sentiments based on their German ethnicities could not be 
tolerated if the Missouri and Canada Synods hoped to avoid nativist discrimination.  
 Declarations of patriotic sentiments would not, however, be enough. In January 
1942, Behnken met with other synod leaders at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis to 
underscore the need to eliminate the pro-German sentiments within the synod. The 
meeting allowed St. Louis’s ethnic elites to ask Behnken for advice on how to deal with 
community members who expressed pro-German and anti-war sentiments. Behnken 
replied that laymen would likely disagree with their pastors, but that the church leadership 
still needed to be seen participating in the war effort. He encouraged pastors to give sound 
advice and encouragement to their congregants, but also to reprimand and admonish them 
if the situation called for it.147 Professors at Concordia Seminary agreed with Behnken’s 
stance. P.E. Kretzmann encouraged pastors “to eliminate the ‘conscientious objector’ 
with his weak and erring conscience” from the congregation.148 Behnken and Kretzmann 
believed that pastors needed to maintain their authority in these situations so as to not 
jeopardize their loyal image. 
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 The outbreak of war led Lutheran pastors to manipulate and control expressions of 
their German ethnic identity. With war officially declared, pastors and congregants alike 
could no longer express their previous pro-German sympathies. They needed to engage 
with Allied patriotism, not ethnic solidarities. The outbreak of war presented Lutheran 
pastors with a decision on how to best mediate their ethnic identities. Although pastors 
and laypeople alike initially felt comfortable voicing their anti-war and pro-German 
sentiments in their letters and publications, the eventual outbreak of war in 1939 and 1941 
caused pastors and other German Lutheran elites to stop articulating these views. As 
ethnic elites, they could not risk appearing as outsiders in the eyes of patriotic Anglo-
Canadian and Americans once again. 
 
Fighting for the German Language 
 
 The reputation of the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone or a German 
organization caused anti-German patriots to target them as “enemy” institutions during 
the Great War. Critics cited the Lutheran tradition of preaching in German as the primary 
reasons why they believed German Lutherans were disloyal.149 Language therefore 
emerged as the primary contentious issue in most congregations in St. Louis and 
Waterloo. As one of the most obvious markers of their ethnicity, German-language 
services were often the first ethnic tradition eliminated from Lutheran congregations. 
Pastors collectively decided to censor and eliminate the German language from their 
institutions and periodicals at the start of the war. During its 1939 annual convention, the 
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Canada Synod passed a resolution to stop producing its records in German, even though 
thirty-nine out of the synod’s fifty-four congregations ordered its yearly records in 
German.150 The St. Louis Pastoral Conference took similar action in late September 1939, 
even before the United States entered the war. St. Louis pastors decided to cancel German 
broadcasts on their radio station, KFUO. War, pastors argued, created “emotional 
thinking” among Americans and they feared their radio station would be forced to shut 
down. They stopped German language broadcasts on account of “the seriousness of the 
days ahead, the forces working against anything which bears the Germanic imprint,” 
thereby making “it imperative that we avoid any possibility of difficultly when it can be 
avoided.”151 Elites in both synods united behind the common cause of demonstrating their 
loyalty to the Canadian and American publics. 
 Pastors who experienced discrimination during the Great War were particularly 
eager to eliminate German-language services from their churches. The police in Waterloo 
County had arrested the Reverend Herman Sperling of St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran 
Church during the previous war after several Anglo-Canadians falsely accused him of 
sending money overseas to help the German military effort. They never found any 
evidence that these rumors were true, but Sperling spent several days in jail until Little 
paid for his release.152 The Reverend Otto Stockmann, of Trinity Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, similarly faced incarceration at an internment camp in northern Ontario after the 
local Member of Parliament called for his arrest on the basis that he preached to a large 
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body of “Germans” in the language of “the enemy.”153 Sperling and Stockmann did not 
want to risk imprisonment again. Both pastors therefore eliminated German services from 
their churches early in the war. Sperling suspended German sermons and Sunday school 
lessons at St. Peter’s owing to the “unsettled condition” in Europe. Likewise, Stockmann 
converted Trinity’s religious services to English in order to avoid “possible offence or 
provocation” from the outside community.154 They did not make this choice easily. 
Stockmann worried that his language reforms would discourage congregants from 
attending weekly sermons. He publicly recognized that while the transition to English 
was not ideal, it was essential that congregants not resist these changes and appear 
disloyal. He pleaded with congregants to remain dedicated to the church during this 
“difficult time.”155 Breaking with the ethnic traditions of the church did truly threaten the 
possibility of losing congregants.156 Although pastors were anxious over breaking 
Lutheran traditions, they considered sacrificing their language as a necessary strategy to 
pre-empt anti-German attacks.  
 Pastors in St. Louis were also willing to eliminate German services once the 
United States officially entered the war. The Missouri Synod’s adherence to conservative 
Lutheranism, however, ensured that the decision to switch from English to German did 
not occur as abruptly as their neighbors in the Canada Synod. Missouri Synod 
congregations placed more emphasis on congregational autonomy than those in the 
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Canada Synod. Thus, the decision to switch to English services first required that pastors 
obtain the consent, or at least consult with, members of their church councils. The church 
council at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church, for instance, advised the Reverend Paul 
Streufert to eliminate German services due to “the present emergency and because the 
community may misinterpret the holding of German services as indicating a sympathetic 
feeling” towards Germany. They feared that “such uncharitable judging on the part of the 
community may do great harm” to their congregation. Streufert promised to meet with 
those who attended German services and explain to them the necessity of speaking 
English in order to avoid possible nativist attacks.157    
 The efforts of pastors and other elites threatened a radical break with the ethnic 
traditions practiced in Lutheran churches. While pastors proved willing to downplay their 
ethnicity in order to stress their loyalty, members of their congregations rejected making 
their churches indistinguishable from other Canadian and American churches. 
Congregants did not have the same fears of internment as their pastors. More importantly, 
they resisted what they saw as a broader effort to transform the cultural space of their 
churches. As cultural theorist Henri Lefebvre notes, “(social) space is a (social) product” 
and is accordingly shaped by human actors. The human influence on space establishes 
unspoken norms, and therefore transforms space to take on a “reality on its own.” These 
unspoken social norms influence those who enter the space and can shape the actions and 
attitudes of the people that occupy it.158 Since their inception, Lutheran churches 
functioned as ethnic boundaries in which the German language thrived. Throughout the 
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early decades of the twentieth century, Lutheran churches took on a particular importance 
for German immigrants wishing to speak their language. Historian Barbara Lorenzkowski 
recounts how German immigrant communities in North America spoke a hybrid language 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that combined both English and 
German, particularly when in public. While ethnic elites decried the loss of a “pure” 
German language, ordinary German immigrant families largely embraced their new 
hybrid language and spoke a mix of English and German comfortably. The public use of 
the German language decreased without protest from most German immigrant 
communities.159 While true of the public sphere, German immigrants of Lutheran faith 
could still attend church, and speak and hear German spoken regularly. Their pastors 
regularly preached in German and social clubs often conducted their business in German. 
Thus, many German Lutherans became accustomed to speaking English in the public 
sphere and German in the private sphere or ethnic boundary of their churches by the mid-
twentieth century.  
 Wartime hysteria put these ethnic traditions in jeopardy. The elimination of 
German services in Lutheran congregations may have appeared as a patriotic necessity for 
pastors, but it threatened the ethnic identity of congregants who attended weekly sermons. 
It forced congregants to sacrifice one of their main forms of preserving their ethnicity via 
the German language. Congregants did not passively accept this sacrifice. By March 
1940, members of St. Peter’s congregation organized to protest the Reverend Sperling’s 
decision to switch entirely to English services. Led by layman John Schell, the protestors 
circulated a petition to determine if the congregation still desired to worship in German. 
Schell’s petition gained traction amongst the congregation at large and emboldened him 
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to take his demands to the church council. Schell and his supporters requested that 
Sperling preach at least one or two German sermons a month, and offer at least one 
German language communion per year. Schell also wrote to the church council detailing 
his demands and requested to personally meet with them to express his opposition to 
Sperling’s language reforms. St. Peter’s church council proved hesitant to meet with a 
congregant so vocally opposed to its wartime actions. They rejected his offer to discuss 
his opposition in person. Instead, the church council wrote to Schell reminding him of the 
reasons German language services were suspended at the beginning of the war. Although 
the church council did not risk association with someone as vocal as Schell, they 
organized a committee to meet with the more moderate members of the congregation who 
signed Schell’s petition to reinforce the importance of not speaking German while Canada 
was at war.160 Schell’s protest was exactly the type of behaviour Sperling and the church 
council wished to avoid. His protest threatened to revive nativist concerns and the church 
council therefore worked to quell his opposition in order to maintain the image of loyalty.   
To make matters worse, Sperling’s health declined in 1940 just as the debate over 
speaking German divided St. Peter’s. Without Sperling’s assistance, the church council 
had to confront Schell and his supporters without the authority of their pastor. Schell’s 
convictions, however, did not waver and he continued to campaign for his cause at St. 
Peter’s congregational meetings throughout 1940. In a May meeting, Schell once again 
advocated for reintroducing German services and asked that the church council reconsider 
its earlier decision. Schell’s efforts occurred at an inopportune period in the war. In the 
previous weeks, the Nazis had invaded northern Europe. Nazi expansion fueled English-
Canadian fears that Canada was subject to internal threats. Rumours circulated that the 
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Nazis benefitted from the support of “fifth columnists,” citizens who willingly 
collaborated with the Nazis against their own country. These rumours played on English-
Canadian fears that German Canadians were loyal to Germany.161 As Schell’s demands 
coincided with a peak period in the fear over German-Canadian saboteurs, the church 
council proved even less willing to grant Schell’s wishes. Still, the congregation debated 
Schell’s demands and only stopped when the church received a phone call from the 
nearby hospital. The call notified the congregation that Sperling had just passed away due 
to complications during kidney surgery. The symbolism of their pastor dying during a 
discussion of reviving the German language was not lost on the congregation. The church 
council interpreted the omen as sufficient grounds to end the meeting and table other 
discussions for future review.162 For the remainder of the year, St. Peter’s church council 
remained preoccupied with finding a suitable replacement for Sperling and had little time 
to address the concerns of individual congregants. Thus Schell’s efforts to bring the 
German language back to St. Peter’s failed due to internal and external factors alike. 
In contrast, Trinity’s congregation did enjoy one small victory. Several 
congregants approached the Reverend Otto Stockmann during the winter of 1940 in an 
attempt to reinstate German language services. Specifically, congregants wished to create 
an exception to Stockmann’s language reform in order to allow a German Easter service. 
While Stockmann did not record the exact number, enough congregants approached him 
with complaints that he felt it necessary to give a public explanation. Stockmann 
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addressed the issue at the annual congregational meeting in January 1941. Standing 
before his congregation, Stockmann argued that it was necessary for him to speak English 
if Trinity hoped to avoid possible anti-German attacks, at least for the duration of the war. 
He urged them to accept his decision lest he face internment once again.163 The 
congregation, however, remained unmoved by Stockmann’s plea for loyalty. They urged 
him to call a vote on whether to include a German service on Easter. Stockmann had little 
choice but to oblige. A record forty-three members of the congregation attended the vote, 
when the average attendance to congregational meetings hovered around twenty to 
twenty-five.164 The resolution to hold an Easter service in German received 
overwhelming support from the congregation and was subsequently passed by the church 
council. Of the forty-three members present, four congregants voted against bringing 
German-language services back to Trinity. Stockmann recorded the names of those who 
voted “no.” The abstainers were members of prominent families in the church who had 
close ties to the church council.165 As Stockmann and the church council had originally 
suspended use of the German language, the family members of the church council 
supported their initial decision. The congregation received its wish at Easter in 1943, 
when Stockmann conducted a morning Easter service in German and another service later 
that day in English for those who were not comfortable attending it in German.166 In the 
minds of Trinity’s more elite members, the risk of appearing and speaking German was 
not one worth taking. While the vote to conduct an Easter service in German appears to 
have had the general support of the congregation, there still remained a divide between 
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the desires of the laity and Stockmann’s wishes. Elite church members were not willing to 
risk their status in the community by appearing disloyal by speaking German.  
St. Louis pastors also had to make certain conciliatory gestures in order to avoid 
the protests over language that engulfed congregations like St. Peter’s. The church 
council at St. Paul’s Lutheran Church recommended that the Reverend Rothe consult with 
laymen who might take issue with their decision to cancel German services in January 
1942. Rothe consulted prominent families at St. Paul’s and tried to convince them of the 
wartime necessity to preach exclusively in English. They agreed, but only on the 
condition that Rothe continue to discreetly administer communion in German in private 
ceremonies.167 Louis Sieck, the pastor at Zion Lutheran Church, agreed to privately offer 
“spiritual care” in the German language in exchange for the congregation’s public support 
of his decision to preach Sunday sermons in English. The pro-German lobbies at these 
congregations therefore extended thanks for “the tactful way the Pastor is handling this 
delicate matter.”168  
 The disagreement over language in these congregations reveals how central 
language was to the ways that laypeople in St. Louis and Waterloo County conceptualized 
their German ethnic identity. Congregants proved unwilling to let the war alter their 
ethnic traditions because they believed their Lutheranism was intertwined with their 
ethnicity. Laypeople in Waterloo County and St. Louis petitioned primarily for the 
opportunity to speak German on days with a specific religious importance or at 
significant religious rituals, such as confirmation ceremonies, communion, and Easter. 
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Language debates demonstrate the degree to which the church evolved into an important 
German space during the interwar years. Congregants conceptualized their German and 
Lutheran identities as two halves of a single whole, wherein they needed to speak German 
on days of religious importance. German immigrants may have allowed English to eclipse 
German in the public sphere, but they proved unwilling to let this happen at their 
churches. Rather than treating the switch to English with ambivalence, as German 
immigrants did in the public sphere, congregants fought vigorously to maintain their 
church as an ethnic boundary zone immune from the influence of their host society. This 
difference reveals an important aspect of the development of the German language in 
immigrant communities. The German language in 1940s St. Louis and Waterloo County 
became imbedded with religious and cultural importance. The spirited protests that 
occurred within these three Lutheran churches remains a testament to the cultural 
significance congregants placed on speaking the language of their ancestors during times 
of religious importance. To speak German at church contained more than religious 
meaning or a mere functional use; it also provided an opportunity to practice and 
commune with one’s ethnic identity. While language in the public sphere was fluid and 
allowed for change, congregants resisted language reforms that violated their perception 
of the church as an ethnic boundary zone. 
  
Protesting Patriotic Space  
 
 The fight to keep Lutheran churches German spaces did not begin and end with 
the question of German-language services. Many congregants felt that their pastors were 
too accommodating to wartime patriotism more generally. They were also concerned by 
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their pastor’s willingness to allow their religious and ethnic spaces to be marked by 
patriotic symbols such as flags. These efforts to remake their churches into landscapes of 
loyalty and patriotism align with Lefebvre’s concept of “representational space.” 
Representational spaces employ “complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes 
not” that provide its inhabitants with meaning. These symbols can overlay “physical 
space, making symbolic use of its objects” that would otherwise be meaningless.169 
Pastors who brought Canadian and American national symbols into their churches sought 
to demonstrate their loyalty, but at the expense of preserving their congregations as 
German spaces outside the purview of the state. These symbols provided a clear meaning 
to both insiders and outsiders as to how their pastors felt about the war. Pastors hoped that 
such changes would demonstrate their loyalty as Canadians and Americans, even if it 
meant further downplaying their German ethnicities.  
 Eliminating German services helped pastors avoid accusations of loyalty to 
Germany, but did little to show their host societies that they were loyal to Canada and the 
United States. During the Great War, nativists often criticized Lutheran pastors for not 
upholding Canadian and American norms such as singing “God Save the King” or 
saluting the flag. Pastors sought to rectify this image by including explicitly patriotic 
customs and symbols in their churches. Sperling and the St. Peter’s church council 
realized that they could no longer advertise their church as a “German” church if they 
hoped to demonstrate their loyalty. As of 1939, the congregation still had its public sign 
on the church lot written in the German language. By 1941, the church council replaced 
the old German sign with a new English one accompanied by a Canadian flag.170 With a 
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Canadian flag and an English sign directly outside the church, there were few visible 
markers to distinguish St. Peter’s from the nearby Presbyterian churches. Other 
congregations adopted a similar approach. Both Trinity and “Old Trinity” in St. Louis 
raised flags during the early stages of the war in order to demonstrate to the broader 
community that they were loyal to Canada and the United States respectively.171  
Pastors and the church elite monitored the behaviour of their congregations 
outside as well as inside the space of the church. St. Peter’s in Kitchener rescheduled its 
weekly sermon so as to not conflict with a 1939 Remembrance Day ceremony. The 
church council advised the congregation to take part in the civic ceremony that was held 
at the community cenotaph in Kitchener.172 Congregations in St. Louis engaged in 
displays of patriotism as well. Zion’s congregational newsletter published the names of its 
congregants who had already joined the armed forces as early as July 1941.173 It would be 
difficult, the church council hoped, for “patriots” to attack German Lutheran loyalty when 
they so proudly displayed the names of members of their congregation who served in the 
military.  
 St. Matthew’s in St. Louis implemented one of the clearest threats to the 
traditional German spaces of Lutheran churches during the early stages of the war. In 
October 1941, the church newsletter advertised a new initiative pioneered by Erwin 
Rodenburg, the congregation’s Sunday school teacher. As the congregation’s teacher, 
Rodenburg had considerable authority within the congregation. Yet, he also had the most 
to lose as a result of wartime discrimination. Since Rodenburg taught the congregation’s 
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children in German, he was more susceptible to anti-German attacks than other members 
of the congregation. In an attempt to demonstrate his patriotism, Rodenburg proposed to 
host soldiers stationed at the nearby Jefferson Barracks at the church for dinner, 
entertainment, and a brief respite from military life. Elite members of the church saw an 
obvious benefit in implementing such a patriotic program. Rodenburg recognized that 
during “this critical time, we should do all we can to aid our boys and thus help promote 
national unity.”174 For the German Lutheran members of St. Matthew’s who supported 
the program, national unity naturally meant avoiding anti-German discrimination and 
working cooperatively with American patriots during the impending war. 
Rodenburg’s idea, however, militarized church space and brought the 
congregation closer to the war effort. Rodenburg knew this, and the elite members of the 
church realized they had to convince the congregation of the program’s necessity. The 
church council told the congregation that the soldiers in the program were typically 
Lutheran, but acknowledged that soldiers of varying religious backgrounds would also 
participate. In an attempt to justify the presence of non-Lutherans, the church council 
claimed that hosting non-Lutherans constituted “an excellent missionary opportunity” to 
attempt to convert these non-Lutheran soldiers to the Missouri Synod.175 Thus, they tried 
to portray a patriotic activity as a religious one. In doing so, Rodenburg and his 
supporters attempted to reconcile the congregants’ perception of their church as a 
distinctly German Lutheran space with the demands of patriotism. 
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 Pastors increasingly tried to connect the wartime accommodation of their churches 
with a general expression of Christian spirit. The language debates made them realize that 
appealing to their congregation’s sense of patriotic duty or nationality would generate 
opposition to, rather than participation in, the war effort. Pastors therefore had to 
somehow confront the attitudes of their congregants that treated patriotism and their 
ethnicity as incompatible forces. They subsequently worked carefully to encourage 
participation in the war effort by appealing to their congregation’s identities as Lutherans, 
rather than as Americans or Canadians. Reverend Lewis Niemoeller at Faith Lutheran 
Church in St. Louis encouraged his congregation to support St. Louis’s wartime 
fundraisers because of their faith, not out of patriotic sentiment. He told his congregation 
that “this work is one way of showing our Christianity to the world” and emphasized that 
the city’s wartime fundraisers supported Lutheran charities as well as secular ones.176 St. 
Matthew’s in St. Louis adopted a similar approach. It encouraged its congregation to buy 
war bonds, for as “Christian citizens we want to come to the assistance of our country in 
its hour of dire need.”177 In 1943, Zion started its campaign for war bonds by appealing to 
the congregation’s religious identity. They titled the campaign “For Church and for 
Country,” in attempt to reconcile an obviously patriotic fundraiser with the Lutheran 
faith. Sieck, Zion’s pastor, argued that congregants should purchase war bonds and use a 
portion of their savings to donate it to the church. He told Zion’s members that 
purchasing war bonds “proves our loyalty to both of these divine institutions, church and 
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government.”178 Sieck argued that “in this way you will be serving both your nation and 
your church.”179 The German identities of their congregants ensured that pastors had to 
find a motivation outside of patriotism to encourage their congregants to support wartime 
fundraisers. War with Germany did not provide enough impetus for German Lutheran 
congregants to donate their time and money. By turning wartime fundraisers into church 
fundraisers, however, pastors hoped to accomplish their goal of appearing loyal without 
generating opposition among their congregants.  
 Congregants, however, still did not support their pastors and attempts to combine 
church and state. They resented their pastors taking such strong patriotic stances on the 
war as it clearly violated their Biblical understanding Romans 13, which dictated that the 
state not exert its influence over spiritual affairs. Congregants rejected the demands of 
patriotism and, unlike their pastors and church councils, often proved reluctant to 
embrace the war’s impact on their churches. The divide that emerged during the early 
years of the war between laymen and elite church councils continued to generate conflict 
within local congregations. One congregant in St. Louis criticized their pastor for 
preaching “about war every Sunday from the pulpit” and for placing an emphasis on how 
it “was a privilege to serve.” The congregant complained that “he is a good preacher and 
his sermons used to be fine before but he sort of detracted from the Gospel by doing 
that.”180 Unlike their pastors and the church elite, congregants did not celebrate the 
wartime “achievements” that their pastors often cited in order to demonstrate their 
loyalty.  
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 German Lutheran women put up the strongest resistance to elite attempts to gain 
acceptance through patriotism. Their protests, however, differed from those of their male 
peers, as Lutheran women had very few outlets in which to express their opposition to the 
patriotic reforms initiated by the church’s male elite. Both the Missouri and Canada 
Synods did not allow women the right to vote in congregational meetings. Nor could 
women sit on church councils or other advisory boards. While men like Schell could 
voice their protest via the official channels of congregational meetings, German Lutheran 
women had to voice their opposition to the war within their own organizations or by 
refusing to comply with the patriotic directives of their pastors. Their protests reveal the 
extent to which German Lutheran women voiced anti-war sentiments despite elite 
attempts to regulate their ethnicity. They conceptualized their churches as a site outside of 
the purview of the state, and resented attempts by their pastors to bring wartime 
patriotism into a religious institution.   
 For women in the Canada Synod, the annual conferences of the Women’s 
Missionary Society (WMS) provided a space wherein German Lutheran women could 
articulate their own thoughts on the war. During the early war years, the annual themes of 
their conferences contained explicit anti-war messages. In 1939, the WMS met at St. 
James in Waterloo County under the banner “Ambassadors of Peace.” Unlike their male 
pastors, the WMS did not conceptualize church space as one that needed to support the 
war effort. They understood their churches as places of refuge where they could practice 
their religion outside of state influence. They believed that their role in church was to 
follow “the example of our Lord Jesus Christ” and “solemnly pledge ourselves for further 
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the realization of peace by bringing the Gospel to bear upon the hearts of men.”181 The 
WMS’s 1940 convention met under the theme of “Love.” Margaret Kalbfleisch, the 
conference organizer, wrote that “surely the Convention theme, Love, is most fitting, 
particularly, in these times of world tragedy, when many nations are engaged in a terrific 
conflict which is shaking the very foundations of our Christian civilization. The world is 
in need of more love.”182 Denied official recognition by their congregations, German 
Lutheran women critiqued the war effort in the few spaces they could control. 
 As the war continued, German Lutheran women became increasingly vocal about 
their anti-war views. Women, even outside of Lutheran congregations, were expected to 
volunteer in the war effort due to their “naturally self-sacrificing” disposition. Men saw 
tasks such as sewing, cooking, and canvassing for funds as extensions of women’s 
domestic duties, and expected women to complete this work in order to help the war 
effort.183 These gendered expectations also existed in the German Lutheran communities 
of St. Louis and Waterloo County, where pastors expected women to carry out their 
patriotic wartime efforts in order to stress their loyalty to the state. By cooperating with 
their pastor’s plans for patriotic fundraisers, women maintained the role of “ancillary 
partners” that did not challenge the pastor’s authority and leadership in the church.184 But 
while pastors expected their congregation’s women to carry out their patriotic fundraisers, 
they became some of the most chief opponents of their pastors’ patriotic reforms during 
the latter stages of the war. 
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 German Lutheran women resented bearing the burden of patriotic war work. In 
early 1942, Faith Lutheran Church in St. Louis publicized the few women who were 
“taking the lead” in fundraising activities in hopes that other women would notice and 
help. However, patriotic fundraisers within the church failed to generate a significant 
attendance from the congregation’s women. The church leadership pleaded for “all the 
ladies of the congregation” to attend the patriotic fundraisers, instead of the same handful 
of women each time.185 By refusing to participate in patriotic fundraisers, German 
Lutheran women conveyed their anti-war beliefs to their pastors and the church elite. 
They rejected the ways that their pastors and church councils transformed their churches 
from places of worship and ethnicity into patriotic national spaces. As women could not 
vote or participate in congregational meetings in both the Missouri and Canada Synods, 
they did not have an official venue in which to voice their protests as with their male 
counterparts. Remaining silent and ignoring their pastor’s pleas emerged as one of the 
most effective ways German Lutheran women could express their opposition to the war. 
If their pastors proved intent on transforming church space, German Lutheran women at 
Faith Lutheran Church simply stopped attending a space that no longer spoke to their 
religious and ethnic identities. Denied a voice within their congregation, the women at 
Faith Lutheran Church let their silence speak for them. 
 Even the women who did seem to support wartime fundraisers eventually became 
disillusioned over the theological contradictions of their pastors. In late 1942, a Ladies 
Aid Society raised enough money from fundraising efforts to purchase a war bond. 
Purchased under the name of the congregation, some of the women involved with the 
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initial fundraiser expressed concern that the congregation should not use the bond as it 
was “blood money.” They believed the government would use their money for “bad 
purposes” and felt uncomfortable attaching the name of their congregation to money that 
would support the government’s war.186 Although instructed to purchase war bonds by 
their pastors, German Lutheran women could not ignore that this money could be used to 
bomb German civilians, including mothers and children overseas.187 In 1943, another 
Ladies Aid Society resisted their pastor’s request to cook free meals for American 
soldiers. The pastor expected his congregation’s women to purchase food for these meals, 
and subsequently cook and serve them to visiting American soldiers. The women were 
dismayed to find out, however, “that hardly 10% of the visiting boys are Lutheran” and 
many of the soldiers they fed were in fact “Catholics and others [taking] undue 
advantage” of their generosity. They subsequently protested their pastor’s decision over 
the “waste of money” to the synod’s leadership.188  
 Their protests, however, found little sympathy among the synod’s male 
leadership. Conflict between German Lutheran women and their pastors proved so 
common throughout the war that The Lutheran Witness eventually commented on the 
issue. The magazine’s editor, Theodore Graebner, took issue with women who refused to 
purchase war bonds. Graebner reported that certain women claimed “they had been taught 
that the Church and State are separate” and that “it was wrong to make such a purchase of 
bonds.” Rather than acknowledge the valid theological claims made by German Lutheran 
women, Graebner dismissed them and slandered their reputation. He warned that such 
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protests meant that their pastor may not uphold their reputation as loyal citizens should 
these women ever come into conflict with the government or hostile community 
members. Whereas male objections to synod policy were treated seriously, Graebner 
believed that women protested the war not “for righteousness’ sake, but as a result of their 
ignorance of what their Church teaches.”189 Behnken dismissed women’s theological 
challenges with equal arrogance. He challenged one Ladies Aid Society “to prove their 
assertion” that war bonds were blood money.190 Unlike male congregants who could 
voice their protests through official channels and hope for their desired results, pastors 
generally ignored women’s protests. One pastor refused to cancel his patriotic programs, 
despite protest from the congregation’s women, because it would “be difficult to 
discontinue the project now without getting a black eye.”191  
 Whereas pastors relied on the elite men in their church councils to support their 
patriotic reforms, synod leaders believed German Lutheran women were a problem 
throughout the war. Specifically, synod leaders saw the tendency for German Lutheran 
women to view involvement with the military as a violation of Romans 13 as a major 
impediment to their war effort. If the clearest way for synod leaders to demonstrate their 
loyalty was to ensure a large number of Lutheran youth enlisted in the armed forces, then 
Lutheran mothers acted as a significant barrier to their ultimate goal of promoting loyalty. 
Women had good cause to fear that the military opposed their religious and ethnic 
identities. After all, wartime propaganda from the American government often portrayed 
military training camps as a place where Americans of diverse ethnic and religious 
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backgrounds mixed and merged into one “team.”192 Many German Lutheran women grew 
up within a Missouri Synod that often stressed the dangers of interfaith unions and 
discouraged relationships with other ethnicities and religions outside the synod.193 They 
saw military training camps as places of assimilation where their sons would stray from 
their Lutheran faith. As a result, Missouri Synod leaders worried that Lutheran mothers 
prevented, or discouraged, their sons from enlisting in the military due to their anti-war 
beliefs. The editors of The Lutheran Witness specifically targeted Lutheran mothers in 
their editorials in an effort to convince them that the military was harmless to their faith. 
They emphasized the services available to Lutheran soldiers at training camps, ranging 
from Lutheran chaplains to hymn books. The Lutheran Witness editors recognized that 
few Lutheran mothers ever thought their sons would undertake a career in the military, 
but still chastised mothers for clinging “to our hopes and dreams of yesterday” during a 
time “when our Government calls for defense.”194  
 While Lutheran mothers emerged as objects of scorn during the war, certain 
younger Lutheran women in St. Louis achieved a new measure of authority in their 
congregations. During the war, a select few young women achieved prominent positions 
within mixed gender social clubs like the Walther League for the first time. The Walther 
League lost many of its senior members during the war due to the pressure on its male 
members to enlist in the armed forces. During the 1942 election of Walther League 
positions, five women from St. Louis were elected as a result of the absence of men. 
These young women filled certain positions, such as vice-president and treasurer, which 
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had previously always been occupied by men.195 However, these women were not elected 
as a result of gender equality within the Walther League. Its membership suffered as a 
result of the war and the club needed Lutheran women to participate more actively if the 
club wished to survive the war years. A newsletter from Holy Cross in St. Louis made the 
attitude of male Walther League members all too clear. The young men appealed   
“especially to the young women of our congregation to come and join our…Walther 
League” throughout the war. However, they told the new female members that their 
participation in the club was only to “help us ‘keep the home fires burning’ until our boys 
return home again.”196 Much like wartime gains for women more generally, German 
Lutheran men expected that women would only temporarily participate in “male” 
pursuits. 
 Historians of North American Lutheranism routinely comment on the absence of 
German Lutheran women’s voices from the official record.197 In her feminist critique of 
the Missouri Synod, historian Mary Todd comments that Lutheran history is 
“remarkable” for to its “absence of women, both from the discussion forum and from any 
position of advocacy on their own behalf.” As a result, she states that “women’s roles 
have been marginal at best” within the church.198 Yet, pastors could not ignore the 
important role played by German Lutheran women during the war. Their unwillingness to 
support patriotic activities threatened the loyal image the church leadership wished to 
project throughout the conflict. German Lutheran women participated in theological 
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debates in their congregations via their protests, thereby attracting the attention of 
Behnken and the church elite. They challenged their pastors’ authority, either overtly or 
through their silence, in order to communicate that they opposed the war measures 
imposed on them by their pastors on both religious and ethnic grounds.  
 The apparent inability of their congregants to understand and embrace the 
importance of wartime patriotism frustrated pastors. The war split congregations along 
lay/clerical and gendered lines, causing pastors anxiety over how to unite their 
congregations behind their need to appear loyal. Reble, for instance, noted that the war 
split his congregation into those he considered “problems” and those he believed worked 
towards providing solutions for issues facing the church. The congregants Reble labeled 
as “problems” included those “who are loudest in their critiques” of the church’s conduct 
“to the present world situation.”199 The editors of The Lutheran Witness commented on 
these congregational divides, and lamented the development of “families living in feuds 
with church officers and the pastors, dissension between older and younger groups,” and 
believed that “these do more to hinder the growth of the church than the devil himself.”200 
The unsympathetic attitudes of pastors and church elites only enhanced the divide within 
congregations.  
 By transforming Lutheran churches into patriotic spaces, pastors tried to dispel the 
rumours that Lutherans held secret “pro-German” meetings. By using the same patriotic 
symbols and customs as Anglo-Americans and Canadians, German Lutherans hoped to 
avoid accusations of disloyalty while simultaneously highlighting their own dedication to 
the war effort in ways readily understandable to their American and Canadian audiences. 
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Pastors took no chances risking internment or discrimination once again. Just like their 
language reforms, however, congregants protested such overt changes. German Lutheran 
women put forward a message of peace in the face of their pastors’ patriotic calls to 
support the war, and resisted clerical efforts to blur the line between church and state. 
They intended for their churches to be a refuge from the war, not a willing participant in 
it. 
 
Relations Between St. Louis and Waterloo County 
 
 Examining cross-border collaboration between pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County highlights how pastors tried to use their national identities as Americans and 
Canadians to their advantage. This strategy angered their congregants who wished to keep 
their churches as German spaces, but helped provide pastors with a way to appear loyal 
when negotiating with government officials. The war, however, initially threatened the 
transnational relationship between St. Louis and Waterloo County. Prior to the war, the 
Ontario District of the Missouri Synod cooperated easily with their parent body in St. 
Louis. Charity drives and synod conventions ignored the Canadian-American border as 
Lutherans in both countries collaborated towards a common cause. The Second World 
War placed this dynamic in jeopardy due to Canada’s involvement in the war while the 
United States stayed neutral. Initially, it appeared as though Waterloo County’s 
relationship with Lutherans in St. Louis would cause problems for the community. 
American neutrality during the opening stages of the war seemingly placed St. Louis 
Lutherans at odds with Missouri Synod congregations in Waterloo County. As they were 
officially affiliated with an American, or “foreign,” entity, Missouri Synod Lutherans in 
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Waterloo County were placed in an even more precarious situation than their Canada 
Synod neighbours. Frank Malinsky, the president of the Ontario District of the Missouri 
Synod headquartered in Waterloo County, wrote to Behnken to make him aware of the 
problems American neutrality caused for his congregants. He told Behnken that the anti-
war messages contained in Missouri Synod periodicals read in Waterloo County may 
“seem quite harmless to the ears of people living in a neutral country but they offend in a 
country at war and may cause embarrassment” for his community. Missouri Synod 
advocates for neutrality could easily provoke accusations of disloyalty if associated with 
their congregations in Waterloo County due to the image of the Missouri Synod as a 
“foreign” institution.201  
 American neutrality posed further problems in Waterloo County.  In 1940, 
Waterloo County Lutherans petitioned the Department of National Defense to obtain a 
Missouri Synod chaplain to serve in the army. Traditionally, Behnken and the synod’s 
leadership in St. Louis handled any interaction with the federal government. War 
disrupted this tradition. A Waterloo County pastor informed Behnken that “because of the 
strong nationalistic tendency of the Canadians, we deem it wise that a committee of 
resident Canadian citizens should be appointed to look after Lutheran chaplaincy work in 
the present war.” He felt that the “Department of National Defense would not entertain 
such a request were it to come from outside of Canada. Of that I feel quite certain.” The 
Ontario District concurred, and asked Behnken to formally establish “a Canadian military 
and navy Board” of the Missouri Synod so they could collaborate with Canada’s military 
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uninterrupted.202 Behnken agreed. He appointed three pastors from Ontario to act as the 
Missouri Synod’s representatives for Canada. He deliberately did not choose pastors 
either born in the United States or Germany. Instead, he selected Alfred Dashner, a 
Canadian-born pastor. He also selected M.J. Michael as another representative because he 
was a Canadian citizen. Behnken told Michael that “since you were born in Denmark, 
your status in the eyes of the government should cause no difficulty whatsoever.”203 None 
of these men had obvious ties to Germany and were therefore prime candidates to 
demonstrate German Lutheran loyalty to the government.  
 Despite these early issues surrounding American neutrality, German Lutheran 
leaders in both St. Louis and Waterloo County eventually used their national identities as 
a way to moderate problems with the Canadian federal government. Pastors readily 
emphasized whichever portion of their hyphenated identities as German-Canadian and 
German-American Lutherans suited them at the time. Much as they did during the debates 
on language and church space, pastors consciously emphasized their national identities as 
a way to mitigate their ethnicity. This strategy proved particularly effective when, during 
the opening stages of the war, the Canadian federal government passed an order-in-
council that forced aliens (or non-citizens) who had arrived in Canada since 1929 to 
register with the federal government if their father or grandfather was born in Germany. 
Malinsky wrote to Behnken for assistance regarding the order-in-council, which he 
considered to be nothing more than “war hysteria” on behalf of the government. Malinsky 
worried that government authorities would abuse this law and “may cause our church 
much embarrassment” by forcing Lutherans to register. According to Malinsky’s records, 
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there were six pastors in the Canadian districts of the Missouri Synod who fell under this 
category. As these pastors were all born in the United States with German ancestors, the 
order-in-council would force them to register with the Canadian government as aliens.204 
Protests to the government proved difficult under the strict conditions of wartime. 
If Behnken, Malinsky, and their Canadian colleagues protested the order-in-council too 
vigorously, they risked being misunderstood as disloyal or pro-German. Thus, German-
Canadian Lutherans carefully constructed their criticism of the order-in-council as an 
“American” instead of “ethnic” problem. Traugott Herzer, a Canadian Missouri Synod 
Lutheran, told government officials that the order-in-council wrongly included “American 
citizens whose fathers or grandfathers had been born in Germany.” To further point out 
the absurdity of the law, he declared that if Wendell L. Willkie, the presidential candidate 
for the Republican Party in 1940, lived in Canada, he would also be affected by the law. 
In order to voice their opposition, Malinsky enlisted Behnken’s aid. He implored 
Behnken to travel to Ottawa to meet with government officials and use his prestige as the 
leader of the synod to protect those affected by the order-in-council. After Behnken 
agreed to meet with Canadian government officials, Herzer made sure to stress Behnken’s 
American, not German, roots by reminding the government that Behnken “is a native of 
Houston, Texas.”205 As a result, German Canadians portrayed Behnken’s intervention as 
an American interested in the treatment of his countrymen, instead of pro-German and 
disloyal. Ultimately, Canadian Lutherans needlessly worried about the order-in-council. 
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The final law did not include any stipulations about ancestors from Germany, thereby 
eliminating the formerly affected pastors from having to register as enemy aliens.206  
 The early stages of the war had ambiguous effects on the relationship between 
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Although American neutrality 
created the potential for nativists to accuse Waterloo County Lutherans of disloyalty, 
Behnken’s willingness to let Canadians operate independently seemed to mitigate this 
possibility. However, ties with St. Louis became beneficial when German-Canadian 
Lutherans used the guise of American concern to help protest discriminatory legislation. 
Wartime issues ultimately prompted Behnken to recognize the national character of 
Missouri Synod congregations in Canada. He wrote that Americans “are often apt to write 
and act as though, because they are our fellow Lutherans, they are also Americans. The 
truth of the matter is that all these folks are Canadians” and encountered different 
challenges than Lutherans in the United States.207 Although war generated a greater 
awareness of national difference between St. Louis and Waterloo County, it could not 
overcome the shared bonds of ethnicity and religion. Behnken, Malinsky, and their 
colleagues successfully collaborated to overcome the challenges that the nation placed on 
their German and Lutheran identities. 
  Although Canadian congregations affiliated with the Missouri Synod relied on its 
support early in the war, St. Louis quickly realized there were several problems with 
running a national war effort in a transnational church. The symbols and rhetoric that 
motivated German-American Lutherans did not always resonate with Canadian Lutherans 
in the same way. Many Canadian Lutherans read the Missouri Synod’s primary 
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periodical, The Lutheran Witness, and Canadian pastors complained that it offered very 
little use for Canadian congregations. One pastor objected to the photos of American 
soldiers and flags, and noted that it did little to inspire Canadians to enlist. He hoped that 
the synod would stress the international character of their war work, and perhaps even 
include a Union Jack flag on its cover. Another pastor noted that he could not use The 
Lutheran Witness in his patriotic fundraising campaign because “it was ‘all Stars and 
Stripes’.”208 While not entirely unsympathetic, the Witness editorial staff defended their 
decisions by noting the lack of Canadian material available to them.209  
 The wartime patriotism in Canada and the United States strained the transnational 
ties that existed between German Lutherans in Waterloo County and St. Louis. Patriotism 
inevitably included embracing national symbols that alienated German Lutherans in the 
neighboring country. Despite sharing similar goals, wartime patriotism ensured that 
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County had to express these aims with 
nationalist symbols and language instead of ethnic ones. Although German Lutherans in 
St. Louis and Waterloo County shared an ethnic and religious heritage, the war made 
them recognize their distinct national identities whether they wished to or not. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 German Lutheran pastors and elite laymen in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
worried that the onset of war would provoke attacks against them. Their memories of the 
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First World War, coupled with some signs of discrimination, motivated these ethnic elites 
to implement patriotic reforms in their churches. They worked cooperatively to eliminate 
German language services and transform their churches into patriotic spaces. For ethnic 
elites, their German ethnicity acted as a handicap that needed to be downplayed and 
overcome. Their efforts do not indicate that these individuals were either victims or fully 
assimilated. Rather, the very fact that these pastors and elite laymen took such an active 
role in demonstrating their patriotism and downplaying their ethnicity shows that a 
German consciousness still remained strong within these communities. The actions of 
pastors and their church councils should not be seen as agents of assimilation, but rather 
as individuals attempting to reconcile their ethnic and national identities to avoid 
discrimination. The partnership between synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
showcases their ability to simultaneously use their ethnic and national identities to their 
advantage. They collaborated and used their national identities as Americans and 
Canadians as a way to negotiate ethnic issues. Wartime cooperation shows that the ethnic 
and religious bonds between these two communities remained strong during the 1940s. 
They deliberately used their nationalities as a vehicle for ethnic maintenance, not 
disappearance.  
 Congregants, especially women, were less willing to embrace the national and 
patriotic symbols sanctioned by their pastors and the state. Although the strategies 
implemented by pastors and elite laymen tried to alter the physical and ideological space 
of Lutheran churches, the strong protests on behalf of the congregants demonstrated a 
continued German ethnicity during the early stages of war. The willingness of 
congregants to protest elite reforms ensured that Lutheran churches did not fully 
transform from German to patriotic spaces. Their resistance shows that they 
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conceptualized their ethnicity as intimately connected to their Lutheranism during their 
struggle to maintain German language services at their churches. Furthermore, German 
Lutheran women rejected the militarization of their churches, as it did not resonate with 
their own perception of what it meant to be a German Lutheran. They could not support a 
Lutheranism or church space that called for war, when they believed strongly in working 
towards peace. Pastors ultimately advocated a wartime patriotism that did not reflect the 
ethnic identities of their congregants. Lutheran churches functioned as important places to 
perform their ethnic and religious identities, and congregants were unwilling to silently 
accept the reforms implemented by their pastors and church councils.  
 The Second World War strained the church’s historic function as an ethnic 
boundary zone. The war made being both “German” and “American” or “Canadian” 
appear incompatible, thereby forcing pastors to emphasize their nationality while 
congregants fought to keep their ethnic traditions intact. The war therefore prompted 
German Lutherans at all levels of the congregation to confront, and, for some, to defend 
their ethnic identity. Far from victims or seamlessly integrated Canadians and Americans, 
pastors and congregants alike took the steps they felt necessary in negotiating their ethnic 
identities in wartime. Regardless of how they felt about the war, another war with 
Germany ensured they were acutely aware of their German heritage. Pastors saw their 
ethnicity as a source of anxiety whereas congregants saw their German ethnic identity as 
closely related to faith and as a vehicle for expressing anti-war and pro-peace sentiments. 
German Lutherans did not assimilate during the early stages of the war, but rather tried to 
balance their hybrid German, Canadian, American, and Lutheran identities.  
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Chapter 2: Between Church and State: Race and Religion during the Second World 
War 
 Lutheran pastors and synod leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County had their 
authority challenged not only from within their congregations, but also from outside. 
While the previous chapter examined the internal debates and controversies that divided 
Lutheran churches, this chapter examines how the German Lutheran elite mediated their 
ethnicity in the public sphere. As ethnic elites and leaders in their communities, pastors 
vocally advocated support for the war through speeches, publications, and 
correspondence with government officials to prove their loyalty. Government officials 
ultimately determined whether or not pastors would face incarceration or internment, and 
leaders in the Missouri and Canada Synods eagerly cultivated political alliances to ensure 
they endured the war unscathed. The Missouri Synod cooperated with several government 
agencies throughout the war to highlight their patriotism. They worked alongside the 
Office of Civilian Defense to produce propaganda booklets, such as People Come First, 
and also reported to the Office of War Information (OWI) about how ethnic and racial 
tensions impeded the war effort. Canada Synod leaders, meanwhile, established 
connections with some of Canada’s leading politicians such as Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King over shared notions of citizenship and history by discussing their loyalty in the 
context of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth. This chapter examines these points of 
contact between ethnic elites and government agencies in order to examine how German 
Lutherans mediated their ethnicity and faith in these interactions.  
 German Lutheran elites on both sides of the border worried that their governments 
doubted their loyalty as a result of their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith. This chapter 
argues that although their ethnicity and religion may have placed their loyalty in doubt, 
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German Lutheran appeals to a shared Protestantism and whiteness provided valuable 
strategies to negotiate wartime hostility. Critics both inside and outside the Missouri and 
Canada Synods often viewed Lutheran theology as a barrier to participation in the war 
effort, and synod leaders worked consciously to portray Lutherans as part of North 
America’s broader community of Protestants. They depicted Lutherans as the “original” 
Protestants and utilized the patriotic discourse of Canada and the United States as 
Christian nations to integrate their Lutheranism into the fabric of Protestant North 
America. Similarly, synod leaders mitigated the negative associations with their German 
ethnicity by appealing to a shared whiteness with government officials. Although 
government officials associated their German ethnicity with Nazism, synod leaders 
proclaimed the common bonds of whiteness, a privilege that nonwhite Americans and 
Canadians could not access. Synod leaders successfully avoided the same level of 
discrimination that nativists inflicted upon their communities during the First World War 
by consistently invoking the Protestant and white backgrounds of their churches and 
communities.  
 The ability of German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County to maintain 
both ethnic and racial identities challenges the standard depiction of the Second World 
War as a period when European immigrants adopted uniform “white” identities. David 
Roediger, one of the leading historians of whiteness, notes that “scholars have most often 
seen World War II as such a turning point” when immigrants from Eastern and Southern 
Europe joined “old stock” immigrants, such as the Irish, in a community of “white 
Americans.”210 Historians generally claim that a broad range of forces during the war 
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coalesced to ensure that European immigrants across North America viewed “World War 
II as a watershed in their acceptance as Americans.”211 Most notably, historians argue that 
the overt racism of Nazi Germany shook American and Canadian faith in scientific 
racism and subsequently prompted them to view tolerance as a key component of their 
national identities. The armed forces, and the war effort more generally, functioned as a 
“melting pot” wherein Americans and Canadians of all backgrounds overcame their 
ethnic and religious differences in order to achieve the common goal of defeating Nazi 
Germany.212 In his history of whiteness in the United States, Matthew Frye Jacobson 
describes the Second World War as a moment when European ethnic groups achieved 
acceptance as whites in contrast to the “colored races.” He argues that “not only did these 
[European] groups now belong to a unified Caucasian race, but race was deemed so 
irrelevant to who they were that it became something possessed only by ‘other’ 
peoples.”213  Historian Gary Gerstle agrees, describing the Second World War as a period 
when “Euro-Americans achieved a unity and a sense of common Americanness greater 
than what they had previously known. Full acceptance into American life finally seemed 
within” their grasp.214 Several case studies subsequently confirmed these assertions. 
Historian Thomas Guglielmo describes how Italians during the Second World War 
increased their likelihood “to identify as whites” in public, while Eric Goldstein states the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service started recording Jews as “white” instead of 
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“Hebrew” during the war.215 The Canadian scholarship supports similar conclusions, 
albeit less explicitly about race. Historians Aya Fujiwara and Ivana Caccia both describe 
how successful participation in the war effort ensured that “ethnic groups took a critical 
step in the pursuit of full partnership in Canadian society.”216  
 The German Lutheran case complicates the previous emphasis on a coalition of 
white ethnic groups working cooperatively during the war under a banner of acceptance. 
Although not completely shunned by Anglo-American and Canadian political leaders, the 
ethnic elite in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not feel welcomed as “100 percent 
Americans” or Canadians. The coercive nature of wartime patriotism alienated German 
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County from their national communities because of 
their German ethnicity. Ethnicity and religion prevented German Lutherans from 
participating in the coalition of accepted white ethnics during the Second World War. 
Yet, whiteness, and the ability of German Lutherans to portray themselves as Protestants, 
remained important in St. Louis and Waterloo County. White and Protestant identities 
helped create common links with Anglo-Canadians and Americans in instances where 
their ethnicity and religion would have “othered” their communities. The German 
Lutheran wartime experience therefore characteristically positioned these communities as 
“in-between” group. They did not face the same racial discrimination as black or Japanese 
citizens, nor did they obtain the same level of acceptance that other European groups 
received. Their ethnicity and faith made them outsiders while their race and Christianity 
prevented their complete exclusion.  
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The Protestant Appeal 
 Fear over discrimination against German Lutherans motivated John Behnken, 
president of the Missouri Synod, and John Reble, president of the Canada Synod, 
throughout the war. Both leaders realized that public declarations of loyalty would not be 
enough to guarantee their status as good citizens. In order to ensure their wellbeing, they 
needed to explicitly work with their national governments to demonstrate that they 
deserved the reputation of loyal citizens. Although government agents primarily targeted 
recently arrived German immigrants with ties to fascist clubs and not established 
German-Canadian and German-American communities, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County were unaware of such sentiments in the 1940s.217 Behnken and Reble worried 
about “this new era that is upon us” and wondered whether their churches would “occupy 
the place [it] should, or will [it] perchance be left our in the cold, or shoved back into the 
corner.”218 They made cooperation with the government one of their most important 
wartime goals in the hopes of gaining the prestige and respectability granted to other 
Protestant groups. As ethnic elites, they believed Lutherans could not be second-class 
citizens in the eyes of the government.219 Rather than the suspicion and discrimination 
that German Lutherans faced during the Great War, synod leaders hoped that 
collaboration with the government would alleviate any doubt in the public perception 
over German Lutheran loyalty.  
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This proved to be a difficult task given the public associations between 
Lutheranism and German culture and Nazism. Canadians and Americans hostile to 
Lutherans often pointed to Romans 13 and Luther’s concept of the two kingdoms to 
question German Lutheran loyalty. Since Lutherans were loyal to both church and state as 
separate institutions, some critics worried that Lutherans could profess their loyalty to 
Canada and the United States while also secretly holding a religious obligation to support 
Nazi Germany. Lutheranism had no political connections to Nazi Germany, and yet 
critics in The Canadian Baptist distorted Lutheranism as a religion “well adapted to 
German nature.” One article stated that German Lutherans were not inherently bad 
people, but rather “they are only too German and too Lutheran” to be trusted.220 Other 
editorials condemned Lutherans for perpetuating a “German institution” in North 
America. These critiques believed that Hitler was “the spiritual successor of Luther” 
because of their shared history of anti-Semitism. It concluded that if the Allies wished “to 
undo the work of Hitler, it is necessary first to undo the work of Luther.”221  
Reble and Behnken needed to combat the popular perception that Lutheranism 
and Nazism were synonymous if they hoped to make a case for their loyalty. Pastors 
started to downplay their “Lutheran” identity in favour of a vague “Protestant” or 
“Christian” identity in order to disassociate themselves from the negative associations 
between Lutheranism and Nazism. In a 1941 article, Canada Lutheran editor Douglas 
Conrad tried to create a different association in the minds of his readers: namely, that 
Canadian citizenship and Christianity were inherently linked: “Because Canadians are 
free, they have always treasured the Christian religion…The Christian people of Canada 
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realize that the only hope of the world is Christianity, and not in any manmade doctrines.” 
As Lutherans were Christians, Conrad suggested that they too belonged to “a Christian 
nation and be an example of right and justice to all the other nations of the world.”222 The 
fact that Lutherans could portray themselves as the “original Protestants” helped pastors 
argue that their religion should be connected to Christianity instead of Nazism. The 
Missouri Synod’s Lutheran Witness echoed Conrad’s sentiments in its editorials 
throughout the war that also sought to construct the idea of Lutherans as loyal Christian 
citizens. It suggested that “our greatest statesmen, like Lincoln, Washington, and Grant, 
have testified to the liberating and purifying power which proceeds from this Holy Book.” 
These men gained their insights from the Bible, a text Lutherans shared with other 
Protestant Americans. Unlike Baptists or Anglicans, however, Lutherans had particular 
claim to the modern Bible because it could be traced back to “the foundation which 
Luther had laid.”223 Instead of the whiggish narrative of Luther’s anti-Semitism 
influencing Hitler, Lutherans hoped their Canadian and American peers would see 
Luther’s important religious contributions to modern Christian North America. As 
Christian citizens, they too belonged to their national communities. 
These discourses had practical applications for Lutheran pastors throughout the 
duration of the war. Pastors used their Christian and Protestant identities as discursive 
tools in which to advocate for their loyalty. In 1942, the police arrested a young German 
war worker in St. Louis for committing an act of sabotage at the factory that employed 
him. The police alleged that this German immigrant deliberately caused the factory’s 
machinery to malfunction so as to slow production and stall the American war effort. The 
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episode troubled St. Louis’s German Lutheran population. They worried this act of 
sabotage would reflect poorly on their community and further embolden their anti-
German neighbours. In an effort to defuse the situation, the Reverend Louis Sieck argued 
that the act of sabotage never would have happened if the young man was a Christian. He 
argued that “the Christian is indeed a nation’s best citizen,” who “will cooperate even 
though his government’s policies are not entirely to his liking.”224 Sieck hoped his 
congregation’s Christianity would overcome any negative associations their German 
heritage created.      
 A broad Christian, instead of Lutheran or German, label became even more 
important when dealing with government officials. Behnken and Reble both worried that 
their Lutheran faith would cause government agencies to look upon them with suspicion 
and mistrust. As a result, they both created wartime organizations that aimed to establish 
political connections with the government as Christian rather than Lutheran 
organizations. In April 1940, Reble met with other synod leaders across Canada to form 
the Commission for Wartime Services (CWS) so that Lutherans across Canada “prove 
[the synod’s] vitality and determination” to the Canadian public in waging a patriotic war 
effort.225 The CWS aimed to promote Lutheran loyalty in Canada and act as an 
intermediary between the various synods and the Canadian government.226 They 
publicized their wartime fundraising campaigns to demonstrate that they were loyal 
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citizens.227 Operating under much the same pressures, Behnken established the 
Emergency Planning Council (EPC) in 1942.  
 The CWS and EPC both petitioned their respective governments to help assist 
German prisoners of war held in North America as Christian, rather than Lutheran, 
organizations. Synod leaders expressed sympathy with the interned Nazi prisoners 
throughout the duration of the war. They believed that many of these soldiers should be 
granted access to spiritual assistance during what was surely a lonely and foreign 
experience. Both synods proposed programs that sought to alleviate what they perceived 
as German suffering in these prisoner of war camps. The CWS and EPC contacted pastors 
stationed nearby these camps and prompted them to visit prisoners weekly and deliver 
sermons, as well as distribute Bibles and hymn books so that prisoners could worship 
even when the pastors were absent. They furthermore intended to send relief packages 
containing small gifts, food, and other means to make their imprisonment less isolating.228 
As Germans, synod leaders believed they had a “distinct obligation” to provide for the 
spiritual needs of prisoners while other religious groups would merely forget about 
them.229  
 Helping German prisoners, however, threatened to dismantle the “loyal” image 
synod leaders attempted to cultivate throughout the war. Such efforts would inevitably 
lead them to form relationships with Nazi prisoners, a group that their governments 
considered dangerous. After trying to downplay their ethnicity throughout the war, 
contact with German prisoners threatened to raise government suspicion. Harvey H. 
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Budny, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, expressed concerns over the Missouri 
Synod’s increased contact with imprisoned Germans. He asked synod representatives if 
distributing German-language hymns could “in any way be used by German political 
organizations of Gestapo character” to undermine the American war effort. He questioned 
if Missouri Synod efforts would allow a pro-Nazi German to “spy on the activities” of the 
synod and pass these secrets back to Germany.230 In order to overcome Budny’s 
suspicion, synod leaders relied on portraying their support for German prisoners as a 
religious rather than ethnic duty. In outlining their reasons for helping prisoners of war, 
members of the Missouri Synod stated they felt “a distinct obligation to bring them a 
spiritual ministry which is in harmony with their convictions.”231 Their job was “to supply 
appropriate hymnals, prayer books, and devotional literature for the spiritual care of war 
prisoners” and “to foster general welfare of prisoners of war,” and nothing that might give 
reason to suspect the synod of disloyalty.232  
 Internally, the EPC reminded pastors who preached to prisoners of war to “be 
discreet in your public utterances by speaking objectively in terms of spiritual values.”233 
Government officials needed to feel secure that they ministered to prisoners out of a 
religious desire, and not because of their ethnicity or pro-German attitudes. “Do not allow 
your sympathy to run away with better judgment,” one pastor reiterated. “Your mission is 
                                                        
230 CHI, LMC, Box 79, POW Strieter Folder, Memorandum Re Conference in Washington About 
Establishing Theological Seminary Camp for German Prisoners of War, 20 February 1945. 
231 CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 8 October 
1943. 
232 CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 5 November 
1943. 
233 CHI, LMC, Box 76, Folder 560, Minutes of the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, 5 November 
1943. 
 97 
purely spiritual.”234 By framing their desire as a religious over ethnic obligation, German 
Lutherans tried to avoid raising the old wartime suspicions that they preached to “the 
enemy” in their own language. While the Protestant label did not fully shield Lutherans 
from suspicion, it provided a strong enough argument that they could carry out their work 
with permission from the government.  
 
The People Come First Controversy  
 
 The separation of church and state, or Romans 13, complicated the Missouri 
Synod’s attempt to cultivate a public Protestant identity. Because Romans 13 stated that 
political and religious affairs must be kept separate, many members of the Missouri 
Synod were more hesitant to explicitly cooperate with the federal government than other 
religious groups. This proved particularly problematic, because the American government 
had little interest in working individually with each religious denomination to ensure 
cooperation on the home front. They preferred to work with large interfaith groups 
composed of different Protestant denominations. This tactic, however, sparked fear of 
“unionism” within the Missouri Synod. They worried that cooperation or “union” with 
these other liberal Protestant denominations would dilute their conservative theological 
convictions and understanding of the Bible. Cooperation might have the unintended 
consequence of weakening the Missouri Synod’s doctrine and dilute their “pure doctrine” 
or Lehre that synod officials fought to preserve since the synod’s nineteenth century 
foundation. Concerns that contact with liberal religious groups would furthermore 
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weaken their use of the German language, which proved insight into Luther’s 
understanding of the Bible, often went hand-in-hand with these fears.235 
 Anxieties over Romans 13 and unionism shaped the Missouri Synod’s initial 
meetings with government officials in 1942. In late November, the Office of Civilian 
Defense (OCD) contacted the EPC and asked them to send a representative to a meeting 
in Washington to advise the government on how to best promote wartime patriotism and 
cooperation on the home front with other American religious leaders. Lawrence Meyer, 
the EPC’s executive director, attended the meeting as the synod’s representative. Meyer 
discovered that the OCD planned on creating a pamphlet to be disseminated to 
congregations of all faiths in order to promote patriotism on the home front and justify 
controversial government policies such as food and fuel rationing. This plan, however, 
violated the Missouri Synod’s conservative stance on Romans 13 and unionism by 
encouraging both cooperation with the state and other religious groups. The OCD’s 
proposed pamphlet promoted a general and theologically unspecific text meant to appeal 
to all Christians, regardless of how closely they followed the Bible. It seemed to promote 
what Meyer conceived as a bland “social gospel” rather than a religious view centered on 
the Bible and Christ’s teaching. Meyer made his disdain clearly known at the meeting and 
promised that the Missouri Synod could not work alongside other religious groups with 
such a loose understanding of the Bible. He voiced his displeasure and left the meeting 
before it even concluded.236   
 Meyer realized the poor impression he had made during the meeting with the 
OCD and other government officials. He remained true to his theological convictions but 
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these same convictions threatened the loyal image he and other synod leaders wished to 
cultivate. Concerned that the government would question his loyalty, Meyer apologized 
and admitted he was “rather ashamed of my outspoken suggestions and criticism” but that 
“such topics as ‘Inter-faith’…are too controversial at the moment to foster a spirit of unity 
in the nation.” Meyer worried his criticism reflected poorly on the synod’s loyalty and 
took pains to remind the OCD of the Missouri Synod’s allegiance to the government. He 
told Maynard Cassady, the OCD’s representative on religious matters, that “wherever we 
can be of service we are at your command.”237  
 Meyer could not risk the government thinking he was disloyal or uncooperative. 
He ultimately decided to suppress his theological concerns and promised to work with 
Cassady and the OCD in the future. Cassady subsequently made Meyer one of the lead 
writers of a propaganda pamphlet titled People Come First, a booklet intended for 
American pastors. The booklet provided pastors of all different faiths with advice on how 
to discuss the war with their congregation. It recognized Americans might have a difficult 
time adjusting to new wartime policies such as food and fuel rationing, and provided 
short explanations on how pastors could convince their congregation to support these 
government policies. Meyer worked alongside Cassady to ensure that the pamphlet 
emphasized the government’s aims of promoting a united war effort on the home front.238 
 While Meyer recognized that his involvement with the government could 
emphasize the synod’s loyalty, he also knew that such a blatant display of interfaith 
cooperation with other Protestants exposed him to criticisms within the synod of 
advocating for unionism. When the OCD released People Come First in mid-1943, Meyer 
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sent out a press release to all Missouri Synod pastors explaining his rationale for 
endorsing the book. He explained that the war made him more aware of his “duties to 
community and State from which we derive the benefits of life, liberty, and freedom of 
worship.” In his defense of People Come First, Meyer encouraged German Lutheran 
critics of war not to view the state as a threat to their ethnicity and faith. Instead, he 
claimed that the American government protected religious freedom and therefore 
deserved to be respected. He encouraged pastors to read People Come First and 
implement its recommendations as a way to demonstrate that they too were good citizens. 
More significantly, Meyer believed that the synod needed to increase its involvement in 
the war effort as a “lack of cooperation, inefficiency, and low-geared work is labeled 
‘sabotage’” in American society.239 Meyer’s message was clear. If pastors wanted to 
avoid wartime discrimination, they needed to follow the patriotic steps outlined in the 
booklet. In publishing People Come First, Meyer hoped that the government would no 
longer see German Lutherans as saboteurs, but as loyal American Protestants.  
 People Come First provoked a strong reaction among synod members who did not 
agree with the Missouri Synod leadership’s emphasis on government cooperation. Critics 
objected to the pamphlet’s interfaith character. The OCD distributed the pamphlet to all 
Protestant congregations in the United States and People Come First accordingly 
emphasized cooperation among all Americans without consideration of religious doctrine. 
To many, it triggered fears that the Missouri Synod was heading towards a violation of 
their position on “unionism” that encouraged religious cooperation without due 
consideration of the Bible. Several pastors wrote to synod leaders, like Behnken and 
Meyer, in St. Louis to voice their disgust over what was clearly one of the “sinister 
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tactics” employed by synod leaders “to bring our beloved Synod into fellowship with 
another church body with which we are not yet in doctrinal agreement.” Opponents 
believed that in a time of crisis such as war, the synod should focus its attention on 
“purity of doctrine instead of social gospel.”240 Critics also believed that the booklet’s 
emphasis on participating in public life through wartime charities violated the Missouri 
Synod’s traditional stance on Romans 13. By encouraging Lutherans to participate in 
state sanctioned wartime activities, critics argued that the church moved beyond the realm 
of spiritual care. Many critics accused Meyer of “distorted doctrine” that “commits the 
church to a political philosophy” thereby violating Romans 13.241 The clearest indication 
that the booklet violated scripture was contained on the first page of the booklet, which 
contained a message that stated the booklet had the approval of the OCD. One pastor 
expressed shock that “what the church teaches & does must be submitted to government 
censorship!”242 The strict adherence to Romans 13 and policy on union that synod leaders 
stressed prior to the war became a significant source of tension as synod leaders violated 
these theological positions in an effort to gain government approval.    
 The booklet also angered Missouri Synod members on the basis of their ethnicity. 
People Come First contained several political cartoons and illustrations within the 
booklet. While many tried to depict amusing observations on the American home front, 
others ridiculed Germans and Germany. The illustrations often featured Germans dressed 
in Gestapo uniforms or as personified by Hitler. These cartoons upset many members of 
the synod who felt it attacked their own ethnic identities as Germans. One district of the 
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synod protested to the leadership in St. Louis that a cartoon featured within People Come 
First “expresses an improper contempt for the enemy.” Other pastors went further and 
stated that the portrayal of Germans within the booklet was “grotesque and hideous.”243 
Critics similarly objected to attempts to justify war with Germany. On the opening page 
of the booklet, Meyer described how “the messy business of the world” required the 
church to take a leading role in the war effort. J. Franklin Yount, a pastor from Ohio and 
Meyer’s most vocal critic, referenced this passage and questioned why, instead of 
preparing for war, the church did not instead work towards peace.244 Meyer replied that 
Americans who did good Christian deeds during the war were doing the charitable work 
of Christ. Because all good deeds could be considered Christian, Meyer told Yount that 
helping win the war ultimately helped create a peaceful world. The irony of this statement 
did not escape Yount. He wryly asked Meyer that if participating in the war was to do 
Christ’s work, “what about the Germans?”245 In a passage describing the importance of 
rationing so that American farms could help feed the British, Yount quoted the Biblical 
passage “If thine enemy hunger, feed him” to demonstrate the hypocrisy of Meyer’s 
statements. Yount went so far as to comment that American soldiers were overseas to 
“bomb, blast, and butcher the innocent victims” of Germany.246  
 The Missouri Synod’s pro-German attitude influenced their opposition to 
American militarization of the home front. One section of the booklet discussed local 
Defense Councils in glowing and positive terms. Meyer encouraged Christians to work 
alongside their Defense Councils so that they could be seen as loyal members of their 
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community. Once again, critics rejected this overt patriotism by questioning the 
practicalities of Defense Councils that were surely run by “ungodly men.”247 Another 
section of People Come First encouraged young people to engage in war work, to which 
one critic replied that these workers only helped “to make hell in [the] world.”248 Such 
critiques of war industries were common. Yount, for instance, rejected all portrayals of 
heroic women war workers who, as Meyer portrayed them, should still have time to spend 
looking after their children. Yount replied that Meyer “forgot one picture” of the 
American family, namely the mother who works all day to create bombs that kill “the 
children of other mothers!”249 To critics, People Come First was just another instance of 
the Missouri Synod becoming “a mere adjunct to a military machine in an all-out war 
program.”250 Yount commented that virtually every pastor he spoke to objected to the 
booklet’s publication, but that “few of any will have the courage under present conditions 
to write to you.”251 Fear of appearing disloyal over not supporting a government 
publication motivated pastors to stay silent in fear of anti-German reprisals.  
 The People Come First controversy highlighted the precarious position the war 
created for ethnic elites such as Lawrence Meyer. Even in instances where Lutherans 
could successfully portray themselves as Protestants and mitigate wartime discrimination, 
they faced internal critics that felt the synod’s position on the war violated their Lutheran 
faith. Lutheran theology problematized the Missouri Synod’s ability to participate in the 
war effort, both in the eyes of nativists who did not trust their faith and among their peers 
who believed that it violated Romans 13. Synod leaders and pastors seemed increasingly 
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caught in the middle between church and state. Regardless of what strategies they 
engaged in to appear loyal, it seemed to officials like Meyer that German Lutherans 
would not be able to unite behind the war effort without theological reservations. 
  
Whiteness and Race Relations in St. Louis 
 
 
 Unlike their attempts to appeal to a Protestant identity, efforts on behalf of synod 
leaders to benefit from their racial status as whites proved less controversial and far more 
effective. While their German ethnicity and Lutheran theology may have placed their 
loyalty in doubt, the ability of synod leaders to appeal to a shared whiteness with 
government officials proved effective in negotiating wartime tensions. While government 
officials sometimes expressed doubts about German Lutheran loyalty, they also saw 
synod leaders such as Behnken as possible allies due to their shared racial attitudes 
towards racialized Americans. Although their German ethnicity kept them outside of the 
coalition of “white ethnics” during the war, their whiteness prevented their complete 
exclusion from North American society.  
 Created in June 1942 by President Roosevelt, the Office of War Information 
(OWI) sought to provide Americans with an authoritative voice on the war. The OWI 
encouraged Americans to unite behind the war effort in order to defeat fascism abroad 
and reached the American public through an extensive propaganda campaign that utilized 
films and posters.252 The OWI often viewed any home front tensions as possibly 
detrimental to the war effort, and therefore sought to promote an American identity based 
on tolerance and democratic values. In arguing against the necessity to defeat a Nazi 
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Germany fuelled on hatred and militarism, the OWI crafted a narrative of a United States 
founded on acceptance and freedom. Their propaganda efforts often targeted American 
ethnic and religious groups like Jewish, Catholic, Polish, and Greek Americans who 
previously had not felt fully embraced as “100% Americans.”253 The image of an 
American platoon featuring soldiers from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds 
helped cultivate an image of a country where all white ethnics could find acceptance due 
to their shared belief in defeating fascism overseas.254 As whiteness historians have 
demonstrated, the OWI’s attempts to promote equality throughout the nation gave white 
ethnic groups an unprecedented level of acceptance as unhyphenated “Americans” 
throughout the war.255 
 German Americans, however, were left out of the newfound state-sanctioned 
definitions of tolerance and respect towards ethnic communities. While other ethnic 
groups saw themselves represented in Hollywood films and propaganda posters 
contributing to the war effort, portrayals of Germans were limited to menacing depictions 
of the enemy. Yet, the OWI was interested in working with German Americans as part of 
their outreach program to monitor how various American ethnic groups participated in the 
war effort. As part of their study to see the effects of their propaganda campaign, the OWI 
contacted various ethnic leaders “in key situations throughout the country” to ask them 
questions on how they could improve their propaganda efforts. In the summer of 1942, 
Keith Kane, Chief of the Bureau of Intelligence, contacted Behnken under the pretense of 
accomplishing this goal. Kane explained to Behnken that the OWI chose to correspond 
with him as they often selected individuals who they felt were able to best represent 
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“members of the group with which they are best acquainted.”256 Without explicitly stating 
so, Kane referred to Behnken’s connection with German Lutherans, particularly in St. 
Louis. Kane hoped that Behnken would provide the OWI with information on how 
German Lutherans in St. Louis responded to the war effort. After a few relatively non-
controversial questions on food rationing, Kane and the OWI’s employees started to 
pressure Behnken to answer questions relating to German-American loyalty. In March 
1943, an OWI employee bluntly asked Behnken to tell him about “the present attitude of 
the people with whom you come in contact toward the Germans.” Specifically, the OWI 
wanted to know whether German Americans distinguished between the various groups in 
Germany, ranging from German students to members of the Schutzstaffel, commonly 
referred to as the “SS.” The OWI also asked Behnken whether any of these groups “could 
be relied upon to support a democratic” government after the war and what measures 
Behnken’s “people” believe should be adopted “toward the Germans” after the war 
ended.257  
 The OWI’s questions placed Behnken in a difficult position. The synod leader 
knew that many members of the Missouri Synod had ambivalent or outright hostile 
responses to the war and did have sympathies for Germany. Instead of lying to the 
government or exposing German-American hostility, Behnken embraced his role as an 
ethnic elite. He tried to broker a better understanding between the OWI and his German-
American followers by contextualizing German-American responses to the war. Behnken 
had to provide the opinions of his community while ensuring they did not appear as pro-
Nazi. Behnken began his response by noting there were “divergent opinions” regarding 
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Germany. Although the OWI expected Behnken to describe how German-Americans felt 
about Nazism, he subverted their expectations by describing the uncritical and biased 
view of most American nativists. Alluding to the discrimination he previously faced, 
Behnken reported how Americans “whom I have heard from even without making any 
inquiry have expressed themselves in sharpest terms about all the people of Germany.” 
Behnken recounted how many Americans believed all Germans blindly supported and 
idolized Hitler. This lack of nuance led Americans to believe that the German people 
willingly allowed Hitler to come to power because “they all favor his policies.”258 
Behnken contrasted these opinions with his own views. He reported that unlike nativists, 
his “people” differentiated “between the ordinary [Germans] and the party in power.” 
Behnken stated that he personally believed ordinary Germans were not responsible for the 
war and “have gotten into evil hands and are not able to remove the shackles which have 
been placed upon them.” In adopting this more critical approach, Behnken still made sure 
to sufficiently critique the Nazis so that no reader could question his loyalty. He labeled 
Hitler an “unprincipled demagogue” and said that he had “heard no one attempt to defend 
the present party in power.” Behnken concluded his assessment on Germany by 
describing his hope that Germany could be reformed as a democracy once the war 
ended.259 As an ethnic elite, Behnken sought to broker a better understanding between his 
German-American community and his Anglo-American hosts. Behnken demonstrated his 
fluency in both German and American worlds by describing both nativist and German-
American responses to the war. Most importantly, providing the OWI with the nativist 
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reaction allowed Behnken to insinuate that it was the nativists who had an extreme 
opinion, not German Americans.  
 The OWI responded with a lukewarm letter that, despite Behnken’s best efforts, 
situated him exclusively as a “German.” An OWI official replied that Behnken and “the 
people with whom you have talked” considered German politics much more than most 
Americans. The employee lectured Behnken on the “correct” and “American” stance on 
the German question. He informed Behnken that most Americans believed “the German 
people, not alone their leaders, are responsible for the war.” The Nazi-indoctrinated 
German youth ensured there was “relatively little hope” in finding a group in Germany to 
support democracy.260 The OWI’s hostile anti-German response to Behnken stands out in 
contrast to their treatment of other American ethnic groups. Although historians have 
singled the OWI out for wartime achievement in combating nativism on the home front 
through their pluralistic films and propaganda posters, Behnken’s sympathetic 
interpretation of Germany received little of this charity.261 The OWI’s traditional 
portrayal as an organization that accepted a broad coalition of immigrant groups into 
white mainstream America had little resonance with Behnken. Germany’s status as an 
enemy combatant country meant OWI employees treated any signs of German sympathy 
with mistrust. The OWI listened to Behnken’s point of view on rationing and other 
wartime issues, but admonished him for his “un-American” stance on Nazi Germany. 
While Behnken tried to advocate on behalf of his German-American community, the 
OWI’s responses indicate that his ethnicity continued to place his loyalty in doubt. Their 
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German ethnicity prevented German Lutherans from joining other white ethnics in the 
OWI’s coalition.  
 The OWI’s vision of a tolerant and united America that could overcome ethnic 
and religious difference furthermore could not incorporate racialized Americans. The 
OWI hoped to portray a united American populace working harmoniously to support the 
war effort via war production on the home front. Racial tensions and Jim Crow 
segregation in the work place, however, complicated their ability to incorporate black 
Americans into their idealized vision of a unified America.262 Several cities in the 
Midwest enforced strict segregation practices that excluded black workers from working 
in the war industry, or gave them the most dangerous and undesirable jobs. A 1942 study, 
for instance, found that over seventy percent of employers refused to hire black workers 
in the war industry.263 Black activists calling for an end to segregation or equal pay in the 
work place brought attention to the inequalities racialized Americans faced and 
challenged the OWI’s propaganda efforts to portray their nation as founded on tolerance 
and equality. 
 If Behnken’s ethnicity placed him outside the patriotic mainstream, his whiteness 
and hostility towards black workers granted him the respectability his ethnicity denied 
him. The OWI corresponded with Behnken not just over issues relating to German 
Americans, but also over racial tensions in the Midwest. These opportunities provided 
Behnken with the chance to firmly support the war effort by condemning striking black 
labourers alongside OWI officials. Black labor unrest throughout the country and in St. 
Louis prompted the OWI to ask Behnken about the “tension(s) between Negroes and 
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whites” in St. Louis in 1943. Race riots between white and black Americans made 
national headlines throughout the war and repeatedly called attention to the racial 
inequalities faced by many Americans.264 Several protests over the poor working 
conditions black Americans faced in St. Louis occurred throughout the war. Black 
labourers staged peaceful protests to call attention to segregation in the city throughout 
1943 and 1944. Black workers employed in segregated factories found they were often 
refused service at the local lunch counters throughout the downtown core. The Citizens 
Civil Rights Committee of St. Louis organized several “sit-ins” at local restaurants 
throughout the war in order to demonstrate the racial disparities that existed within the 
city.265 Although minor compared to the race riots that occurred in Harlem and Detroit, 
such protests showed the growing tension between white and black workers in St. Louis 
and jeopardized the OWI’s ability to portray the United States as a nation of freedom and 
equality. 
 The OWI was not interested in how black workers felt about labor unrest, nor 
whether the government provided them with enough assistance. Instead, the OWI wanted 
to learn how white Americans responded to these racial conflicts. For once, Behnken 
easily met the OWI’s expectations. Behnken told the OWI “there can be no doubt that 
[hostility] between Negroes and whites” existed throughout St. Louis. Personally, he 
believed that “the white man” should generally follow a policy of “live and let live” with 
his black neighbors. However, he joined other Americans in condemning “the colored 
people” when they became “too bold…as soon as social equality is demanded you notice 
the tension.” He told the OWI that he and other Americans believed the government 
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should intervene only if “the Negro became too forward” in demanding equality.266 
Behnken’s critical response towards black protestors echoed the fears of many white 
workers and union leaders who rejected racial equality in the workplace. Black workers 
entered war industries such as shipbuilding in greater numbers in the 1940s and wanted 
membership in preexisting unions. Unions resisted these efforts as they felt black workers 
would take this as a sign of racial equality. They argued that allowing both white and 
black workers in the same union threatened the superiority of the white worker.267 
Behnken’s statements echoed arguments in the mainstream press that viewed blacks who 
made demands for workplace equality as “troublemakers” and “uppity” more 
generally.268 He believed the government should not force the issue of equality and let 
time ease the nation’s racial tensions. Behnken believed race riots occurred during the 
war because of “pushy” black workers, not because white employers denied them 
equality. He told the OWI that the more black activists “insist upon their privileges [the] 
longer we will have these problems before us.”269  
 Condemning labor unrest provided Behnken with a rare opportunity to 
demonstrate his support for the war effort. Government officials and branches such as the 
OWI placed the highest importance on achieving unity on the home front. Racial and 
labor unrest therefore emerged as one of the main obstacles to maintaining wartime unity. 
The Labor Department emphasized throughout the war that each strike represented hours 
or days wasted in wartime production. Many politicians, especially those from the 
southern states, condemned black protests on the basis that they hampered both wartime 
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unity and war work simultaneously.270 Although Behnken’s ethnicity and religion put him 
at odds with the war effort, his race and hostility towards black issues allowed him to join 
mainstream America. Behnken’s whiteness positioned him firmly on the side of capital 
and elite whites, over labor and nonwhite workers. In doing so, Behnken allied himself 
firmly with the war effort.  
 Behnken’s precarious relationship with the OWI highlights the complex interplay 
between race and ethnicity that emerged during the war. Ethnicity and race operated in 
tandem for German Lutherans during the war and played an integral role in how OWI 
employees interpreted Behnken’s comments. Behnken’s German ethnicity created 
tensions with the OWI and effectively placed him on the “wrong side” of the government 
and its positions on Germany. However, Behnken’s whiteness created an avenue for him 
to bond with and voice the “agreeable” wartime positions on matters relating to labour 
and race relations. Unlike the black labourers he so readily condemned, Behnken 
managed to advocate for tolerance during the war without facing possible incarceration as 
result of his white skin. In this instance, Behnken’s whiteness made his advocacy work on 
behalf of a stigmatized ethnic group possible.  
 
Whiteness and the Pioneer Myth  
 
 Race played an equally important role in determining loyalty at the cultural and 
ideological level. In particular, German-Canadian Lutherans most often drew on their 
whiteness through the covert language surrounding their Canadian citizenship and 
through the pioneer myth that emerged during the interwar years. The story of German 
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immigrants and “Loyalists” arriving in early nineteenth century Waterloo County 
followed a narrative typical in many settler societies. Historian Lorenzo Veracini 
describes “settler colonial narratives” as linear stories of “progress,” wherein settlers 
narrate their arrival on unoccupied land where they built new homes or nations.271 By 
focusing on establishing new communities on the “frontier,” these narratives convey the 
idea that settlers are entitled to or deserving of the land they occupy. They help settlers 
imagine themselves as the “natural” or even “indigenous” inhabitants of their land.272 By 
describing the process of settlement as “peaceful” and “nation-building,” these stories tap 
into broader racialized discourses that often associate governance and leadership with 
whiteness. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, centuries of imperial and colonial rule 
convinced Europeans that the white race had a natural aptitude to constructing and ruling 
new nations.273 Portraying the settlement process as “peaceful” furthermore allows 
settlers to ignore their own role in deliberately and violently displacing the region’s 
indigenous inhabitants. In doing so, these narratives help craft the idea of the “innocent 
settler” that disavows their complicity in marginalizing indigenous peoples in favour of 
crafting an image that portrays them as the legitimate owners of the land.274 The pioneer 
myth, with its emphasis on peaceful German immigrants “taming” the “wilderness,” very 
much fits the settler colonial narrative, with German settlers joining the ranks of Anglo-
American settlers. The pioneer myth functioned as a coded narrative only available to 
white Canadians that allowed German Canadians to argue for their loyalty throughout the 
war.  
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 German Canadians risked being portrayed as “enemy aliens” or “foreigners” by 
discriminatory Anglo-Canadians and therefore needed a way to demonstrate that they 
belonged in Canada. The pioneer myth served this function during the early years of the 
war. Carl Klinck, a professor of English at Waterloo College and Waterloo Lutheran 
Seminary, drew explicitly on the pioneer myth in a 1939 article titled “Waterloo College 
and the Nazi Issue.” Klinck intended the article to act as an early argument against the 
possible attacks he and German Lutherans in Waterloo County could face on account of 
their ethnicity and faith. He wrote that that the Second World War once again revived the 
“falsehood, perpetuated since the Great War by…mistakenly patriotic enthusiasts, that 
Lutheranism and Pro-Germanism (now known as Nazi-ism) are synonymous.”275 
Klinck’s paper combatted these public perceptions by using historical and contemporary 
references framed in the pioneer myth. He noted that the 1931 census stated only six 
percent of Canada Synod members were born in Germany. He argued that even this 
minority was not cause for concern, as most of this group “are old people” who came to 
Canada as “youthful pioneers,” long before Hitler’s rise to power.276 Reble drew on 
similar themes in a 1939 speech that connected the synod’s current membership with their 
“Loyalist” ancestors. He described how many Lutheran churches in Ontario and Quebec 
originally formed as a result of the Loyalist migration to Canada and were “at all times 
loyal and faithful citizens of King and country.” The long history of Lutheranism in 
Canada demonstrated, according to Reble, that the church “is native to [Canadian] soil” 
and could therefore work in cooperation with the Canadian state.277 St. Louis-based 
pastors drew on similar themes as well. Paul Koenig, the pastor at Holy Cross Lutheran 
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Church, preached that “the Saxon Immigrants who settled in our country one hundred 
years ago were patriotic Americans.” He quoted C.F.W. Walther’s positive thoughts on 
the Declaration of Independence extensively to show the unbroken link of loyalty that 
existed from the initial generation of pioneers to present day. Koenig urged his 
congregation to “follow in the footsteps of the fathers…and let us prove by our actions 
that true Lutherans are patriotic Americans.”278   
 The pioneer myth proved particularly potent when paired with the Lutheran 
strategy of appealing to religious or Protestant-based identities. H.T. Lehmann, the 
president of Waterloo College and Seminary, gave a speech during the war that tried to 
insert Lutherans into Canada’s national mythology by drawing on the pioneer myth. He 
argued that they, like their other Anglican and Presbyterian peers, also helped contribute 
to the Canadian nation. Lehmann deliberately downplayed the church’s German heritage 
by eschewing “the custom in Canada to evaluate the contribution of an individual or a 
group of individuals to Canadian national life…largely on a racial basis.” Lehmann 
proposed that Canadian society examine the accomplishments of religious groups, 
wherein Lutherans played an important role. He went on to emphasize the role of 
“Lutheran Loyalists” who “contributed to the prosperous development of this section of 
Canada through thrift and industry” alongside the current generation of Lutheran soldiers 
“paying the greatest price anyone can pay” overseas. He believed that the Lutheran 
sacrifice, both in the past and present, ensured that future Canadians would evaluate their 
“contributions to Canadian Culture…from a religious rather than a racial point of 
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view.”279 Lehmann described the ancestors of his church not as foreign German 
immigrants, but as dedicated Lutheran Loyalists who contributed to the nation alongside 
Loyalists of other religious denominations.   
 Reble, Klinck, and Lehmann’s use of the pioneer myth contained many 
contradictions. While all three men mythologized the original wave of Lutheran 
“Loyalists,” very few members of the Canada Synod could trace their own ancestry to the 
Loyalist migrations.280 In fact, most of the synod leaders and pastors praising the so-
called “Lutheran Loyalists” were first or second-generation immigrants. Reble, for 
instance, was born in Germany and only migrated to Canada shortly before the First 
World War. Moreover, their attempt to demonstrate the “indigenous” or “Canadian” 
character of Lutheranism was particularly dubious given Lutheranism’s historic 
connections to the German states and Protestant Reformation. Yet, this is precisely why 
the pioneer myth resonated so strongly in Waterloo County. Unlike other narratives used 
by settlers, German-Canadians did not deliberately use the pioneer myth to displace 
indigenous people, even if it did implicitly do so by ignoring and erasing their presence. 
Instead, German Canadians used the pioneer myth because it deployed Anglo-Canadian 
narratives of colonization against nativist assertions of German disloyalty, even as it also 
provided a sense of belonging for German Lutherans and normalized their presence in 
Canada. Transforming “foreign immigrants” into “indigenous inhabitants” with legal and 
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social rights was the primary function of settler colonial narratives.281 By using a settler 
colonial narrative like the pioneer myth, German Lutherans normalized their existence in 
Waterloo County as loyal citizens rather than “dangerous foreigners.” The pioneer myth 
recounted German-Canadian Lutheran history in a language readily understandable to 
Anglo-Canadians. Thus, the pioneer myth did not try to disrupt the Canadian racial 
hierarchy or challenge Canadian supremacy. It merely sought to broaden the definition of 
who could be considered Canadian by framing German Lutheran history in a manner that 
resonated with Canadians who might otherwise demonize them on the basis of their 
ethnicity.  
 The inherent whiteness built into the pioneer myth helped German-Canadian 
Lutherans cultivate alliances with certain members of the Anglo-Canadian political elite. 
Liberal Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King emerged as a staunch ally to 
German Canadians in Waterloo County during the early years of the war as a result of his 
long history with the region. King was born and raised in Waterloo County as a part of 
the community’s minority Scottish and English population. Yet, as German culture 
dominated the community, King grew up learning German in school and studied abroad 
in Germany during his university career. During the 1908 federal election, King 
campaigned in Waterloo County by giving speeches in German that emphasized the 
cooperative bonds that existed between German and English Canadians in the area.282 
King’s belief in a “cultural partnership” between Germans and Anglos did not wane 
during the interwar period. King embraced the county’s pioneer myth and continued to 
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remember his hometown in idealized and romantic ways throughout his lifetime.283 King 
knew of the ethnic antagonism that occurred in Waterloo County during the war, but did 
not let it deter his positive associations with the area and with German Canadians more 
generally. King expressed regret that Berlin changed its name to Kitchener during the 
Great War, and as late as 1939 still conceptualized the area as “a portion of Germany 
transplanted in this distant land.”284 The prime minister still felt a strong connection to the 
region as Canada edged closer to war with Germany. Passing by Waterloo County on a 
train in the summer of 1939, he thought of “Berlin” as his place of birth and “the place 
ordained” for him.285 Thanks to his ties to the community, King rejected any ethnic 
antagonism towards German culture or Waterloo County, even as other Canadians 
expressed mistrust of German Canadians during the two world wars.  
 As a result, German Canadians found an ally in their prime minister when Canada 
went to war with Germany once again in 1939. In the days proceeding Canada’s official 
declaration of war, various members of the House of Commons gave patriotic speeches 
that called upon Canada to do its duty and fight alongside Great Britain. Caught in the 
spirit of nationalism, several Members of Parliament (MPs) extolled the virtues of 
Canada’s “two great races,” namely the French and English, and how it was their duty to 
defeat fascism abroad. This was precisely the same type of jingoism that generated 
xenophobic attitudes in “Berlin” during the previous war.  On 8 September, King gave a 
speech in the House of Commons that called “for toleration and moderation” and 
cautioned MPs against saying “many bitter things and express words the like of which 
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they would never express save under the provocation of the hour.” While King did not 
directly ask other MPs to stop praising the virtues of English and French Canada, he 
interrupted the proceedings by asking if he could “go a step further…and make a plea for 
the toleration on behalf of the German people themselves?”286 King recognized that 
German Canadians would be disproportionately impacted by the war. As such, he took 
pains to emphasize their loyalty in the House of Commons. 
 King defended German Canadians in two ways. First, he argued for German 
Canadian loyalty based on region. Just like Reble and Klinck, King drew upon the 
pioneer myth to demonstrate German Canadian innocence and loyalty. He told the House 
of Commons that he knew “something of the German people” and described both his time 
abroad and the first sixteen years of his life he spent living in Waterloo County. He 
rearticulated the pioneer myth by telling the House of Commons that Waterloo County 
consisted of “many other communities made up very largely of German settlers, some of 
whom came to this country to get away from forms of oppression” in Europe.287 In doing 
so, King restated one of the pioneer myth’s most integral components. German-Canadian 
leaders specifically emphasized the pacifist origins of Waterloo County’s German settlers 
to disassociate their community with accusations of disloyalty during the First World 
War.288 The emphasis on “peace” contained in the pioneer myth and other settler colonial 
narratives provided a useful counterpoint to nativist fears of German saboteurs lurking in 
Canada. Although the German Canadians’ use of the pioneer myth was designed to help 
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mitigate discrimination during the Great War, its themes continued to resonate as King 
and German Canadians fought for a loyal reputation once again in the 1940s.  
 Secondly, King argued for German-Canadian loyalty broadly based on 
citizenship. Throughout his speech, King reminded the House of Commons that his 
political career actually started in Waterloo County. He reminisced about the 1908 federal 
election and believed that he won the election as a young MP as a result of Waterloo 
County’s German constituency. King believed that “if the votes could have been 
separately identified it might have been found that there were more votes cast from those 
of German descent than from those of the English or any other race, to send me to this 
parliament.”289 King’s status as prime minister lent significance to this example. By 
crafting a narrative of his career that intrinsically included Waterloo County and its 
German inhabitants, King made it difficult to critique German-Canadian loyalty in 
Waterloo County without simultaneously critiquing him and his hometown. King’s 
defense situated German Canadians as upstanding citizens who deserved the reputation of 
loyalty during a period where their ethnicity might suggest otherwise.  
 Without explicitly stating so, King based both of his arguments for German 
Canadian loyalty on a common and shared whiteness. Nonwhite Canadians could not 
articulate their presence in Canada the same way, as Anglo-Canadian conceptions of race 
framed them in the exact opposite light. Japanese Canadians, for instance, could not craft 
a similar pioneer myth that focused on Anglo-conformity and loyalty because many 
English Canadians saw the Japanese as inherently “unassimilable.” Regardless of how 
long the Japanese lived in Canada, English Canadians believed them too racially distinct 
and tied to their homeland to ever fully become “Canadian.” Even though Japanese 
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Canadian families may have lived in Canada for several generations, English-Canadian 
society largely saw the Japanese as temporary “sojourners,” not permanent “settlers.”290 
As the pioneer myth was tied explicitly to settlement, Japanese Canadians could not 
cultivate a similar myth that tied their community to Canada’s founding. Other nonwhite 
Canadians, such as Canada’s black and indigenous populations, were presented as ill-
suited to Canada’s environment and as a premodern or dying race, respectively.291 With 
such popular and dominant discourses on race, racialized Canadians could not access the 
same Anglo-Canadian narratives of loyalty and conformity as easily as the white German 
immigrants in Waterloo County. The success of the pioneer myth ultimately hinged on 
Germans’ ability to claim a settler colonial narrative due to their whiteness.  
 The pioneer myth normalized the presence of German settlers to such a degree 
that King, a Canadian of Scottish and English heritage, purported it himself. By 
portraying the German settlers as the definitive story for Waterloo County, the pioneer 
myth and other symbols allowed white Canadians to “ignore the oppressive conditions 
suffered by racial and ethnic minorities.”292 The ultimate impact of symbols like the 
pioneer myth implicitly suggested that racialized people never actually belonged in 
Canada.293 Furthermore, King’s defense of German-Canadian loyalty on the basis of their 
voting record also shows how German-Canadian Lutherans benefitted from their white 
privilege. The ability for German Canadians in Waterloo County to vote for King was a 
privilege few racialized Canadians had in the early to mid-twentieth century. The vast 
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majority of Japanese Canadians were barred from voting in both provincial and federal 
elections at the start of the Second World War. Most did not have the ability to vote until 
1949, after a long campaign to receive civil rights in the name of postwar democracy.294 
Japanese Canadians lacked other basic rights and opportunities that were available to 
white Canadians. For example, King “exempted” Japanese Canadians from serving in the 
armed forces in January 1941, long before Pearl Harbor.295 German Canadians, despite 
also sharing an ancestry connected to an enemy nation, faced no such restrictions and 
were expected to enlist in the armed forces alongside other white Canadians. If members 
of the government like King viewed fulfilling the duties of citizenship, such as voting or 
enlisting in the army, as a condition to be considered loyal, Japanese Canadians could not 
prove that they were good citizens. As Germans belonged to the same white race as 
Canada’s “two founding” French and English populations, they could easily demonstrate 
their value as citizens to Canada as “pioneers” or as members of the electorate. By 
portraying German immigrants as “pioneers,” King’s advocacy did not appear overtly 
radical and posed little risk at alienating his primarily Anglo-Canadian audience.  
 The racial implications of King’s defense are further clarified when contrasted 
with his attitude towards Japanese Canadians and their eventual relocation and 
incarceration during the war. King defended German Canadian loyalty, even though he 
recognized that such a direct appeal for tolerance towards “the enemy” could be 
considered controversial by some members of parliament. Although no MPs voiced their 
opposition to King’s claims, the prime minister’s defensive attitude suggests he knew 
other MPs disagreed with his plea for tolerance. To his critics, King responded that “I am 
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not going to be false to my whole inheritance by refraining to take any step that may be 
necessary to preserve freedom.”296 If Canada was going to war to protect democracy and 
“freedom,” this democracy needed to be extended towards the people of Waterloo 
County. 
 King’s charitable attitude, however, did not extend to Japanese Canadians. King 
based his advocacy for German Canadians largely on his familiarity with living among 
them in Waterloo County. Yet, as historian Stephanie Bangarth points out, King had a 
great deal of familiarity with Japanese Canadians compared to most other Canadian 
politicians.297 King had considerable experience dealing with British Columbia’s Asian 
population following the 1907 Vancouver Riots. King witnessed firsthand the destruction 
white Canadian nativists caused on Japanese and Chinese businesses and properties. King 
saw Canada’s Japanese population as a clear threat within Canada, even if he never fully 
joined the type of wartime hysteria that shaped British Columbia’s politicians. Just a few 
days prior to his speech defending German-Canadian loyalty, King stated that he believed 
the Japanese would indeed bomb Canada’s west coast or participate in “hit and run” 
tactics.298 While King situated Germans as loyal pioneers, he still associated Canada’s 
Japanese population with the actions of their country of origin.  
 King and the Canadian federal government more generally recreated racial 
assumptions about the white and “Asiatic” races in their treatment of German and 
Japanese Canadians. Historian Aya Fujiwara notes that government officials viewed 
Japanese Canadians “collectively and monolithically” and paid little to no attention to the 
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differences in politics and generation that existed within British Columbia’s Japanese-
Canadian community. She suggests that Canadian politicians saw the Japanese “as a 
single dangerous ethnic community.”299 Yet, as King’s House of Commons speech made 
clear, he did not view Germans in the same monolithic light. Both in the House of 
Commons and within the Department of External Affairs, King encouraged members of 
the government to view Germans in a nuanced manner. King described how the current 
war did not reflect the attitudes of Germans, both “in this country and in the old world.” 
He encouraged his peers to blame Hitler and his government for the current conflict.300 
Under King’s guidance, the Department of External Affairs and the RCMP did not 
suspect all German Canadians of disloyalty arbitrarily. Instead, government officials 
largely saw German Canadians as either “good Germans” or “bad Nazis.” The 
government constructed the latter category as German immigrants who explicitly had 
membership in fascist organizations, recently migrated to Canada, or lived in large urban 
centers where they could potentially disrupt war work.301 Thus, the vast majority of 
Waterloo County’s German population avoided government persecution as a result of the 
“good versus bad German” binary that King and the Liberal government enforced. This 
nuanced approach to German Canadians ensured that only around 850 Germans were 
interned during the war, compared to the 22,000 Japanese Canadians who were forcibly 
relocated during the war.302 Leaders in the Canada Synod advocated for such a nuanced 
approach in their speeches and writing. Klinck, for example, argued that if the Canadian 
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public had to associate Canadian Lutherans with any movement in Nazi Germany, they 
should think of the anti-Nazi movement of Martin Niemöller, a German Lutheran 
clergyman who was imprisoned in a concentration camp for opposing Hitler.303 By using 
Niemöller as an example, Klinck hoped to demonstrate that “Germans” and “Lutherans” 
were a diverse group that did not all share the same views and opinions. Thankfully for 
Klinck, King and other government leaders largely saw the German-Canadian community 
in the nuanced and multifaceted way he suggested. Membership in the white race allowed 
German Canadians to be treated as individuals, whereas the attitudes of government 
officials towards the Japanese reinforced racist ideas that they constituted a single 
monolithic race.  
 As pioneer stories are predicated on creating an ideology for white settlers to 
“become indigenous,” German-Canadian Lutherans could argue that they had just as 
much a claim to Canadian citizenship and belonging as other Anglo-Canadians who 
celebrated their Loyalist ancestors. Even though some Japanese-Canadian families lived 
in Canada longer than German Lutherans like John Reble, racialized communities could 
not successfully advocate for their belonging on the basis of being “pioneers.” Within this 
context, Waterloo County’s white image proved an even greater marker of belonging than 
any flag or patriotic fundraiser could provide.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Debates over church, state, and patriotism waned as the war came to a close. The 
tensions between pastors and laypeople began to dissipate with the successful Allied 
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invasion of Normandy in June 1944. Military victories overseas signaled to German 
Lutherans that the war, and their need to appear loyal, was soon coming to an end. Pastors 
and congregants alike largely stopped the contentious debates that occurred in St. Louis 
and Waterloo County as the need for wartime fundraising, chaplaincies, and declarations 
of loyalty started to come to an end. Instead, synod leaders shifted their attention to the 
rise of “broken families,” juvenile delinquency, and “newly orphaned children” that 
increased casualties in Normandy inevitably created.304 Organizations such as the Canada 
Synod’s CWS and the Missouri Synod’s EPC adjusted their mandates accordingly, and 
shifted their goals from one of wartime patriotism to general humanitarian aid. The 
tensions between pastors, congregants, and synods slowly started to dissipate as these 
various groups started to once again collaborate over Europe’s pending refugee crisis.  
 Germany’s formal military defeat in May 1945 prompted many congregations to 
slowly reintroduce German language services to their churches. In St. Louis, the vestry at 
St. Paul’s passed a resolution petitioning that the Reverend Rothe reintroduce German 
language services in the fall of 1945. The Board of Elders approved the congregation’s 
desire and Rothe preached his first German language service since Pearl Harbor in 
December 1945. In Waterloo County, Stockmann started preaching predominantly in 
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German again at Trinity in January 1946.305 Other congregations in both St. Louis and 
Waterloo County followed suit as it became clear the war was finally over.306 
 The German Lutheran communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County did not 
assimilate during the war. They perceived of themselves as Germans and were also 
perceived as such by Anglo-Americans and Canadians. Both before and during the war, 
certain members of the community resented mainstream attempts to vilify the German 
people and the Lutheran faith. Pastors and congregants alike opposed projects such as 
People Come First for their negative portrayal of Germans in a war that they felt 
demonized their ethnic identities. Members of the government, most notably Mackenzie 
King, still strongly associated Waterloo County with its German ethnicity. Neither the 
host society nor the German Lutheran communities themselves responded as though this 
group had lost their German ethnicity. Although the war prompted pastors and synod 
leaders to express their national identities more frequently, their German ethnicity and 
that of their congregations continued once the need to demonstrate their loyalty passed. 
As a result, government officials and members of the public occasionally expressed 
uncertainty about whether German Lutherans could truly be loyal to the Allied cause 
throughout the war. 
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 These fears, however, never manifested via the extreme acts of discrimination that 
occurred during the First World War. The ability of German Lutherans to portray 
themselves as Protestant and white help explain why they were able to negotiate their way 
through the Second World War while still maintaining their ethnic identities. By 
emphasizing a shared Christian heritage, racial views, and a common history, German 
Lutherans established enough links with Anglo-American and Canadian political elites to 
avoid the widespread discrimination many pastors endured during the previous war. 
Although their German ethnicity and Lutheran faith were undesirable during the war, 
their whiteness and Christianity prevented them from facing the same racial persecution 
as racialized communities like the Japanese Canadians and Americans. Whiteness and 
Protestantism allowed their ethnic identities to survive, even if their German ethnicity 
occasionally placed them at odds with mainstream society. Their wartime experiences 
therefore do not lend themselves to the story of assimilation or complete acceptance into 
white North America, but a complex middle ground. Their race allowed them to avoid the 
same fates as other racialized groups, but their ethnic associations with “the enemy” kept 
them outside the coalition of “white ethnics” that found inclusion within a larger, 
unmarked “white” category in Canada and the United States. Their wartime experience 
was characterized by debate and contention, not assimilation or destruction. The war 
provoked a struggle in which German Lutheran ethnic elites, congregants, and women 
had to balance their racial, ethnic, national, and religious identities. Although the war did 
not destroy the ethnic identities of Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County, the 
tensions it generated had lasting consequences. With the war officially over, community 
leaders now needed to figure out how they would put their communities back together. 
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Chapter 3: “I Was A Stranger”: Confronting Europe’s Refugee Crisis Through 
Transnational Ties 
 
“World War II left in its swirling wake the most tremendous population dislocation in all recorded history. 
Some of the movement was in a sense voluntary; the greatest portion was forced. Large groups of people 
were forced to move as an element of the Nazi program of slave labor, other groups were swept before 
invading armies, others [fled] to escape hostile occupying forces, still others are fugitives from political 
oppression and religious persecution. Most of these people found themselves, at the end of the war, in 
Germany, Austria, or Italy...After VE-day, the Allied armies were faced with the grave problem of these 
millions of homeless persons.”307  
– The Reverend Louis Sieck, President of Concordia Seminary 
 
 The devastating impact of the Second World War on Europe troubled German-
Canadian and German-American Lutherans after 1945. Reports of poverty and starvation 
along with images of displaced persons (DPs) living in makeshift camps featured 
prominently in the secular and Lutheran press. Pastors and laypeople agreed that they 
needed to work together to help alleviate German poverty, hunger, and suffering 
overseas. North America’s German Lutheran communities were not alone in this regard. 
Jewish, Catholic, and Mennonite communities also worried about their coreligionists in 
Europe and formed organizations following the war that sought to provide aid for their 
European brethren.308 The Missouri Synod’s Emergency Planning Council (EPC) and the 
Canada Synod’s Commission for War Services (CWS) transitioned from handling 
wartime crises to confronting a global humanitarian emergency. Although both 
organizations had humble beginnings, they quickly grew to meet the task of providing 
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food and clothing to Europe’s most desperate while trying to solve the problem of 
homeless DPs and refugees.309 
 This chapter examines how the Missouri and Canada Synods organized campaigns 
to provide relief to postwar Germany and advocated for liberalized immigration laws to 
allow more German immigrants entry to Canada and the United States. It describes how 
Lutherans created several organizations, such as the Canadian Lutheran World Relief, in 
order to meet the needs of impoverished German civilians, refugees, and displaced 
persons. Germany’s humanitarian crisis motivated Lutheran organizations in both St. 
Louis and Waterloo County to collaborate and form a transnational relationship that 
spanned across the Canadian-American border. Drawing on their shared religious and 
ethnic backgrounds, pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo County combined their financial 
resources in an attempt to provide for Germany’s poor. Moreover, the two groups used 
their transnational relationship to mitigate the restrictive immigration policies of their 
respective nations. American immigration policy placed greater restrictions on DPs 
arriving in the United States and enforced small quotas in contrast to Canada’s 
comparatively liberal postwar immigration policy.310 St. Louis Lutherans had little 
success lobbying their government for policy changes, whereas Waterloo County 
Lutherans succeeded in changing immigration policy to admit more German DPs to 
Canada. St. Louis Lutherans worked alongside their counterparts in Waterloo County to 
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encourage German immigration to Canada in an effort to save their Lutheran brethren 
overseas from poverty and hardship.   
 The transnational relationship that formed between St. Louis and Waterloo 
County following the Second World War helped reignite the ethnic identities of German 
Lutheran pastors. After years of downplaying their German ethnicity during the war, 
pastors once again embraced their role as ethnic elites in an effort to mobilize their North 
American followers to help the German “homeland.” As ethnic elites, pastors “knew 
about the histories, politics, and languages of both [North America] and their respective 
homelands,” thereby making them ideally suited to act as brokers between their Lutheran 
followers and Germans abroad. Their ethnicity ensured they resisted Canadian and 
American attempts to vilify the German people and brand them all as “Nazis” 
undeserving of North American aid. By arguing against the popular perception of 
Germans as Nazis, pastors simultaneously hoped to shed the negative associations North 
Americans projected onto their ethnic identities. They were not Nazis, but rather informed 
experts who could help address the unique needs of German Lutherans abroad. Moreover, 
pastors found a new utility for their ethnic identities following the war. They appealed to 
their congregants’ German ethnicities in an effort to mobilize the financial and charitable 
resources necessary to assist impoverished DPs. They discursively drew upon their ethnic 
identities to motivate their followers to help the “homeland,” while also combating 
negative stereotypes associated with their ethnicity and place of birth. This newfound 
emphasis on ethnicity at the elite level follows Kathleen Conzen’s observations about the 
malleable nature of ethnicity. She argues that “ethnicity is continuously being reinvented 
in response to changing realities both within the group and the host society.” Ethnic 
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identities can appear, disappear, and reappear as historical circumstances change.311 
Pastors downplayed their ethnicity during the war in order to avoid possible internment or 
discrimination. With the war concluded, pastors remobilized their ethnic identity in order 
to combat anti-German stereotypes and alter immigration policy in the hopes of bringing 
more German migrants to North America. 
 Race, gender, and theology also shaped German Lutheran efforts to help German 
DPs and relief work. This chapter argues that German-Canadian Lutherans succeeded in 
changing Canadian immigration policy to allow for greater German migration as a result 
of their whiteness. Canadian government officials initially limited immigration from 
Germany following the war because they subscribed to the belief that former “Nazis” 
should not be admitted to Canada. Pastors, however, argued for the acceptance of 
Germans, regardless of their former political ties, by arguing that they were “racially 
suited” to migrate to Canada as whites. Germans, they reminded the House of Commons, 
were pioneers, farmers, and had a history of “settling” the land. German Lutheran women 
helped their male peers with all aspects of immigration and relief work, although they 
received little credit due to the patriarchal gender norms in the Lutheran Church. These 
customs ensured that pastors continually portrayed themselves as the leaders of 
immigration work and discredited the important role Lutheran women played in admitting 
DPs and conducting charity work for Germany. Theology played a similar role in 
determining how Lutherans engaged with relief work. The Missouri Synod’s conservative 
Lutheranism caused the synod to be less engaged with immigration work than their 
colleagues in the Canada Synod due to their fear of union with other Lutherans. Because 
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the Canada Synod held more liberal beliefs on unionism, they cooperated with other 
Lutheran groups and became the de facto champions of Lutheran immigration to North 
America. This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of the 
intricacies and bureaucratic implementation of postwar immigration policy.312 Rather, it 
looks at the ethnic motivations behind these policies and examines how racial, 
theological, and gender relations in St. Louis and Waterloo County influenced relief and 
immigration work. 
 
Ethnic and Religious Motivations for Assisting Germany 
 
 
 Six years of war created dire economic and social conditions in Germany. Aerial 
and land warfare destroyed German cities, industry, agriculture, and left thousands of 
Germans homeless. In an effort to cripple German war production, the Allied air force 
conducted bombing raids on German cities with large industrial factories that supported 
the Nazi war effort. Aerial raids inevitably harmed civilians who worked in factories and 
destroyed residential areas where workers lived. From 1943 to 1945, the Allies dropped 
over one million tons of bombs on Germany. By the end of the war, roughly half a 
million Germans had died as a result of the bombing campaign.313 In Hamburg, the site of 
one of the most devastating bombing campaigns, nearly fifty thousand civilians died from 
1940 to 1945 as a result of bombing-related injuries.314 The city of Kassel fared even 
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worse. Records after the war suggest that only sixteen thousand of the city’s original 
sixty-five thousand inhabitants survived the Allied the bombing campaign.315 Yet even 
these statistics fail to convey how thoroughly the Allied bombing campaign impacted all 
aspects of German life. Bombing not only destroyed Germany’s war production, but also 
its food stores, drinking water, and residential areas. This destruction of German 
infrastructure led to starvation and homelessness for those who survived the bombings.316  
 Thousands of refugees and displaced people, made homeless from the war, fled 
into Germany’s borders following the war and accentuated the severity of the nation’s 
broken infrastructure. Germans living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern 
European countries fled west into Germany beginning in 1944. These “German 
expellees” fled for several reasons. Some voluntarily left their homes in order to avoid the 
invading Soviet Army. They feared that Soviet occupation of their homes would result in 
harm or possible death. Reports of the Soviet Army taking “revenge” on German civilians 
for their wartime complicity caused refugees to flee to Germany for safety from Soviet 
aggression.317 Others had no choice but to leave their homes due to the rising nationalism 
in newly formed Eastern European states. In July 1945, the leaders of the Allied powers 
met near Berlin to discuss how to govern postwar Europe. The meeting resulted in the 
Potsdam Agreement, which gave considerable control to recently formed governments in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. These nations requested that the Allies give them 
power over their national borders and the ability to determine who would be included in 
their nations. They argued that their states must be ethnically homogenous and claimed 
                                                        
315 Arnold, The Allied War and Urban Memory, 192. 
316 Overy, The Bombing War, 436. 
317 R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New 
Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2012), 127-128. 
 135 
that they could not risk maintaining sizeable German minorities in their borders. Thus, 
they proposed to “transfer” or forcibly remove ethnic Germans residing in their territorial 
boundaries.318 The Soviet Union supported these requests because they provided useful 
“buffer states” between the USSR and their old German enemies. With Soviet backing, 
Eastern European governments successfully convinced the lukewarm United States and 
Great Britain to support the expulsion of ethnic Germans. Although the Allies requested 
these governments transfer Germans in an “orderly and humane” manner, the subsequent 
Potsdam Agreement gave European governments free reign to render its German 
inhabitants homeless, poor, and vulnerable to expulsion.319 The resulting deportation led 
to one of the largest forced migrations in European history. A total of twelve million 
people arrived at Germany’s borders between 1944 and 1950. The brutal conditions led to 
approximately half a million to two million deaths along the way from malnourishment, 
hypothermia, and neglect. Those fortunate enough to survive the journey to Germany 
arrived in a devastated country unable to provide them with shelter and care.320 The 
arrival of millions of desperate refugees accentuated Germany’s housing and food crisis.  
 The Allied powers felt little sympathy for the homeless and impoverished German 
refugees. High-ranking politicians and military officials believed that Germany bore 
“collective guilt” for the war: all Germans, regardless of their civilian or military status, 
held some responsibility for Nazi Germany’s crimes.321 There was little sentiment in 
favour of aiding a population recover from a war that “they” had started. This lack of 
sympathy extended to an indifference regarding the fate of refugees and displaced people. 
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Canadians and Americans alike generally opposed liberalizing their restrictive 
immigration policy from the 1930s. Some politicians pushed President Henry Truman to 
organize a committee to examine Germany’s DP problem, but Truman formally denied 
their request in June 1945.322 Governments and labour groups worried that an influx of 
refugees would provoke a crisis in unemployment or unduly burden the state as “public 
charges.” Memories of the economic recession that followed the First World War 
provided nativist politicians with the proof they needed to oppose admitting refugees on 
economic grounds.323 The Canadian Congress of Labour, for example, told the federal 
government that “we cannot afford to expose Canadian workers to the constant threat of 
having their standards undercut by immigrants.”324 Instead, Canada and the United States 
prioritized repatriating their soldiers stationed overseas. Only immigrant groups with 
direct ties to the military received state approval. Canada admitted Polish veterans who 
fought alongside their military and both countries allowed “war brides” married to 
servicemen to immigrate.325  
 Civilians shared their government’s indifference towards Germany’s humanitarian 
crisis. A December 1945 Gallup poll found that approximately seventy percent of all 
Americans wanted no changes to the country’s immigration policy, or favoured greater 
restrictions.326 A 1946 Gallup poll in Canada concluded that thirty-four percent of 
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Canadians supported completely banning future immigration from Germany.327 Other 
polls reflected these sentiments, as a majority of citizens in Allied countries stated they 
“hated the Germans” and supported the Allied bombing campaign throughout the war.328 
Even witnessing German poverty firsthand did not change the prejudiced opinions some 
had towards refugees. While stationed in West Germany, General George S. Patton Jr. 
opposed those who believed “the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not.”329 
Although Patton’s comment represented an extreme view, many Americans and 
Canadians had difficulty sympathizing with a populace that they had spent the last several 
years fighting.  
 North America’s German Lutherans, however, mobilized to help Germany 
recover from the war. As ethnic elites, pastors believed they had a unique ability to 
“explain” or “interpret” their German homeland to Canadians and Americans of all 
backgrounds. As predominantly first and second-generation immigrants, they assumed 
that they possessed specialized knowledge on how to help German and Lutheran people. 
The editors of the Canada Lutheran, for example, called upon its readers to “extend the 
hand of practical compassion and encouragement” to suffering Germans. Published just 
one month after the war ended, they told their audience to ignore the wartime patriotism 
that vilified the German people. “We have had enough of harsh accusations and lofty 
criticism springing from sheer prejudice,” they concluded. “The people of Europe crave 
our understanding.”330 John Reble made the Canada Synod’s religious obligations to 
Germany clear during his presidential speech at the 1946 synod convention. He told the 
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pastors and laymen in attendance that the “YOUNG CHURCH in America must save the 
OLD CHURCH in Europe, so desolate, so shamefully weak and tired, bleeding out of 
many wounds.”331 The Missouri Synod’s publicity campaigns reflected the ethnic bonds 
pastors believed existed between themselves and Germany. Hugo Bloedel, a St. Louis 
pastor in charge of the synod’s relief program, wrote that “through the Relief Program of 
our Church our people have become the fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers of 
thousands of orphans across the sea.”332 Although separated by an ocean and several 
generations of immigration, the relief campaign demonstrated that those in St. Louis had 
not forgotten their “family” across the sea. Lutherans had a special debt to their brethren 
overseas that North America’s Lutheran community needed to fulfill due to their shared 
ethnicity and faith.  
 Sympathetic attitudes towards Germany caused some St. Louis and Waterloo 
County Lutherans to express anti-American and anti-British sentiments. The mainstream 
and secular presses often ignored the fact that Germany required relief primarily as a 
result of destruction caused by the Allied armies. Pastors in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County, however, put the blame solely on the devastating Allied bombing campaigns. 
Paul Eydt, a Waterloo County pastor, described DPs as “the 12 million people of various 
countries in Europe [that] have been uprooted due to POST WAR ALLIED ACTION.”333 
Bloedel expressed anti-Allied sentiments in even harsher terms. He described the 
devastating impact of the Allied bombing campaign as “appalling. Hundreds of cities 
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were a twisted mass of rubble and ruin.”334 Bloedel accused the American government of 
pursuing a policy “motivated by an evil spirit of revenge” following the war in contrast to 
the Missouri Synod, which “harbored no hate.”335 Pastors such as Eydt and Bloedel did 
not call on their followers to help Europeans on a humanitarian basis. Their identities as 
Germans provided them unique insight into the plight facing Germans overseas. Unlike 
their Anglo-American and Canadian counterparts, they did not see German refugees as 
members of a former “enemy nation,” but rather as people deserving help and acceptance. 
They resented any vilification of the German people, and encouraged their followers to 
ignore popular images of the German “enemy” in favour of a more sympatric image of a 
people recovering from a cruel war made worse by Allied involvement.  
 The hybrid German and Canadian/American backgrounds of the Lutheran 
leadership led them to believe that they could occupy a place of importance among relief 
campaigns. Although pastors faced suspicion during the war as a result of their ethnicity 
and faith, they hoped that their knowledge of European affairs would now prove a 
valuable asset in North American society. As news of Europe’s humanitarian crisis 
spread, Anglo-Canadian and American charities such as the YMCA and Salvation Army 
started to canvass for funds to provide food, clothing, and shelter for those suffering 
overseas. They felt compelled to help the poor as a way to demonstrate their “true 
Christian charity.”336 Initially, Lutherans offered their assistance to these charities. As 
Germans and Lutherans, they believed they were “experts” who could assist charities in 
meeting the specific needs of their brethren. While they expected to take on leadership 
positions at these gatherings, they found Anglo-Canadians and Americans hesitant to 
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accept their role as cultural brokers. Outsiders continued to stigmatize German Lutherans 
as peculiar and largely rejected their offers to help. After attending a 1949 Canadian 
Council of Churches meeting, Eydt reported to the synod that he “found a great lack of 
knowledge in inter-church circles about the Lutheran Church. Indeed, I was amazed at 
what a strange phenomenon we Lutherans appear to be upon the religious horizon.”337 
Eydt had cause to worry. A YWCA meeting reported that they did not require Lutheran 
assistance because “there are deep divisions in the Lutheran Church” due to the ethnic 
and theological diversity within North American Lutheran groups. The YWCA had no 
interest in hearing the perspectives of “niche” conservative, liberal, German, Finnish, and 
other Lutherans spread out across the continent.338 Pastors worried that misguided 
perceptions of Lutherans would marginalize them from conducting relief work with DPs. 
This violated their own self-perception as ethnic elites with a special mission to mobilize 
North American wealth to help impoverished Germany. Pastors believed that Anglo-
Canadians and Americans could not adequately help suffering Lutheran DPs overseas 
because they did not have the same sympathy that they had towards their coreligionists. 
Eydt told his Canada Synod colleagues that “there is reason to believe that some 
communions are not prepared to recognize that our church has priority towards [the 
DPs]…If there is no Lutheran representation made at all, the other groups will proceed to 
take action as though we did not exist.”339 Helping DPs therefore took on the added 
importance of ensuring pastors kept their authority as religious and ethnic experts. Nils 
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Willison noted that “other church denominations are organized to help 
immigrants…Surely we Lutherans must not – we dare not – leave it to them to look after 
our Lutheran people.”340 Lutheran pastors recognized shortly after the war that they could 
not rely on others to look after the needs of German and Lutheran DPs. They would need 
to create their own organizations and charities if they wished to help their brethren 
overseas and preserve their authority as ethnic experts. 
 
Creating an Infrastructure for Relief Work 
 
 
 Members of the Missouri and Canada Synods had the motivation to help Germany 
recover from the war, although it remained unclear just how they would accomplish this 
lofty goal. A single congregation had little hope of solving hunger and homelessness in 
Germany. If German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County wanted to make a 
tangible impact on relief and immigration work, they needed to initiate fundraising 
campaigns at the synod, national, and continental levels. The years following the Second 
World War prompted an unprecedented level of collaboration and discussion between 
Lutheran synods throughout North America. From 1945 to 1947, Canadian and American 
Lutherans created several transnational organizations in an effort to come to Germany’s 
aid. Germany’s crisis served as a catalyst for cross-border connection and a reassertion of 
the German identities of Lutheran leaders in St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
 Theology shaped how Lutherans across North America formed relief 
organizations. As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod had few qualms about unionism or 
cooperating with other religious bodies. They demonstrated this during the war, when 
they included synods based in Western Canada in the CWS. In January 1946, the Canada 
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Synod hosted a meeting at St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener open to 
all Lutherans interested in providing relief and aid to Germany. The meeting helped “to 
continue efforts towards reopening the channels for relief to Germany and other nations.” 
Their shared goal helped ensure collaboration and they decided to continue to “find ways 
and means for cooperating in sending food and clothing to Europe.”341 This initial 
partnership led to a subsequent meeting with all members of the CWS in Ottawa in March 
1946 to discuss “relief work in Europe, particularly on behalf of sufferers in former 
enemy countries.”342 As fellow Germans, they expressed a natural affiliation towards 
helping Germany, even if Canadians still considered it an “enemy country.” The various 
Lutheran representatives discussed how their organization’s name no longer seemed 
relevant since the war ended. They decided to abandon their former title and establish a 
new organization with a new name: the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR) with 
Lloyd Schaus, a Waterloo Lutheran Seminary graduate, as its first executive director. The 
CLWR was created with the mandate to help Germany recover from the war by sending 
food, clothing, and other resources overseas. During the first several months of his tenure 
as executive director, Schaus established shipping warehouses in Winnipeg, Montreal, 
and Kitchener to help process and ship donations made by Canadian Lutherans.343 In 
December, the CLWR decided to expand its mandate to include immigration reform as 
well as relief work “due to the widespread interest of European peoples to move to 
Canada, and due to the fact that many of these are Lutheran, it was decided that a 
Canadian Lutheran body or committee should undertake to look into the matter of 
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immigration.”344 The CLWR’s formation provided Canadian Lutherans with the 
beginning of a bureaucratic organization that would allow them to conduct nation-wide 
level fundraisers in order to provide relief for Germany. The Canada Synod’s liberal 
theology allowed it to justify cooperation with other Canadian Lutherans, even if their 
doctrines did not perfectly align.  
 In contrast, the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology prevented them from 
engaging in the close partnerships the Canada Synod formed via the CLWR. Although the 
synod also shifted their EPC from war-related work to immigration and relief campaigns, 
their stance on unionism kept the Missouri Synod on the margins. The Missouri Synod’s 
resistance to cooperation with other Lutheran bodies dated back to its founding in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The synod’s founders disparaged other Lutheran bodies in North 
America for what they perceived as shallow and liberal interpretations of the Book of 
Concord and other religious texts. They rejected cooperation with other synods on the 
basis that collaboration would dilute their own theology. Subsequent synod presidents, 
including John Behnken, held this attitude and maintained that there could be no 
organizational union without doctrinal unity.345 In September 1947, Lutherans from 
various American synods met in Chicago to discuss how to best approach “the care and 
resettlement of Lutheran Displaced Persons and Refugees.” Most of those present were 
already members of the National Lutheran Council (NLC), an organization of American 
Lutherans that formed in the interwar years. The NLC was largely a product of the United 
Lutheran Church of America (ULCA) and fulfilled a similar function to the Canada 
Synod’s CWS during the Second World War. Just like their Canadian counterparts, the 
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NLC switched from focusing on war work to relief campaigns following the war’s 
conclusion. The Missouri Synod, citing its adherence to conservative Lutheranism, 
refused to participate with the NLC during the war and instead formed the EPC.346 The 
1947 meeting threatened to cause further divisions between the NLC and Missouri Synod, 
because it was not clear to either group whether ethnic solidarity would be enough to 
overcome theological differences. Louis Sieck, the EPC’s director and a professor at 
Concordia Seminary, worried that the meeting would “reopen several of the old gripes.” 
He was pleasantly surprised, however, when all pastors found common ground and 
sought to work together.347 While Sieck did not make any formal commitment to unite 
with the NLC, he agreed to create a “Joint Committee” of Missouri and NLC pastors to 
collaborate over future DP work. The Joint Committee consisted of four pastors total, 
with two representing each group. Sieck subsequently appointed Lawrence Meyer and 
E.T. Bernthal as Missouri’s representatives.348 A desire to help their fellow Germans 
appeared to allow both sides to worry less about their theological positions, at least 
initially.  
 Sieck and the EPC maintained an ambiguous relationship with the NLC until 
Congress passed the Displaced Person Act in April 1948. After persistent pressure from 
President Truman, Congress finally created a law that would allow the American 
government to admit DPs in addition to its preexisting immigration quotas. Congress 
estimated that the new legislation would permit one hundred thousand DPs entry into the 
United States over the next four years.349 DPs, however, had to demonstrate that they 
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would not become “public charges” if admitted to the United States. Despite this 
requirement, the 1948 act did little to provide financial assistance to DPs who wished to 
migrate. Thus, financial responsibility for newcomers largely fell upon voluntary agencies 
led by American citizens, which promised the federal government that their sponsored 
DPs would not become burdens on the state.350 After the act passed, the NLC discussed 
how they could help DPs offset required financial commitments such as passage to the 
United States. If the Missouri Synod wished to partake in this work, the NLC needed a 
formal commitment from Sieck and the EPC to help them address the large financial 
commitment DP work entailed.351 Yet, the synod’s tradition of avoiding Lutheran 
cooperative ventures in the name of guarding against unionism prevented the EPC from 
finding a consensus over aligning with the NLC. Ethnicity provided an impetus to help 
Germany, but the Missouri Synod’s theology posed a barrier to completing this goal.  
 E.B. Glabe, a Lutheran philanthropist and pastor from Minnesota, emerged as a 
staunch advocate for working cooperatively with the NLC. As Glabe was interested 
mainly in charity work, he placed little emphasis on maintaining “pure doctrine” and 
instead sought solutions that would provide the most relief for DPs. “The resettlement of 
the D.P.’s is going to cost considerable money,” he advised members of the EPC, “and it 
is for this reason that I believe it should be handled on an all Lutheran basis.”352 Glabe 
repeatedly wrote to Sieck throughout 1947 and 1948 in an effort to force the EPC to 
clarify its position on unionism and DP work more generally: “The [NLC] has proceeded 
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with its program on the international, national and local levels. Where do we fit in?”353 
The EPC’s delayed response to working with the NLC prompted Missouri Synod 
Lutherans in other states to address the question on their own terms. Werner Kuntz, a 
Michigan pastor, notified the St. Louis leadership that their lethargy prompted him to 
align his DP work with the NLC. “When we waited painfully long without any word of 
plans that might be under consideration,” he wrote, “some of us initiated a program of our 
own and, having no better resource, we connected our program with the channel of the 
National Lutheran Council.”354 Not surprisingly, Glabe aligned his efforts to help DPs 
with the NLC in Minnesota as well. Glabe believed Sieck was unwilling to engage with 
his critiques of the synod’s stance on unionism and believed that the EPC could not 
possibly hope to conduct a nation-wide relief campaign isolated in St. Louis. “I cannot 
see how you intend to function only on a national level without working through some 
local agencies,” he wrote.355 Kuntz agreed, stating that he could not “understand how it is 
possible for you to do this on a National level” without NLC assistance.356 Exasperated 
by the EPC’s slow response, both men aligned their local work with the NLC without 
consulting St. Louis. Both Glabe and Kuntz decided that their theological convictions 
were ultimately less important than their ethnic obligation to help German DPs. Their 
loyalty was to their homeless and starving German coreligionists, not to the synod’s 
theological peculiarities.    
 The St. Louis leadership, however, proved more conservative than their brethren 
in other states. During a January 1949 meeting with the NLC, the EPC decided “not to 
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join the NLC and its Displaced Persons Program.”357 Unlike Glabe and Kuntz, who both 
had backgrounds in social work, the EPC’s members consisted of pastors and professors 
deeply entrenched in the Missouri Synod’s conservative doctrine. While Glabe and Kuntz 
willingly sacrificed possible theological traditions to support their social mission, Sieck 
and the rest of the EPC members in St. Louis were steeped in a culture that prioritized 
maintaining their conservative theology. Although unwilling to align with the NLC 
formally, the EPC did acknowledge that many of its local branches already collaborated 
with the NLC regardless of their decision. As a result, they promised to “support up to 
40% of all DP work which our recognized Lutheran Welfare Agencies expend on actual 
regional DP work” so as to not leave DP work completely unsupported.358 In doing so, 
the EPC formalized its position as the quiet financial backer to local and national 
organizations, rather than a direct participant in the process of DP work. Unlike the 
CLWR, the conservative theology of the synod’s St. Louis leadership prevented them for 
participating as freely in relief and DP work as their coreligionists in Canada.  
 Aside from their financial assistance, the EPC published several pamphlets in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s that advised congregations on how to partake in DP work at 
the local level. These publications stressed that laypeople interested in helping DPs 
should cooperate with their local pastor rather than the EPC. Any DPs that Missouri 
Synod members assisted would ultimately be their responsibility rather than the synod’s. 
One EPC member wrote that “as soon as a DP enters the midst of a congregation that 
congregation and that pastor becomes, in a general way, responsible for the social, 
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religious and economical adjustment of the DP.”359 Thus, DP work in the Missouri Synod 
took a decentralized and local approach that varied from district to district. While the 
EPC’s hands-off approach and unwillingness to work with the NLC continued to generate 
criticism, its members reiterated that “we have no animosity with [the NLC] and feel that 
they are doing a very excellent job as far as the DP program is concerned.” Instead, the 
EPC “preferred to be independent in our program and are confident that we have also 
accomplished a great deal, however, on a much less expensive basis.”360 The St. Louis 
leadership was content to provide advice for local situations while letting the NLC 
conduct DP work at the national level as a result of their conservative theology.  
 The different theological positions of the Missouri and Canada Synods directly 
shaped the ways in which the two synods approached immigration. The Canada Synod’s 
liberal theology created a highly centralized approach to immigration that operated on a 
national scale, while the Missouri Synod’s conservatism directed it towards a 
decentralized and local approach. Far from being insular and academic, theological 
debates played a key role in determining how each synod responded to the arrival of 
postwar DPs. Although they worked towards a common goal of helping their fellow 
Germans, each synod strove to meet the demands of DP work in accordance with their 
own theological traditions. 
 
Transnational Ties and Early Immigration Schemes, 1946-1950 
 
 
 The Canadian and American federal governments responded much more slowly to 
the DP crisis than the Missouri and Canada Synods wished. The EPC and CLWR 
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discovered that their respective governments often proved unable or unwilling to help 
them bring German Lutheran DPs to North America. As a result, Canadian and American 
Lutherans relied upon one another to help meet their common goal of helping Lutheran 
DPs. United by a mutual desire to help Germany recover, Lutheran organizations 
collaborated to navigate national restrictions in an effort to address an international crisis.  
 Canadian and American Lutherans tended to ignore the Canadian-American 
border if it meant they could better help their German Lutheran coreligionists overseas. 
Prior to 1946, for instance, Canada and the United States monitored and controlled the 
extent to which civilians could gain access to Germany. Both countries enacted 
legislation that prohibited civilians from trading and shipping supplies to so-called enemy 
nations, thereby significantly hampering early Lutheran attempts to conduct relief work. 
As of early 1946, it appeared that the American government had no immediate plans to 
amend their Trading with the Enemy Act to allow Americans contact with Germany. 
Legally barred from sending relief supplies such as food and clothing to Germany, 
American Lutherans looked to Canada to overcome their government’s restrictive policy.  
Unlike the United States, the Canadian government granted permission to the CLWR “to 
send relief supplies to Europe, including ex-enemy countries such as Germany and 
Finland,” as of March 1946.361 Franklin Clark Fry, the president of the ULCA, contacted 
pastors in the Canada Synod for assistance. He initially planned on opening “a second 
warehouse on the Canadian side of the international border” that Americans could use to 
ship food and clothing overseas. Since the Canadian government permitted the CLWR 
access to Germany, Fry hoped the Canada Synod could act as an intermediary that would 
allow American Lutherans to help Germany as well. “We had made up our minds to 
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attempt to ship to the British Zone through your nation,” Fry wrote.362 The plan, however, 
proved unnecessary. The American government amended its Trading with the Enemy act 
in the following weeks to allow the ULCA and other charitable organizations to start 
sending relief to European nations. 
 The early willingness of Canadian and American Lutherans to collaborate proved 
essential during the immediate aftermath of the war. As both Canadian and American 
governments clarified their positions on Germany and the DP crisis, Lutherans on both 
sides of the border worked towards their shared goal of providing aid for as many 
Germans and Lutheran DPs as possible. Differences in governmental policy, however, 
complicated their efforts. In these situations, the transnational connections between St. 
Louis and Waterloo County Lutherans proved essential in overcoming national policies. 
In the summer of 1947, a small fishing vessel carrying twenty-four Estonian and Latvian 
Lutheran DPs arrived illegally in the southern United States. American immigration 
officials detained the Baltic refugees and moved them to Ellis Island to await deportation. 
The Baltic DPs contacted the Missouri Synod and the EPC, who later tried to advocate for 
their formal entry into the United States. Without the proper immigration visas, however, 
the American government proved unwilling to admit the Baltic DPs.  
 The EPC reached out to the CLWR in the hopes that the Canadian government 
might allow the Baltic refugees to enter Canada. The EPC’s faith in their transnational 
connection with Canadian Lutherans proved well founded. Traugott Herzer, a prominent 
member of the CLWR, pitched the dilemma to his peers in the CLWR and the Reverend 
John Schmieder, the pastor at St. Matthew’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Kitchener, 
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agreed to take action.363 In the following months, Schmieder contacted Arthur Jolliffe, the 
Director of Immigration of the Department of Mines and Resources, about possibly 
admitting the detained Baltic DPs. Schmieder portrayed the DPs as “truly political 
refugees” who “have a real fear of returning to their former homeland which is now 
occupied by Soviet Russia.” The Balts, he noted, wished to live “in a country built on the 
democratic principles in which they believe and for which they stand.”364 Knowing full 
well that Jolliffe and the Canadian government viewed immigrants in terms of their 
labour potential, Schmieder lauded their capacity to join Canada’s work force. “As we 
have learned from our United States Representative, who has had direct contact with 
these people, they are an exceedingly fine group of young people, very sturdy physically 
and very anxious to work.”365 Schmieder’s lobbying proved successful. When Canadian 
authorities received word in December 1947 that the Board of Special Inquiry of the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service still refused to accept the refugees, they granted 
the CLWR’s request. They admitted the DPs “providing that Canadian Lutheran World 
Relief guarantees that the refugees will not become public charges during the next five 
years.” Schmieder agreed to these terms and subsequently arranged for their arrival in 
Kitchener.366 By drawing on the transnational relationship between Canadian and 
American Lutherans, Schmieder saved these Lutheran DPs from eventual deportation.  
 St. Louis and the EPC continued to play an important financial as well as moral 
role during the CLWR’s early years. Unhappy with the minimal changes to American 
immigration policy in the late 1940s, the St. Louis leadership took advantage of Canada’s 
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comparatively liberal immigration laws to encourage German immigration to Canada. In 
early 1948, the EPC’s Lawrence Meyer met with Herzer to discuss how to help young 
children stuck in Germany’s DP camps. They discussed the possibility of sending young 
Lutheran DP children to reformatory schools in England and Canada to escape the 
poverty and hardship commonly found in the camps. Meyer proposed that the EPC grant 
the CLWR twenty-five thousand dollars as a revolving fund to help these children travel 
out of the DP camps and subsequently pay for their upkeep.367 The plan represented a 
compromise to both parties. Without the EPC’s financial backing, the CLWR had little 
hope of operating a program of this size. St. Louis’s support therefore allowed them to 
assist Lutheran DP children find new homes in Canada and the United Kingdom. The 
plan also satisfied the Missouri Synod. The few quotas available for DPs under the 1948 
Displaced Persons Act would not allow for the immigration of so many children. Yet, the 
synod still wished to partake in DP work. Meyer therefore promised to fund the CLWR 
program only “with the understanding that Missouri Synod take over complete chaplaincy 
work” of escorting the DPs to their new homes.368 In this way, the synod could still 
actively participate in DP work even if their government did not permit it. Restrictive 
immigration policy coupled with the enormity of the DP crisis in Europe prevented both 
the CLWR and EPC from operating effectively. However, combining their resources in 
order to help their fellow Germans and Lutherans overseas provided an effective solution 
to an otherwise insurmountable problem. The EPC and CLWR ignored their national 
differences in favour of combining their resources to help their fellow German Lutherans 
abroad. 
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 This transnational relationship continued in the CLWR’s early years. The 
American government did not pass legislation allowing DPs to enter the United States 
until the summer of 1948. It also failed to match the high hopes of the Missouri Synod. 
The EPC continued to use the CLWR as a type of surrogate to meet their desire to help 
DPs, despite their government’s restrictive attitude. In 1947, the EPC worked with other 
American Lutherans to donate a total of fifty thousand dollars to the CLWR to act “as a 
revolving fund for the movement to Canada of refugees of German ethnic origin” in 
1947.369 This early financial involvement provided the CLWR with the necessary funds to 
carry out its primary goal of encouraging German and Lutheran immigration while 
providing the Missouri Synod with a sense that they too could help German DPs even if 
its government would not.  
 By late 1946, Canadian immigration policy allowed citizens to sponsor their 
parents, siblings, or children to migrate to Canada. This policy included people living in 
Europe’s DP camps, and as a result created a possible avenue for the CLWR to bring DPs 
to Canada.370  CLWR officials encouraged its laypeople to participate in this “close 
relatives scheme” because it allowed their German-Canadian laity to reconnect with 
family members under a policy already approved by the federal government. In this 
sense, Canadian immigration policy worked in concert with the CLWR’s ethnic goals. 
Canada Synod members wished to bring family members to Canada to escape Germany’s 
poverty, and the Canadian government’s policy allowed this to happen.  
 However, the government failed to make it clear that not all Europeans in 
displaced persons camps were eligible for migration. The International Refugee 
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Organization (IRO), an agency of the United Nations, did not permit the movement of all 
DPs. The IRO barred any DPs with German citizenship from migrating. While DPs with 
Latvian or Estonian citizenship could migrate, DPs with German citizenship could not. 
DPs with German citizenship were often referred to as Volksdeutsche, a term used to 
denote people of German ethnic heritage who were not born in Germany.371 Because 
these Volksdeutsche had German citizenship, the IRO considered them “the enemy” and 
regarded these DPs as Germany’s responsibility.372 While the Volksdeutsche were indeed 
of German ethnic heritage, the majority did not live in Germany during the Second World 
War. They lived in territories like Czechoslovakia and other countries later annexed by 
the Nazis. When the Nazis invaded, the Volksdeutsche received German citizenship as a 
result of their ethnic heritage. These subtle nuances, however, meant little to the IRO. 
When the CLWR tried to bring their Volksdeutsche relatives to Canada, they found that 
the IRO denied their applications. Approximately one-third of the initial requests to bring 
relatives to Canada were rejected because they asked to sponsor Volksdeutsche 
relatives.373 Without IRO support, German Canadians could not bring their German 
relatives to Canada.  
 The so-called “Volksdeutsche problem” presented a practical and moral dilemma 
to the CLWR. The IRO’s decision meant that the CLWR and their German-Canadian 
members could not help German DPs escape poverty and homelessness in Europe. 
Despite their success in establishing and financing the CLWR, their project of helping 
Germany collapsed due to the IRO’s decision. Morally, the plight of the Volksdeutsche 
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resonated deeply with members of the CLWR. After all, as people of German heritage, 
they too could be considered Volksdeutsche in the most liberal sense of the word. If they 
happened to live in Europe instead of Canada, the Nazis would have just as easily granted 
them German citizenship, either willingly or unwillingly. The CLWR remained 
determined to help the Volksdeutsche as their fellow Germans, even though the IRO 
sought to punish them on these same grounds. 
 Members of the CLWR soon discovered that other German religious groups in 
Canada also resented the IRO’s strict Volksdeutsche policy. German-Canadian Catholics, 
Baptists, and Mennonites relied on the government’s “close relative scheme” to bring 
their German relatives to Canada, but found their efforts thwarted due to the IRO’s 
policy. The CLWR collaborated with these other religious groups to form the Canadian 
Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR) to operate outside the 
mandate of the IRO in June 1947. Although the Volksdeutsche could not legally migrate 
via international programs like the IRO’s, they seemingly conformed to Canada’s pre-
existing immigration policy that favoured family reunification. Thus, the CCCRR 
petitioned the Canadian government that their organization could essentially fulfill the 
same role as the IRO, but for Volksdeutsche instead of general DPs. The CCCRR 
promised to pay for their passage from Europe’s DP camps to Canada, and promised to 
work in cooperation with the government to help find DPs who could meet Canada’s 
labour shortage.374 In doing so, the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO’s authority and 
succeeded in bringing Volksdeutsche to Canada. 
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 The CCCRR’s success in facilitating Volksdeutsche immigration allowed the 
CLWR to create specific programs to encourage Lutheran immigration. In 1948, the 
CLWR created a project that later became known as the “Lutheran Labour Scheme” in 
conjunction with the Missouri Synod and the Department of Labour.375 The Lutheran 
Labour Scheme occurred at an opportune moment. In the mid to late 1940s, Canadian 
cities and farms alike suffered from labour shortages that DP workers could easily fill. 
Employers proved willing to take on otherwise undesirable and oftentimes unilingual DP 
workers as a result of these shortages. High employment rates in skilled jobs across 
Canada furthermore lessened the chance that Canadian workers would see the unskilled 
DPs as threats to their own economic stability.376  The scheme suited the needs of both 
Lutherans and the Canadian government. The Canadian government received its 
necessary labourers, and the CLWR and Missouri Synod could facilitate the entry of 
Volksdeutsche immigrants.  
 The Lutheran Labour Scheme once again drew on the transnational connections 
between the CLWR and St. Louis in order to meet their shared goal of helping fellow 
Germans. Herzer and Meyer collaborated over the Lutheran Labour Scheme with the 
intention of using it as a “Seed Movement,” or Musterknaben. The so-called seed 
movement involved “bringing over of Baltic Lutherans, who have no relatives in Canada” 
with the intention that they would then initiate the legal proceedings under the close 
relative scheme to bring their family members to Canada.377 Although the Department of 
Labour placed a priority on finding DPs with agricultural experience, the CLWR had its 
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own priorities for Volksdeutsche labourers. “The Seed Movement idea will be the guiding 
policy in making selections,” the two men decided.378 The CLWR therefore prioritized 
Volksdeutsche that did not already have family in Canada, since they could migrate to 
Canada through other means. The goal, after all, was not simply to bring any DP to 
Canada. The CLWR and Missouri Synod specifically wanted Volksdeutsche immigrants 
so that they could encourage as much immigration from Germany as possible. Eydt made 
it clear to members of the Canada Synod that the “Lutheran Labour Scheme is intended 
primarily for the assistance of Volksdeutsche who have no relatives in Canada and are 
thus otherwise ineligible for admission.”379 Volksdeutsche with relatives in Canada should 
work with their families, not the CLWR, for assistance. The title “Lutheran Labour 
Scheme” was therefore rather dubious, given the actual motivations behind the plan. 
Herzer and Meyer were not concerned about meeting the Canadian government’s labour 
shortages, but rather saw the scheme as a way to fulfill their ethnic vision of encouraging 
German migration to Canada.   
 Connections to St. Louis remained important for the CLWR in order to operate the 
Lutheran Labour Scheme. Because the very notion of the seed movement involved the 
constant application and movement of people, it was a costly endeavor in constant need 
of financing. Herzer routinely visited St. Louis throughout 1949 and 1950 to demonstrate 
to Meyer, Sieck, and the EPC the continual need to fund the Labour Scheme.380 During 
his visits, Herzer made sure to emphasize how the program succeeded in accomplishing 
their shared goal of encouraging Volksdeutsche migration. “After a thorough investigation 
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on the ground,” Herzer told Meyer, “I am more convinced that our Lutheran Labour 
Scheme is one of the most effective methods of dealing with many compassionate cases 
of the refugees in Germany.”381 Sieck and Meyer echoed Herzer’s message when the EPC 
met to discuss relief work. The two men “reported that Canada had rescinded many of its 
immigration restrictions which makes it possible for the immigration of many more 
refugees.”382 The EPC passed a resolution granting the CLWR twenty-five thousand 
dollars to continue its work. With the EPC’s moral and financial support once again, the 
transnational connection between the EPC and CLWR allowed for the Lutheran Labour 
Scheme’s success. 
 Despite the program’s early accomplishment, the CLWR soon found its work 
again hampered by the “Volksdeutsche issue.” By 1950, the CLWR received multiple 
reports stating that the majority of Volksdeutsche faced considerable difficulties gaining 
acceptance to the Lutheran Labour Scheme overseas. Although the program had many 
applicants, the Canadian government’s immigration agents overseas accepted 
comparatively few applicants.  
Some [Volksdeutsche] were eliminated by the medical examination, some few by the security 
man, but by far the largest number were rejected because they had acquired German citizenship 
somewhere in the course of the years 1939 to 1945…This difficulty which is applicable to the 
greatest majority is threatening to undermine and even bring to a standstill the entire program 
because of its moral implications…It is a truth that during the course of the war years virtually all 
Volksdeutsche were repatriated in German occupied territories and in most cases naturalized 
whether they desired citizenship or not.383  
 
Although the CCCRR circumnavigated the IRO, it appeared they could not avoid 
Canadian immigration officials who still rejected migrants they considered “the enemy.” 
A high number of Volksdeutsche rejections had serious implications for the CLWR and 
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CCCRR programs. If the program did not fulfill their yearly quota of securing seven 
hundred labourers for government programs, the government could legally cancel the 
CCCRR’s funding.384 The high rejection rate offered a further moral dilemma for the 
CLWR. Stewart Herman, a member of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) described 
how the Volksdeutsche were “virtually forced to lie in order to pass the Canadian 
requirements” or face rejection.385 Although they could not condone liars, they also could 
not condone the policies of Nazi Germany that they saw as unfairly punishing the German 
people. Herman described the Volksdeutsche who received German citizenship as similar 
to “hords (sic) of cattle branded without consideration of individual desires.”386 The 
German ethnicities of CLWR employees made them predisposed towards adopting a 
sympathetic attitude towards the Volksdeutsche. Unlike Canadian immigration officials, 
they gave Volksdeutsche the benefit of the doubt. They refused to believe that the 
Volksdeutsche willingly accepted German citizenship by the Nazis, and thus chose to 
believe this status was forced upon them. This sympathetic attitude prompted the CCCRR 
and CLWR officials to argue that the federal government needed to lift restrictions facing 
the Volksdeutsche. Because it was unwillingly forced upon the Volksdeutsche, they 
argued that German citizenship should not prevent their admittance to Canada.387 Their 
German ethnicity compelled CLWR leaders to continue looking for a solution the 
Volksdeutsche problem, even if it meant challenging and petitioning the federal 
government. 
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Race, Religion, and Confronting the Volksdeutsche Problem 
 
 
 The CCCRR and CLWR started to lobby the government to permit the entry of 
Volksdeutsche with German citizenship in the late 1940s. Although Canada was no longer 
actively at war with Germany, perceptions of Germans as “the enemy” proved difficult to 
overcome. Canadian politicians did not prioritize accepting more German immigrants to 
Canada. A 1946 Gallup poll found that thirty-four percent of Canadians supported 
banning future immigration from Germany.388 Politicians had very little to gain from 
supporting this cause, particularly when approximately one-third of their constituents 
opposed it. The CLWR and CCCRR had to overcome the stigma that the Volksdeutsche 
were enemies or Nazis. Both organizations succeeded in doing so by relying on tactics 
they developed during the war. German-Canadian Lutherans once again offset the 
difficulties their ethnicity posed by cultivating alliances with local political elites and 
appealing to Canada’s Christian and white character.  
 Regional ties between political elites and Waterloo County Lutherans once again 
laid the groundwork for collaboration between government officials and Lutheran 
interests. Specifically, Waterloo County members of the CLWR and CCCRR used their 
regional connections to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Senator 
William Euler, a fellow Lutheran and former Kitchener mayor, to lobby for changes in 
Canada’s immigration policy. Euler took a particular interest in the CLWR’s work and 
frequently attended Lutheran meetings in Waterloo County to eavesdrop on their 
immigration plans. Although he requested his name be kept out of their minutes, Euler 
used these interactions with the CLWR to keep abreast of their plans to bring 
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Volksdeutsche to Ontario. This relationship benefitted the CLWR, as Euler subsequently 
urged Mackenzie King and his fellow senators to study Canada’s immigration policy in 
greater detail throughout the late 1940s.389  
 CLWR members from Waterloo County also travelled to Ottawa to meet with 
King, who approved of their mission based on their Christian principals and his own 
nostalgia of living in Waterloo County. The night prior to a February 1947 meeting with 
the CCCRR, King had a dream wherein he briefly found himself on streets that resembled 
“one leading to Waterloo in old Berlin…During the morning, I thought of it when one of 
the delegates who was present was a Minister now in Kitchener.” King later recounted 
that the dream seemed “a sort of vision which seemed symbolical in a way.”390 The 
CCCRR, consisting of “representatives of persons from European countries” asked him if 
“the door might be opened a little wider for refugees.” Although not generally 
sympathetic to immigration reform, King conceded that “the pleas made by these man 
(sic) was very strong. I was again touched by the regard which they seemed to express 
toward myself for action I had taken, evidencing friendship for the underprivileged etc.” 
More significantly, the Christian character of the CCCRR gained King’s sympathies. 
Although King recognized that the CCCRR was German (or “European”) in background, 
the CCCRR presented itself as a primarily Christian institution. The Christian and 
humanitarian aspect to the CCCRR’s work of feeding and clothing the needy appealed to 
King’s Christian convictions. He later reflected that the CCCRR’s actions demonstrated 
that “Christian influence was making itself felt more strongly in the world.”391 The 
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CCCRR’s collective lobbying and international emphasis served to confirm King’s bias 
in that regard. By appealing to King as a likeminded Christian, the CCCRR’s liberal 
position on immigration reform received a warm welcome when it would have otherwise 
faced scorn.392  
 Highlighting the religious, rather than ethnic, aspects of the CCCRR proved a 
common strategy for the organization and its political allies. The CCCRR made a 
conscious choice to highlight the organization’s common Christianity, rather than their 
shared German ethnicity. By emphasizing the humanitarian elements of their work, the 
CCCRR avoided accusations that they were a pro-German group.393 Although its 
members recognized that their purpose was to facilitate Volksdeutsche immigration in the 
privacy of their meetings, they tried to portray their work as based on Christian and 
humanitarian needs in public periodicals and correspondence. One article reiterated the 
fact that the CCCRR and CLWR had a higher purpose than simply supplying “the labor 
market with brawn.” Instead, their “Christian business” was to help “homeless people to 
find new homes…good Christians homes” throughout Canada.394 Walter Tucker, one of 
Herzer’s political connections from Western Canada, repeated this language when he 
advocated for the CCCRR in the House of Commons. Tucker emphasized the Christian, 
rather than ethnic character, when he stated that the Volksdeutsche already in Canada 
“never went to bed at night without getting down on their knees and thanking God that 
they had the privilege to come to this free country.”395 The DPs in Tucker’s speech were 
not ex-Nazis or German citizens, but rather devout Christians. The CCCRR and Tucker 
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hoped that cultivating a pious image would allow members in the House of Commons to 
relate to, and perhaps even sympathize with, the Volksdeutsche. Although they may not 
wish to help members of a former enemy nation, the CCCRR and their allies hoped 
politicians would want to help fellow Christians.  
 German-Canadian requests to change Volksdeutsche policy occurred during a time 
in which the Canadian federal government debated the country’s future immigration 
policy. At the end of the Second World War, the federal government did not yet have a 
department to specifically oversee immigration. Instead the Senate Standing Committee 
on Immigration and Labour in 1946 examined the nation’s immigration policies. The 
committee consisted of an eclectic mix of government officials that met with other 
branches of the government and the IRO to ultimately determine policy and establish 
immigration quotas.396 Despite the international emphasis on helping DPs for 
humanitarian reasons, the Canadian government continued to see immigration as a 
process that should benefit Canada instead of the DPs. King provided one of the clearest 
articulations of Canada’s postwar immigration policy in a 1947 speech. “I wish to make it 
quite clear,” King stated, “that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the 
person whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a ‘fundamental human right’ 
of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege.”397 Immigration was not an exclusively 
humanitarian endeavor, nor did King conceptualize immigration as process that 
inherently benefitted them. Immigrants would only be accepted if it suited Canadian 
interests and conformed to the values they looked for in “desirable future citizens.”  
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 Canadian politicians put forward several different approaches to immigration in 
the late 1940s.398 For some members of Parliament, these debates provoked a fear that 
Canada was losing its British character. Lawrence Skey and Thomas Kidd, two 
Conservative MPs from Ontario, believed that any discussion of Canada’s immigration 
policy needed to include British immigrants. Skey told the House of Commons that many 
Britons wished to leave the United Kingdom and that Canada “must now be ready to 
receive the torch from these people.”399 If Canada needed to encourage immigration from 
any country, Kidd argued, it should obviously be the United Kingdom. Kidd mentioned 
that his constituents “are greatly disturbed because of the coldness of the government 
toward British immigration. The citizens of the British isles (sic) have been brought up to 
believe in the same ideals and the same type of constitutional government as we have. 
Our soldiers fought side by side for the same way of life.”400 Canada’s history as a white 
and British nation provided the basis of Kidd’s argument. “England spent millions of 
dollars in finding homes in Canada for the United Empire Loyalists…Just as those men 
had the pioneer spirit,” Kidd argued, “so have many of the young men in the United 
Kingdom who are desirous of living within the empire.”401 Anglophiles such as Skey and 
Kidd tried to convince their peers of the relevance of British immigration and history in 
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Canada. “Let us continue to perpetuate British traditions….Let us keep Canada British,” 
he concluded.402 
 While certainly not their intention, Skey and Kidd’s emphasis on keeping Canada 
“British” opened a door for proponents of Volksdeutsche migration to make their own 
case. Although Skey and Kidd applied their emphasis on the “pioneer spirit” with his 
“love of freedom” to potential British immigrants, Anglo-Canadians associated these 
values broadly with the white race. As cultural theorist Richard Dyer notes, decades of 
European imperial rule perpetuated popular racial thinking that portrayed whites as 
inherently suited to nation building and governance. They alone, supposedly, had the 
genetic stock necessary to pioneer a functioning society.403 Because Skey and Kidd’s 
comments employed a coded language to describe broadly the quality of white settlers, 
advocates for Volksdeutsche immigration used the opportunity to demonstrate how 
Volksdeutsche could also embody the same “pioneer spirit” as British settlers due to their 
whiteness. MPs in favour of Volksdeutsche reform used Kidd’s language to demonstrate 
that the Volksdeutsche could conform to the British model of immigration Kidd 
described. Tucker mimicked Kidd’s argument by stating “our finest immigrants have 
been those who came to us from the various countries of Europe, who are of German 
ethnic origin. We have in Canada literally hundreds of thousands of people who are of 
that descent.”404 As whites, Germans embodied Kidd’s “pioneer spirit” and conform to 
so-called “Canadian” values. J.A. MacKinnon, the Minister of Mines and Resources, 
expressed sympathy for the Volksdeutsche based on these common cultural 
understandings of Germans as white and therefore good settlers:  
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“I was brought up in the county of Bruce, Ontario, whose early settlers consisted of highland Scots 
and people of German origin. We did not know those people as anything but Canadians….In every 
way they were the best possible settlers and the best people we could have. They have made a 
great contribution to this country not only in western Ontario but all across Canada. I am very 
sympathetic to the suggestion that carefully selected people with that background should be 
allowed into Canada as soon as possible.”405  
 
Whiteness allowed German immigrants to historically conform to Canadian standards and 
would allow the Volksdeutsche to continue to do so as well.  
 The notion of Germans as “good” settlers proved to be a powerful discursive tool 
in which to combat the anti-German or anti-European sentiments of other MPs.  During a 
1949 debate in the House of Commons, Lewis Cardiff, a Conservative MP, suggested that 
the government’s current labour schemes involving DPs “is absolutely wrong. If you are 
going to bring d.p.’s out here as farm labour, then we want farmers, not people who 
merely call themselves agriculturalists and stay on farms for just as short a time as they 
possible can until they can find themselves a job elsewhere.”406 Other MPs quickly rallied 
to the defense of the government’s labour schemes, and the DPs in particular. MPs from 
across Canada vouched that farmers in their constituencies were overall satisfied with the 
quality of the DPs that worked on their farms. Wilbert Thatcher stated that “if there is one 
feature of any governmental policy that I can agree with, it has been their bringing in of 
these farm workers.” In fact, Thatcher wished “they would extend this program a little 
further and allow our Canadians of German descent to bring in their relatives from 
Germany.” Like others before him, Thatcher drew upon Canadian society’s shared 
understanding of equating whiteness with agricultural suitably. “In the past, Canada’s 
experience has been that the German people usually have made the best possible settlers,” 
he argued. “They have made good agriculturalists. I think we are missing a bet if we do 
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not take advantage of the huge pool of manpower in Germany at present time.”407 Of 
course, Thatcher recognized that any potential Volksdeutsche immigrants “will have to be 
screened” so that they did not admit any Nazis into Canada. With this caveat aside, 
Thatcher reminded his colleagues that “we are in the process of building a nation, and the 
manpower that we choose today is going to determine, to some extent at least, the kind of 
nation we shall have in the future…There are many reasons why we should change our 
present policy towards Germans.”408 If immigrants determined Canada’s future, 
Thatcher’s speech made it clear that Canada’s future needed to consist of white 
immigrants who could politically and culturally conform to Canada while contributing to 
it through their hard work. The cultural characteristics prescribed to the white race 
allowed the Volksdeutsche to appear as ideal immigrants and overcome any associations 
with their Nazi past. 
 The frequent associations between the Volksdeutsche and white qualities such as 
pioneering, settlement, and agriculture, eventually paid off for the CCCRR and their 
political allies. In March 1950, the Canadian government issued PC 1606 which granted 
the CCCRR’s request that Volksdeutsche with German citizenship could now migrate to 
Canada. A few months later, the government expanded the order by no longer classifying 
German nationals as “enemy aliens.”409 The CCCRR interpreted PC 1606 as an important 
victory for their organization.410 The CCCRR’s persistence, as well as Canada’s desire to 
establish positive relations with West Germany, played an important role in achieving PC 
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1606.411 Yet whiteness proved an equally important, if at times invisible, factor in 
ensuring Volksdeutsche admission. While the Volksdeutsche were not ideal immigrants, 
their whiteness gave them enough cultural currency to overcome the political stigma 
attached to their character. 
 
Gender Relations and Immigration Work 
 
 
 If race played an important yet subtle role in framing the Volksdeutsche debate in 
the public sphere, gender played a significant role in shaping the internal dynamics of the 
Canada and Missouri Synod’s immigration work. The large-scale relief campaigns 
required that all members of Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
needed to participate if they had any hope of alleviating suffering in postwar Germany. 
Patriarchal gender relations within Lutheran communities dictated how congregations 
could participate in this process. As relief fell under the branch of charity, local pastors 
assumed that German Lutheran women and youth would collectively work towards 
meeting their fundraising goals. Pastors and synod leaders, in contrast, did not need to do 
this work themselves. As male leaders, they only needed to inspire others to complete 
these tasks and to demonstrate their importance through their sermons and newsletters. 
While relief work therefore involved Lutheran men and women, only men received 
official recognition for their work. Pastors often commended one another for conducting 
relief and immigration work, which served to reinforce themselves as the authority 
figures within their community. Even though it was mainly Lutheran women who 
actually completed the tasks associated with relief work, gendered notions of “good” 
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women as inherently subservient and uninterested in leadership roles ensured that pastors 
took credit for their accomplishments denied them the respect and praise they deserved. 
 German Lutheran women accomplished the vast majority of relief work for 
postwar Europe. When the CLWR started its campaign to send food overseas, its leaders 
recommended that women and youth initiate campaigns at their local congregations. They 
suggested that each congregation “form a committee representative of the Ladies Aid, 
Church Council, Young People Society, to promote this programme, or some particular 
society such as the Ladies should take the lead.”412 As natural caregivers, it seemed 
obvious to the CLWR’s male leadership that women would extend their other charity 
work to include food and clothing campaigns in Germany. Their previous experience with 
fundraising for their churches would help the postwar relief campaign run smoothly. The 
CLWR’s male leaders believed “the Ladies…are especially able and efficient when it 
comes to the practical aspects of organizing the gathering, the processing and the sharing 
of food.” They argued that “the success of this programme depends, above all, on the 
whole-hearted support of our Ladies!”413 The postwar relief campaign resembled other 
Lutheran fundraising efforts from previous years. Although the food and clothing 
campaigns operated on a larger scale than other charities, they involved the same 
principled skills of purchasing, canning, and preserving food and clothing. Regardless, 
these campaigns made heavy demands on the women and youth willing to participate. 
During the early months of the Missouri Synod’s clothing campaign, German Lutheran 
women and youth in the Walther League gathered at the Concordia Publishing House in 
St. Louis four nights a week. They worked long hours sorting and packaging acceptable 
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clothing, often until after nine o’clock at night. This labour, of course, was unpaid.414 The 
synod’s women and youth did the actual work required to send relief to Germany, while 
Lutheran men more often than not simply wrote about it. 
 Participating in relief work often became a family affair. Although German 
Lutheran men rarely discussed the important roles their wives played in relief work, 
circumstances forced them to tacitly acknowledge their wives’ authority. If a particular 
CLWR executive happened to be unavailable or away on business, those who wished to 
reach him would often turn to his wife for assistance instead. In 1954, for instance, Hugh 
Whitteker needed to reach Arthur Mehlenbacher to discuss the CLWR’s relief program. 
Away on business in Western Canada, however, he turned to his wife Ruby 
Mehlenbacher for help instead. After discussing the program’s future, he told Ruby that 
“in reading this letter over I find that I have set up a sort of puzzle that will occupy some 
of your lonesome hours while you are alone.” Whitteker referred to the fact that his letter 
made such frequent use of the pronoun “you,” Ruby would have to determine which “of 
the pronouns ‘you’ on the preceding page are directed to yourself and which to Arthur.” 
However, Whitteker recognized that their work “has developed into a sort of family co-
operative affair you might just decide that they belong to both.”415 Arthur’s absence 
forced Whitteker, somewhat unwillingly, to recognize that Ruby was just as capable as 
carrying out relief work as her fully ordained husband. Arthur later recognized Ruby’s 
involvement in their work, but only in the context of a shared error. In the mid-1950s, 
Ruby and Arthur volunteered to compile statistics for the CLWR’s relief campaign. To 
their horror, they realized they forgot to include the name of a Canada Synod pastor in 
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their statistics. “This missed statistician Stockmann and our own triple checking,” Arthur 
wrote. “My wife says she is going to skip to Mexico now,” he later joked.416 Although 
this comment was made in jest, it suggests the precarious nature of women’s involvement 
in work that the synod gendered as masculine. Although a minor detail, pastors involved 
with Lutheran organizations often took the accurate compiling of statistics seriously, and 
often took offense when any errors were replicated.417 As Arthur’s wife, Ruby knew that 
any bruised egos would direct their criticisms towards her involvement.  
 Outside of conducting the daily tasks necessary to carry out relief programs, 
German Lutheran women who worked as secretaries in the Canada and Missouri Synod 
often emerged as de facto sources of information on immigration policy. Unable to 
contact any of the Missouri Synod’s leadership, one layman reached out to Olivia Scott, 
Lawrence Meyer’s secretary, asking for advice on sponsoring DPs. The layman hoped for 
a more liberal policy that would allow his relatives to come to the United States. He asked 
Scott about the typical procedures, and who in the government he should contact for more 
information. “Please look into this for us, since we want action,” he asked.418 Secretaries 
similar to Scott knew just as much about relief work and immigration policy as their 
pastor-employers, as they carried out the daily business or organizing and replying to 
correspondence. Through their important bureaucratic role in the synod, women also 
became involved in the political aspects of DP work. 
 The Missouri and Canada Synod maintained traditional gender roles that 
prioritized men’s work over women’s labour, and only celebrated women’s involvement 
                                                        
416 LA, ESF, 30 CLC, Folder 30.4.2.18.2.2., Mehlenbacher to Jacobi, 12 July 1954. 
417 As the Canada Synod’s statistician, Otto Stockmann even resented the notion that he could make any 
errors. To challenge Stockmann’s statistics was to open yourself up to severe rebuttal.  
418 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Folder 49, Hartenberger to Scott, 25 October 1948. 
 172 
in synod affairs when it related to their role as caregivers. Bloedel, for instance, 
repeatedly diminished the varied contributions women made to St. Louis’s food and 
clothing campaign by only praising their charity efforts to help German children. In his 
retrospective of St. Louis’s relief campaign, Bloedel wrote that providing food and 
clothes to children “appealed especially to the women, and helping orphans and orphan 
homes became the particular province of the Luther Women’s Missionary League.”419 
Bloedel did not need to include why precisely the LWML felt invested in German 
orphanages. His readers knew too well that, as women, Lutheran women should be 
predisposed to helping children over the more masculine pursuits of rebuilding churches 
and theological seminaries. The tendency of synod leaders to write in the passive voice 
further divested women of any action or authority. In 1947, the Lutheran Women’s 
Missionary League conducted a fundraising campaign throughout Missouri and Illinois to 
raise money for Lawrence Meyer to travel to Germany and personally distribute food and 
clothing to Germany’s needy. Although they conducted one of the synod’s most 
profitable fundraisers, the synod leadership denied the LWML official recognition. 
Bloedel later recounted the campaign by stating the local “district has placed at [Meyer’s] 
disposal the sum of $20,000 for the purchase of orphanage equipment.”420 Bloedel’s 
seemingly neutral account of the campaign embodied the synod’s strong patriarchal 
assumptions about women’s work. First, Bloedel’s use of the passive voice managed to 
ensure that he stripped the LWML from their role as the primary actors in the campaign. 
Instead, he situated Meyer as the one spending and conducting relief work overseas. He 
portrayed Meyer as the individual taking action and coming to Germany’s aid, not the 
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LWML. Second, Bloedel made the assumption that the LWML money would be used on 
orphanages in Germany. Meyer’s account of his 1947 trip to Germany demonstrates that 
he used this money on a variety of different projects, and not solely on orphanages.421 
Bloedel’s assumption that the LWML would express interest in only children’s work, 
however, prevented him for providing a more nuanced understanding of the variety of 
charitable work Lutheran women conducted. The patriarchal assumptions by the synod’s 
male officials wrote Lutheran women out of their contemporary and retrospective 
writings of the synod’s relief campaign. Dismissing women’s contributions allowed 
pastors to once again portray themselves in positions of leadership and authority. As both 
men and pastors in their community, they were used to thinking of themselves as leaders 
with agency and control, despite the evidence suggesting women took on these roles as 
well.  
 Gendered use of religious language further separated the experiences of Lutheran 
men and women who participated in relief work. Since German Lutherans in both St. 
Louis and Waterloo County felt compelled to help DPs on religious grounds, they often 
used religious language during their relief campaigns. These sentiments often contained 
gendered language and implications that reinforced patriarchal gender norms within the 
church. Although both men and women saw their work as a religious calling, they 
expressed their relationship with God in very different terms. German Lutheran men often 
compared themselves directly to God or Jesus Christ and believed that the two directly 
influenced their work. Their roles as leaders allowed them to exhibit Christ-like traits and 
attributes. Bloedel, for instance, described the EPC’s programs as “glorious, Christ-like 
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and God-pleasing work of mercy.”422 Bloedel’s description is tame when compared to 
hyperbolic comparisons other pastors used to describe their participation in relief work. 
Other pastors claimed that God almost moved through them in order to complete His will. 
They continually reiterated that they had God’s blessings and authority to conduct relief 
work among Europe’s poor. Recounting a 1950 trip to Germany, Herzer told his male 
peers how “the objective of this trip was to remove, with the Lord’s help, various 
impediments and difficulties which had bogged down our refugee work in Germany and 
Austria.” Herzer stated that this was no easy task, but “the knowledge that I was 
proceeded and accompanied by the prayers of thousands of Christians in Canada not only 
gave me courage, but accounted largely for the success of my mission.”423 By expressing 
his faith that both God and Canadian Lutherans prayed for him, Herzer reaffirmed his 
position as an ethnic elite within the CLWR and CCCRR. God and Christ acted as 
functional metaphors for Lutheran men to use to reaffirm their natural and “God-given” 
right to lead their institutions and churches.  
 Men drew upon their perceived commonalities with Christ as a common tactic to 
encourage and inspire one another to accomplish more work for the church. If “good” 
Lutheran women were expected to accomplish relief work, it was the duty of a “good” 
male pastor to inspire his followers to meet their monthly fundraising goals. Responding 
to the lackluster relief campaigns in the early 1950s, Eric Reble took his fellow pastors to 
task for not leading by Christ’s example. In a Canada Lutheran article, Eric described 
how congregations stopped contributing to the CLWR and Lutheran World Action 
(LWA) charities as frequently as they did immediately following the war. “The 
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enthusiasm has gone. The L.W.A. quota is just another burdensome chore to be met by 
the congregation year after year,” he wrote. “But we know that’s not true. We know that 
L.W.A. is still an opportunity for us to become Christs to our neighours.”424 By making 
financial contributions, Eric encouraged other men to demonstrate that they could 
embody the values of giving like Christ. He told laymen to listen more consciously to 
their pastors’ attempts to fundraise. He scolded laymen by telling them that Christ 
certainly would not complain about being asked to feed the hungry or heal the sick. “No, 
you’re right, that’s not the kind of a Christ we have, is it?” he asked rhetorically. “Nor do 
I think that you and I have any business saying, ‘Oh, no, not again!’ when Christ comes 
calling to us for our help. Church Member, you look at the cross of Christ and then decide 
what you want to do about L.W.A.”425 Eric’s article placed the failure of the early 1950s 
relief campaigns on the shoulders of laymen who did not rise to the level of Christ’s 
example. Further still, his analogy affirmed the connection between the local pastor as the 
voice of Christ. Eric’s comparison encouraged congregants not to see their pastor as an 
adversary nagging them for more money, but hoped that laymen would hear Christ 
speaking through their pastors. By making this comparison, Eric and other pastors 
conformed to masculine standards in the church that expected male pastors to lead 
effectively by meeting synod and congregational goals. 
 In contrast, German Lutheran women expressed a more passive relationship with 
God. Women believed they laboured for God rather than the male emphasis on working 
through God. Strict gender norms within the church prevented women from speaking 
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about God and Christ in such exaggerated ways. While men put their actions on equal 
footing as the charity of Christ and will of God, Lutheran women portrayed their actions 
as showing subservience to God. This is particularly true of Irma Lehmann and Katrine 
Petersons,426 two Lutheran women that the CLWR hired as “port workers” in Halifax and 
Montreal respectively. As port workers, Lehmann and Petersons greeted newly arrived 
Lutheran DPs in Halifax and Montreal each week. They had far greater contact with a 
larger number of DPs than most of the male pastors who championed their own Christ-
like behaviour. Yet, Lehmann and Peterson’s language adopted a far more subdued tone 
than their male counterparts. In their monthly reports submitted to the Canada Synod, 
Lehmann and Petersons often stressed their subservient position to God and Christ. “I 
submit this report with a deep sense of gratitude to our Lord and to those in authority over 
me for having been given the opportunity of reaching out a helping hand to the 
newcomers,” Lehmann wrote in one report. “I pray for continued strength and guidance 
in my work ahead.”427 Unlike her male colleagues, Lehmann hoped for God’s guidance 
and expressed no certainty that God blessed her work unconditionally. Her uncertainty 
often dominated her reflections on her own labour. “The outlook on immigration for 1954 
is very bright as God willing another 16,000 newcomers are expected and we believe that 
there shall be a good number of Lutherans among them. We are praying for God’s 
guidance in our work,” she later wrote.428 Petersons’s language in her reports matched 
Lehmann’s emphasis on subordination and uncertainty. Even after receiving the praise of 
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her male peers, Petersons diminished her own contributions to the church. After receiving 
accolades, she wrote that “the trust and confidence of the LWF NCC shown to the Port 
worker is…gratefully acknowledged, with a willing heart and mind to do the best in 
serving our Lutheran brethren, which is a Service of our Church and our Lord.”429  
 Lehmann and Petersons’s personal writing therefore reflected broader trends in 
gender relations within the Lutheran community, and within North American culture 
more broadly. While the synod’s male leaders acted confidently on God’s authority, 
Lehmann and Petersons expressed doubt. Biblical and theological texts in both the 
Missouri and Canada Synod stressed the subservience of women to men. Discussion of 
gender relations within Lutheran communities throughout the twentieth century inevitably 
involved at least one pastor citing St. Paul’s assertion that he did not “permit a woman to 
teach or to assume authority over a man; she must be quiet.”430  Pastors, as community 
leaders, routinely praised subservience and some Lutheran women came to adopt and 
enforce these values in their congregations as well. Women’s groups at Lutheran 
congregations routinely incorporated the theme of servitude into their conferences and 
meetings. The LWML advertised its 1947 convention around the slogan “serve the Lord 
with gladness” to stress servitude as not only a positive quality, but also a God-pleasing 
one.431 On other occasions, the two port workers directly referenced Biblical passages on 
gender relations. Petersons wrote that “we pray that the Almighty may continue to bless 
us and to give us strength for this work in which so much satisfaction and profound 
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happiness can be found.”432 The culture surrounding women’s secondary role in the 
church shaped their immigration reports to the synod’s male leaders. Their 
professionalism and knowledge often lay hidden beneath the subservient tone contained 
in their monthly reports. 
 The synod’s patriarchal and paternalistic nature shaped relations between the 
synod’s male leaders and its port workers. Despite their important status in DP work and 
professionalism, the male leadership routinely diminished their status through comments 
on their gender. After meeting Petersons for the first time, Hugh Whitteker wrote to a 
colleague that he was “very favourably impressed with Miss Petersons. She is a girl with 
a great deal of personality, pleasant mannerisms, attractive, easy to talk to and I am sure 
she will be easy to work with. She speaks several languages (7 someone told me) and she 
likes her work very much.”433 Evidently, Whitteker’s need to affirm his status as a 
qualified community leader led him to focus disproportionately on Petersons’s 
appearance and personality rather than her credentials, which surpassed his own. Despite 
her many qualifications, Whitteker saw Petersons as a woman first, and a social worker 
second. Jokes about the “girls” circulated within the synod, particularly when Petersons 
and Lehmann requested greater rights for themselves in their jobs as port workers. Both 
port workers had a verbal agreement with the synod that they would be allowed to take 
several weeks of vacation during the year. Lehmann, in particular, valued this time so that 
she could return to Germany to visit her ailing mother. When Petersons and Lehmann 
insisted that the synod uphold its promise of vacation time through a written contract, 
Mehlenbacher joked to Whitteker that “I’m in the stew again as always.” He told 
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Whitteker that his “two girl friends in Halifax and Montreal want to know about vacation. 
I must ask for a little information. Had you ever intimated any plan of vacation for these 
workers?”434 Far from a trivial concern, the synod issued a questionnaire to prominent 
pastors asking their thoughts on allowing Lehmann and Petersons to take a vacation. The 
pastors responded favourably, but debated whether a month was too long or too short and 
other aspects of their request. Even though pastors took annual vacations without facing 
any bureaucratic hurdles, pastors scrutinized Petersons’s and Lehmann’s request for a 
vacation from their work.435 Pastors rarely faced the same level of paternalism and 
regulation the two port workers encountered over such a simple request. Although 
Lehmann and Petersons rivaled, and often surpassed, the linguistic ability and daily 
workload of male pastors, their gender allowed the synod’s leadership to place their 
requests under greater scrutiny than would otherwise be normal.   
 Bloedel’s management of the Missouri Synod’s campaign for food relief in St. 
Louis embodies how women’s important role in relief work was undermined by German 
Lutheran masculinity. Like relief programs carried out at the congregational level, 
Bloedel relied upon the knowledge of German Lutheran women to help him run food 
relief program. “Housewives,” he wrote in a later report, “were questioned about food 
selections. Information was secured about packing techniques.”436 One of the so-called 
housewives Bloedel consulted was Margaret Graebner, the daughter of Concordia 
Seminary professor Theodore Graebner. As a woman, Graebner could not obtain a high-
ranking position in the synod’s relief program. She therefore sought a position with the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as a dietitian as it did not have 
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the synod’s same qualms about hiring women. Before Bloedel sent out the list of 
acceptable food to the synod, he submitted his list of proposed food items to Graebner to 
ensure that it met UN approval. “To our great surprise,” Bloedel wrote, “she approved the 
entire list.” Rather than commend Graebner for her inside knowledge of the UN’s relief 
program, Bloedel used the opportunity to congratulate himself. “This compliment, 
coming from a member of the fair sex, schooled and skilled in the art of selecting and 
preparing food, flattered us – a mere man – and richly rewarded us for our efforts. 
However, since this may seem to be self-praise, we shall pass over the matter in 
silence.”437  Aside from Bloedel’s ironic use of “silence,” his interaction with Graebner 
highlights the practice of Lutheran men dismissing the role of Lutheran women from 
relief work inaction. Their tendency to dismiss Lutheran women while comparing 
themselves to God or Christ helped Lutheran men to solidify their leadership positions as 
ethnic elites within the church. Although the amount of work Lutheran women conducted 
for the postwar relief campaigns surpassed those of Lutheran men, patriarchal gender 
norms ensured that public discussion of relief work highlighted male achievement over 
the consistent work conducted by German Lutheran women. 
 
Old and New Directions in Immigration, 1951-1960 
 
 
 The CCCRR and CLWR’s victory passing PC 1606 did not end their struggles 
admitting Volksdeutsche to Canada. Although a shared whiteness proved effective in 
mitigating political concerns for most MPs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
still believed certain Volksdeutsche immigrants posed a security threat. William Kelly, an 
RCMP officer in charge of admitting visas to Europeans, sponsored a directive that 
                                                        
437 CHI, EPCC, Box 4, Hugo Bloedel Folder, The Relief Program of the LCMS, n.d. 
 181 
refused to admit any Volksdeutsche involved with the Nazi Party’s most essential military 
and intelligence communities. This directive encompassed Nazi organizations such as the 
Waffen-SS or concentration camp guards.438 Thus, another, albeit smaller, group of 
Volksdeutsche found themselves barred from entering Canada just as the CCCRR 
assumed that the door had finally swung open. Although PC 1606 helped ease restrictions 
on the Volksdeutsche with German citizenship, Herzer realized that “now, many in our 
camp are being rejected [on] account [of] membership in the Nazi party.”439 The RCMP’s 
decision to bar even a segment of the Volksdeutsche population disappointed the CLWR. 
The German ethnicities of those involved with the CLWR clouded their ability to see the 
RCMP’s decision as anything other than anti-German. Their sympathetic attitudes 
towards the Volksdeutsche prevented them from believing that any German would 
willingly serve in Hitler’s army. This blanket support for Volksdeutsche innocence meant 
the CLWR maintained that they should not be punished simply for being German, 
regardless of their associations with Nazism.440 The RCMP’s influence of government 
policy made it clear to the CLWR that the fight for Volksdeutsche rights was clearly not 
yet over. Accordingly, the CLWR reaffirmed its dedication to remain a member of the 
CCCRR in January 1951. They decided that they would continue their membership in the 
interfaith organization “until the end of the emergency, i.e. as long as Volksdeutsche need 
our assistance.”441 While the government’s resistance to unreserved Volksdeutsche 
immigration tested their patience, pastors in the CLWR recognized the CCCRR’s 
necessity as long as their fellow Germans needed assistance.  
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  The CLWR’s difficult relationship with the Canadian government over the 
Volksdeutsche issue soured relations between the two groups. It seemed that they would 
never be able to admit their Volksdeutsche brethren without stipulations, regardless of 
how many changes in immigration policy they helped prompt. As a result, the CLWR 
altered its focus in the early 1950s back to its original aims. A series of meetings in 1951 
allowed the CLWR leaders to voice several concerns with the Lutheran Labour Scheme’s 
future and their relationship with the Canadian government. They noted that the scheme’s 
collaboration with the government often resulted in the obligation to help non-Lutheran 
families to appease the federal government. These concessions generated a great deal of 
cost that the CLWR no longer wished to finance. Paying for labourers that the 
government wished to help obviously did not fit with the CLWR’s goal of helping their 
fellow Germans, and CLWR officials grew to resent their obligation to provide a service 
they believed the government should offer. Furthermore, these non-Lutheran labourers 
“seem to assume an air of independence” and expected the CLWR to help them with 
other problems in which the CLWR had no interest.442 Their charitable attitudes did not 
extend to all people fleeing Europe, especially when they felt that these individuals 
simply used the CLWR “as an avenue” to come to Canada. Close collaboration with the 
government and its disappointing results prompted the CLWR executives to wonder 
whether they were “losing sight of the fact that ours is a ‘seed movement’” meant for 
Volksdeutsche immigrants.443 The CLWR could not hope to, and did not wish to, solve 
Europe’s many issues regarding homelessness, starvation, and displaced people. They 
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wished only to help German DPs and started to realize that their relationship with the 
government pulled them away from their ultimate objective. 
 The CLWR decided that they needed to begin the year 1952 with a stronger sense 
of their priorities. They needed to return to their original aims of helping the 
Volksdeutsche, rather than cooperating with the Canadian government. They placed their 
emphasis on “re-uniting of families where we have already brought a single man or a 
single girl to this country” through the Lutheran Labour Scheme and finding “single men 
and single girls, chiefly domestics, who are genuinely interested to act as a ‘seed’ to bring 
their parents and immediate family to Canada.”444 Solidifying their firmly pro-German 
and anti-government direction, Reble passed a motion affirming that the “C.L.W.R. is not 
in a position to be of assistance financially at the present time” to non-Lutheran labourers 
that the government wished to sponsor.445 If the Canadian government wished to 
prioritize their own labourers over the Volksdeutsche, the CLWR decided that they could 
pay for them on their own. As a German and Lutheran institution, the CLWR affirmed it 
would only help other members of their ethnic and religious group. 
 The constant advocacy work on behalf of the Volksdeutsche caused some CLWR 
members to express disillusionment with the Canadian government. Although they gave 
the appearance of a cooperative spirit, CLWR members privately criticized the 
government and its immigration policy. “The humanitarian aspect of immigration is gone 
and has been replaced by Labour needs and specifications,” Herzer lamented.446 Clifton 
Monk, another CLWR executive, shared these views. “Mass Government immigration 
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does not always lend itself to the humanitarian approach,” he believed.447  In their eyes, 
the government seemed to treat German and Volksdeutsche immigration as secondary or 
incidental in their policy planning. While they felt motivated to help DPs due to their 
shared ethnicity, the government seemed motivated only by labour regulations. Statistics 
presented at the 1953 CLWR meeting seemed to confirm their cynical perspective. They 
noted that, despite their best efforts, immigration from Britain consisted of over 32,000 
immigrants whereas German immigration sat around 25,000. “Apparently Canada’s 
immigration policy is to maintain British immigration the first place,” Monk derisively 
stated.448 The constant problem surrounding Volksdeutsche immigration even made Eydt 
question whether the CLWR should “get out of immigration work gradually.”449 Monk 
conceded that Germany’s improved economic situation by 1954 might provide “an 
appropriate time to ease graciously out of the field of church-sponsored immigration.”450 
However, the desire to continue to help their German brethren ultimately convinced 
members of the CLWR to continue advocating for Volksdeutsche and assisting their 
immigration. As long as the Volksdeutsche required assistance, Monk believed that “it 
would be wrong for us to step out of the overseas field.”451 The government could not be 
trusted to adequately care for the Volksdeutsche and other German DPs. As long the 
government continued to embody this attitude, they believed the CLWR served a purpose. 
Their German brethren would not go unrepresented as long as the CLWR remained 
vigilant.  
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 Although the CLWR continued its work with the Volksdeutsche, the 
organization’s scope broadened considerably starting in the mid-1950s. Germany’s 
improved economic conditions meant that the organization’s work no longer appeared as 
immediate and catastrophic as the 1940s. Immigration from Germany continued, but 
without the pressure and urgency that characterized the previous years. Furthermore, the 
West German government seemed less interested in promoting immigration, prompting 
the CLWR to question in 1954 whether “this may be the last big year for migration from 
Germany.”452 Germany’s slight recovery allowed the CLWR to begin looking elsewhere 
to send its relief. By the early 1950s, the CLWR discussed allocating a portion of their 
relief work to the needy in Korea, Syria, and Palestine.453 Relief work in Germany 
became so routine by 1953 that it barely warranted discussion among the CLWR 
executive. While the executive started to earnestly discuss providing clothing to other 
nations around the globe, the program for German relief largely ran itself. In the 
organization’s minutes that year, the secretary simply recorded “this matter is self-
explanatory” under the section for Germany.454 By 1953, the clothing and food campaigns 
for Germany proved well established and in little need of heavy monitoring. The CLWR 
felt comfortable with their decision to prioritize other nations starting in the mid-1950s 
largely because their American peers “continued to ship foodstuffs in quantities 
amounting to thousands of tons” to Germany.455 With their American peers now helping, 
they could turn their attention elsewhere. 
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 The Missouri Synod also surrendered its involvement in immigration work to the 
NLC during the mid-1950s. Their withdrawal from DP work, however, was motivated 
primarily by theological differences. The Missouri Synod promised to pay for a portion of 
the NLC’s immigration work, but slowly started to claw back its financial commitments 
throughout the 1950s. By 1955, Meyer threatened to completely pull the synod’s funding. 
Although he officially claimed that DP work was simply too expensive for the synod to 
continue, the synod’s traditional stance on letting individual congregations conduct DP 
work lay at the heart of his reasoning.456  He argued that congregations would be better 
suited to determine budgets and run DP work than national organizations like the NLC.457 
Although the synod continued to contribute to DP work financially, their moral 
investment in the cooperative NLC cause started to wane after 1955. 
 The CLWR’s slow withdrawal from German DP work strained the previously 
positive transnational connections between North American Lutherans. With Germany 
showing signs of recovery, the various groups of North American Lutherans had less 
reason to cooperate as urgently as before. The internal dynamics of the CLWR also 
weakened the relationship between American and Canadian Lutherans. Since its 
inception, the CLWR represented a shaky alliance between Lutherans in Western Canada 
and Ontario. Pastors in Western Canada interpreted the CLWR as the creation of a united 
group of Canadian Lutherans that would prioritize Canadian Lutheran affairs and 
eliminate competition between Lutheran synods. They believed that the CLWR would 
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grant them a national platform to exercise a political agenda along the same lines as other 
Protestant denominations in Canada, such as the Anglican or United churches. In contrast, 
members of the Canada Synod saw the CLWR as the first step to cooperating with other 
global Lutheran bodies.458 Pastors from the Canada Synod advocated for cooperation with 
American Lutherans due to their historic relationships with the ULCA and Missouri 
Synod. Transnational ties were the norm for both groups, and they hoped to continue 
working with American Lutherans and international Lutheran institutions like the 
Lutheran World Federation (LWF). Western Canada pastors saw the CLWR’s creation as 
a national moment, whereas the Canada Synod saw it through a global lens. 
 The competing perspectives between CLWR members in the West and in Ontario 
often led to passive aggressive arguments that motivated both sides to try and claim as 
many leadership positions within the organization as possible.459 By the 1950s, however, 
it became clear to both sides the CLWR’s leadership primarily consisted of pastors from 
Western Canada. Herzer, alongside his peers Earl Treusch and Clifton Monk, dominated 
CLWR affairs. Their vision of the CLWR as an independent and nationalist body often 
came at the expense of American cooperation by the late 1950s. With the actual 
admission of DPs slowing in the late 1950s, Monk believed that the CLWR needed to 
transition from encouraging immigration to providing social services for DPs in Canada. 
Finding housing, employment, and improving language skills were all services that the 
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CLWR could theoretically provide. Monk, somewhat enviously, noted that the Canada 
Synod already sponsored several “immigration service centers” in Ontario cities that 
provided these services. Monk proposed that the CLWR create several of these centers in 
Western Canadian cities with large DP populations as well. As the CLWR’s future lay in 
providing social services, he proposed that the CLWR sponsor the creation of these 
centers while also assuming control of the Canada Synod’s immigration centers. The 
CLWR would become integral to DP work in Canada at a national level and continue to 
help German immigrants once they arrived in Canada. 
 Monk did not have a vision of this future beyond these vague plans of expansion. 
He did little to account for the Canada Synod’s relationship with the ULCA, which 
helped them finance these immigration centers. Bengt Hoffman, who had positions in 
both the ULCA and LWF, doubted the feasibility of Monk’s plan. He told Monk that he 
assumed “that the ULCA will agree to CLWR taking over their centres…But this 
approach will not solve the larger question of over-all co-ordination.”460 Monk’s 
imprecise plans did not clarify whether the CLWR would continue a partnership with the 
American ULCA or terminate this relationship in the name of Canadian nationalism and 
CLWR independence. Monk contacted Earl Treusch, another ecumenically-minded pastor 
in Western Canada, in the following weeks in order to devise a budget for the proposed 
immigration centers. The two men estimated that a $50,000 loan would help them fulfill 
their vision of opening and maintaining new centers for DPs. They subsequently put 
forward a proposal requesting funds “for Canadian Missions for the purpose of reclaiming 
new Canadian Lutherans for the Lutheran Church.”461  Rather than addressing Hoffman’s 
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concerns, the proposal sat uneasily between CLWR idealism and reality. Monk and 
Treusch wanted the immigration centers to strengthen Canadian control over Canadian 
Lutheran affairs, while simultaneously requesting money from global and American 
Lutheran organizations to do so. 
 American Lutherans resented the CLWR’s request for money couched in the 
language of Canadian nationalism. Paul Empie, one of the NLC’s executives, commented 
that the proposal was “a little peculiar” that the CLWR would ask them to “subsidize 
work in Canada which was the regular responsibility of the churches which operate 
there.”462  Empie suspected that Monk and Treusch did not inquire as to whether the 
Canada Synod and ULCA approved of such a request that would, after all, take away 
their authority over immigration centers. “I would feel very uneasy in considering a 
request of this magnitude and significance which had not come before us with the 
knowledge and approval of the proper officials of church bodies concerned,” Empie later 
commented.463 The LWF ultimately postponed ruling on the Canadian request for more 
money. They passed a resolution stating that “since these projects would still have to be 
discussed between Canadian and US church leaders no action could be taken at this 
time.”464  
 The LWF’s decision wounded Monk and Treusch’s egos and emboldened the 
proposals’ American and Canada Synod’s critics. The latter two groups both felt as 
though Treusch and Monk overstepped their authority in submitting the proposal prior to 
receiving proper consent from them. Albert Jacobi, then the president of the Canada 
Synod, kept careful watch of the whole affair. Jacobi wrote to Treusch to let him know 
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that he “was never too enthusiastic about the ‘Brief” which was to have been submitted to 
the Lutheran World Service, for obvious reasons.”465 He urged Treusch and Monk to 
continue working with American Lutherans towards their goals instead of their 
nationalistic tendency to put Canada first.  
“Why not point out to the parent bodies the tremendous needs and responsibilities confronting us 
in Home Missions etc., advising them that to adequately meet these needs demands more than can 
be accomplished by the individual church but calls for all bodies to work together. It would be our 
responsibility to spell out how this could and should be done and it goes without saying that we 
must give very careful thought to what we submit. In other words Earl [Treusch] I’m suggesting 
that we discuss this matter…”
466
 
 
Jacobi recognized that cooperating with the Americans could be difficult yet ultimately 
necessary if they wished to adequately meet the needs of DPs. 
 Jacobi’s conciliatory tone did little to quell Monk’s temper. Monk took particular 
offense to the suggestion that Canadian Lutherans needed to work with their American 
counterparts if they wished to receive “subsidies” from the LWF. “I do not look upon any 
money received by the CLWR from the LWF, Geneva, as a subsidy,” Monk wrote. “In 
reality LWF is really contributing money for services rendered.”467 Monk’s attitude tested 
the generally patient American Lutheran leadership. Hoffman replied that “I know that 
the Lutheran churches in Canada would by and large like to be independent in all 
respects. However, as long as they are not, I see no other solution to the question of new 
migration projects than clearance with the American Lutheran churches.”468 The control 
exerted by Western Canadian pastors tested the previous transnational relationship 
between Canadian and American Lutherans. While the DP crisis of the mid-1940s 
provided the impetus for Canadian and American Lutherans to work side by side to help 
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their fellow Germans, the Western Canadian attitudes towards immigration work 
demonstrated that nationality, over ethnicity, became a larger factor by the late 1950s. 
 By the end of the 1950s, both the CLWR and the Missouri Synod started to 
reassess their financial commitments to immigration work. The Missouri Synod, for 
instance, opened its 1958 meeting with the frank declaration that its work for the year 
1958 “will probably not be spectacular.”469 Not coincidentally, the ULCA substantially 
decreased their financial support for immigration work in Canada starting in 1958. They 
reduced their budget for Canadian immigration by fifty percent in the years 1958 and 
1959, causing the CLWR to reconsider its future work as well.470  “In a sense we are now 
at the cross-roads in the life of C.L.W.R.,” Monk noted. “For a number of years our 
immigration and resettlement program was operating at full-throttle. Now we are coasting 
along.”471 Although organizations like the CLWR continued to operate with renewed 
interest in relief and refugees from Asia, the structures they put in place for German and 
Lutheran DPs largely started to fade away by the late 1950s and early 1960s.472 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Publicity material distributed by the Missouri and Canada Synods often relied on 
Biblical passages in order to motivate their laypeople to donate charitably to their many 
fundraising campaigns of the 1940s and 1950s. Both synods quoted frequently from 
Matthew 25:35: “For I was hungry, and you gave me something to eat. I was thirsty, and 
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you gave me something to drink. I was a stranger, and you took me in.” The passage aptly 
represents the charitable spirit pastors wished to instill in their followers and encouraged 
them to assist a German or Lutheran stranger they had likely never met. Yet, “stranger” 
does not fully capture how German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans 
conceptualized needy Germans and Lutheran DPs following the war, either. German 
Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County freely gave their time, money, and resources 
to help German Lutherans in Europe due to a sense of ethnic and religious solidarity. The 
postwar climate was not inherently friendly to the German people, nor could other 
religious groups be trusted to help Lutherans DPs with the same understanding and 
compassion that those in St. Louis and Waterloo County believed they could. Through 
their involvements with organizations like the CLWR, pastors took leading roles in acting 
as the voice of the Volksdeutsche overseas. As ethnic elites, they showed compassion to 
German Lutherans when they felt certain that no others in Canadian or American society 
would. 
 Despite the tensions and clashes competing identities posed, the German Lutheran 
communities in St. Louis and Waterloo County successfully met their goals of providing 
relief overseas and bringing Lutheran DPs to North America. Theology and gender 
determined how Lutherans completed this work, but the transnational relationships and 
white privilege in both Lutheran communities ensured it was successful. Uniting behind 
their shared ethnicity and faith, organizations like the CLWR managed to fulfill their 
mandate thanks to their transnational connections with St. Louis. As German-American 
Lutherans in St. Louis could not help their brethren as easily due to slow-moving 
immigration policy, they were able to meet their goals by helping DPs find passage to 
Canada. This transnational relationship allowed both parties to fulfill their goals when 
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their respective nation states seemed to place them in doubt. Furthermore, organizations 
like the CLWR and the Volksdeutsche alike benefitted from appealing to Canadian 
politicians as Christians and members of the white race. Lutherans eschewed the religious 
parochialism government officials resented in order to present a common Christian 
identity that resonated with Anglo-Canadian MPs and their core values of providing 
humanitarian relief and charity. The Volksdeutsche benefited enormously from the 
immigration debates of the late 1940s that stoked white Canadian fears that broad 
immigration reform would diminish Canada’s white character. Canadian politicians 
willingly looked past the Nazi backgrounds of the Volksdeutsche due to their shared 
whiteness as a result. The transnational connections between Canadian and American 
Lutherans made German and Lutheran immigration to North America a practical reality, 
while their race and religion justified it at an ideological level.  
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Chapter 4: Returning to the Land of Luther: The Campaign to Rebuild West 
Germany, 1945-1960 
 “Europe calls for aid!” was a popular phrase within German Lutheran circles in St. 
Louis and Waterloo County during the 1940s and 1950s. Newsletters and synod-produced 
material frequently featured photos of West German cities destroyed by the Allied 
bombing campaign and starving German civilians living in the rubble of their former 
homes. As presidents of the Missouri and Canada synods, John Behnken and John Reble 
publicized Germany’s dire political, social, and spiritual conditions after six years of war 
and thirteen years of Nazi rule. Beginning in 1945, Behnken and Reble mobilized support 
within their communities to raise money, food, and clothing, to help Germany recover 
from the devastation of the war. Germany was in a desperate state, and the two Lutheran 
leaders believed that it was their duty as fellow Germans and Lutherans to return to 
Germany and help the “land of Luther” recover. 
 Lutheran efforts to help rebuild Germany from the war did not simply end with 
raising money and shipping goods overseas. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, pastors 
travelled to West Germany to distribute aid and assess the needs of the Lutheran church 
in Germany. While the previous chapter examined how German Lutherans mobilized 
support to send aid overseas and alter immigration laws, this chapter details two synod-
sponsored programs that brought the Missouri and Canada Synods into direct contact with 
Lutherans in West Germany. First, the Missouri Synod embarked on an ambitious plan to 
help rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Europe. The war severely damaged Lutheran 
churches and many pastors had been killed or went missing as a result. Under Behnken’s 
leadership, the synod created an informal missionary program in which Missouri Synod 
pastors travelled to West Germany to “educate” German Lutherans about the synod’s 
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conservative theology. Second, Reble initiated a “chaplaincy program” in the mid-1950s 
that sent several Canada Synod pastors overseas to accompany German displaced persons 
from Germany to Canada. Reble’s program was a logical extension of the Canada 
Synod’s effort to promote Volksdeutsche immigration to Canada after their legislative 
successes.  
 This chapter examines how both programs highlighted the ways in which pastors 
continued to enforce their roles as cultural brokers. Efforts to rebuild West Germany 
caused pastors to use their knowledge of the German language and culture to try to 
promote positive relations between German civilians and the Allied military governments 
that controlled West Germany throughout the 1940s and 1950s. As both Germans and 
Canadians/Americans, pastors believed they had a unique obligation to turn former 
enemies into new allies. This chapter details several theological conferences known as 
“Bad Bolls” organized by the Missouri Synod to help “explain” and “educate” West 
Germans about American democracy and North American Lutheranism. It examines how 
Reble and Behnken brought West German pastors on trips to Canada and the United 
States as part of the West’s emphasis on promoting democracy during the Cold War. This 
chapter also describes the deeply personal, ethnic journeys that North American 
Lutherans experience as they completed missionary work in West Germany. While 
working in West Germany, pastors revitalized or “reinvented” their ethnic German 
identities. During the Second World War, pastors had downplayed their ethnic heritage or 
centered it within the ethnic boundary zone of the Lutheran church. Postwar engagement 
with Germany created the opportunity for their ethnicity to once again become associated 
with the German “homeland.” Indeed, both Reble and Behnken started to value pastors 
that had an intimate knowledge of the German language, culture, and history. Trips to 
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Germany functioned as more than mere humanitarian or bureaucratic visits. Members of 
the Missouri and Canada Synod expected to be welcomed “home” as fellow Germans and 
coreligionists when they arrived in West Germany. 
 Missionary activity in West Germany, however, did not lead ethnic elites to once 
again craft an ethnicity centered around their German homeland, as with nineteenth 
century immigrants.473 By examining the relationship between Missouri and Canada 
Synod missionaries and West Germans, this chapter argues that while missionaries 
believed they were “true Germans,” the West Germans they encountered treated them 
strictly as “Amerikaners.” West Germans used the Missouri and Canada Synod for their 
financial and physical aid, but showed no interest in their imagined ties of ethnic 
solidarity. After fighting two world wars against Canada and the United States, West 
Germans had difficulty looking beyond the national identities of their Lutheran 
coreligionists. Attempts to “educate” Germans on American and Lutheran ways appeared 
as yet another American attempt to “conquer” and “control” aspects of German life. The 
lukewarm reception pastors received ensured that the idea of a German homeland was an 
unsustainable and temporary portion of their constructed ethnicity. Behnken and Reble’s 
efforts to rebuild Germany once again questions the traditional assumption that Germans 
in North America ceased practicing an ethnic identity during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Their renewed relationship with Germany during the 1940s and 1950s 
demonstrates that a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County well into the postwar period, even if it was not reciprocated by their West German 
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peers. Ultimately, these trips abroad highlighted the competing ethnic, religious, and 
national identities of members of Canada and Missouri Synods. While a common ethnic 
and shared religion created the conditions in which North American Lutherans could 
create a transnational relationship with West Germans, their nationality prevented this 
vision from taking root.  
 
Creating a Policy for Providing Relief to West Germany 
 
 Members of the Missouri Synod began to discuss Germany’s postwar condition 
after the successful Allied invasion of Europe in June 1944. By combining various media 
accounts and knowledge of Germany prior to the war, synod officials concluded that 
Germany’s Lutheran churches experienced persecution under Nazi rule. They estimated 
that many of the country’s leading seminaries and churches were “bombed out of 
existence” as a result of the Allied bombing campaign. Synod leaders also worried that 
the Nazis conscripted Lutheran pastors to fight in the German army, thereby leaving the 
Lutheran church leaderless.474 Pastors also knew that Lutheranism in Germany was 
divided primarily into two groups. The first group, the Landeskirche or “State Churches,” 
included a loose fellowship of Lutheran, Reformed, and United churches combined under 
one governing body. These churches placed little importance on doctrinal unity and 
treated theological issues more liberally than the Missouri Synod. Shortly after the war, 
this group organized a formal union called the Evangelical Church in Germany, 
commonly referred to as EKiD. The second group consisted of the Freikirche, or “Free 
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Churches.” In an effort to remain conservatively Lutheran, the Free Churches refused to 
enter into fellowship with liberal Lutherans and declined to join EKiD. Their conservative 
nature made them natural allies of the Missouri Synod, who even provided them with 
small amounts of funding before the war began.475  
 Synod leaders worried that West Germans would lose their Lutheran faith after the 
devastation of the war. Germany’s Lutherans no longer had the basic infrastructure that 
pastors, seminaries, and churches provided. The Free Church’s conservative theology 
ensured that the synod placed its “primary concern” with helping to rebuild the Free 
Church seminaries and churches.476 However, initial planning at a 1944 synod convention 
emphasized that the synod would “not confine its postwar relief to the Freikirche.” The 
synod agreed to also provide aid for the State Churches to help them recover in the 
aftermath of the war as a “labour of love to the fellow members of the body of Christ.”477 
West German Lutherans may have been unable to help themselves, but American wealth 
could help the Lutheran church abroad recover. Synod leaders hoped that “our Church, 
blessed as it is spiritually and physically” could help Lutheranism in Germany thrive once 
more. “The Lutheran Church of Europe is in serious danger of disintegration unless it 
receives help from the Lutheran churches of America,” they concluded.478   
 Ethnic elites in St. Louis believed they needed to provide Germans with physical 
and spiritual relief on the basis of their shared religious and ethnic ties. One pastor 
commented that “we, as Lutherans and children of the Reformation, believe we have a 
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special postwar obligation to fulfill not only in Europe at large, but especially in the land 
which gave birth to the Reformation.”479 Lawrence Meyer, who later travelled to West 
Germany to distribute aid, became one of the synod’s most vocal proponents for helping 
Germany. In a public appeal in the Lutheran Witness, Meyer argued that “the Lutheran 
Churches of America are the children of the Lutheran Church of Europe. Our heritage 
came from Europe. We must help to preserve Lutheranism in Europe.”480 Pastors often 
relied on the symbol of Germany as the “birthplace” or “parent” of North American 
Lutheranism to argue for the synod’s obligation to help. One pastor believed that the 
German people would also understand this relationship. He imagined the German people 
calling out to “bring us the Gospel as once our forefathers brought it unto you.”481 These 
calls to arms on the basis of a shared ethnic and religious heritage made it clear to synod 
members why they needed to help Germany. Pastors felt a clear need to help Germany 
recover from the war’s devastation as the descendants of German Lutheranism. 
 Declarations of ethnic and religious fellowship, however, did not produce a 
tangible strategy on how to provide physical and spiritual aid to Germany. In order to 
solidify a plan, Behnken travelled to West Germany in October 1945 to meet with civic 
and religious leaders. Aside from the various Missouri Synod chaplains in the military, he 
was the first representative of the Missouri Synod to visit Germany since war began in 
1939. Behnken’s two-month visit made the synod leader realize just how dramatically the 
war had altered Germany’s religious landscape. From October to December 1945, 
Behnken met with various State and Free Church pastors and learned that the two groups 
                                                        
479 Reports and Memorials for the Twenty-Fourth Delegate Synod (Thirty-Ninth Regular Convention), 21-
30 June 1944, p. 393; H.W.G., “Come Let Us Build!” The Lutheran Witness, 7 November 1944, p. 365. 
480 Lawrence Meyer,  “Our Share in the Rebuilding of Europe,” Lutheran Witness, 8 May 1945, p.152. 
481 CHI, WDC, Box 14, WDC Minutes Folder, Western District Pastoral Conference, 14 June 1948. 
 200 
had radically different theological positions as a result of their experiences during the 
Second World War. Behnken discovered that prominent European theologians Karl Barth 
and Martin Niemoeller had seized control of EKiD and intended to unite all Protestants in 
Europe within its organization. Unlike the relatively minor theological differences 
amongst North American synods, Barth and Niemoeller advocated for an extreme and 
liberal Lutheranism that opposed some of the Missouri Synod’s most important beliefs. 
Barth, Niemoeller, and their EKiD allies believed that Germany’s Lutherans were 
responsible for Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Niemoeller in particular cited Martin 
Luther’s belief in the “two kingdoms” or Romans 13 as an example of problematic 
Lutheran theology that allowed Hitler to control Nazi Germany. Just as Romans 13 stated 
that church and state must be kept separate, Niemoeller suggested that Lutherans 
passively accepted Hitler and his reign of terror as it was a state, and not religious, affair. 
He believed that Lutherans needed to believe that state and church should cooperate in 
order to resist future authoritarian regimes. Conservative Lutheran theology, Niemoeller 
surmised, helped perpetrate the Holocaust and Hitler’s brutal war.482 Originally from 
Sweden, Barth was even more critical of Germany’s Lutheran population. Barth believed 
that Hitler’s hatred of the Jewish people could be traced back to Luther’s anti-Semitic 
comments and beliefs. Since conservative Lutherans supposedly accepted Luther’s words 
as unchallenged fact, Barth believed modern Lutherans turned a blind eye towards 
Hitler’s anti-Semitic crimes due to their own racism justified through faith.483 Thus, Barth 
and Niemoeller believed EKiD needed to unite Germany’s Protestants into one single 
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body that would work cooperatively with the state to ensure another dictator like Hitler 
never rose to power again.   
 Barth and Niemoeller’s comments placed them in opposition to the Missouri 
Synod’s conservative Lutheran doctrine. The violation of Romans 13 jeopardized, 
according to conservative Lutherans, their ability to practice Lehre or “pure doctrine.” If 
Lutherans started blurring the line between church and state as EKiD’s members 
suggested, the government could begin to influence Lutheran interpretations of the Bible. 
Any attempts by the state to alter the conservative Lutherans interpretation that the Bible 
was inerrant and the final authority of God would essentially jeopardize the purity of their 
faith.484 Free Church pastors believed EKiD wished to dilute their conservative doctrine 
and resented Barth’s anti-German sentiments. After meeting with these concerned Free 
Church Lutherans during his trip, Behnken concluded that “Lutheranism in Germany 
faces a fight for its very existence.” He feared that “decades of liberalism, higher 
criticism, rationalism at the theological schools” in Germany influenced EKiD, and could 
even foreshadow “the death-knell of the Lutheran Church in this country.”485 Behnken 
realized that he could not support EKiD when its leaders so clearly violated Missouri’s 
theology. As a result, Behnken developed close ties with Free Church pastors in an effort 
to help them stave off the influence of EKiD’s liberalism during his two-month visit. 
 Theological meetings with Free Church pastors occupied the majority of 
Behnken’s trip to West Germany. However, Behnken could not ignore the overwhelming 
poverty facing many civilians and refugees as he met with Lutheran pastors. Witnessing 
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the war’s devastating impact on German civilians left a deep emotional impact on 
Behnken. He often relayed the personal stories of individual Germans he met during his 
visit and included details of their suffering in his letters home. Orphaned children and 
homeless families featured prominently in his correspondence. Behnken could not escape 
witnessing these horrors daily, and German suffering continued to haunt him at night:  
The cruel specters of rubble and debris, of demolished homes and business houses rise up before 
your eyes like ghosts in the night. These horrible sights haunt you. You lie awake and think of the 
millions whose properties were utterly destroyed, the hundreds of thousands who lost their lives or 
were wounded and crippled. You see the streams of homeless and hopeless refugees roaming around 
for some place to sleep or perhaps to die.486   
 
Behnken decried the lack of state support available to refugees and noticed that they “are 
not welcome anywhere.” He believed that if their situation was not remedied soon, that 
“millions will die this winter because of undernourishment or lack of clothing.”487 He 
concluded that “Europe’s greatest and most urgent need today is the feeding and clothing 
and housing of more than ten million refugees.”488 
 Behnken bore witness to Germany’s refugee plight as well as EKiD’s movement 
against conservative Lutheranism during his visit abroad. Both factors shaped how he 
believed the Missouri Synod should address its campaign to help rebuild Germany 
spiritually and physically. Behnken reconsidered the synod’s previous policy of providing 
aid to both the Free and State churches. His meetings with Free Church pastors led to an 
informal policy of providing aid primarily to churches that supported conservative 
Lutheranism. For instance, after two Free Church pastors vigorously condemned 
Niemoeller and EKiD, Behnken declared that these “men are ready to fight and die for 
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Lutheranism.” In return for their support, Behnken arranged subsequent meetings with 
them to discuss how the Missouri Synod could meet “their present physical needs” and 
discuss “the doctrine of God’s Word.”489 Behnken continued to conflate doctrinal 
agreement and relief when he met with more Free Church congregations. He opened a 
meeting with Free Church Lutherans in the small town of Gross-Oesingen in November 
1945 by using expressions of familial solidarity. The Missouri Synod would provide them 
with both spiritual and physical aid. Behnken told his audience of Free Church Germans 
that “we come to you as brethren meeting brethren. We are ready to help you in your 
temporal and spiritual needs wherever you require our assistance.” He told his audience 
of pastors and refugees that “the Missouri Synod is prepared to support the weak and, 
above all, to back up the Lutheran Church in the homeland of the Reformation. It will aid 
the Free Churches in their fight” against liberal Lutheranism and the earthly battle against 
starvation.490 Physical aid and theological agreement became increasingly intertwined as 
Behnken aimed to help his fellow Germans. His concern for the survival of conservative 
Lutheranism and the German people alike shaped a policy that emphasized physical relief 
to the spiritually conservative.  
 A personal connection with German refugees on the basis of his ethnicity and a 
religious connection to conservative Lutheranism shaped Behnken’s attitude when he 
returned to the United States in December 1945. He believed that both the German people 
and conservative Lutheranism could face extinction if the Missouri Synod did not spring 
to action. The degree to which German Americans came to Germany’s aid, he stated, 
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“will mean either triumph or defeat for the Lutheran cause” in all of Europe.491 Behnken 
immediately started to collaborate with Meyer and other St. Louis pastors to convince the 
synod’s laypeople to send money, clothing, and food to Germany. In his articles and 
speeches, Behnken drew on the synod’s German heritage to motivate laypeople to send 
aid to Germany. Behnken reminded his audience that “the refugees are people of German 
extraction” who were incidentally “citizens of Poland, Latvia, Austria, etc.”492 In 
emphasizing the ethnicity of the refugees, Behnken articulated his own understanding of 
the relationship between ethnicity and nationality. He viewed the nationality of these 
refugees as secondary to their ethnic identities. Behnken hoped members of the Missouri 
Synod would ignore both the European nationalities of the refugees, as well as their own 
American nationality, in order to help their fellow Germans. Cultivating a common 
identity as ethnic Germans was the most likely way to gain aid for ailing refugees. 
 As practitioners of the liberal Lutheranism that the Missouri Synod opposed, the 
Canada Synod felt little need to help Germany theologically after the war. EKiD’s 
success in uniting European Lutherans into one organizing body ensured that they did not 
need the Canada Synod’s aid for theological assistance. However, members of the Canada 
Synod participated in the process of renewing ties to Germany by participating directly in 
humanitarian efforts to help German civilians and DPs. In 1953, Reble retired as 
president of the Canada Synod and moved to Bremen, West Germany, in order to 
dedicate himself to conducting charitable work among German DPs. While overseas, 
Reble developed a concern that the many DPs travelling from West Germany to Canada 
lacked spiritual care during their voyage to North America. He worried that the trip 
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caused DPs undue stress and that their journey could be made less burdensome if a 
Lutheran pastor accompanied them. In the mid-1950s, Reble devised a plan he called the 
“chaplaincy program” as a result.493 The program sought to help DPs by hiring German 
and Canada Synod pastors to accompany synod-sponsored ships carrying German 
refugees to Canada. Pastors could preach to the DPs as well as offering more practical 
advice on life in Canada. While Reble’s plan for postwar Germany did not involve the 
same theological components as Behnken’s, he nonetheless devised a plan that would 
strengthen ties between his synod and German Lutherans abroad. 
 
Missionary Work as an Ethnic Experience 
 
 Behnken and Reble’s plans to assist West Germany directly influenced how ethnic 
elites in both synods engaged with their German ethnic identities. Their plans involved 
sending “missionaries” (or “chaplains”) overseas to Germany to implement their 
respective relief campaigns. The pastors selected by Behnken and Reble highlight that the 
two men understood relief work in Germany as a way to reignite the German heritage of 
their synods. The Missouri Synod’s Board of European Affairs, the committee in charge 
of overseeing the synod’s relief program, sent Walter Daib and Frank Mayer to West 
Germany to act as permanent representatives of the Missouri Synod overseas in 1946. As 
“missionaries,” the Board tasked Daib and Mayer with fostering goodwill between the 
Missouri Synod and the Free Churches, while trying to convince State Churches to 
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remain independent of EKiD.494 Behnken carefully considered and selected missionaries 
such as Daib and Mayer due to their familiarity with German culture. By selecting first 
and second-generation German immigrants like himself, Behnken prioritized pastors with 
a strong knowledge of the German language, theology, and who often had firsthand 
experience living in Germany. Reble used a similar criterion for selecting his chaplains. 
He handpicked pastors that had a similar background to him, especially favouring those 
from Waterloo County. For example, Reble advocated that the synod accept Otto 
Stockmann as a candidate for a chaplaincy position. Just like Reble, Stockmann was born 
in Germany and attended Kropp Seminary before immigrating to Canada in the early 
twentieth century. Reble favoured Stockmann and pastors of their generation because 
they were both familiar with the German language and with the immigrant experience.495 
Reble underscored that those selected “must command the German language” so that he 
could both preach to the immigrants as well as converse with them about Canada.496 As 
former immigrants, Reble believed those of his generation would be inherently 
sympathetic towards the DPs. By selecting first-generation immigrants, Reble also 
ensured that chaplains would have the unique ability to act as authorities on both Canada 
and Germany. Their experience living in both countries ensured that they could council 
the incoming DPs with knowledge of both nations.497  The selected missionaries and 
chaplains viewed their positions through a similar ethnic lens. One chaplain reported that 
“having been in Canada for more than thirty years, I feel I should be able to orientate” the 
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new immigrants to Canadian life.498 He accepted Reble’s offer after “realizing that such a 
trip to Germany would give me the opportunity of seeing relatives whom I have not seen 
since 1930.”499  Whereas first and second-generation pastors like Behnken, Reble and 
Stockmann had to mediate their German ethnicity during the Second World War, their 
ethnicity became an asset that could help foster a stronger community among North 
Americans, Germans, and new immigrants.  
 Missionary work in West Germany, however, was more than simply a religious 
endeavor. It also provided a way for missionaries to reconnect with their ethnic identities 
as Germans. For many pastors, Germany was literally ‘the land of their fathers.’ 
Missionaries took the opportunity to visit family members or visit sites of familial 
importance while working overseas. During his 1946 visit, Mayer drove over sixty miles 
in order to visit his “tante.” He travelled to her home in Muenster where he updated her 
on “all the happenings in our family since the outbreak of the war.” The visit renewed 
Mayer’s spirits and he hoped “to be able to see her again” before he had to return to the 
United States.500 Similarly, Herman Harms, Vice-President of the Missouri Synod, took 
time out of his work schedule to visit relatives that he had not seen since his last visit to 
Germany in 1908. He visited his mother’s hometown where his four siblings still lived. 
During these “hometown” visits, Mayer and Harms visited the Lutheran churches where 
their grandfathers, also Lutheran pastors, preached when they lived in Germany.501 Mayer 
toured the church cemetery and paid his respects at his grandfather’s grave.502 Unlike 
first-generation immigrants who had tangible and existing connections to Germany, 
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second-generation pastors often did not have living relatives in Germany with whom they 
remained in contact. Yet, second-generation pastors such as J.T. Mueller also made trips 
to the hometowns and Lutheran congregations of their parents. During his 1949 trip 
overseas, Mueller hoped for a break in missionary work so that he could travel to “a little 
town called Haina, Hesse, from which my father came” so that he could “consult the 
church records” to find information on his father’s life prior to his immigration.503   
 Visits with relatives and pilgrimages to churches of familial importance 
functioned as more than mere personal journeys. These men saw their connection with 
Germany as important for all North American Lutherans to acknowledge. Reble spent 
several days touring the small town of Kropp in northern Germany while he lived 
overseas. Like Stockmann and several other Canada Synod pastors, Reble studied to 
become a pastor at the Kropp Seminary as a young man before immigrating to Canada in 
the early twentieth century.  Visiting the town prompted Reble to question “where would 
our Church in Canada be today” if Kropp Seminary had not supplied so many pastors to 
North America. He believed that if the leadership at Kropp had not sent missionaries to 
North America beginning in the 1880s, North America “would have suffered even 
heavier losses among the German speaking Lutherans.” Yet, thanks to Kropp’s training, 
he and other Canada Synod pastors maintained Lutheranism in Canada decades after their 
arrival. In his mind, Kropp provided the origin and the growth for Lutheranism in “the 
Midwest States” and Canada.504   
 Visits “home” to Germany allowed pastors from St. Louis and Waterloo County 
to reconnect with their German roots. Most of these trips occurred shortly after the 
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Second World War, a time in which pastors had to downplay their German heritage for 
fear of facing government internment or discrimination. After at least six years of viewing 
their German ethnicity as a source of anxiety, pastors felt relieved to be able to once again 
openly connect with their birthplace or that of their parents. As Kathleen Neils Conzen 
and others have made clear, examining ethnicity as a social construct allows for ethnic 
identities to wax and wane as social circumstances change.505 Although pastors may have 
temporarily stopped publicly identifying as Germans during the war, travelling to 
Germany after the war’s conclusion allowed them to reclaim that identity with pride. As 
first and second-generation pastors sought to rebuild Germany from the ruins of war, so 
too did they start to rebuild their German ethnicities by connecting with the “land of 
Luther.” 
 
Ethnicity, Nationality, and Denazification at the Bad Boll Conferences 
 
 
 The Missouri and Canada Synod programs coincided with Allied attempts to 
dismantle the Nazi state and eliminate Nazis from all levels of German government. This 
process, commonly referred to as “denazification,” began in early 1947 as a result of 
increasing tensions in the Cold War. American politicians initially favoured punishing 
Germany for its crimes and subscribed to the idea of “collective guilt” that blamed all 
Germans for willfully participating in another world war. By 1947, however, American 
elites worried that severely punishing Germany would turn its citizens towards radical 
political philosophies like communism instead of embracing democracy. They realized 
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that West Germany could become a powerful propaganda tool in which to demonstrate to 
the world the benefits of democracy in contrast to the Soviet Union’s communism. Lucius 
Clay, the general responsible for overseeing civil affairs during the American occupation 
of West Germany, gradually became convinced that Germany could become a 
democracy. Americans, however, could not simply declare West Germany a democracy 
overnight. They needed to teach democratic values and encourage Germans to study and 
practice democratic beliefs. This philosophy made Clay an early proponent of German 
elections and trying to rehabilitate German political culture to mirror America’s.506 The 
introduction of the Marshall Plan in 1948 signified that the United States was more 
interested in turning West Germany into an economically stable democracy than 
punishing its citizens for the war.  A recovered German economy, American politicians 
hoped, would help stave off the influence of Soviet communism.507  
 The Missouri and Canada Synods naturally favoured this more paternalistic and 
benevolent attitude towards West German recovery. Formal denazification, as opposed to 
collective punishment, resonated with North American Lutherans that believed the 
Second World War represented the wishes of a Nazi minority rather than the majority of 
the German people. Missionaries eagerly embraced denazification as it resonated with 
their roles as cultural brokers. As ethnic elites, Missouri and Canada Synod pastors 
believed they had a unique role to play in fostering a better understanding between the 
United States, Canada, and West Germany. Several Lutheran initiatives in late 1940s 
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attempted to “reeducate” West German pastors after living under Nazi rule. Meyer, for 
example, suggested that the synod establish a series of scholarships to Valparaiso 
University specifically intended for German pastors. “The quicker we institute an 
exchange of students,” Meyer reasoned, “the quicker Germany will be taught how the rest 
of the world lives and what it thinks.”508 The program, formally implemented in 1947, 
involved German pastors enrolling in courses at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. They 
took several courses in conservative theology “in order to condition them to come back to 
Germany and introduce these subjects in the theological departments at the 
universities.”509  Meyer also sought to bring prominent Free Church advocates to St. 
Louis in order for them to gain “first hand insight into our system of separation of Church 
and State.” This, he hoped, would show more forcefully the benefits of conservative 
Lutheranism and would give them greater confidence in preaching such doctrines back 
home in Germany.510 The Canada Synod initiated a similar program under Reble’s 
leadership. Reble arranged for West German pastors to visit prominent Canada Synod 
congregations in Montreal, Kitchener, and Winnipeg so these pastors could “renew old 
friendships and establish new contacts” in Canada.511 In these instances denazification 
and the Missouri and Canada Synods’ goals worked in tandem. Anglo-Americans wanted 
to educate West Germans about American democracy, and ethnic elites hoped to 
reconnect St. Louis and Waterloo County with their German homelands.  
 The Missouri Synod in particular successfully combined the American process of 
denazification with efforts to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in West Germany. In 
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order to increase their influence over Free Church congregations, Missouri’s missionaries 
started to host interdenominational theological conferences in 1947. These conferences, 
colloquially known as “Bad Boll” conferences as they took place in a municipality of the 
same name, brought together Missouri, Free, and State Church pastors in order to discuss 
the theological problems confronting Lutheranism in postwar Europe. In practice, the 
conferences functioned as a way for Missouri Synod missionaries to demonstrate the 
strength of the Missouri Synod’s conservative theology. Meyer explained the motivations 
for these conferences by emphasizing the threat EKiD posed to conservative Lutheranism. 
He believed that “there is great danger of Barth’s becoming the religious dictator of 
Lutheranism in Germany. While there are many staunch Lutherans…the great bulk of 
Lutheran clergy are not well enough founded to immediately recognize the pitfalls of 
Barth’s” liberal theology.512  Members of the Missouri Synod hoped the Bad Boll 
conferences would convert German pastors to conservative Lutheranism. “This is by far 
the most important and the largest project undertaken by any American Church body in 
Germany,” Meyer noted.513 Meyer and other missionaries justified expending resources to 
host Bad Boll conferences in the language of denazification. They drew upon their ethnic 
identities as Germans to argue why they could “educate” Germans more effectively than 
their Anglo-American counterparts that occupied West Germany through military and 
political force. After several years of American occupation, pastors believed that West 
Germans would benefit from being around those “who would treat Germans as fellow 
humans and not as second class” citizens or ex-Nazis. Unlike other Americans that 
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Germans encountered, pastors promised not to “act like the troops of occupation.”514 As 
both Germans and Americans, Missouri Synod pastors believed they could connect with 
West Germans in ways their Anglo-American peers could not. 
 In fact, the culture surrounding the Bad Boll conferences in the late 1940s often 
functioned as yet another way for missionaries to connect with their ethnic identities. 
Missouri Synod attendees used their free evenings to celebrate the German portion of 
their identity by engaging in “German traditions.” At one conference, Meyer packed a 
Volkswagen full of barrels of German beer for the nightly festivities where Missouri and 
German pastors alike indulged in a healthy dose of the provisions. Perhaps as a result, the 
Missouri pastors began to sing “traditional” German songs in hopes their German 
brethren would participate as well. Behnken reportedly spent the night giving improvised 
speeches on the similarities he noticed between the German-American communities and 
Bavaria.515 
 German pastors, did not see their German-American colleagues as distant ethnic 
cousins.  
Although missionaries performed their German identities while abroad, West Germans 
saw them through a national lens and always reminded their guests that they were 
Americans, not Germans. In particular, the Missouri Synod’s tendency to discuss relief 
alongside theological issues caused the Free and State Churches to doubt their sincerity. 
Pastors in both the State and Free Churches often expressed their unease over the 
tendency to blur these two issues.  Mayer knew this and frequently responded to the 
criticism that the Missouri Synod only provided relief for congregations that aligned with 
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its theological positions. He stressed that theology and relief were unrelated during his 
many meetings with German pastors. For instance, several German pastors expressed 
disdain towards the Free Churches that allied themselves with the Missouri Synod during 
Behnken’s 1945 visit. They noted that these congregations consequently received 
substantial relief packages as a result of their union with Missouri. Mayer responded to 
this charge by claiming this was merely coincidence. He described that certain Free 
Churches and the Missouri Synod united on the basis of theological unity, rather than any 
meddling on Behnken’s behalf or attempts to gain aid.516  
 Behnken’s subsequent directions to the missionaries, however, lent credibility to 
the Free and State Churches’ accusations. Behnken warned Missouri Synod 
representatives that they “must not commit [themselves] as though there were actual 
fellowship” when meeting with the State Churches. Instead, they must “support every 
effort toward” promoting “sounder Lutheranism” among their congregations. Behnken 
instructed missionaries to give the State Churches “our moral as well as financial support. 
The latter is true especially if they show actual interest for the cause of Lutheranism.”517 
Of course, Behnken’s Lutheran “cause” meant doctrinal alignment with the Missouri 
Synod and a rejection of EKiD. Essentially, they would grant relief  “especially unto 
Them Who are of the Household of Faith.”518 Although Behnken and the Missouri Synod 
officially lent aid and relief to all German Lutherans, the level and volume of this relief 
depended on theological alignment. 
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 Certain Lutheran congregations in Germany knew that accepting the Missouri 
Synod’s aid would place pressure on them to accept conservative doctrine. While some of 
the Free Churches were willing to make this deal, the majority of State Churches outright 
rejected Missouri’s offers. In a meeting with several State Church leaders, Mayer saw that 
there was “considerable opposition to Missouri Synod’s help” among these men. They 
stated that they did “not want American help” and tended to agree with Barth’s position 
on uniting the Protestant churches of Europe.519 Attempts to sway their position with the 
possibility of aid did not work. 
 State and Free Churches rejected Missouri’s aid because of their staunch anti-
American attitudes. Although Daib and Mayer expected to be greeted as ethnic cousins 
and fellow coreligionists in the “land of Luther,” Germans viewed them through a 
national, not ethnic, lens. As the official representatives of the Missouri Synod in 
Germany, Mayer and Daib confronted the anti-American attitudes of German pastors 
most frequently. In the summer of 1946, Mayer hosted a conference with the intent to 
unite the Missouri Synod with some of the Free Churches that remained independent of 
any synod. A Free Church pastor gave a strong speech that attacked the Missouri Synod 
and its American attitudes. This pastor rejected union with other Free Churches since to 
do so was “tantamount to a union with Missouri” and its “American ideals.” The pastor 
continued to warn others not to trust the Missouri Synod’s promises. “The failure to carry 
out Wilson’s 14 points” and America’s “record in two wars” showed that Americans 
could not be counted as allies to the German people. He worried that any association with 
the Missouri Synod “will estrange their people” from “German” Lutheranism.520 Mayer 
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argued with the indignant pastor that such national distinctions were irrelevant when 
theological unity could be achieved. In Mayer’s opinion, “there is no such thing as a 
German or Indian Christian,” they were all simply Lutherans. When the Free Church 
pastor again criticized the Missouri Synod for not being truly “German,” Mayer explained 
that their Lutheranism was German “in the sense that it uses German language, methods, 
etc.”521 Mayer’s argument drew on Behnken’s original appeal to German Americans to 
help refugees on the basis of their ethnicity first, and their nationality second. In an 
attempt to bring the Free Churches into fellowship with the Missouri Synod, Mayer 
similarly downplayed nationality in favor of a common religious identity based on 
German culture, not citizenship. True to the synod’s hybrid identity, Mayer believed that 
being Lutheran meant you were inherently German and vice-versa. Yet, the German 
pastor remained unconvinced. The Missouri Synod was simply too American to be 
accepted among West German congregants.   
 American nationality hampered Daib’s ability to convince Free and State Church 
pastors to join the Missouri Synod as well. During a July 1946 conference, a Free Church 
pastor unaffiliated with the Missouri Synod spoke of the dangers they faced in uniting 
with the Missouri Synod. He argued that Lutheranism in Germany “must be built within 
the framework of the German people and their ideas” and not the “American importation” 
that would dilute their religion. He believed that “Missouri has the intention of impressing 
its own particular type of theology upon the other Free Churches” that was inherently 
“foreign” to the conditions that Germany faced. Daib emphasized Mayer’s earlier point 
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that the Free Church should not believe “that there was a specific type of Christianity for 
Germans, another type for Americans, etc.”522  
 The antagonistic meetings between the Missouri Synod and German churches 
considerably weakened Mayer and Daib’s morale. By the late summer of 1946, the two 
men started to express doubt in their mission. Thus, when they met with the same group 
of German pastors in late August, Mayer asked the Germans frankly “whether our help 
was welcome.” The German pastors gave a diplomatic reply. They once again expressed 
their fears that “all Missouri’s activity in its world-wide tasks has but one aim; to create 
Missourian replicas of itself all over the world.” They made it clear that if the Missouri 
Synod came to Germany “to Americanize…then [their] help was not welcome.” 
However, one pastor acknowledged that if the Missouri Synod was “here to help in the 
right way, then [Missouri’s] help will be gladly and gratefully received.”523 Of course, the 
“right way” to help included using the Missouri Synod for its material power to gain 
relief and aid to German civilians and refugees. In the interest of maintaining a 
relationship with the Free Churches, Mayer was forced to concede and ask 
“whether…there was something we could do from America that would be helpful” to the 
Free Churches. The Free Church pastors responded with a list of material demands, which 
ranged from providing food for their congregations to obtaining cars for themselves.524  
 Daib and Mayer’s interactions with the Free Churches demonstrate that German 
pastors entered these meetings with objectives that differed and conflicted with those of 
the Missouri Synod. Daib and Mayer assumed that their German ancestry and 
Lutheranism would grant them authority among the Free Churches, because Germany 
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was the homeland of both their relatives and religion. In their minds, these transnational 
ties overrode their nationality and identities as Americans. The lukewarm reception 
Germans gave Daib and Mayer, however, indicates that Germans viewed these 
interactions in the reverse. Daib and Mayer were not Germans, but rather yet another 
example of Americans intervening in German affairs. Speaking German and sharing the 
same religion did not convince German critics that the Missouri Synod had their best 
interests at heart. The very real local concerns of providing food and clothing to a starving 
population influenced the Free Churches pastors far more than the theological concerns of 
the Missouri Synod. The local and national experiences of Free Church Germans colored 
their interactions far more than any imagined ethnic and transnational ties. 
 
Gendering Missionary Work 
 
 Behnken and Reble expected all members of their synods to participate in relief 
work for Germany. They did not, however, expect them to participate in the same 
manner. Gender dictated how German-Canadian and German-American men and women 
participated in renewing their ties with Germany. Male pastors could serve as 
missionaries abroad, whereas women had to carry out the synod’s relief program in their 
homes and churches. Synod leaders expected both groups to conform to established 
gender norms in the church. Missionaries, for instance, needed to embody a respectable 
Lutheran masculinity. Behnken and Reble conceptualized a good Lutheran pastor as a 
man who inspired, but did not succumb to, strong displays of emotion. This belief 
informed how pastors moderated their relationship with their congregations and 
leadership style. Theodore Graebner, a former professor at Concordia Seminary and 
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Lutheran Witness editor, believed “a professor of philosophy should not admit any such 
weakness” by showing emotion to his audience.525 Pastors saw humility, a strong 
understanding of theological issues, and an awareness of their German heritage as 
essential markers of Lutheran masculinity. 
 In contrast, male synod leaders enforced patriarchal gender norms that 
conceptualized women’s role in the church as confined primarily to charity work. While 
pastors could participate in rebuilding Germany by traveling abroad, they expected 
women to carry out the fundraising, packaging, and shipping work necessary to send 
relief packages to Germany. Meyer stated that the “vast program” of providing relief was 
the task of “the Lutheran women of America.”526 This work easily conformed to Lutheran 
gender norms, as women typically carried out the majority of charity work within 
Lutheran churches. It embodied the values of servitude and dedication that Lutheran men 
expected women to exhibit.527 Behnken, Reble, and other pastors saw themselves as the 
leaders of the efforts to rebuild Germany, with women playing secondary roles. 
 These gender norms informed how Lutheran men and women conducted their 
missionary work in West Germany. Male missionaries in Germany, for example, faced 
frequent surveillance from synod leaders and their fellow pastors. Pastors routinely 
commented on the psychological and physical health of their peers in order to make sure 
they conformed to the synod’s rigid masculinity. According to Behnken and his 
colleagues, such scrutiny seemed warranted and contained practical purpose. In order to 
encourage the Free Church to remain independent of EKiD, missionaries needed a strong 
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command of the German language to express their theological convictions. These 
convictions needed to be clearly and confidently explained. If missionaries did a poor job 
explaining Missouri’s theology, they risked losing Free Church congregations to the more 
persuasive EKiD campaign to unite European Lutheranism under one banner. Thus, 
missionaries deemed it necessary to ensure that they all upheld masculine norms lest it 
endanger their mission to rebuild conservative Lutheranism.   
 Synod leadership believed a strong understanding of German helped them 
communicate effectively with Free Church Germans at both a theological and personal 
level. Karl Arndt, the synod’s representative with the American Military Government in 
Germany, noted that the Missouri’ Synod’s “delegation in general, is making itself felt 
more because of the fact that it handles the German language better” than other American 
groups.528 As Meyer and Behnken selected candidates to work in Germany, they 
highlighted their ability to speak German. One man, Meyer noted, “understands German 
very well” while another candidate was selected for being “well versed in the German 
language, both in speaking and writing.” Meyer also noted that this pastor “boldly 
expressed a sympathetic attitude for Germany.”529 Arndt recommended the synod sponsor 
Alfred Rehwinkel to attend the 1949 Bad Boll because his “knowledge of history and 
German literature” gave him “a very good background for this program.” His “unusual 
ability to reply to discussions without special preparation” made him a particularly viable 
candidate to debate other German theologians.530 As such, Rehwinkel embodied the pro-
German and theologically conservative traits Arndt deemed respectable. Behnken and 
other missionaries ridiculed their colleagues who had a poor grasp of the German 
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language. Graebner noted that Daib’s “German is very awkward indeed” and that “he 
certainly would be at a serious disadvantage” if called upon to meet with German 
theologians. However, Daib’s organizational efficiency and leadership remained 
unparalleled, and therefore his poor language skills were not enough to recall him back to 
St. Louis.531  
 Missionaries fluent in the German language, however, still faced criticism from 
the synod’s leadership. Missionaries had to have the correct “physical, spiritual, and 
mental make-up” to debate “German thinkers without suffering a breakdown.”532 
Behnken and Meyer frequently evaluated the mental and physical health of their peers 
during their visits to West Germany. During a 1946 visit, Behnken and Meyer found one 
of their missionaries, Fritz Mueller, in a “pathetic condition.” His “nervousness” when 
discussing theology with Free Church pastors seemed evident to the two men and “had a 
very depressing effect upon” Behnken.533 Mueller was hardly alone in feeling anxious 
debating German theologians. The Bad Boll conferences in particular proved trying for 
Missouri Synod missionaries who not only engaged in theological debates with Free and 
State pastors, but also had their performances evaluated by their German-American peers. 
Arndt reported that “two of the representatives of Missouri Synod upon their return to the 
United States suffered serious heart attacks” after the 1948 Bad Boll. “The physical toll 
which Bad Boll has taken of the entire Missouri Synod delegation,” Arndt believed, 
“reflects the intense seriousness with which theologians in Germany” debated theological 
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issues.534 Mueller’s anxiety and the subsequent heart attacks cast doubt on whether or not 
these pastors were strong and manly enough to withstand debating German pastors. 
Behnken wanted men who could confidently demonstrate the validity of conservative 
Lutheranism, and not succumb to the anxiety and pressures of debate.  
 The 1949 Bad Boll proved even more strenuous for Missouri’s missionaries. 
Meyer and Behnken did not attend the conference that year and instead told Arndt and 
Harms to organize the proceedings. Arndt confessed to Meyer that his main burden in 
organizing that year’s conference was the poor quality of men the synod sent to Germany. 
“Frankly,” he reported, “Harms is not capable of handling this situation…Graebner is so 
disinterested in the conferences that he leaves meetings to take his wife out on drives 
through the country-side, and Praeses Harms does not have the stamina to hold his men 
together.”535 Missionaries at the 1949 Bad Boll simply did not conform to the masculine 
standards set by Behnken in the previous years. Arndt commented that the “Bad Boll this 
year lacks that spirit which made it such a remarkable success last year. The Behnken-
Meyer team has not been replaced” in adequate form.536 Furthermore, the conferences 
attendees that year lacked the humility that Lutheran pastors were supposed to embody. 
Arndt frequently complained about Concordia Seminary professor J.T. Mueller and his 
arrogance. “I need not stress the obvious fact that J.T. [Mueller] is an ass,” Arndt told 
Meyer. His arrogance proved unpopular with the Free Church pastors who resented being 
condescended to at the conference. Arndt worried that if the Free Church pastors 
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discovered that Mueller edited the synod’s theological texts they would likely throw them 
away.537  
 German-American and German-Canadian women faced social barriers that 
prevented them from participating in relief work overseas alongside their male 
counterparts. Reble and Behnken conceptualized missionary work abroad as a 
theological, and therefore male, activity. Lutheran women faced greater scrutiny than 
male pastors. Although both Missouri’s fight for conservative Lutheranism and Reble’s 
chaplaincy program privileged male pastors, women also wanted to renew ties with 
Germany or reconnect with their German roots. The Missouri and Canada Synod’s male-
dominated programs, however, meant that German-American and German-Canadian 
Lutheran women had to travel to Germany through different means. Pastors deemed 
charity and educational work as acceptable for Lutheran women as both jobs emphasized 
female servitude and motherhood. Working with children or serving the needy fit both 
roles.538  Thus, some women found that volunteering with the Red Cross was one of the 
few ways they could travel overseas to Germany on their own. Aside from charity work, 
the wives of Missouri and Canada Synod pastors occasionally accompanied their 
husbands as they worked in Germany. Regardless, most women found their visits to 
Germany disappointing. Unlike their male counterparts, women often found their 
experiences in Germany limited by male pastors or soldiers who continued to regulate 
their behaviour overseas.  
 Ruth Renick was one of the first German-American women from St. Louis to visit 
postwar Germany due to her work with the Red Cross. Renick spent most of 1945 
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working in France in the hopes that the Red Cross would later transfer her to Germany. 
Much like German-American men, Renick volunteered to serve overseas in part because 
it would allow her to travel Germany and connect with her German heritage. She noted 
that she “would like very much to take the trip down around Salzburg, Munich, Bremen 
Pass and over into Austria and Czechoslovakia” if the Red Cross approved her vacation 
time.539 In late 1945 Renick received her wish and the Red Cross transferred her to work 
north of Frankfurt. 
  Renick’s time in West Germany proved to be a disappointing experience. She 
noted that American soldiers enjoyed “seeing the American girls and eating the donuts 
and drinking the coffee, but we aren’t receiving the satisfaction we need to keep us 
going.” This was in part because of the frequent derogatory remarks American soldiers 
made about her. She told her family that American soldiers often referred to her as 
fräulein, which she considered to be a disparaging comment referring to her marital 
status and ancestry.540 She also shared the Missouri Synod’s criticism of American 
attempts to govern Germany. She discussed the “general mess of confusion” that occurred 
whenever she had to deal with American or Red Cross officials.541 After several months 
of unfulfilling service, Renick told relatives that her “morale is about as low as the 
men’s” and she often longed to return to St. Louis.542 “There is only one way I could 
return to the states now,” she told her family, “and that is to have my boyfriend (one I 
don’t have) write a letter to me asking me to return to the states to be married. That letter 
would be my ticket home. But I don’t have a boyfriend to marry and I don’t think I want 
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to marry right now so unless you can give me some good advice, I’ll be over here another 
year.”543  She even joked that perhaps her cousin could write a letter pretending to be her 
boyfriend in order to secure her passage back to St. Louis: “If worse come to worse he 
can write that proposal letter to me, and when I get back I won’t hold him to it! How 
about that!”544 Renick tried to forget her dissatisfaction by reminding herself of the 
reasons she initially signed up for the Red Cross. She noted optimistically that “I could 
come home now if I really wanted to, but there’s a bit of the country I want to see first 
and I think by next July I will be able to see every thing I want to see.”545  
 Elite German Lutheran women had greater success conforming to Lutheran 
gender norms than younger women such as Renick. The wives of prominent synod 
officials, including Meyer and Graebner’s wives, accompanied their husbands overseas. 
Both women spoke “German fluently” and were allowed to accompany their husbands 
because they exercised “great influence in the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod, and 
have done a great deal for the cause of relief in Germany.” Both women planned on 
meeting with other groups of German Lutheran women to discuss relief and aid.546 
Reble’s wife, Gertrud, also accompanied him overseas and participated in distributing aid 
and relief in West Germany. However, she was only allowed to do so among other 
women. She held classes where she lectured to German women on Lutheranism in 
Canada and the differences between church life in Germany and Canada. By speaking 
solely to women, Gertrud ensured that she did not violate Lutheran doctrine of holding 
authority over a man. She also never spoke directly on theological issues, but instead 
                                                        
543 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945. 
544 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 27 September 1945. 
545 MHSA, Fritschle Family Papers, Folder 4, Renick to Fritschle, 21 October 1945. 
546 CHI, LMC, Box 4, Folder 22, Arndt to Mrs. Antonie Nopitsch, 11 March 1949. 
 
 226 
focused her lectures on charity work and social activities. These topics, deemed safe by 
the synod leadership, therefore never threatened the authority of the male pastor. 
 Lutheran men continued to devalue Lutheran women’s labour even when they did 
conform to acceptable feminine standards. Reble, for example, did not value his wife’s 
work as equally important to his own contributions in the field of theology and relief in 
Germany. The Canada Lutheran frequently published Reble’s reports from Germany, but 
never published articles on Gertrud’s work. Reble was equally dismissive of his wife’s 
work. He paid brief attention to Gertrud’s work in his columns and reports. He listed her 
work among German women at the end of his columns under the miscellaneous heading 
of “Here and There.”547 His wife’s work took a secondary role compared to his own 
efforts to help rebuild Germany. 
 Although men devalued their work, Lutheran women managed to push for their 
own agendas, even in their limited spheres of authority. Eddie Arndt accompanied her 
husband Karl overseas to West Germany and spent her time raising money and aid for 
several German orphanages. Karl approved of her work, because it focused on charity and 
children. However, Eddie’s work still faced scrutiny by the synod’s male leaders. In a 
1947 meeting, Meyer expressed shock that her budget for an orphanage included six 
towels per child. He rejected her budget on the basis that “in my home in St. Louis we did 
not have 6 towels per person.” Eddie refused to budge on the issue. She told Meyer that 
six towels per person was the norm in Germany prior to the war. She pointed out that the 
synod’s goal was to help Germany recovery from the war’s losses, and that her budget 
seemed justified in this light. Her act of disobedience prompted Meyer to “explode.” For 
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the rest of the meeting he refused to listen to what Eddie had to say. Instead, he called 
upon his authority as a pastor and “simply told them” what he believed should be done.548 
Meyer received the final say, and he changed Eddie’s budget to reflect his own priorities. 
Meyer’s reaction reveals that even women who conformed to synod-sanctioned 
definitions of feminine respectability were under surveillance. Regardless of where they 
worked, the synod’s male leadership still had the final authority. 
 Anna Brauer was one of the few young women the Missouri Synod sponsored to 
travel to West Germany in 1949. Young and educated with a Masters degree, Brauer 
represented the synod’s future as a middle-class and educated institution instead of its 
rural and working class roots. Brauer was part of a broader movement in North American 
Lutheranism that increasingly saw young professional women appointed to oversee the 
synod’s bureaucratic and social work.549  Synod leaders tasked Brauer with developing 
parochial schools among Free Churches so as to better train Lutheran youth in 
conservative Lutheranism. As the program inevitably involved knowledge of and working 
with children, the synod had little issue delegating this task to a woman in the synod.  
 As one of the few educated Lutheran women stationed in West Germany, the 
synod relied on Brauer to oversee humanitarian aid involving German children. Shortly 
after her arrival, the Society of Girls Homes in Stuttgart wrote to the synod asking for 
clothes and food to help assist their orphan girls. Meyer originally rejected their plea for 
aid. He explained to the organization that it was synod policy to only distribute aid 
through the German organization Hilfswerk, an organization in Germany that worked 
closely with the Free Churches and Missouri Synod. Since the orphanage was not a 
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religious institution, it did not qualify for aid. However, Meyer recognized that the 
orphanage was still in need. He contacted Brauer and asked her to try and assist the 
orphanage herself in a personal capacity.550 Unlike other German-Canadian and German-
American women overseas, the synod placed considerable trust in Brauer’s work due to 
her professional and educational background. As long as Brauer continued to work in the 
fields of charity and children, the synod had no problem with her putting her training into 
practice.  
 However, Brauer did not always abide by the restrictions the synod placed upon 
her. She pushed the boundaries of her job and the limitations the synod’s male leadership 
placed on her. When Brauer arrived in Germany, she met with Eugene Gerstenmaier, the 
leader of the Hlifswerk. Gerstenmaier was also a Lutheran pastor and worked closely with 
Behnken and Meyer to ensure that the Missouri Synod’s aid reached conservative Free 
Church Lutherans. Although the Hilfswerk theoretically distributed charity among all 
West German Lutherans, Gerstenamier and his employees often tried to influence 
Lutheran politics and participated in the battle between Free Church pastors and EKiD. 
Like their Missouri Synod counterparts, the Hilfswerk promoted conservative 
Lutheranism by responding quickly to aid requests from churches unaffiliated with EKiD. 
Gerstenmaier’s work with the Hilfswerk was therefore inherently political and 
theological, and could not involve Lutheran women without violating the Missouri 
Synod’s strict gender norms. Brauer excused her meetings with Gerstenmaier as 
accidental and by chance. Meyer was not convinced, and told her that her meeting with 
Gerstenmaier was rather “fishy.” Meyer investigated the matter more deeply and received 
word from Arndt that Brauer had in fact deliberately met with Gerstenmaier. Arndt, 
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continuing to spread gossip throughout the synod as usual, reported that Brauer likely 
arranged the meeting in order to secure more money for herself. Meyer disapproved of 
Brauer’s attempt to gain financial independence outside of the synod, particularly when it 
meant Brauer became involved in theological aspects of the Hilfswerk’s work. Meyer 
warned her to “watch her step” and told her that working with the Hilfswerk “will 
definitely reflect on you and your job unfavorably.”551 Meyer continued to discourage 
Brauer’s ambitions throughout her stay in Germany. When she wished to attend and 
volunteer her help at the 1952 Bad Boll conference, Meyer told her that she was surely 
capable, but would offer nothing substantial to the conference.552 The Ball Boll would 
remain a male-dominated space due to the theological nature of the conference. Despite 
her best efforts, Meyer’s intervention ensured that Brauer’s work remained confined to 
the church’s traditional emphasis on women’s work involving charity and children. 
Attempts to push the boundaries of acceptable Lutheran femininity resulted in 
condemnation of her behaviour.  
 
A New Strategy 
 
 By the early 1950s, any sentiment of ethnic and religious solidarity between 
German and Missouri’s pastors started to fade. The numerous reports that missionaries 
sent to St. Louis convinced synod leaders that their current approach towards German 
recovery prompted the local population to view them as “Americans,” and not as fellow 
Lutherans and Germans. They realized that they needed to recognize the Free Churches as 
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equals if they wanted to rebuild conservative Lutheranism in Germany. Synod leadership 
understood that they had to alter their missionary efforts to adjust “to European 
conditions and under the leadership of a locally trained national ministry” if they hoped to 
succeed.553 These sentiments became official at the 1950 Missouri Synod convention. The 
synod passed a resolution solidifying that “long-distance direction of the work in Europe 
is unsatisfactory.” Instead of trying to enforce Missouri’s conservative Lutheranism 
abroad, they recognized that synod policy needed to make its “objective to build an 
indigenous Church also in Europe which will be self-supporting, self-governing, and self-
propagating.”554 The resolution offered the first indication that calls on the basis of a 
shared ethnicity and religion were not sufficient in convincing Free State churches to 
work harmoniously with St. Louis.  
 The 1950s witnessed a departure in Missouri Synod policy concerning Germany. 
The first step in completing the synod’s goal of creating an “indigenous Church” in 
Germany consisted of providing the necessary infrastructure. A theological seminary 
where Germans could attend and learn conservative Lutheran theology seemed an 
obvious first step to help the Free Churches cultivate their own leaders rather than relying 
on the Missouri Synod. The synod sponsored the creation of a seminary located just 
outside of Frankfurt. After just three years of operation, synod representatives noticed that 
the seminary created a strong change of attitude within the Free Churches. Newly 
graduated pastors from the Frankfurt seminary took an interest in promoting the 
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conservative Lutheran cause.555  In a departure from their previous attitude, the Missouri 
Synod did not use its status as benefactor to exert authority over the Free Church pastors 
who worked at the seminary. When the 1954 budget proved inadequate to pay the entire 
seminary staff, the synod dismissed a Missouri Synod pastor rather than a member of the 
Free Church. Although contradictory to his original plans for a strong Missouri presence 
in Germany, Behnken did not override or interfere with this decision.556 
 The Missouri Synod’s shift in policy resonated with the Free Church pastors who 
felt their autonomy and local concerns were, for once, clearly recognized. Yet not all 
members of the Missouri Synod unanimously supported the synod’s new direction. In 
1955, the Board for European Affairs submitted a report to the Missouri Synod that 
outlined its dissatisfaction with its relationship with Lutherans in Germany. With the 
Missouri Synod’s new hands-off approach, the Board explained it now lacked a sense of 
direction. Daib subsequently recommended that the Board be dissolved.557 Behnken 
rejected the idea that the Board for European Affairs no longer had a purpose. He 
explained that “co-ordination between various agencies of Synod is not assured and no 
machinery exists to make it possible.” The Board therefore still had a purpose in acting as 
an intermediary between the German Free Churches and the Missouri Synod. Daib and 
the other Board members remained unconvinced. They dissolved the board in 1955 after 
Behnken conceded that “it was not my purpose to persuade them to continue as a Board. 
If they serve with feelings as they expressed it will not be good.”558 The dissolution of the 
Board for European Affairs marked the end of the Missouri Synod’s attempts to exert its 
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authority over the German Free Churches and initiated a new relationship that placed 
each group on an equal footing. 
 Reble’s chaplaincy program faced a similar fate as Behnken’s campaign for 
conservative Lutheranism. Rather than facing challenge from Free Church pastors, 
however, Reble encountered internal disputes between himself and a younger generation 
of German-Canadian pastors in the National Lutheran Council (NLC). In particular, 
members of the NLC from Western Canada objected to Reble’s commanding position 
overseas. Western Canadian pastors like Clifford Monk and Traugott Herzer interpreted 
Reble’s program as yet another example of the Canada Synod dominating Lutheran 
affairs at the expense of their own authority. Monk and Herzer, in particular, objected to 
what they perceived as Reble “meddling” in immigration affairs overseas.559 The issue 
became a regional power struggle, and they particularly disliked Reble’s preference for 
recruiting chaplains from Waterloo County to serve the immigrants. Albert Jacobi, 
Reble’s successor as the Canada Synod’s president, confronted Reble about striving for 
greater regional balance in order to quiet the Western Canadian pastors. Reble quietly 
admitted that he “might favor the East” and promised to work towards greater regional 
representation.560  
 However, Reble also tried to use this compromise as a way to gain more 
privileges for German pastors in Canada. In return for participating in the chaplaincy 
program, Reble wanted Western Canadian congregations to invite visiting German 
pastors to tour their congregations and cities on the Prairies.561 In order to implement this 
plan, Reble submitted a request to the NLC for the necessary funds to facilitate travel to 
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and from Western Canada for both Canadian and German pastors. This proved 
particularly problematic given that it was largely Western Canadian leadership, such as 
Monk and Herzer, who controlled the NLC and its budget. Their lack of faith in Reble’s 
program made it easy to reject his request for financial assistance.562 
 Reble continued his chaplaincy efforts despite not gaining approval from the 
NLC’s Western pastors. His insistence of allowing Canadian chaplains to travel to 
Germany and vice-versa eventually poisoned his relationship with the pastors in the West. 
In the summer of 1956, the NLC’s Earl Treusch confronted Reble about his maintenance 
of the program. He expressed concern that despite passing a resolution to offer no funding 
to the chaplaincy program, German pastors continued to send receipts for reimbursement 
to the synod. Treusch, emboldened by Monk and Herzer’s outrage, disapproved of how 
the German pastors behaved in Canada. Treusch resented the German pastors for using 
their opportunity to visit the country as little more than a way to ask the congregations 
they visited for greater relief. Monk expressed indignation that one pastor visiting 
Winnipeg had the confidence to even tell members of the congregation to not send food 
and clothing to the Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR), but directly to his 
congregation in Germany.563 Unsurprisingly, the action of these German pastors largely 
conforms to their interactions with the Missouri Synod. German pastors used their 
meetings with Canadians as a way to lobby for more aid for their congregations. They had 
little use for Behnken and Reble’s idealistic aim of promoting connections between North 
American and West German Lutherans. Reble remained unapologetic and confident that 
the chaplaincy program still had value for the German and Canadian Lutherans. He 
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believed that, while unfortunate, the behaviour of these German pastors could be 
corrected “with the proper amount of coaching” before they travelled to Canada. 
Speaking on Reble’s behalf, one Waterloo County pastor insisted they were “convinced 
in the continuing need for ships chaplains, both German and Canadian.”564 
 Reble’s position with the CLWR expired in the fall of 1956 and he returned to 
Canada. Free from Reble’s influence, Treusch saw this as an opportunity to place the 
chaplaincy program under review.565 Unsurprisingly, Treusch condemned the program as 
expensive, unrealistic, and a bureaucratic headache. Most significantly, Treusch believed 
that Reble gave the German pastors the impression that they were “guests” of the 
Canadian Lutherans when this was certainly not the case. Treusch recounted several 
instances where Canadian congregations were unaware that they had to host a visiting 
German pastor and were unsure of the purpose of the visit. Other members of the NLC 
agreed with Treusch’s assessment. They believed that if German or Canadian pastors 
wished to visit either of the two countries, that they had best carry it out individually and 
at their own expense. They suggested that if the chaplaincy program continued, 
administering to the spiritual needs of the immigrants should be their primary concern. 
Thus, they would return immediately to Canada upon arriving in Germany rather than the 
previous tradition of traveling Germany afterwards.566 However, Treusch realized the 
limitations to this plan. He understood that such a plan significantly diminished the 
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Canadian appeal of serving as a chaplain. If they could not travel throughout Germany, 
Treusch admitted “it will be practically impossible for me to find men to serve.”567 
 The chaplaincy program continued in this diluted form for the next three years 
before being formally discontinued in 1960.568 Reble responded to this decision with a 
resigned attitude and inquired as to why the program was cancelled. Treusch responded 
that “this program had almost passed out of existence by itself” and that it was not worth 
the “problems” associated with the program to continue to offer it in such a limited 
form.569 Of course, Treusch and the other synod leaders made very little effort to keeping 
the program alive. The same NLC pastors that shifted they synod’s power away from 
Waterloo County after the war similarly contested and ultimately ended Reble’s attempt 
to promote greater interaction between Germany and Waterloo County. Without Reble’s 
vision, the program faltered and died. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Lawrence Meyer’s experiences in June 1948 highlight the conflict between 
ethnicity and nationality that missionaries and chaplains encountered in Germany. After 
frequent meetings with American military officials, Meyer decided that he did not believe 
the “American personnel here in Germany can really render a service. Most Americans 
are merely here to fill a job and to put in time.”  He believed that “the great majority of 
them have no conception” of what rebuilding postwar Germany entailed, and that he 
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“almost despairs to think” that Germans formed their opinion of American democracy 
based on their interactions with the military. Meyer drew on his own self-identification as 
a German in order to critique how the American military interacted with German 
civilians. He criticized Americans for having “little understanding of the language, 
culture, and background of Germany,” in contrast to his own authority as a German 
American. Yet Meyer’s interactions with German civilians that same month proved that 
although he thought of himself as German, the German people perceived him as an 
American. He remarked that most “Germans look upon us as conquerors, and it is the 
exceptional American who enjoys the confidence of the Germans.”  Meyer’s interactions 
highlight the ambiguous hyphenated identities that he and other missionaries encountered 
in Germany. They felt German when interacting with Anglo-Americans, but felt 
American when they interacted with German civilians. While this gave them 
opportunities to engage with both communities, it also meant that they were not fully 
accepted as insiders in either group.570 
 The experiences of Behnken, Reble, and their colleagues continues to complicate 
the traditional narrative of identity loss present in the scholarship on German immigrants. 
These pastors self-identified as Germans and articulated an ethnic identity while renewing 
their ties with Germany. They displayed their ethnicity through trips to places of familial 
importance, sympathies with their “fellow” Germans over the war, and through their 
efforts to help rebuild Germany. Yet, the fact that these men never felt embraced by 
Germans civilians offers more evidence that a hybrid identity emerged during the Second 
World War and continued into the postwar period. German Americans and Canadians did 
not abandon their ethnic identity. Instead, they adopted a hyphenated “German-
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American” or “German-Canadian” identity that placed them simultaneously in both 
“German” and “American/Canadian” worlds, yet firmly in neither.  
  Their experiences in Germany provide a compelling argument that, while a 
shared ethnic heritage and transnational ties linked Germany with the Missouri and 
Canada Synods, local conditions in Germany and their nationality prevented these bonds 
from taking root. In the decades since Reble and others left Germany for North America, 
the country fought two large wars that pitted them against North American “conquerors.” 
Germans developed their own theological stances on Lutheranism and rejected what they 
saw as yet another attempt of American takeover. These local conditions in Germany 
were stronger than the transnational ties Behnken and Reble believed existed between the 
two peoples, and Germans could not help but see the Americans as members of a 
different nation, instead of ethnic cousins. Behnken and Reble’s attempts to renew ties 
with Germany demonstrates a German ethnic identity continued to exist in St. Louis and 
Waterloo County, even if their attempts to solidify connections with a German 
“homeland” failed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
Chapter 5: German Space as White Space: Race and Ethnicity during the “Ethnic 
Reverie” of the 1950s and 1960s 
 
 German displaced persons and refugees started to arrive in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County by the late 1940s. Their arrival dramatically increased the size of the Missouri 
and Canada Synods, as well as their local congregations. Germans constituted the largest 
group of refugees to settle in Missouri in the postwar decades. By 1960, over 360,000 
German refugees arrived in Missouri with over 80,000 of them choosing to live in St. 
Louis. From 1950 to 1960, the Canada Synod’s population grew from approximately 
38,000 to 64,000 due to increased immigration. These numbers continued to increase 
until the mid-1960s when immigration from Germany began to decline.571  
  The influx of refugees and DPs in the postwar decades prompted national 
conversations on how “foreigners” would adapt to their new North American homes. The 
transformation from “DP” to “citizen” was by no means a passive experience. Historian 
Franca Iacovetta’s scholarship describes the number of middle class Anglo-Canadians 
and institutions that monitored immigrant behaviour in Canada’s urban centers. Iacovetta 
labels such individuals and institutions as “gatekeepers.” Although the term “gatekeeper” 
typically refers to immigration officials and “those who determine admission 
requirements and regulations for a country or institution,” Iacovetta broadens this term as 
a useful shorthand to include the “wide array of reception, citizenship, and regulatory 
activities” that immigrants faced after they arrived in Canada. She argues that Anglo-
Canadian social workers, educators, journalists, and health professionals all worked to 
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assimilate newcomers into a hegemonic Canadian culture based on British and 
“respectable” middle class values. Gatekeepers monitored immigrant behavior, ranging 
from their language, parenting style, clothing, food, and mental and physical health, in an 
effort to coerce them to conform to Canadian cultural norms. These preoccupations 
reflected Cold War-era concerns. They stressed the need for immigrant newcomers to 
embrace North America’s liberal democracy in contrast to the totalitarian and communist 
governments that the DPs left behind in Europe. Gatekeepers realized many DPs 
originated from communist nations or formerly fascist countries and thus needed to be 
“de-programmed” from their former totalitarian governments and embrace Western 
democratic values. Essentially, gatekeepers believed DPs needed to be “taught” how to 
become good Canadian and American citizens.572 This chapter examines similar 
gatekeeping institutions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. Local charitable 
organizations such as the International Institute of St. Louis (IISTL) and the Kitchener-
Waterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) managed by Anglo-Americans and Anglo-
Canadians tried to assimilate newcomers and encouraged them to abandon their ethnic 
ties. These organizations tried to integrate newcomers through English-language classes, 
citizenship tests, and generally monitored immigrant behaviour.  
 This chapter argues that the effective and widespread need to “integrate” 
newcomers Iacovetta identifies was not as pronounced in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
as other North American cities. While gatekeeper institutions such as the IISTL and 
KWCF tried to integrate newcomers, local German Lutherans challenged their efforts.  
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This occurred for two reasons. First, pastors performed their duties as ethnic elites and 
welcomed DPs into the pre-existing ethnic traditions of their congregations rather than 
trying to assimilate them. Pastors had a vested interest in German DPs maintaining their 
ethnic traditions and, most importantly, speaking the German language. By encouraging 
DPs to retain their German ethnicity, pastors hoped their Lutheran churches would grow 
in size and power, thereby allowing them to maintain their position as ethnic elites. 
Rather than encouraging DPs to adopt new North American norms as Anglo gatekeepers 
did, pastors created an inclusive ethnic boundary zone in their churches by increasing the 
number of German-language services and nurturing an interest in German culture. 
Creating a harmonious relationship between themselves, their congregants, and new DPs 
allowed pastors to remain in integral leadership roles that bolstered their authority, and 
had the added side effect of limiting the power of Anglo gatekeepers in their 
communities.  
 Second, while German immigrants may have been minorities in other North 
American communities, the reputations of St. Louis and Waterloo County as German 
communities helped discursively define the character of these cities. Historian Kathleen 
Neils Conzen refers to this phenomenon as the “localization of immigrant cultures.” She 
defines localization as 
the tendency of an immigrant-constructed culture to embed and reproduce itself…in the educational 
institutions, political and governmental organizations, businesses, media, and popular culture of the 
broader local community. Consequently, what are initially ethnic group values come to play a strong 
role in determining the local ‘rules of the game,’ in molding ‘the way we do things here,’ in shaping 
non-group as well as group life on the local level.573 
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The density of German immigrants in both St. Louis and Waterloo County helped 
“localize” German-American and German-Canadian culture in both communities. Local 
legends such as the pioneer myth along with the number of German immigrants in both 
communities complicated gatekeeper attempts to educate German DPs on how to “fit-in.” 
Over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, gatekeepers realized they could not 
convince DPs to fully abandon their language or culture when their German Canadian and 
American neighbours had yet to do so either.  
 Whiteness, alongside the localization of German culture, helped Lutheran 
churches remain ethnic boundary zones in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Just as in the 
previous decade, German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans continued to 
articulate white racial identities that inadvertently allowed their congregations to function 
as both German spaces and white spaces. The Missouri Synod, in particular, grappled 
with the issue of segregation and “white flight” in the 1950s. While they easily 
incorporated German DPs into their congregations, this chapter describes how synod 
leaders laboured to keep black Lutherans in separate and segregated congregations. In 
Waterloo County, the popularity of the pioneer myth ensured that German-Canadian 
Lutherans continued to cultivate a white ethnic culture inaccessible to racialized members 
of their community. Lutheran churches remained ethnic boundary zones in the postwar 
period, but only because German Lutherans actively worked to keep their racialized 
neighbours out of their congregations.  
 By investigating the ways German-Canadian and German-American Lutherans in 
St. Louis and Waterloo County confronted ethnic and racial diversity in the postwar 
period, this chapter questions the notion of an “ethnic reverie” in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This term, used notably by historian Matthew Frye Jacobson, argues that European 
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immigrants and their descendants practiced an “American” or “white” identity during 
these decades at the expense of their ethnic identities. European immigrants and their 
descendants ignored their ethnic heritage and culture in favour of an all-American identity 
that stressed inclusion in the nation. Jacobson suggests that this approach started to 
change in the mid-1960s with the “white ethnic revival.” This revival witnessed white 
Americans reclaim and re-identify with the ethnic identities of their grandparents or 
forebears as a response to the successes of the African-American Civil Rights Movement. 
As black Americans successfully demonstrated the links between Jim Crow segregation 
and racial inequality with white supremacy in the United States, it was no longer 
politically expedient for white Americans to identify as “whites.” Articulating an Italian 
or Polish identity, for example, allowed white Americans to ignore their complicity in 
perpetuating racial inequalities by identifying with their ethnic rather than racial 
identity.574 American intellectuals ranging from Will Herberg and Eric Goldman, for 
instance, support Jacobson’s notion of an ethnic reverie. Goldman stated that postwar 
affluence caused white ethnics to be “more anxious to achieve further respectability of 
unhyphenated Americanism.”575  
 This chapter joins other historians, such as Joshua Zeitz, in arguing that the ethnic 
reverie was more complicated than the typical “view of postwar American history as a 
swift trajectory from city to suburb, from working class to middle class, and, hence, from 
pluralism to white homogeneity.”576 German Lutherans practiced an ethnic identity within 
their congregations and resisted mainstream attempts to assimilate DPs while also 
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articulating white supremacist views. Indeed, these were not unrelated events. The ethnic 
elites that supported keeping their congregations segregated allowed for their churches to 
remain ethnic boundary zones wherein they practiced their German culture without the 
influence of other racial groups. As gatekeepers begrudgingly acknowledged St. Louis 
and Waterloo County’s German heritage and culture, they also reaffirmed this culture and 
their communities as white. While the “pluralism to white homogeneity” narrative of the 
ethnic reverie may describe the experiences of other white ethnic groups, the Lutheran 
church continued to act as an ethnic boundary zone throughout the postwar decades 
wherein German Lutherans practiced their ethnic identities alongside their racial status as 
white.  
 
  
The Lutheran Church as an Ethnic Boundary Zone 
 
 
 Congregations in both St. Louis and Waterloo County increased the number of 
their German-language services in the late 1940s. With the war over, Lutheran churches 
once again started to reflect the hybrid identities of their inhabitants by featuring both 
English and German services. Pastors and laypeople saw no contradiction in attending or 
offering services in both languages. Bilingual services did not make them any less 
American or Canadian, and attending services in English did not make them less German. 
Holy Cross Lutheran Church in St. Louis, for example, continued to offer German-
language services following the Second World War. By 1949, German remained the 
dominant language of the church. The Reverend Paul Koenig preached close to two 
hundred German sermons compared to one hundred and thirty English language sermons 
in 1949. Attendance at both services, however, remained roughly the same. 
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Approximately 66,000 congregants attended the German services as opposed to the 
62,000 that attended the English services.577 St. Peter’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Kitchener functioned in much the same manner. Although St. Peter’s church council 
staunchly opposed speaking German during the war, it fully endorsed the Reverend 
Albert Lotz’s motion to reintroduce German services in 1948.578 As German immigration 
to Waterloo County increased in the 1950s, many German immigrants chose to join St. 
Peter’s due to its frequent German language services and downtown location. In 1951 
Lotz suggested that he offer German language sermons more frequently at the church, and 
the church council agreed to purchase more German-language prayer books to meet the 
linguistic needs of the church’s newcomers.579  
 Congregational life at St. Peter’s and Holy Cross did not show signs of the “ethnic 
reverie” present in other ethnic communities during the 1940s and 1950s. Language and 
an interest in their German “homeland” prevented Lutheran congregations from 
completely conforming to mainstream Canadian and American culture. Koenig and Lotz 
demonstrated a dedication to their German ethnicities, rather than accepting the 
monoculture and monolinguistic norms supported by mainstream North America. Both 
pastors took steps to guarantee that English and German received equal attention and 
importance among their followers. They ensured that one language group would not feel 
secondary or beneath the other. Holy Cross, for example, held separate clubs for its 
congregants who wished to participate in church life in English or German. The 
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congregation had both a “Ladies Aid Society” and a Frauenverein to support bilingual 
and unilingual women. Regardless of their language of choice, the congregation remained 
actively involved in German affairs. When Koenig and his wife went to Germany in 
1949, the entire congregation followed their time spent abroad in Germany with great 
interest. When Koenig returned in the fall, representatives from both language groups 
asked him to attend their meetings and show his photos from Germany and recount his 
experiences.580 No matter their language of choice, they still wished to see glimpses of 
their “homeland.” Likewise, St. Peter’s guaranteed that both its English and German-
speaking members felt welcome at the church. St. Peter’s customarily stationed several 
members of their church council outside the church’s doorstep each Sunday to greet 
members of the congregation as they entered the building. In 1952, Lotz realized that this 
custom excluded German DPs from this weekly tradition. The church council contained 
no DP representatives and instead consisted of older, prominent, Canadian-born families. 
Lotz rectified the situation by asking several DP volunteers to work as greeters alongside 
the church council.581 In doing so, Lotz demonstrated that recent German arrivals were 
just as important as the elite members of the church council. Lotz’s effort to include 
German immigrants in the “welcoming party” suggests that he wanted a “unified 
congregation” that was not overtly divided along class or linguistic lines. Congregational 
cohesion, however, did not mean forcing German DPs to recognize English as the 
superior language. Lotz achieved internal unity in a way that empowered St. Peter’s 
German DPs rather than identifying them as second-class citizens. Lotz and Koenig, 
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along with their congregations, performed a careful balancing act that resulted in 
churches unified by a shared respect for their German-English frameworks.  
 Smaller congregations also offered German-language services, and actually did so 
in order to attract new DP members. By increasing German services, pastors at smaller 
congregations could grow their churches by increasing their membership amongst 
recently arrived DPs. Bethlehem Lutheran Church, located near downtown St. Louis, 
increased the frequency of their German services with the hopes that DPs would become 
members of their church. Their efforts paid off. By 1952, the number of congregants 
wishing to speak German at church showed signs of increasing, thereby helping the 
congregation grow as well.582 Smaller congregations in Waterloo County adopted a 
similar strategy. At St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Waterloo, the Reverend 
C.S. Roberts visited the homes of recently arrived German DPs in order to encourage 
them to attend the church. Although St. John’s operated primarily in the English 
language, Roberts still conducted monthly, and later weekly, German services that he 
hoped to grow as a result of DP attendance. “Though not accustomed to attending 
services regularly in their home land,” Roberts acknowledged, “many who are negligent 
might become regular attendants at our German service.”583 Regardless of its popularity, 
speaking German remained an important aspect of church life at these congregations. 
Their pastors invested time and resources in maintaining the German language, even if 
English was the dominant language of that particular congregation. Ethnic culture co-
existed alongside their status as Canadians and Americans, and actually worked to 
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increase the authority and importance of local pastors who could successfully balance the 
German and English languages.  
 An ability to speak German remained important for leadership roles within St. 
Louis and Waterloo County congregations during the so-called “ethnic reverie.” In 1947, 
the Reverend Paul Streufert at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church in St. Louis found he did 
not have enough time to meet the demands of his congregation. Streufert volunteered his 
services at several other St. Louis churches, and therefore did not always have the 
attention or time necessary to preach at St. Matthew’s each Sunday. The synod responded 
by allowing its students at Concordia Seminary to take turns preaching as guests at St. 
Matthew’s when Streufert could not attend. Concordia Seminary still trained their 
students in both the German and English languages, and the students performed bilingual 
services at St. Matthew’s.584 Similarly, St. Peter’s in Kitchener placed importance on the 
ability to speak German when they sought to hire another secretary to help meet the 
demands of the growing congregation. The church council emphasized that the first 
requirement of the new job would be proficiency in both English and German. The 
church council hired Mrs. Michael Gondosch, because she was “particularly suited for the 
position because of her facility with both languages.”585 It was important to the church 
council that those they hired to represent the congregation also embodied its hybrid 
identity.   
 The German language remained an important part of Lutheran churches when 
German DPs arrived in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Efforts on behalf of pastors such 
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as Koenig and Lotz helped cultivate an atmosphere in which the German ethnicities of 
newcomers did not come into conflict with their congregations or fellow German 
Lutherans. Just as in decades past, German Lutherans continued to balance their ethnic, 
religious, and national identities in their churches. They did not slip into an ethnic reverie 
following the war, but maintained their German-English framework and solidified the 
model throughout the upper echelons of their congregations.  
 
Gatekeeping in German Lutheran Communities  
 
 
 Lutheran congregations in St. Louis and Waterloo County provided spaces for 
German DPs to continue to speak and worship in German. Outside of the closed confines 
of the church, however, German DPs encountered secular institutions that sought to 
integrate them into North American life. Just like other urban cities in North America, St. 
Louis and Waterloo County had charitable organizations that aimed to provide DPs with 
services such as English-language classes and advice on finding jobs and permanent 
housing. The Kitchener-Waterloo Council for Friendship (KWCF) and the International 
Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis (IISTL) interacted with German DPs alongside the 
Missouri and Canada Synods. Unlike the two synods, which provided a space for German 
DPs to preserve their ethnicity and language, the KWCF and IISTL aimed to eliminate 
the German language and integrate German DPs into mainstream North American 
culture.  
 Both institutions had similar origins to other gatekeeping organizations in North 
America. The IISTL started as one of the YWCA’s many “international institutes” in 
1919 to promote charitable work among American immigrants. The IISTL helped 
newcomers with medical issues, unemployment, and language training, while also 
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assisting immigrants with naturalization papers, deportation, and other legal matters.586 
Harriette F. Ryan, the IISTL’s director during the mid-twentieth century, was a second-
generation Irish immigrant and devoted much of her life to ensuring that immigrants and 
their children had an advocate in the IISTL. The KWCF started in a very similar fashion. 
Muriel Clement, a member of Waterloo County’s English community and the wife of 
former Kitchener mayor William Clement, founded the KWCF at the local YWCA in 
1937 as an “international club” for other middle-class women in Waterloo County.587 The 
club originally functioned as a way for elite women to discuss culture “relating to the new 
and old world – music, travelogues, films and stunts.” In the postwar period, the 
organization broadened its scope to include philanthropic work among “newcomers with 
problems of employment, housing, obtaining furniture, giving advice, [and finding] their 
new way of life in Canada.”588 The KWCF and IISTL conducted similar events typical of 
other gatekeeping institutions in North America. They hosted English-language classes, 
offered cooking lessons, and sponsored different “folk” or “multicultural” events where 
newcomers could showcase dancing, music, and food from Europe.589 At their core, both 
institutions and its employees had the ultimate goal of assimilating DPs into mainstream 
Canadian and American culture. Although assimilation is rarely linear and more often 
reflects a process of adaptation and integration, the gatekeepers in charge of both 
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institutions did not see assimilation in such a nuanced manner.590 Clement made her 
mandate clear to all DPs that participated in KWCF events: “We are a melting pot, and 
privileged to be part of it.” The KWCF wished to “assimilate not merely integrate.”591 
Ryan similarly acknowledged that the IISTL “is primarily an assimilation, integration or 
Americanization agency.”592 Both institutions sought to undermine the German ethnicities 
of newcomers in favour of a common American or Canadian identity.  
 The KWCF and IISTL initially did not provide a tolerant atmosphere for German 
DPs. The strict immigration quotas in place following the Second World War ensured that 
most immigrants arriving to St. Louis were the wives of returning American soldiers. 
These “war brides” consisted mainly of women from the United Kingdom. Providing the 
war brides legal aid and helping them find employment occupied the majority of the 
IISTL’s time in the years following the war. The IISTL started a War Brides Club shortly 
after the war in an effort to help provide a social space for newcomers to overcome the 
isolation and loneliness that moving to a new country inevitably entailed. The club 
succeeded in bringing together British war brides to socialize, but proved alienating for 
the newcomers who did not fit their American and British culture. Although the majority 
of war brides were British, American servicemen also married women from a variety of 
different countries. These marriages were lesson common, but war brides from Italy, 
Germany, and Japan also accompanied their husbands to St. Louis after the war. At the 
second meeting of the War Brides Club, the brides discussed whether they should allow 
Germans into the group. The decision was a unanimous “no.” The IISTL employee who 
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supervised the club meeting later wrote that she was not surprised over this decision 
“since the majority of the war brides are English.”593 Negative associations with Germans 
as “the enemy” dictated the exclusionary attitudes of the war brides. Even though the 
IISTL sought to provide a space for all immigrants, German women faced rejection as a 
result of wartime wounds not yet healed. The British background of the war brides 
allowed them to adapt easily to American cultural norms, which just so happened to 
include the discriminatory attitudes of other middle-class Americans. As members of 
former “enemy nations,” German war brides did not yet have a place at the IISTL. 
 English-language and citizenship classes sponsored by the KWCF and IISTL 
made it clear that each group expected German DPs to adopt English as their primary 
language, thereby facilitating their integration into Canadian and American culture. 
Although both gatekeeper institutions employed a mix of men and women, men taught 
English and citizenship classes more often than women. Male teachers tended to push a 
narrower definition of what constituted an American or Canadian, and they explicitly 
pursued the gatekeeper agenda of assimilation. Cold War anxieties intrinsically shaped 
the “gatekeeper-newcomer” relationship, because gatekeepers saw their role as not only 
creating productive Canadian/American citizens, but also “de-programming” DPs from 
their former communist backgrounds.594 Stuart Moore frequently taught English-language 
classes at the IISTL throughout the 1950s and imbedded his lessons with patriotic 
messages that stressed “American values” in opposition to what he perceived as the 
communist backgrounds of his DP students. Moore’s curriculum focused on providing 
immigrants with the vocabulary they would need to interact with other Americans on a 
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daily basis. He divided his lessons into several different categories, including vocabulary 
relating to transportation, work, home, and recreation.595 These lessons, however, 
contained clear political messages. Once DPs became familiar with a basic vocabulary, 
Moore used their newfound language skills to promote mainstream American values. For 
example, after learning English words relating to “the church,” Moore launched into a 
discussion of division between church and state in the United States compared to the 
“godless” regimes of communistic countries in Europe.596 W.H. Mertens at the KWCF 
likewise pushed immigrants to use their English-language skills to also increase their 
fluency in civic affairs. In 1957, Mertens encouraged Clement to support a social hour 
called the “Canadian Affairs Discussion Group.” He envisioned the group as a place to 
discuss current and global events to help turn newcomers into informed citizens. Mertens 
decided that the group should play host not only to immigrants, but also to native-born 
Canadians. In this sense, immigrants would improve their English and also learn the 
duties of citizenship from already established Canadians, rather than only socializing with 
their own ethnic group.597 “Cold Warriors” like Mertens and Moore ensured that the 
KWCF and IISTL were not politically neutral spaces. Learning English functioned as 
more than just a utilitarian necessity. English represented an opportunity for German DPs 
to not only learn the language of North America, but also its values. Unlike the Lutheran 
congregations these DPs attended on the weekend, the IISTL and KWCF placed no 
importance on retaining German. English, they believed, was both a practical necessity as 
well as the path to good citizenship. Unlike their Lutheran churches, German DPs found 
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that gatekeeper organizations sought to dismantle their German language and culture in 
favour of a single conformist culture based around the English language. 
 Gatekeepers, however, found their efforts to regulate German DPs complicated 
compared to other North American communities. The high concentration of German DPs 
in St. Louis and Waterloo County alongside the pre-existing population of German 
Lutherans hindered assimilative strategies that worked well elsewhere. Gatekeepers tried 
to enforce an Anglo-American and Canadian culture that did not have hegemonic status 
in either St. Louis or Waterloo County. Although the KWCF and IISTL wished to 
assimilate German DPs, they found their heavy-handed attempts to do so unconvincing. 
The density and history of German immigration in both communities furthermore allowed 
German DPs and German Canadian and German Americans alike to subvert their 
gatekeeper aims. They turned the KWCF and IISTL events into spaces that represented 
their own German heritage rather than the integrationist goals of the gatekeepers.  
 The high concentration of German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County 
complicated gatekeeper efforts to encourage the use of the English language. Gatekeepers 
believed that language “is the great stumbling block to integration,” and the large number 
of German-speaking people in both communities made the transition to English very 
difficult.598 The English-language teachers at the IISTL adopted a “one approach suits 
all” model of teaching English to newcomers. Regardless of what language their DP 
students spoke, the methods for learning English did not change. German DPs, for 
instance, commonly learned English in the same classes as DPs that spoke Polish or 
Italian as their first language. The IISTL’s technique, which favoured a uniform teaching 
method over addressing specific individual or group needs, proved more ineffective than 
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the instructors at the IISTL anticipated. Increased German immigration to St. Louis 
altered the composition of the IISTL’s English-language classes. Rather than their 
ethnically diverse student body, classes consisted solely of German DPs. The instructors 
discovered that homogenous classes composed of German DPs allowed them to learn 
English much more effectively. Learning alongside their fellow Germans allowed 
teachers “to indicate the similarities and differences in emphasis in English words” with 
their German origins, one instructor noted.599 “The overall homogeneity of the group,” 
teachers noted, “has turned out to be favorable. Most of the students are from the same 
language group (German)…so that demonstration through other languages is 
simplified.”600 This realization surprised Moore and the other gatekeepers at the IISTL. 
Gatekeepers generally worried that DPs would simply use the IISTL as a type of ethnic 
club or gathering place to meet, socialize, and preserve their ethnic identity. Such 
practices obviously went against the institution’s goal of assimilating newcomers.601 
Gatekeepers therefore worked hard to ensure DPs did not compose a homogenous ethnic 
group at the IISTL, but rather blended in with other DPs and native-born Americans as 
well.602 The density of German DPs in St. Louis undermined this core desire, because 
they could not prevent their English classes from consisting exclusively of German DPs. 
Ultimately, the IISTL did not alter their philosophical preference of teaching multiple 
ethnic groups at once. It did, however, provoke a moment of reflection wherein they 
realized their general approach to DP work may was not as successful as a model 
designed to meet the needs of specific ethnic communities.  
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 Gatekeepers found it even more difficult to discourage speaking German outside 
of the IISTL and KWCF. Because DPs could speak German at their churches, clubs, and 
occasionally at work, German DPs had few reasons to obtain anything other than a basic 
knowledge of the English language. In the mid-1950s, the Ontario Chamber of Commerce 
contacted its Kitchener branch to seek their advice on integrating DPs into Canadian 
society. Kitchener, with its historic and contemporary relationship with immigration, 
seemed well suited to answer the Ontario Chamber of Commerce’s questions on 
immigration. The organization hoped that its Kitchener branch could help “prepare a 
master plan or pilot plan on integration of newcomers to this country” that could be tested 
in Ontario communities and perhaps, if successful, used across Canada.603 The chamber’s 
plan proved ill-advised from the start, particularly given the KWCF’s trouble successfully 
assimilating German DPs. Regardless, the chamber appointed Joseph Connell, a member 
of Kitchener’s Anglo-Canadian community, as the director of the plan. In 1957, however, 
Connell publicly dissolved the committee looking into DP integration as he “could not 
present any plan since the city was failing in turning newcomers into Canadians.”604 
Connell expressed dismay over his discovery that DPs could “barely speak English” even 
“after being in Kitchener four or five years.” “A serious situation exists in Kitchener,” he 
remarked. “I was amazed at how little is being done.”605  
 Connell’s public resignation triggered a small controversy in Waterloo County, as 
members of the committee freely shared their thoughts on Kitchener’s “failure” to 
assimilate DPs with the local press. Their inability to force German DPs to stop speaking 
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German sat at the crux of the committee’s frustrations and failures. The committee found 
that “many of the newcomers are not too anxious to speak English except under dire 
necessity, and we find a distinct trend on the part of many of them to retreat to the 
comfort and security of using their own language.”606 Waterloo County’s established 
German-Canadian population, as well as the density of German DPs, essentially allowed 
DPs to continue speaking their language that would otherwise be eroded in communities 
with a larger Anglo-Canadian population. While investigating the degree to which DPs 
assimilated, Connell found evidence that the German language actually thrived among 
DPs. He resentfully noted that he received a request from a German ethnic club asking to 
use the local YMCA to host their meetings. “We had offered them the free use of our 
building, our pool, our sports facilities…but I couldn’t go for that,” Connell replied.607 
Gatekeepers in Waterloo County were supposed to integrate DPs into their organizations, 
and yet this request showed signs of the exact opposite. German-language groups, it 
appeared, were trying to “take over” Anglo-Canadian institutions like the YMCA. 
Contrary to Connell’s gatekeeping goals, the German language seemed to be growing 
stronger rather than weaker.  
 In their condemnation of Kitchener’s German DPs, Connell and the rest of the 
committee often drew direct links between the difficulties in integrating German DPs and 
Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian population. G.E. Eastman, one of the 
committee’s members, believed that Waterloo County’s ethnic associations needed to 
“explain what their objectives were” in light of the region’s failure to “Canadianize” its 
newcomers. Connell proved equally skeptical about the role of current German ethnic 
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clubs in Waterloo County. Throughout his investigation, one ethnic association 
approached Connell and asked him to join their association and offered to teach him 
German. Connell admitted that their offer was “half in fun, half in fellowship, but is it a 
trend?”608 The gatekeepers worried that Waterloo County was actually becoming more 
German as a result of the DPs. The committee generally hoped that the Canadian 
education system would solve the question of DP assimilation, even if they could not. By 
speaking English at school, the committee hoped the children of DPs would become 
fluent in English and stop speaking German. However, one committee member noted 
pessimistically that Waterloo County’s current German-Canadian population proved that 
this was not true. He described how “older people, born in this country, who live in rural 
areas and still talk with a strong accent” proved that the community had more generally 
failed at assimilating current and previous generations of immigrants.609  
 The Canada Synod was partially to blame for this trend. Connell divided Waterloo 
County’s DPs into two categories. The first group consisted “of people who chose to 
come to this country,” like the Hungarian refugees of 1956. This group, he believed, 
showed positive signs of adopting Anglo-Canadian cultural norms. The second group, 
however, consisted of DPs “who came because of war, because they were induced to 
come, because of relatives. They seem to feel as long as they have a roof over their heads 
and eat that is their only concern.”610 This latter category of course referenced the 
programs sponsored by the Canada Synod, such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme or Close 
Relative Scheme. These DPs arrived through schemes that Waterloo County’s Lutherans 
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used to bring their fellow Germans overseas and, in Connell’s mind, served to strengthen 
German culture in the area. The resiliency of the German language led Connell to believe 
that “it may be best to follow the English idea of handling immigrants.” He suggested that 
when “large groups” of immigrants arrived, the government “put them into camps and 
teach them English for three or four months. Then when they’ve learned the language, 
and been clothed and fed well, let them out.”611 Connell’s vision represented a coercive 
Canadian nationalism that went contrary to Waterloo County’s German-Canadian values 
of ethnic diversity. Connell wanted to forcibly stamp out the German language through 
imprisonment, whereas the Canada Synod worked to maintain a healthy balance of 
German and English in their congregations. Connell’s views represented those of an 
Anglo-Canadian outsider who ignored the localization of German culture in Waterloo 
County. 
 German Canadians responded to Connell’s report and public airing of grievances 
with equal passion. The German Canadians who shared their views with the press refuted 
Connell’s assertion that Waterloo County somehow failed at assimilating their DPs. One 
letter to The Kitchener-Waterloo Record questioned Connell’s conclusion. “Has the plan 
really failed or has it failed only in the opinion of those who presented it to the Kitchener 
Chamber of Commerce directors?”612 One letter drew, much to Connell’s chagrin, on 
Waterloo County’s localized German culture to contest the committee’s findings. “New 
Canadians of years ago who chose Kitchener for their place of residence helped make our 
community the envy of many other cities. I am sure those who have arrived in the past 
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five or six years will do likewise.”613 Clement also rejected the committee’s conclusions. 
As the KWCF’s leader, she took personal offense to his assertion that they failed to 
assimilate immigrants. She therefore defended herself and the KWCF by drawing on the 
discourses of postwar democratic values that gatekeepers elsewhere commonly expressed.  
“Our government presents Canada to Europeans as a land of opportunities where they will be 
welcomed, be free and enjoy the benefits of free enterprise among people who want them and are 
anxious to integrate them. We cannot think that Canadians would expect them to live in camps and 
be ‘let out’ when they have learned the language. This is absolutely incompatible with our idea of 
democracy and individual freedom to think and speak as we please within the bounds of law and 
morals.”614  
 
Despite her personal goal of assimilating German DPs, Waterloo County’s localized 
German culture made it difficult for gatekeepers like Clement to uniformly reject the 
desire on behalf of DPs to continue speaking German. Clement wrote that trying to 
eliminate German “presents a real challenge to us,” particularly without disrespecting 
“the Pennsylvania Dutch immigrants who helped make this the admirable community it 
has become, and whose descendants’ German, to which we do not object.”615 While she 
and Connell agreed in principal that integration was desirable, the pluralistic discourses in 
Waterloo County prevented her from embracing Connell’s hardline approach.  
 Gatekeeping organizations like the ISSTL and KWCF moreover diverged from 
their sister organizations by eventually including local German Canadians and Americans 
into leadership roles at their clubs. As Conzen argues, communities with a strong 
localized immigrant culture often feature immigrants in leadership positions amongst the 
community’s charitable and educational institutions.616 Prominent German-Canadian 
families started volunteering at the KWCF in the early 1960s as a result of the 
                                                        
613 Canuck, “Letter to the Editor – Is It a Failure?” The Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 22 February 1957. 
614 “More Activity by Canadian-Born People Urged Toward Immigrants,” The Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 
23 February, 1957. 
615 “More Activity by Canadian-Born People Urged Toward Immigrants,” The Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 
23 February, 1957. 
616 Conezen, “Mainstreams and Side Channels,” 7. 
 260 
organization’s university scholarship program. In an effort to promote assimilation among 
younger DPs, the KWCF created a series of university scholarships for DP students 
currently in high school. University-level education, the KWCF believed, promoted 
assimilation as it reinforced the English language and promoted economic mobility. DP 
students could qualify for the award if they attended a Waterloo County high school and 
promised to attend university in Ontario. They deliberately distributed the awards to 
students who had a strong knowledge of the English language, which conveyed to the 
KWCF their desire to assimilate. The scholarship requirements stipulated that the DP 
student submit several essays in English to the scholarship committee if they lived in 
Canada for less than five years. If they expressed a fluent knowledge of English, they 
remained in the applicant pool and had an opportunity to win a KWCF scholarship.617 
 The KWCF intended their scholarships to reward young DP students for their 
willingness to adopt Canadian social norms. Ironically, the awards simultaneously created 
bonds between Waterloo County’s established German-Canadian community and German 
DP newcomers. The KWCF scholarships required extensive fundraising campaigns in 
order to raise enough money to offer a variety of scholarships to numerous DP students 
each year. Thus, KWCF members contacted some of Waterloo County’s elite families 
and businesses in an attempt to secure finances for their scholarships. These community 
leaders, however, often happened to be members of successful German-Canadian 
families. For instance, the prominent Kaufman family donated enough money to create a 
new scholarship titled the “Mrs. A.R. Kaufman Scholarship.” This money sponsored Ute 
Lischke, a German DP, to study modern languages at the University of Waterloo. 
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Similarly, the Schwaben Sick Benefit Society sponsored Waltraut Schork to study 
modern languages at the University of Toronto.618 Although the KWCF intended these 
scholarships to promote assimilation, they generated contact between Waterloo County’s 
German-Canadian population and recent German DPs. The KWCF, and gatekeeper 
organizations more generally, feared that immigrants would use their institutions to 
promote ethnic culture. By asking prominent German-Canadians for funds to help 
German DP students, the KWCF inadvertently caused their scholarship program to 
facilitate bonds between two generations of Germans.  
 Because the KWCF and IISTL operated on a largely volunteer basis, some of their 
volunteers happened to overlap with members of the local German Lutheran community. 
In an effort to increase attendance at their English classes, the KWCF began to advertise 
its classes on German radio stations and at Lutheran churches with large German DP 
populations. The advertisement campaigned worked. Not only did enrollment in the 
KWCF’s English classes increase, but it also generated interest in the program among the 
community’s German-Canadian population. As enrollment in English classes grew, so did 
the number of children the KWCF had to watch while their mothers took English classes. 
In 1962, “ladies from the different Lutheran parishes” started to assist the KWCF’s 
daycare program. Most notably, Gertrud Reble, John Reble’s wife, started to volunteer 
and look after the children.619 Reble’s involvement with the KWCF increased in the 
following years after her introduction to the organization in early 1962. Her role in the 
organization soon expanded outside of looking after children and she became involved in 
the KWCF’s English classes more generally. She joined the organization’s network of 
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women who helped prepare food for the organization’s celebrations, such as Christmas 
parties and graduation ceremonies for the English classes. By 1965, Reble personally 
registered German DPs for KWCF English classes at the different Lutheran congregations 
in Waterloo County.620  
 By participating in the KWCF, Reble and the other Lutheran volunteers managed 
to make the organization an extension of life at the church. They functioned as important 
intermediaries between DPs and their new host society, whether it was through attending 
German-language services together at St. Peter’s or by helping DPs learn basic English. 
Such actions served to undermine the essential goal of most gatekeepers: the explicit 
assimilation of a single homogenous ethnic group into mainstream society. With a large 
number of DPs and extensive interaction with established German-Canadian and 
American communities, gatekeepers found it difficult to break the ethnic bonds that 
existed between established Germans and DP newcomers.   
  
Upholding White Privilege and Supremacy 
 
 
 Gatekeepers found it difficult to completely assimilate DPs not only at practical 
levels like English classes, but also at an ideological level. As a group of DPs who arrived 
in North America with very poor English skills, little money, and possible Nazi or 
“enemy” ties, DPs did not “belong” in a North American society that stressed Anglo and 
American conformity. They were clearly “outsiders.” However the localization of 
German culture in both St. Louis and Waterloo County created a unique situation that 
allowed German DPs to eschew this outsider status. As the DPs were both German and 
white, they could access popular myths in St. Louis and Waterloo County that helped 
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include them in the community. Local legends such as Waterloo County’s “pioneer myth” 
allowed German DPs to situate themselves in the long German histories of these 
communities that privileged their German ethnicities and mimicked the racialized 
discourses on pioneering and nation-building recognized by Canadians and Americans as 
acceptable historical narratives.  Although appealing to these local myths took on a more 
ephemeral process than disrupting English language classes, the German DP ability to 
conform to St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized culture at an ideological level also 
helped complicate gatekeeper efforts to assimilate them. As literary critic Daniel Coleman 
notes, myths and stories in settler societies often took on a sense of urgency found less 
commonly in other nations. As settlers established nations later than those in Europe, they 
often relied upon constructed myths and legends to claim authority and “indigeneity” with 
greater speed and intensity. They used these myths of pioneering and colonization to 
claim a sense of legitimacy to their new homes.621 DPs could also access these myths, 
since they essentially allowed settlers to quickly legitimize their presence in a foreign 
land. As whites, German DPs could share in local myths that inadvertently argued for 
belonging in North America while still acknowledging their German identities. Localized 
German culture in St. Louis and Waterloo County complicated gatekeeper efforts to fully 
assimilate German DPs as gatekeepers repeated local mythologies that directly allowed 
the white German DPs to benefit from the sense of belonging these myths provided. 
Local narratives that celebrated German culture gave DPs an opportunity to acknowledge 
both their German past and Canadian/American present and offered an alternative to the 
conformity emphasized by the gatekeepers. 
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 The pioneer myth in Waterloo County provided a cultural understanding for 
gatekeepers to “place” recent DPs. Through their different language, culture, and desire to 
remain in ethnic communities, DPs threatened the gatekeeper goals of encouraging 
Anglo-Canadian conformity. The pioneer myth provided an important reminder that 
Germans historically contributed to Canadian national life after the initial period of 
settlement. The myth remained so pronounced that even the community’s Anglo-
Canadian population referenced it throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1957, Andrew E. 
Thompson, a member of the Department of Citizenship, tried to combat the anti-
immigrant sentiment in Ontario by drawing on the province’s Loyalist history. He 
encouraged Ontarians to stop associating all European immigrants with “displaced 
persons” that could pose a threat to their job security. Instead, Thompson advocated that 
Ontarians view DPs as “the same as the United Empire Loyalists. They came here under 
political pressure,” just like the DPs that fled communism from Europe. He furthermore 
noted the irony that Ontarians felt some discomfort over the number of European 
immigrants, but that “we feel secure about the British, Irish or Scottish newcomer…yet 
they are all newcomers aren’t they?”622 Clement capitalized on Thompson’s remarks and 
modified them for her local Waterloo County audience. The Loyalists or the “Irish” 
meant very little to Waterloo County’s predominantly English, Scottish, and German 
population. Clement therefore repeated Thompson’s remarks but broadened them to 
reference Waterloo County’s German and “Pennsylvania Dutch” history. She noted, for 
instance, that “these new citizens have had enough faith in Canada to decide to make their 
homes here – as did our ancestors from Germany, England, Scotland, Switzerland, etc. 
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These are the people who will help fulfill our destiny as a nation.”623 While Thompson 
addressed a general Ontario audience, Clement’s remarks could not ignore Waterloo 
County’s German past. As a resident of Waterloo County, she had to acknowledge the 
reality of the community’s German past. Accordingly, Clement had to grant Waterloo 
County’s German forebears the same status bestowed on other white settlers in Ontario.   
 Clement’s remarks not only recognized the ethnic component of Waterloo 
County’s history, but also its racialized one. Like many other Canadians, Clement spoke 
of immigration in nation-building terms. Politicians and Canadians more generally 
discussed immigration as a nation-building process, wherein immigrants would “build” 
the nation economically as well as through their contribution to its “character” through 
changing, or solidifying, the nation’s demographics. While other Anglo-Canadians spoke 
of racialized immigrants, such as the Chinese, as undesirable and contrary to Canada’s 
“character,” Clement spoke of German DPs as contributing positively to Canada’s 
nationhood.624 German DPs could access these positive attributes due to common 
perceptions of the white race as natural “nation-builders.” Cultural theorist Richard Dyer 
argues that white people often associated their whiteness with particular ephemeral 
qualities that other races did not possess. Whiteness, Dyer suggests, contained the 
promise of “enterprise” that allowed white civilization to thrive in the areas of science, 
discovery, leadership, and governance. Decades of imperial and colonial rule convinced 
whites that they had a special inclination towards building and ruling nations.625 As 
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whites, German DPs found themselves the beneficiaries of this racial thinking. Clement 
could easily describe German DPs as “nation builders” since this was a perceived trait of 
the white race. German Loyalists once contributed to building the Canadian nation and 
German DPs, as a result of their whiteness, could do the same. Although men like 
Thompson generally applied this racialized logic to the British and English-speaking 
world, Waterloo County’s tradition of broadening Anglo-Canadian myths to its German 
inhabitants forced Clement to recognize German DPs as racially acceptable “nation 
builders.”  
 Although German-American Lutherans in St. Louis did not have a popular pioneer 
myth comparable to their coreligionists in Waterloo County, they too profited from St. 
Louis’s localized immigrant culture. As director of the IISTL for most of the 1940s and 
1950s, St. Louis’s immigrant population benefitted from Harriette Ryan’s progressive 
views of ethnicity and tolerance. Ryan, a second-generation Irish immigrant, achieved 
middle class respectability while still gaining particular insight into the experiences of 
immigrants and their children. Ryan contested the American emphasis on the “melting 
pot” theory as an inadequate metaphor to explain immigration to the United States since 
the early 1930s. Ryan believed that Americans wrongly conflated the melting pot theory 
with democratic values. Americans spoke too often of vague notions of liberty and too 
little of the inequalities American immigrants faced. While an emphasis on “liberty” 
offered a noble goal, Ryan argued it is was much harder to “put into practical operation 
those democratic principles and methods about which so much is said and all too little 
accomplished.”626 She described how the melting pot theory evoked images of a hot steel 
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factory that boiled up iron and other materials. She asked her audiences to imagine this 
process and to visualize putting people in a factory where “their individuality [would be] 
obliterated.” She wanted nothing to do with the “awful concept” that erased immigrant 
individuality.627 
 Instead, Ryan vouched for her own model of American diversity that she titled 
“the shuttle.” Rather than relying on the melting pot metaphor, Ryan preferred to think of 
American diversity as a shuttle “going into a tapestry or a beautiful design” that Ryan and 
the IISTL would help “weave.” This design had many different threads composed of 
many different ethnicities into one singular unit.628 Ryan did not pressure immigrants to 
lose their ethnic identity “as quickly as possible as [others] would have it.” She hoped 
immigrants would instead adjust to American life “constructively and with as little loss of 
values as possible.” Acculturation to the United States was a dialogue between American 
and ethnic cultures, a “two-way” process, and not a linear pattern of assimilation.629 
Accordingly, Ryan believed that Americanization was a project that immigrants and 
Americans alike could shape.  
 Ryan conceived the shuttle model in part due to her belief that the “melting pot 
theory has not been successful with the Second Generation” of immigrants, like herself. 
Ryan proposed that the melting pot theory “encouraged [them] to cut loose from their 
own ancestral history and culture” which went on to create “an attitude of antagonism 
toward their own culture and their parents.” Yet, Ryan remarked that these immigrants 
lacked the same history and context as native-born Americans and therefore did not 
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belong in the “normal” American world either.630 She recognized the process of hybridity 
many Americans experienced. Her shuttle model, therefore, emphasized providing 
immigrants with a bit of “their own history and culture” and combined it with how it has 
“contributed to American life.” She hoped that recognizing second generation immigrants 
as the beneficiaries of both “ethnic” and “American” worlds would therefore mitigate any 
sense of inferiority and distrust, be it on the part of American society or within ethnic 
communities.631  
 As fellow first or second-generation immigrants, members of St. Louis’s German 
Lutheran community embraced a model of diversity that aligned more closely with 
Ryan’s shuttle metaphor than the standard melting pot theory. Louis Sieck, a Concordia 
Seminary professor and St. Louis pastor, drew a direct connection between the DPs and 
former immigrants seeking refuge in the United States. “The immigrants to be 
admitted…have this in common with earlier immigrants to this country: their potential 
contribution to our national life and economy has been considered of sufficient value,” he 
wrote. “Always in the past immigrants have shared in local community resources along 
with other residents, just as they have contributed to community life.”632 Sieck understood 
that German DPs had the potential to participate in “nation building.” Their whiteness 
conferred a certain understanding that German DPs would be economically and morally 
“of sufficient value.” Other St. Louis Lutherans went further in their comparison and 
directly related the incoming Lutheran DPs to their own nineteenth and early twentieth 
century ancestors. Publicity material distributed by the synod made it clear that DPs 
                                                        
630 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 90, “Radio Program Speech,” 20 January, 1940. 
631 SHSMA, IISTLP, Roll 4, Folder 90, “Radio Program Speech,” 20 January, 1940. 
632 CHI, Emergency Planning Council Collection (hereafter EPCC), Box 4, Folder 49, Excerpts of Report of 
Committee on Financing Social Welfare and Health Services to Displaced Persons Resettled in St. Louis 
and St. Louis County, 1948. 
 269 
would gradually adjust to life in the United States. One synod-produced pamphlet 
described how “Lutheran people from Europe found American governmental and cultural 
patterns quite unfamiliar, but they felt an identification with the Lutheran churches 
already established here. This continuity of their religious ties sustained and enriched the 
lives of many of them as they sought new homes in America.”633 Ryan’s emphasis on 
balancing old and new world cultures found an ideological companion with the Missouri 
Synod’s desire to maintain a hybrid German-American identity in their churches. “No one 
can be expected to strip himself of his past or the behavior developed by this past just 
because he is in another environment,” one St. Louis pastor wrote. “Nor, for that matter, 
would it be wise for the newcomer to try to forget all old patterns and attitudes. Some of 
them will become valuable contributions to our American culture.”634 German-American 
Lutherans saw their congregations playing an important role in facilitating this process. 
“Formerly and now, whenever local congregations and pastors have reached out to 
welcome them, many of these newcomers have found their places in American church 
life….The Church has contributed much to make possible the integration of the old and 
the new.”635 Lutheran churches consciously took on the role of helping to facilitate this 
process for DPs as an extension of their ability to balance ethnic and national identities. 
Ryan’s shuttle philosophy and the Missouri Synod’s construction of ethnicity stressed 
hybridity over American conformity. 
 The shuttle philosophy and St. Louis’s localized German culture, however, 
reinforced a racial hierarchy that placed white citizens at the top. Their celebrations of 
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ethnic diversity did not necessarily lead to declarations of racial equality. The inherent 
whiteness of both models became strikingly evident at IISTL events that implemented 
these philosophies at a practical level. Although the IISTL’s immigrants embraced Ryan’s 
shuttle philosophy, they did not intend on applying it to all St. Louis residents. Ryan tried 
to desegregate the IISTL’s social clubs by inviting more black and Japanese residents to 
the IISTL, but found her efforts met with ambiguous or outright hostile responses. Ryan 
suggested in early 1946 that the IISTL’s Women’s Discussion Group invite “a small 
group of Negro women” to their subsequent meetings. Several immigrant women 
objected on the grounds that there “was no use entertaining for one meeting people whom 
they would not care to have more often.”636 The IISTL also tried to desegregate some of 
its social clubs in the early 1950s. They noted in particular that the Japanese war brides 
associated with the IISTL seemed isolated compared to the rest of their white members. 
They invited Japanese war brides to some of the organization’s social events, but its 
immigrant and DP members expressed reservations about their attendance. They told 
IISTL employees that their lack of English and unfamiliarity with American cooking 
acted as barriers to group cohesion.637 Ryan felt as though her efforts to desegregate St. 
Louis were limited by the “climate of opinion” in the city. She admitted that she was 
prepared to “go much further than perhaps Board members or St. Louisians generally” 
were prepared to go.638 Immigrants at the IISTL embraced Ryan’s notion of ethnic 
diversity while still maintaining racial exclusion. Tolerance, it seemed, was a quality only 
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extended towards their fellow white ethnics.  While the IISTL’s racism excluded 
racialized members of St. Louis, it inevitably included German DPs thanks to their 
whiteness.  
 The KWCF did not voice explicit racial prejudice as frequently as the IISTL. 
Without the large presence of a racialized other, the KWCF did not have to confront 
racial inequalities or their own racism as directly as the IISTL’s employees. Even so, the 
KWCF also faced intermittent difficulties including racialized immigrants in their 
organization. Although nonwhite students did receive the KWCF’s scholarships, they 
generally tended to go to students of European backgrounds. Race did, occasionally, 
factor into who received these scholarships. Although initially nominated for a 
scholarship, the organization later decided not to award a scholarship to one “Dutch East 
Indies student” when her principal suggested that the scholarship go to a white student 
instead.639 Such instances contradict and demonstrate the limits of the KWCF’s 
declarations of tolerance. While the organization proudly boasted that its membership 
included “people from all national groups, community groups, service clubs and women’s 
organizations,” Clement simultaneously stated that “newcomers from Europe are 
especially welcome” within the KWCF.640 Such sentiments capture the way whiteness 
functioned in postwar Waterloo County. The lack of a strong nonwhite presence ensured 
that explicit racist sentiments did not need to be expressed by the KWCF’s Anglo-
Canadian leaders, as the European and British character of Waterloo County was never in 
jeopardy in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, racist sentiment was expressed more subtly by 
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favouring Waterloo County’s German traditions and an explicit presence granted to 
white, European immigrants.  
 
White Flight and Segregation in the Missouri Synod 
 
 
 White flight and Jim Crow segregation in St. Louis also contributed to Lutheran 
churches functioning as ethnic boundary zones. St. Louis, like other American cities, 
participated in the process of “white flight” in the postwar decades. The term “white 
flight” refers to the exodus of white middle-class Americans from urban areas to newly 
constructed suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s. In response to American attempts to 
dismantle segregation, white Americans fled to suburban homes in order to live among 
other affluent whites rather than confront racial integration. Through direct and indirect 
actions by real estate agents, bankers, and construction companies, American cities 
managed to uphold de facto segregation with white Americans living predominantly in 
the suburbs and Black Americans confined to urban or impoverished areas.641 This 
process occurred in St. Louis shortly after the end of the Second World War. The 
manufacturing boom the city experienced as a result of the war quickly vanished, leaving 
many workers jobless or underemployed as deindustrialization shaped the downtown 
core. By August 1945, over 100,000 St. Louis workers had lost their jobs.642 Provisions in 
the G.I Bill, a piece of legislation designed to provide benefits to returning American 
veterans, however, provided white veterans with the financial means to secure education 
and housing at low costs. Without a job in the quickly deindustrializing downtown core, 
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many white families used economic support from the G.I. Bill to move to recently 
constructed suburbs in St. Louis County.643 Promotional material for the newly 
constructed suburbs openly advertised its large neighbourhoods free from the presence of 
black Americans.644  By controlling rental and housing prices, local real estate agents 
helped wealthy whites flee downtown St. Louis to all-white suburbs. This process of 
white flight created an unspoken rule that housed the white residents of St. Louis south of 
Delmar Boulevard while Black Americans lived downtown and north of the “Delmar 
Divide.”645 
 White flight in St. Louis proved particularly problematic for the Missouri Synod’s 
congregations located in downtown St. Louis. Prior to the 1920s, St. Louis’s downtown 
area housed the city’s working-class German immigrant population. Accordingly, the 
Missouri Synod had many of its oldest congregations founded in the nineteenth century 
located in the downtown core.646 Local pastors realized that their congregations suffered 
from decreased attendance as a result of their white congregants fleeing downtown St. 
Louis to live in affluent suburban neighbourhoods. Questions surrounding race therefore 
posed greater problems than ethnicity and language in these congregations. Originally 
established in 1849, Bethlehem Lutheran Church continued to offer German and English 
services in the postwar period. Bethlehem’s pastor, the Reverend L.E. Eifert, continued to 
preach bilingual sermons throughout the 1950s and easily maintained the congregation’s 
hybrid traditions. Eifert’s main concern throughout the decade proved to be the church’s 
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“scattered membership” and “the problem of a changing neighborhood.” White flight 
posed a real challenge for the church, as Eifert noticed that “the movement of members 
out of the area and into the county” adversely affected attendance. He encouraged the 
congregation “to do our best to maintain and preserve” the members that the congregation 
currently had.647 This proved easier said than done. Eifert collaborated with other St. 
Louis pastors in an effort to try and solve the problems white flight posed, but to little 
avail. In a desperate attempt to keep his congregation together, Eifert even proposed that 
he move the entire congregation from downtown to a suburb in the county. The cost of 
this venture, however, ultimately dissuaded the church council from adopting Eifert’s 
proposal.648  
 Eifert and Bethlehem more generally showed no desire to desegregate their 
church, even if it would solve the problem of decreased church attendance. They were 
hardly alone in this regard, as desegregation rarely emerged as a solution to the problem 
of church membership. Pastors often saw the solution to white flight as merely attracting 
new white members, rather than desegregating their downtown churches. In 1956, a 
conference of St. Louis pastors met and essentially confirmed their commitment to 
segregation through their inaction. They concluded that the solution to dwindling church 
attendance was to increase their “evangelical” preaching techniques that appealed to all 
Christians, rather than just their Lutheran base. They hoped energetic preaching would 
draw in new white members to replace those who fled to the suburbs.649 This solution 
showed no attempt to integrate the synod’s German-English congregations with the few 
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black congregations in St. Louis. Effectively, pastors prioritized keeping their churches 
white, and therefore German, spaces instead of creating new multiracial congregations.  
 White flight and the problem of ministering to black congregations in St. Louis 
took place within the broader context of debates over desegregation within the Missouri 
Synod. Racial tensions within the synod became fully apparent in 1955 as a result of the 
controversy surrounding the annual Lutheran Women’s Missionary League (LWML) 
convention. Lillian Preisinger, the president of the LWML, decided to hold the LMWL’s 
biennial convention at the Hotel Roosevelt in New Orleans. The convention’s location in 
the south aptly suited the LWML’s mandate as a group dedicated to mission outreach. 
Traditionally, the LWML hosted their conventions in Midwestern cities due to the high 
concentration of Lutherans in the Midwest. In the 1950s, however, they decided to shift 
hosting their conventions in cities that promised greater Lutheran growth outside of their 
Midwestern core. Missouri Synod Lutheranism was at its weakest in the western and 
southern United States, and therefore it seemed appropriate to hold LWML conventions 
in regions that would receive a strong institutional boost due to the convention’s presence. 
New Orleans seemed a fitting southern city in which to accomplish this goal.  
 Preisinger, however, later discovered that the Hotel Roosevelt still enforced 
segregation. This posed obvious problems for the growing number of black Lutherans 
that the LWML assisted through its missionary efforts. Preisinger contacted John 
Behnken and H.A. Mayer, the synod’s secretary of missions, for assistance on how to 
approach the problem. Both men took no issue with holding a convention in a city that 
still enforced segregation. In fact, the anti-black racism of both men guaranteed that the 
LWML found ready allies in the synod leadership. “I can readily understand that the 
Roosevelt Hotel would not want to house any Colored people,” Mayer privately told the 
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LWML convention organizers.650 Behnken also offered his moral support. Although 
Behnken moved to St. Louis as a teenager, his childhood in Texas and subsequent work 
as a pastor there in the 1920s continued to shape his views on race. Behnken identified as 
a “proud Southerner” during his youth and expressed an admiration and boyhood 
fascination with Confederate general Robert E. Lee.651 In early February of 1955, 
Behnken wrote to the LWML leadership in order to let them know that “as one who was 
born in the South and also as one who served in the ministry in Houston, Texas, for about 
28 years, I am inclined to believe that I can understand your problem and your 
difficulty.”652 The strong support for segregation among the synod’s St. Louis leadership 
ensured that they stood firmly behind the LWML’s decision to host their convention in 
New Orleans. As a synod composed largely of white German-Americans, its leadership 
upheld current power relations by complying with segregation laws. By confirming New 
Orleans as the location of choice, Missouri Synod leaders privileged their white German-
American laity over black members of their church. 
 The synod’s leadership, however, knew that their implicit support for segregation 
could create a public relations controversy for the church should civil rights groups 
discover their decision. Behnken worried that if “Negro delegates” attended the 
convention they “might create a scene which would give our church very unfavorable 
publicity. We know how eager some news agencies would exploit and exaggerate such an 
occurrence.”653 Mayer agreed, and expressed concern over the negative attention that the 
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conference could bring the Missouri Synod. “It would be most unfortunate if newspapers 
would pick up an innocent incident and plaster it across their front pages,” he confided.654 
Behnken and Mayer knew their support for segregation was controversial, but did little to 
challenge it. They felt little need to modify their behaviour and gladly participated in Jim 
Crow segregation. The politics of black exclusion did not trouble either man, but the 
possibility of negative media attention certainly did. In order to avoid a possible 
controversy, Behnken and Preisinger agreed that the LWML organizers should notify the 
various LWML branches that only white delegates should attend the convention. They 
sent out a notice to each LWML branch that the convention would not be “permitted to 
entertain delegates of the Negro race in the same manner as the others, or even allow 
them to attend Convention sessions” as a result of segregation policies throughout the 
city.  
“We are sure this would prove a humiliating and heartbreaking experience to the fine Christian 
women who would represent our LWML. We, therefore, urge that all Negro leagues and those 
leagues having Negro membership be advised of this situation, and that they be urged for their own 
sakes not to make plans to attend the Convention in New Orleans.”655  
 
Unsurprisingly, Behnken and the LWML opted to keep their convention a purely white 
affair when faced with the opposition to desegregate. They privileged protecting their 
own image rather than confronting racial inequalities within their church. 
 The LWML played on Lutheran gender roles in an effort to ensure that others 
respected their decision. Conservative Americans often couched their anti-black politics 
in the language of “respectability” in order to avoid alienating moderate or sympathetic 
whites from their discriminatory views. In contrast to the outlandish costumes of the Ku 
Klux Klan, conservatives cultivated a “respectable” tone of concerned citizens to express 
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their support of segregation. They encouraged other whites to “protect” their community 
and its “integrity” from encroaching black Americans. This discourse successfully 
permeated the language of middle class whites who did not want others to see their 
segregationist politics as divisive or contentious.656 For members of the Missouri Synod, 
respectability often meant conforming to the synod’s gender norms, of humble male 
pastors exerting their authority over docile and submissive Lutheran women. The LWML 
organizers therefore took care to demonstrate that their decision to hold the convention in 
New Orleans was made in cooperation with the synod’s male leadership. “This entire 
problem has been discussed with the national officers, pastoral advisors, and Dr. J.W. 
Behnken,” they made clear. “This letter is an outgrowth of these deliberations and our 
committee meetings.”657 In appealing to the patriarchal nature of the Missouri Synod, the 
LWML hoped to avoid critique. After all, they merely followed the orders of Behnken 
and other male leaders. Male members of the Missouri Synod supported Behnken’s 
paternalistic oversight of the LWML. One man agreed that Behnken “should be in a 
position to exert an influence” over the LWML since any “stigma would certainly rest 
upon the Church rather than upon the organization of women.”658 The LWML organizing 
committee hoped that including Behnken’s involvement as an important caveat would 
help preempt any gender-based criticisms of their choice. 
 The LMWL’s gamble failed. Their decision to host only white delegates at the 
New Orleans convention ignited a series of protests that engulfed the entire synod. The 
issue exposed clear regional tensions within the Missouri Synod. Districts and 
congregations in the northern states generally criticized the LWML for their support of 
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segregation, while the southern and Midwestern states remained quietly supportive.659  
Pastors in Philadelphia issued a collective statement calling the LWML’s decision to host 
the convention in New Orleans an “un-Christian, discriminatory act, contrary to the law 
of love. The Conference deplores the fact that this procedure will be tolerated.”660 They 
subsequently requested that the convention be cancelled entirely, for “it is our firm 
conviction that, under existing plans, no blessing of God could be forthcoming upon a 
group dedicated to the service of Christ in the cause of Missions.”661 Meanwhile, 
Lutherans in the Midwest and South continued to support the decision to host the 
convention in a city that supported segregation. R.T. Eissfeldt, a pastor based in the 
Midwest, tried to confront his critics by noting “we personally have worked with our 
colored sisters at retreats, rallies, etc. in our northern states...However, the situation down 
south is entirely different.”662 Eissfeldt argued that they would support desegregation in 
the north, but allow racial inequality in the south to persist. Segregation was a “southern 
problem” that the church could do little to change. Moreover, proponents of the 
convention continually reminded their critics of the importance of holding the convention 
in New Orleans to help encourage the growth of Lutheranism in the southern states. 
Behnken believed that cancelling the convention would be “very unfair to the people of 
New Orleans” and did not seriously consider this suggestion from the northern critics.663 
Eissfeldt agreed. “This will be the first convention in the south and would be quite a 
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spiritual ‘shot in the arm’ for our Lutheran People and the cause of Christ in that section 
of the country.”664 Unlike their brethren in the northern states, the synod’s Midwestern 
leadership privileged the growth of Lutheranism among white Americans over racial 
equality.  
 Critics and proponents of the convention in New Orleans both drew on theology 
to bolster their position. One critic wrote to Mayer to prompt him to “wonder what St. 
Paul would have said about such procedure…I know what St. James said too about the 
disadvantaged brother how he should not be treated, no matter what social pressures of 
the time may have been.”665 Proponents of desegregation within the synod frequently 
referenced St. Paul’s assertion that God did not see anyone as a stranger or foreigner. One 
Lutheran woman wrote to Behnken to tell that “we can, as Christians, point out the 
injustice of such laws, as God does not discriminate as to color or race.”666 In contrast, 
supporters of the convention portrayed their opponents as either secularists or as violating 
Lutheran theology. Sadie Fulk Roehrs, a former resident of St. Louis and president of the 
LWML, wrote that “if the minority group of whites (clergy and laymen) had spent one 
tenth of the time they spent sending telegrams and letters and adding fuel to the flame had 
spent time on their knees” addressing God they would have realized how wrong they 
were to oppose the convention.667 According to Fulk Roehrs, God placed a greater 
importance on expanding Lutheranism in New Orleans than achieving racial equality. 
Behnken took a more formal approach by couching his theological objections in the 
language of Romans 13. He stated that in “the deep South…there are the laws and 
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regulations of the state and of the city to be taken into consideration.”668 In a reversal 
from his more liberal interpretation of Romans 13 during the Second World War, 
Behnken now used the doctrine in order to excuse the church from contesting state 
politics. Behnken’s use of Romans 13 held little weight, among critics and proponents of 
the convention alike. James D. Brasch, a New York pastor, mocked Behnken’s strict 
position on adhering to local laws. He refuted the implicit argument in Behnken’s 
interpretation that “the laws of a few men may take precedence over the precepts of 
God.”669 Even some of Behnken’s conservative supporters in the synod acknowledged 
that the synod may need to recognize desegregation legislation in the United States. “I 
share your concern for the preservation of sound doctrine,” one pastor told Behnken. “Yet 
I wonder whether we are not straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel when 
we…ignore the basic law of Christian love in our dealings with fellow human beings.”670 
As usual, pastors drew on their own theological inclinations to support their pre-existing 
social views. Although each side tried to portray themselves as adopting the correct 
Christian or theological approach, segregation was a social issue that divided the synod 
along regional lines. 
 The LWML seemed to move ahead with their plan until a last minute effort by 
James Brasch stopped the convention from taking place. One week before the convention, 
Brasch told Behnken that he planned on reporting the synod’s support for segregation to 
the media if the LWML decided to go through with the convention. “I think that I am 
duty-bound bound to notify the large metropolitan press associations,” Brasch warned.671 
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Behnken subsequently met with the LWML leadership and pastors in New Orleans about 
cancelling the convention. Eventually, he and the LWML leadership agreed that 
rescinding the invitation to New Orleans was the most diplomatic way to no longer hold 
the LWML meeting.  
 Behnken’s so-called “compromise” did not stop the flurry of letters expressing 
outrage over the convention’s cancellation. Their outrage highlights just how entitled 
Behnken and his supporters felt to maintain their convention as an all white affair. They 
resented having to cancel the convention and believed that Missouri Synod Lutherans had 
somehow violated their rights in the process of forcing their hand. Historian Kevin M. 
Kruse notes how Southern whites often thought of public spaces such as parks, buses, and 
other sites as “theirs” due to legalized segregation. Thus, they often viewed attempts to 
desegregate these spaces as a “loss” that violated their rights.672 Accustomed to feeling 
entitled to public space due to their whiteness, Behnken and Fulk Roehrs saw the 
convention’s cancellation as a minority part of the synod exerting “mob rule” over the 
rest of the synod. “The minority groups…think nothing of offending thousands – our 
fellow Lutheran Christians in the South,” Fulk Roehrs angrily wrote to Behnken. “I am 
shocked and disillusioned at the action taken.”673 Behnken agreed, and continued to voice 
his support for segregation. “I, too, am shocked and disillusioned that there was so much 
agitation, and this instigated by whites who thought to make an issue of the matter,” 
Behnken replied to her. “I certainly do not like the idea of pressure which some exerted. I 
did not think that it was possible that any minority group could act like that.”674 Behnken 
genuinely perceived the LWML as the persecuted group, and not the black Lutherans 
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more significantly impacted by New Orleans’s segregation laws. By forcing Behnken and 
his supporters to confront their complicity in a manner that made them uncomfortable, 
Behnken portrayed himself as the real victim of the entire affair. “I cannot understand 
why some of our fellow-Lutherans insist on tolerance in the race question can themselves 
become so terribly intolerant. They surely permit their emotions to run away with better 
judgment,” he wrote to a group of pastors in New Orleans.675 Accustomed to enjoying the 
privileges their whiteness granted them, Behnken and other Missouri Synod supporters of 
segregation interpreted any movement towards racial equality as a loss for them.   
 Although the debate around the convention exposed clear regional tensions within 
the Missouri Synod, Behnken and the LWML’s eventual “compromise” bore distinct 
Midwestern qualities. In his analysis of race relations in St. Louis and broader Midwest, 
historian Clarence Lang found that the somewhat artificial binary distinguishing the 
North’s liberal position on race relations versus the racist South could not adequately 
characterize the struggle for black freedom in the Midwest. Lang proposed that race 
relations in St. Louis functioned as a type of border South,” wherein race relations 
functioned as a compromise between northern and southern approaches.676  Lang 
describes that white elites in St. Louis responded to race relations not through “massive 
resistance” to desegregation, but rather “massive redevelopment.” This strategy involved 
maintaining de facto segregation by continuing black subordination through “white 
paternal authority under the guise of cooperation.”677 Behnken and the LWML embodied 
St. Louis’s racial politics by attempting to portray the 1955 convention’s cancellation as a 
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compromise between Lutherans of different locations and race. Free of its respectable 
veneer, however, Behnken’s compromise proved nothing more than another way for the 
synod to continue its policy of segregation and exclusion of black Lutherans. The LWML 
and Behnken pursued policies that favoured their white German-American membership 
over respect for black Lutherans. Keeping their congregations German spaces, then, was 
not a passive act free of racial implications. In preserving the synod as a German space, 
they preserved it as a white institution through supporting segregation.  
 
German Ethnicity at the Core and on the Peripheries 
 
 
 The localization of German culture remained pronounced in St. Louis and 
Waterloo County in the 1950s and 1960s. Race proved a provocative and divisive issue, 
but not their ethnic heritage. However, the German language generated greater 
controversy in Lutheran congregations throughout Ontario and Missouri than in the St. 
Louis and Waterloo County cores. Other Lutheran congregations also practiced German 
traditions, but they did not always go unchallenged. Pastors and congregations alike 
throughout Missouri and Ontario had different expectations of how their German 
ethnicity would function than their coreligionists in St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
These misunderstandings produced debates about the nature of ethnicity in the Lutheran 
church that did not occur in St. Louis and Waterloo County. This proved particularly true 
at congregations founded in the mid-twentieth century, such as those in Toronto or rural 
Missouri. 
  The German language generated significant controversy in the 1950s at Trinity 
Lutheran Church, a Missouri Synod congregation in Toronto. Originally founded as a 
German language congregation in 1935, the Missouri Synod created Trinity with the 
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intention that it would eventually switch to the English language as the congregation 
grew. Compared to other urban areas like St. Louis or Kitchener, Toronto did not have a 
large number of German Lutheran immigrants that could support Trinity as an exclusively 
German church for the foreseeable future. Synod leaders expected that Trinity, as a 
“mission church,” would inevitably grow to attract English-speaking Canadians 
regardless of their ethnic heritage. Trinity eventually switched to English during the 
Second World War when “English was forced upon” the congregation. However, “the 
original members always hoped to get back to the German again.”678 Thankfully for 
Trinity’s founding members, the number of German DPs that settled in postwar Toronto 
proved sufficient that their German-language services grew in the late 1940s. Attendance 
to the English-language services dwindled, and it initially appeared as though Trinity 
would remain a German church.  
 The arrival of Trinity’s new pastor, the Reverend Albert Pollex, in 1949 upset the 
congregation’s functional German-English framework. When Pollex arrived, the number 
of congregants who wished to speak German far outnumbered those who wanted to their 
services in English, and the number German DPs outweighed Canadian-born members. 
Regardless, Pollex followed the Missouri Synod’s original intent of creating an English 
congregation to appeal to as many Canadians in Toronto as possible. Recruiting more 
Canadians to the church would help the church achieve financial stability and transition 
away from being a “mission church” that relied on the Missouri Synod for financial 
assistance. Pollex “feared that the English group would lose out” to the German 
congregants and thus started to discourage attendance to German-language services at 
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Trinity. Pollex preached a German language service early Sunday morning and preached 
an English sermon during the more popular mid-morning time slot. His detractors 
accused Pollex of fudging the numbers and outright lying about the “poorly attended” 
German-language services.679 “This,” wrote one observer from Waterloo County, 
“offended many of the German people, not only the newcomers but especially the older 
members.”680 Initially, the aggrieved congregants complained to Leo Kostizen, the 
assistant pastor at Trinity and a recent DP. Kostizen tried to vouch for his fellow DPs, but 
Pollex refused to change his policy of trying to create an English-only congregation. After 
several disappointing confrontations, Kostizen left Trinity to preach at another 
congregation in Toronto where he offered German and Lithuanian services. Pollex 
therefore replaced him with another DP pastor, William Goegginger, to oversee Trinity’s 
German-language work.681 
 Initially, Goegginger and Pollex worked harmoniously among Trinity’s German 
and English populations. However, the German segment quickly convinced Goegginger 
to push for greater representation within Trinity. They successfully argued that Pollex 
upset the congregation’s German-English framework and that they needed to return the 
congregation to its original roots. In order to accomplish this goal, they had to empower 
the congregation’s German DPs and weaken Pollex’s power and stature as Trinity’s 
pastor. Goegginger proposed increasing the number of eligible voters by confirming more 
German DPs as full members of the congregation. In July 1952, Goegginger put forward 
the names of several German DPs for voting membership. However, these men did not 
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attend the congregational meeting and therefore could not be received and confirmed as 
voting members. The German congregants blamed Pollex for deliberately not notifying 
the DPs that they needed to be present at the meeting in order to be recognized. Privately, 
Pollex expressed concern about nominating so many German DPs for voting rights. He 
believed he needed first to “ascertain whether their beliefs were truly Lutheran.”682 Pollex 
feared that the frequency with which German DPs lobbied for language rights signified 
that they wished to use the Lutheran church solely as a means to maintain their ethnic 
traditions. He worried that the German newcomers attended church to socialize with their 
fellow DPs rather than for the purpose of worship.683 Enfranchising German DPs 
essentially gave DPs the ability to influence congregational practices. Thus, Pollex 
opposed their movement as it threatened his ability to lead Trinity towards an English-
speaking future. 
 Goegginger and the German DPs did not make the same mistake at the next 
congregational meeting in October 1952. Goegginger attended the congregational 
meeting with over twenty new German DPs eligible to become voting members at 
Trinity. Their attendance represented nothing short of a coup. Trinity’s German-Canadian 
members recognized the voting rights of the German DPs, even though Pollex did not 
approve of them for membership prior to the meeting. Bolstered by the increase in 
German voters, a spokesman from Trinity’s German-Canadian group immediately 
presented a motion requesting that the German portion of Trinity unite and separate from 
Pollex. They wished to form a Dreieinigkeitsgemeinde of their own, with Goegginger as 
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their pastor and German-language services granted the authority and frequency that 
Pollex so often denied them. Pollex and the English-speaking members of the church 
council would be dismantled and replaced with a German-speaking administration. Pollex 
and the English members of Trinity rejected the proposal. Their rejection caused around 
thirty German-speaking congregants to immediately leave the meeting in protest, 
demonstrating that they would no longer be associated with Pollex’s vision of Trinity one 
way or another.684   
 Trinity’s German members followed their protest by sending a petition asking to 
form their congregation to the Missouri Synod’s Ontario District headquarters, located in 
Waterloo County. The debacle at Trinity confused the Waterloo County pastors, who in 
contrast managed to maintain a balance between the German and English languages. The 
Reverend C.T. Wetzstein could not see how Pollex, Goegginger, and Trinity’s English 
and German speakers could not worship peacefully together. Privately, Wetzstein blamed 
Pollex for creating trouble at Trinity. Unlike their own congregations, Pollex seemed to 
be creating controversy by meddling with the German-English traditions that produced 
harmonious congregations in Waterloo County. Wetzstein personally visited Trinity in an 
effort to promote reconciliation and decrease animosity between the two sides. In his 
address, he promoted the vision of linguistic tolerance practiced by his congregation in 
Waterloo County. He told Trinity’s English congregants “that a Christian should not be 
concerned too much about language but that we should be ready to serve people in every 
language and should make it possible that all people, no matter what their language is, 
                                                        
684 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work 
Folder, The D.P. Situation in Toronto, Canada, 4 February 1953; CHI, Board for Missions in North and 
South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work Folder, Buszin to Mayer, 4 January 1953.  
 289 
might be able to hear the gospel.”685  Wetzstein created a “compromise” wherein Trinity 
had to remain as a single congregation, but had to grant its German congregants greater 
rights. They agreed to give Trinity’s German population its own treasury and to move 
German language services from the early morning to the more popular 11:00 time slot. 
Henceforth, they agreed that Pollex would preach the English language service at 9:30, 
and Goegginger would preach a German language service at 11:00.686 This decision was 
ratified at a November congregational meeting and received the congregation’s 
overwhelming support. Thanks to Goegginger’s efforts in the previous meetings, the 
voting membership of Trinity now consisted primarily of German-speaking congregants. 
Although Pollex and other English congregants voted against the motion, they were 
overwhelmed by the German voters.687 
 The compromise clearly favoured Trinity’s German congregants at the expense of 
Pollex’s authority. Pollex sought to overturn Wetzstein’s decision by appealing directly to 
the Missouri Synod’s leadership in St. Louis. He wrote to Frank Streufert, of the synod’s 
missionary board, in December 1952 sarcastically thanking him for the money the synod 
provided his congregation to work with German DPs. He rhetorically asked Streufert 
whether this money was “given to ‘take in’ the D.P’s or was it given to ‘have the D.P’s 
take over’?”688 The attitude of the synod, Pollex believed, showed that there were certain 
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“strings attached” to this money that suggested he had to obey the directions of the synod, 
even if they undermined his authority. 
 The debate over language at Trinity encompassed the entire congregation. As the 
dispute intensified, laypeople became embroiled in the controversy as well. After Pollex 
failed to accomplish his goal through the church’s traditional channels of voting and 
congregation meetings, he conspired with his wife to try to gain a favourable policy 
through other means. In December 1952, Gertrude Pollex travelled to St. Louis to utilize 
her kinship ties in an effort to gain St. Louis’s support to challenge the Erdman-Wetzstein 
decision. Officially, Gertrude visited St. Louis under the guise of visiting her ailing 
mother.689 However, her actions in St. Louis prove she visited with the intent of helping 
her husband and Trinity’s English-speaking congregants. Gertrude stayed with her 
brother, Walter Buszin, who worked as a professor at Concordia Seminary in St. Louis. 
Once in St. Louis, Gertrude began pushing her brother to convince his peers and 
colleagues among the Missouri Synod’s leadership to take greater action in the Trinity 
case. Her presence convinced Buszin to write to Frank Streufert and Mayer, two of the 
synod’s leaders in missionary work, and offer his opinion on the “embarrassing” issue 
currently occurring at Trinity. He echoed Gertrude’s stance which lamented the fact that 
Trinity’s English congregants now have “practically no jurisdiction over its own 
property” and congregation.690  Once in St. Louis, Gertrude arranged a meeting with 
Streufert and Mayer. She told the two men Pollex’s correspondence with them did not do 
enough to underscore the tensions at Trinity. She articulated the viewpoints of Trinity’s 
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English members and the importance of speaking English if the congregation had any 
hopes of growing once the influx of postwar immigrants ceased. She worried that 
speaking German would simply serve to alienate the congregation from the rest of the 
community. “We are going twenty years or more back in time if this situation continues,” 
she argued.691  
 Gertrude remained in St. Louis throughout January and continued to lobby for 
Pollex and Trinity. While her brother entered the discussion on Trinity as an interested 
third party, by mid-January he emerged fully on Pollex’s side due to Gertrude’s 
advocacy. Buszin’s correspondence with the synod’s leadership suggest that she knew 
precisely how to prompt him to advocate for Trinity’s English congregants. While in St. 
Louis, she told Buszin how Goegginger “turns up his nose at our theologians, our 
Seminary, etc.” As a theologian and professor at Concordia Seminary, such statements 
naturally provoked Buszin. He told Mayer that he wondered whether Goegginger “and his 
people have any interest in us outside of our money and subsidies.”692 
 Laymen also became increasingly involved in the debate and petitioned St. Louis 
for assistance when Pollex and Ontario District seemed to fail them. In December 1952, 
Adam Ulrich, a laymen associated with Trinity, wrote to Mayer and Streufert about his 
experiences attending a Christmas service among the DPs. On Christmas, Ulrich attended 
a service offered by Leo Kostizen at his new congregation in Toronto. Upon his arrival, 
Kostizen reportedly “stopped me and told me that I was spying on them.” He accused 
Ulrich of attending the service simply to “count how many people attend church and 
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control there (sic) money” and relay this information back to the synod. The interaction 
convinced Ulrich that, despite only wanting “peace and unity” between Kostizen and 
Pollex, Trinity’s problem began because of Kostizen’s poor attitude. He decried the DPs 
for their implicit belief that “the government supports them like it did in the Old 
Country.” In contrast, he praised the Canadian-born members of Trinity like himself for 
sacrificing their own finances to better the church.693 Mayer responded to Ulrich’s letter, 
albeit dismissively. He told Ulrich “difficulties are bound to occur” when so many 
ethnicities live in close proximity. However, he told Ulrich “among Christian people all 
difficulties should always be ironed out in a God pleasing manner” and mentioned he 
should take the issue up with Wetzstein.694 Mayer expected a “God pleasing” solution to 
Toronto’s DP problem, though evidently he did not feel obliged to find one. In this sense, 
Mayer displayed the same attitude that Wetzstein did. Both men lived and preached in St. 
Louis or Waterloo County where the German-English framework functioned smoothly 
and without controversy. Leadership in the St. Louis and Waterloo County cores both 
seemed to expect that the congregations on the periphery needed to handle their own 
disputes internally until they could balance their ethnic and national congregations just as 
well as those in the Lutheran core.  
 Language debates also occurred more frequently in Missouri due to the Missouri 
Synod’s stance on segregation. White flight in St. Louis led to the creation of several new 
congregations in St. Louis County’s suburbs and less urban areas of Missouri. This 
exodus brought German-American Lutherans into contact with other white Americans 
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who participated in white flight from St. Louis. Anglo-Americans occasionally joined 
their German-American Lutheran neighbors at newly established Lutheran churches and 
created more heterogeneous congregations than most German-American Lutherans and 
their pastors were accustomed to in St. Louis. Occasionally, Americans joined Lutheran 
churches because it was the only church in their new suburb. These Americans joined 
Lutheran churches to enjoy the social benefits of organized religion, rather than out of a 
strict loyalty to Lutheran theology or their German heritage.695 Regardless of their 
motivation, synod leaders saw their expansion to the suburbs as an opportunity to grow 
their church. They hoped that their new suburban congregations might thrive and grow, 
thereby recouping the losses their downtown congregations experienced due to white 
flight.   
 However, recent Anglo-American converts quickly came to challenge the German 
traditions and conservative theological beliefs of Missouri Synod pastors. Christ 
Memorial Lutheran Church, established in the late 1940s in southern St. Louis County, 
was one of the first of several Missouri congregations to witness a debate between its 
liberal American members and conservative German-American pastors. The congregation 
started as a church primarily composed of St. Louis residents that fled the city to the 
suburbs.696 The church was built “where there are thousands of new homes and...it is 
reasonable to expect that in due time there will be many more homes.”697 The synod’s 
decision paid off. By the early 1950s, the congregation consisted of more Anglo-
American members than its original German-American membership from St. Louis. 
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 The rise in American membership at Christ Memorial also increased tensions 
within the congregation between its “modern” congregants and “traditional” pastor. 
Members of Christ Memorial started to complain about their pastor, the Reverend Karl 
Schweder, in the early 1950s. Americans congregants, unaccustomed to the Missouri 
Synod’s strong emphasis on a literal interpretation of scripture, found Schweder 
extremely conservative. Schweder’s sermons privileged theological lessons instead of the 
more moral and socially oriented nature of other Protestant denominations. This emphasis 
provided the exact opposite of what Christ Memorial’s American congregants wanted 
from a religious service. These congregants wanted a broader discussion of Christianity 
and how it applied to their day-to-day lives with an emphasis on charity and cooperation. 
This trend was by no means isolated to Christ Memorial, as American Protestants more 
generally placed a greater emphasis on interdenominational cooperation during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The general American public started to see theological differences between 
different Protestant faiths as insignificant. Theological disputes, they believed, should not 
prevent unity and brotherhood among Christians. Essentially, Protestants saw religion as 
a “spiritual marketplace” in which they could “shop” for a church to suit their social, as 
well as religious, values. American Protestants started to see “personal happiness” and 
instruction on how to live virtuous lives as the primary reason for attending church, and 
placed less of an emphasis on theological instruction.698 Schweder, with his emphasis on 
conservative Lutheran doctrine, proved ill-equipped to meet these modern “American” 
standards. 
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 Martin Schaeffer, the pastor in charge of overseeing mission work in Missouri, 
soon started hearing complaints from these congregants as a result of Schweder’s 
preaching. Schaeffer noted that the Americans “haven’t liked his ways. They think he has 
been a little legalistic.”699 In Missouri Synod parlance, “legalistic” often referred to a 
pastor who stuck exceedingly close to a literal interpretation of the Bible, with very little 
room for creative or practical license. Although some pastors prided themselves on their 
legalistic emphasis, most Lutherans generally used this a slur. The congregation’s critique 
contained more than just a theological criticism. They attributed Schweder’s conservative 
Lutheranism as a product of his German heritage. Schaeffer noted that the congregation 
felt uncomfortable with the degree to which Schweder maintained “the traditions of our 
fathers.”700 Schaeffer tried to intervene on Schweder’s behalf, but proved unsuccessful. 
Schaeffer subsequently reassigned Schweder to a different congregation and began the 
process of looking for his replacement. Schweder was simply “too German” or “old 
fashioned” for Christ Memorial’s new American membership.  
 Unlike Schweder’s traditional theology, Christ Memorial’s congregants wanted a 
pastor that reflected their forward-thinking point of view. The congregation listed some of 
its most important qualities in their new pastor and, in doing so, reflected their 
background as a mission congregation that sought to engage in American life. They 
stressed that their replacement pastor must be “devoted to caring for and shepherding the 
souls of the congregation” and demonstrate a “consecrated and zealous” attitude “in the 
work of the Lord, capable of drawing the unchurched to God’s soul-saving grace.” They 
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wanted “a man who will be on excellent terms with the Community.”701  W.T. Rossnagel 
eventually accepted the call to minister to Christ Memorial. He did so with the knowledge 
that part of his job as pastor would be “the welding together of people with various 
church backgrounds” alongside making “people from various large St. Louis churches 
into a working team.”702 These mission churches could not function like their 
counterparts in St. Louis. They did not have a localized German culture, thereby granting 
recently converted American Lutherans more power over determining church affairs.   
 This division between pastors and their congregations occurred at other mission 
churches in areas where the population consisted primarily of Anglo-Americans. The 
synod selected Warrensburg, a smaller city in western Missouri, as another opportunity to 
build a congregation and grow the Lutheran presence in that region. They described 
Warrensburg as “a good ‘American’ town, with less people of German extraction than 
many other towns of that size.”703 While this presented the possibility for growth among 
Americans, it also inevitably brought Missouri Synod pastors into conflict with these 
Americans. The Reverend J.V. Kimpel confessed that “several members have been 
dropping derogatory remarks about the ‘old School’ among the clergy ever since” he 
arrived in Warrensburg.704 Kimpel worked hard the next month to convince his 
congregation that he could fulfill their evangelistic desires and recruit more Anglo-
American members. The following month he proudly reported recruiting three new 
families to the congregation, which did a great deal to quell the congregation’s critiques. 
“Let’s be glad for the Word of God taught purely in our midst, and for the mission work 
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being done by our pastor,” one congregant reported.705 The postwar emphasis on 
expansion and recruiting Americans undermined Kimpel’s education. Kimpel’s training 
in St. Louis emphasized that preaching German and English sermons centered on the 
Bible would be enough to satisfy his congregation. His training, however, did not account 
for preaching to a general American audience that did not value his German heritage or 
conservative Lutheranism.  
 The congregation continued to criticize Kimpel, despite some limited success 
attracting new members. Kimpel reported that he and “the elders who stick with me” 
continued to be plagued by the feeling that nothing they did pleased the American 
contingent in the congregation. “I can not satisfy some of the members here…I have 
heard too much deprecating of things ‘Missouri Synod’ and things which are good old 
Lutheran customs as mere ‘old-fashioned Germanisms’.”706 Kimpel’s fears proved well 
founded. In the following months the American contingent continued to make 
“disparaging remarks, sometimes downright wild against Mo. Syn. Clergy and 
practice.”707 These divides, along with several personality conflicts, forced Kimpel to 
leave the congregation shortly thereafter. Schaefer recognized that Warrensburg needed a 
“good, faithful pastor who is willing to work, who has tact and good judgment, who is 
cordial and sympathetic, who is willing to go out and win the unchurched for Christ and 
the congregation.” Such a pastor “ought not only find his work in Warrensburg pleasant, 
but also ought to meet with constant success.”708 Essentially, Americans in Warrensburg 
wanted a pastor who was not German. They wanted a pastor that reflected their 
                                                        
705 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 8 October 1951. 
706 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 8 October 1951. 
707 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 1, Kimpel to Schaefer, 26 November 1951. 
708 CHI, WDC, Box 14, Folder 2, Schaefer to Paul Czamanske, 3 September 1952. 
 298 
“American” background, and not someone steeped in a German and Lutheran tradition 
that seemed out of step with modern evangelical practices. Much like the infighting at 
Christ Memorial, balancing a hybrid German-American identity proved an insufficient 
model to implement in Warrensburg.  
 As the pastor in charge of expansion in Missouri, Schaeffer continually tried to 
solve congregational disputes by appeasing the synod’s new American members over 
their German pastors. This often involved hiring younger and more mission minded 
pastors at these congregations who shared their congregation’s desire to recruit 
Americans to their church. This, however, proved harder than either Schaeffer or his 
pastors realized. The Missouri Synod’s reputation as a German church acted as a barrier 
in many cases that dissuaded Americans from joining their congregations. One pastor 
wrote in frustration that his efforts to reach Americans in Missouri often failed. “We were 
on the wrong side of the tracks, known as the ‘little Dutch church’; few in numbers,” he 
believed.709 At other times the German-American members of these congregations 
challenged the time and focus their pastors placed on recruiting Americans who did not 
share their Lutheran faith or German ethnicity. The Reverend Robert Harms at Trinity 
Lutheran Church in Lebanon, Missouri, found that German-American members of his 
church council looked down on his efforts to appeal to potential American recruits. 
Harms lamented the “lack of cooperation” from the “founding fathers” of the church. He 
noticed that unchurched newcomers were practically excluded from the church unless 
they were directly related to prominent German-American families from St. Louis. “This 
point however, is gradually losing weight as new blood comes in, and when the ‘old 
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timers’ no longer can swing the votes negatively,” he continued. “Obviously the ‘old 
timers’ resent that, and have mentioned it in just about so many words.”710 
 This generation of “old timers” and their disciples guarded their authority within 
their communities and continued to prize their German ethnicity. Despite criticisms from 
new American congregants throughout Missouri, synod president John Behnken 
continued to prioritize a theologically conservative ministry steeped in their German 
culture. Behnken encouraged Missouri pastors at a 1951 gathering to increase their 
“Christ centered, Christ motivated, and winning preaching.” Behnken criticized the 
emerging generation of younger pastors so desired by American congregations for their 
more liberally minded theology in contrast to his generation’s strict emphasis on 
conservative Lutheranism. He blamed their liberal emphasis primarily on the growing 
tendency to prioritize English-speaking services within their congregations. He 
encouraged Missouri pastors to again consult classic German-language texts like Gesetz 
und Evangelium written by the synod’s founder in the nineteenth century to better 
acquaint themselves with both the German language and conservative Lutheran 
principals.711 Although new American members stressed conformity and evangelism, 
Behnken continued to prioritize the synod’s German and conservative Lutheranism within 
the St. Louis core.  
 Canada Synod pastors like John Reble and Otto Stockmann also saw themselves 
as continuing their own German and Lutheran principals for a new generation. In the late 
1950s, the German National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation offered 
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“assistance to the Canadian churches in the ministry to the immigrants.”712 The Canada 
Synod graciously declined their offer. After all, they did not need help from Germany to 
preach to German DPs when pastors like Reble and Stockmann could accomplish this 
task easily on their own. By 1957, Stockmann, a “veteran of the cross,” retired from his 
position as Trinity’s pastor and started to travel throughout Northern Ontario to preach to 
small groups of German DPs.713 Retirement similarly could not stop Reble from 
continuing to work among German-language congregations in Waterloo County. 
Although he retired from his position as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, he started 
to offer his services as a guest preacher at St. Peter’s.714  
 In contrast to the contentious relationship between Pollex and German DPs at 
Trinity, or the debates between American congregations and Missouri Synod pastors, 
minor debates did not lead to extensive congregational breakdown in Waterloo County. 
Lotz and his German-Canadian church council prevented any dissenters from mobilizing 
too much support at St. Peter’s because of their support for bilingual services. At St. 
Peter’s annual congregation meeting in 1957, one congregant voiced his concern that “a 
greater effort should be made to encourage more of the German members to make use of 
the English Services.” Lotz rejected the layman’s position and stated that the German 
immigrants had ample opportunity to partake in English life at the church if they so 
chose. He replied that “the two groups get along harmoniously and that every effort 
should be made to appraise the situation objectively.”715 A few congregants occasionally 
expressed their uncertainty over St. Peter’s willingness to continue its German-English 
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model. Peeter Vanker, a young seminary student, voiced his concern about German DPs 
at a 1967 congregation meeting. Vanker was a member of what one pastor once referred 
to as Waterloo Lutheran Seminary’s “rebellious generation” of seminary students. Vanker 
and his fellow students in the late 1960s developed a reputation for questioning the 
synod’s ethnic traditions in favour of their more “modern” and evangelical approaches to 
preaching. They particularly criticized the insistence of pastors like Lotz and Reble who 
encouraged German-language services, and instead favoured English-language services 
so that their churches would appeal to “all” Canadians.716 After listening to various 
members of St. Peter’s praise its work among German DPs, Vanker requested that the 
church council authorize a special committee in order to discern whether the church’s 
leadership “should contribute more towards the English segment of the congregation.” He 
believed that the church should place a greater emphasis on integration so that the 
Germans “might proceed unitedly (sic) in the total congregation.”717 Vanker was clearly 
an outlier at the meeting, as his motion did not receive endorsement from the 
congregation. Unlike Trinity in Toronto, Lotz’s refusal to indulge any of the 
congregation’s critiques of its German congregants cultivated an atmosphere of tolerance 
rather than doubt. By the late 1960s, the German-English framework of the congregation 
could not be seriously criticized, even by younger members of the congregation like 
Vanker. 
 St. Peter’s German-Canadian and DP members continued to balance their German 
and Canadian identities even without Lotz’s insistence. When Lotz retired from St. 
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Peter’s to assume leadership of the Canada Synod in 1961, the church council had to find 
a replacement pastor. They created a list of desirable traits that they wanted their new 
pastor to embody. At the top of the list, they stated their new pastor had to speak fluent 
German. They disqualified several promising candidates with important family lineages 
in the Canada Synod. The church council rejected Fred Little, the son of seminarian and 
St. Peter’s congregant C.H. Little, from the position even though he had completed intern 
work at St. Peter’s during his time as a seminary student. The church council cited his 
weak understanding of the German language as the primary reason they rejected him. 
Instead, the majority of the church council voted to offer the job of pastor to Otto Reble, 
John Reble’s son, who was bilingual and even completed graduate work in Germany.718 
Otto declined the position and the congregation subsequently offered the job to Henry 
Opperman in 1961.719 Because Opperman was born in Waterloo County and spoke fluent 
German, he seemed the perfect fit for St. Peter’s. Opperman accepted the call and looked 
forward to return to “the city of my birth and early life.”720 In selecting Opperman, the 
congregation ensured that they had a pastor that would continue both German and English 
traditions.  
 Opperman’s arrival at St. Peter’s coincided with an internal debate about the 
congregation’s future. St. Peter’s grew considerably in size after the end of the Second 
World War due to the arrival of so many German DPs to Kitchener’s downtown core. The 
church council frequently commented on the church’s cramped quarters as a result of the 
congregation’s steady growth. Shortly after Opperman’s arrival, the church council 
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started to consult with the congregation about whether it should construct a new larger 
church building, or perhaps split into two separate English and German-language 
congregations. In 1963, the congregation decided to remain as one single congregation 
that would keep its German heritage and customs an essential part of the church. 
Opperman ensured the congregation continued its hybrid traditions while the new church 
building moved towards completion. In June 1963 the church council unanimously voiced 
their dedication to “work harmoniously toward the ultimate objective, set out by the 
church Council, of a total congregational life and attitude” based on its shared German 
and English traditions.721  
 Congregational cohesion at St. Peter’s represented a model for other Canada 
Synod congregations to follow. By the early 1960s, the Canadian Lutheran World Relief 
(CLWR) continued to remind its congregations that they “must continue to be the back-
bone of all our efforts to make our migrants feel at home.” Reble agreed and proudly told 
his audience at St. Peter’s that their “policy and method…in this respect is well known 
throughout the Church. It is with St. Peter’s an act concerned love and not by law,” that 
they welcomed German newcomers into their church. He maintained that the German-
English model at St. Peter’s continued to be a shining example throughout the synod.722 
The new St. Peter’s church building was completed by 1967-1968 and allowed the 
congregation to continue its German-English framework in less cramped quarters. Reble 
continued to conduct German-language services for the congregation into the late 1960s, 
and even reported that attendance to his services increased now that the congregation was 
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in the new church. “We can justly and humbly be proud of our new building in the heart 
of the city,” he told the congregation in 1968.723   
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 The two decades following the Second World War did not constitute an “ethnic 
reverie” for the German Lutheran communities of St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
Gatekeepers certainly tried to eliminate the German language from each community and 
unsuccessfully attempted to break the ethnic bonds that existed between German DPs and 
local German Canadians and Americans. The localization of German culture provided a 
strong discursive tool for ethnic elites to combat pressures to integrate while pastors also 
worked to ensure that a harmonious relationship existed at the congregational level. 
Pastors continued to support and work towards maintaining hybrid congregations that 
balanced both languages through sermons, clubs, and respect for both DPs and native-
born congregants. Although congregations in rural Missouri and urban Ontario had a 
more difficult time reconciling the English and German portions of their congregations, 
ethnicity nevertheless continued to determine church life during decades previously 
thought to be a period of conformity. The importance of the Lutheran church as an ethnic 
boundary zone ensured that German Canadians and Americans earnestly welcomed 
German DPs into their congregations.  
 Cultivating a respect for their German heritage did not, however, make German 
Lutherans immune from also maintaining strong racial views. German Lutherans 
participated in both direct and indirect acts of white supremacy throughout the 1950s and 
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1960s. While the localization of German culture provided a welcome atmosphere for 
German DPs in St. Louis and Waterloo County, so did the inherent whiteness embodied 
in cultural myths in both communities. German DPs found themselves welcomed at local 
congregations because they were not only German spaces, but also white spaces. 
Gatekeepers and Lutheran leaders alike drew on histories of St. Louis and Waterloo 
County that valorized their white settler ancestors and continued to see white ethnic 
culture as compatible with Canadian and American life. The Canada Synod and KWCF 
kept their community white largely through ideological practices, whereas the Missouri 
Synod directly confronted race through policies of segregation and white flight. In St. 
Louis, keeping their churches German also meant keeping their churches white. Lutheran 
churches in the 1950s and 1960s therefore not only remained ethnic boundary zones, but 
they also remained white spaces due to the historic and contemporary cultures that upheld 
traditions of white supremacy in both communities.  
 The ethnic-racial binary so frequently used in historical examinations of whiteness 
does not match these two communities of German Lutherans. They practiced ethnic 
identities at their churches, and also maintained strong views on race that kept their 
churches simultaneously German and white spaces. German Lutherans easily maintained 
their hybrid identities while conforming to North America’s white supremacist standards. 
The ethnic reverie narrative does not fully capture the complexities of the multiple 
identities German Lutherans juggled throughout the postwar decades. While it is tempting 
to reduce them to simply one category of “German” or “American/Canadian” or “white,” 
German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County actually practiced all of these 
identities simultaneously. There was no ethnic reverie during the 1950s and 1960s in 
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these communities. Instead, ethnic diversity worked acceptably within the confines of 
white supremacy in St. Louis and Waterloo County.  
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Chapter 6: A Church of Many Nations: The Arrival of Lutheran Displaced Persons, 
1948-1965 
 Lutheran efforts to assist refugees and displaced persons included campaigns to 
admit Latvian, Estonian, and other eastern European Lutherans following the Second 
World War. Although the Missouri and Canada Synods were primarily interested in 
helping German Lutheran DPs, programs such as the Lutheran Labour Scheme also 
assisted DPs of other ethnic and national backgrounds. While the previous chapter 
examined how St. Louis and Waterloo County’s pre-existing German communities 
responded to German DPs, this chapter addresses how they engaged with Latvian, 
Estonian, and Finnish newcomers throughout the late 1940s to the mid-1960s.  
 Unlike the harmonious relationship between local Lutherans and German DPs, the 
influx of Latvians, Estonians, and Finns in Canada and Missouri Synod congregations 
directly challenged the authority of ethnic elites in St. Louis and Waterloo County. 
Initially, ethnic leaders like John Reble and John Behnken showed an interest in 
maintaining harmonious relations with the various DP groups that populated their 
congregations. Incorporating Latvian, Estonian, and other DPs into their congregations 
would help ethnic elites grow their churches and increase their influence in the Lutheran 
community. However, newly arrived DP pastors did not passively accept their role as 
subordinates within the synod. Rather, they sought to exert their influence and become 
ethnic elites within their own DP communities. Latvian DPs, and their self-proclaimed 
leader Alfred Skrodelis in particular, frequently challenged synod leaders by organizing 
Latvian congregations and synods independent of the Missouri and Canada Synods. 
Latvians wished to speak their own language at church and tried to maintain a political 
connection to the Latvian state. Finnish DPs similarly tried to form their own 
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congregations where they would not have to attend German or English services. They 
tried to obtain pastors from Finland to preach to their congregants rather than relying on 
those provided by the Missouri and Canada Synods. German-Canadian and German-
American pastors responded by limiting the influence of DP pastors and undermining 
their efforts to form independent congregations. They saw little need for DPs to form 
their own congregations when they could attend German or English services at 
established congregations.  
 This chapter argues that competing notions of ethnicity led local ethnic elites and 
DPs to disagree over how to best incorporate DPs into the church. DPs articulated an 
ethnicity firmly rooted in citizenship or nationality, alongside allegiance to their former 
European homelands. DPs did not consider themselves “Americans” or “Canadians” like 
their German Lutheran neighbours, but rather conceptualized themselves as communities 
“in exile.” As a result, DPs tried to form their own congregations, speak their own 
language, and retain a direct political connection with their homeland in the hopes that 
they would one day return. Their desire to establish congregations rooted in their specific 
Latvian or Estonian identities represented a political decision, rather than a theological 
choice.  In contrast, German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and 
Waterloo County practiced hybrid identities that sought to balance their ethnic, religious, 
and national identities. German Lutherans justified the ethnic tradition of speaking 
German at church by citing theological and spiritual tenants that argued for the links 
between language and faith. Speaking German in church did not represent a political 
connection to Germany, nor did it suggest that they did not belong as Americans or 
Canadians. Despite their status as first or second-generation immigrants, they recognized 
St. Louis and Waterloo County as their homes. These fundamental different definitions of 
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ethnicity pitted German-Canadian and German-American pastors against recently arrived 
DPs and help explain the tensions that resulted from trying to incorporate DPs into North 
American synods.  
 The subsequent clash between German-Canadian and German-Americans and 
Lutheran DPs demonstrates the saliency and importance of ethnicity in St. Louis and 
Waterloo County following the Second World War. While American historians have 
emphasized that the 1940s and 1950s constituted an “ethnic reverie,” the efforts of Baltic 
and Scandinavian immigrants to maintain their own ethnic identities in opposition to 
synod policies demonstrates the centrality of ethnicity in North American Lutheranism 
during these decades.724 The Missouri and Canada Synods consciously maintained their 
churches as German spaces and rejected attempts to make them “Latvian” or “Estonian” 
spaces as well. Although tolerant towards their fellow Germans, the Missouri and Canada 
Synods proved more hostile hosts to those who advocated different ethnic identities than 
their own. Ethnicity continued to play an important role in Lutheran congregations in St. 
Louis and Waterloo County prior to the “ethnic revival” of the 1960s. 
 
The “New Canadian” and “DP” Problems 
 
 The Missouri and Canada Synods’ attitude towards DPs was shaped by several 
trends in postwar North American society. Demographic data suggests that Lutherans, 
like other North Americans, contributed to the “baby boom” of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Lutherans also followed the national trend of moving from rural and urban communities 
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to newly created suburbs following the end of the war.725 These broad developments in 
postwar society caused synod leaders to place a greater emphasis on what they called 
“home missions.” Although mission work typically referred to attempts to convert non-
Lutherans overseas, “home missions” placed an emphasis on converting North Americans 
to Lutheranism in their local communities and retaining existing members. Some of the 
most prominent pastors in each synod served on boards organized explicitly to deal with 
home missions. John Reble and Albert Lotz both sat on the Canada Synod’s Home 
Missions Committee (HMC). Likewise, Frank Streufert and H.A. Mayer both sat on the 
Missouri Synod’s Home Missions Board (HMB). Both the HMC and HMB became 
increasingly occupied with addressing the issue of home missions in the postwar era. 
 The population boom of the 1950s and 1960s helped prompt the interest in home 
missions in both St. Louis and Waterloo County. With the increased size of Lutheran 
families, one Canada Synod commenter noted that the synod could not afford to 
“overlook the fact that our babies constitute a mission challenge.”726 If the synods hoped 
to retain its members for the future, they needed to pay close attention to ensure that these 
children attended church. This proved difficult, however, due to the population shift from 
rural and urban areas to the suburbs where no Lutheran churches often existed. Norman 
Berner, assistant to the Canada Synod’s president, commented on this “new condition in 
our national life.” “Once upon a time Canadians stayed where they were. Families lived 
in the same house for generation after generation. Those days are gone forever,” he 
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argued. “Today, practically everybody moves two or three times in his life.”727 As a 
result, the two synods needed to ensure that these people continued to attend a Lutheran 
church after they moved. In situations where no Lutheran churches existed in the suburbs, 
the HMC and HMB attempted to conduct synod-wide fundraisers in which to build new 
churches in these areas. Finances and a congregation’s ability to be economically “self-
sufficient” became increasingly important to synod leaders and their home missions 
organizations.728 
 The new emphasis on home missions in the postwar period represented a break 
with the past for the Missouri and Canada Synods. Previously, their mission work within 
North America focused on reaching out to newly arrived German immigrants.729 
However, their attention to the suburbs led synod leaders to focus equal attention on 
recruiting “unchurched” Canadians and Americans who had no religious affiliation. 
Berner, for instance, believed that the synod should not “confine our home mission work 
to the ‘Lutherans.’ The Gospel is for all and we must minster to all that we can reach.”730 
Many new neighborhoods in North America’s urban communities did not yet have 
established churches, thereby opening up the possibility of recruiting “unchurched” 
Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-Americans into their Lutheran churches. Synod leaders 
turned their attention to the growth and future of their church, and realized that their 
ability to continue to grow depended on meeting the challenges of urban and suburban 
life.731 
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 The arrival of Lutheran DPs heightened the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ability 
to achieve their goal of postwar growth while simultaneously placing it in jeopardy. On 
one hand, the influx of DPs would theoretically increase church attendance and provide 
the two synods with more laypeople in which to help their fundraising efforts. “Each 
newcomer,” Berner commented, “is a challenge to us to preserve the Gospel in him, and 
him in the Gospel.”732 However, synod leaders had several financial and cultural concerns 
about the DPs that also challenged their ultimate goal of postwar expansion. Although 
nominally Lutheran, DPs arrived in North America with religious and cultural customs 
that differed from the Missouri and Canada Synods. These prescribed traits and qualities 
subsequently became known as the “new Canadian” or “DP problem” among synod 
leaders in Waterloo and St. Louis and placed their goal of postwar growth in jeopardy.  
 Synod leaders believed that Lutheran DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries 
had a poor record of church attendance that would ultimately hinder their plans for 
postwar growth. They believed that Finnish Lutherans, for instance, more commonly met 
in “meeting-houses” and other “homelike gatherings” to practice their religion. This 
tradition stood in contrast to their own North American emphasis of practicing their 
religion overwhelmingly in the church.733 Lutheran DPs, it seemed, did not really know 
how to “behave” as proper North American Lutherans and did not understand the 
responsibilities that went along with joining a congregation. Horace Erdman, a Missouri 
Synod pastor from Waterloo County, believed that pastors needed to explain that “church 
membership does not consist primarily in having their names recorded on the membership 
roll of a congregation.” They needed to understand that church membership meant 
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participating in “congregational activity, especially attendance at divine services.”734 
Other synod leaders took an even more pessimistic view. “The DP’s, as a rule, never 
learned to go to church regularly,” argued Frank Streufert, of the Missouri Synod’s HMB. 
“To many the church is on the same level with the social organization.”735 The casual 
attitude that DPs exhibited towards church attendance placed synod goals of 
congregational expansion in jeopardy and constituted a chief concern of the “new 
Canadian” or “DP” problem.  
 Increased immigration further complicated the push for postwar growth due to the 
perception that DPs did not contribute to the church financially. Synod leaders noted that 
Lutheran churches in Europe received state support in order to continue to function. This 
negated the need for European congregations to rely upon their congregants for 
fundraisers and acts of charity to fund their churches. DPs arrived from a context in which 
their local church made very few economic demands on them. The North American 
emphasis on charitable donations therefore surprised newcomers, and their North 
American pastors resented DPs for not giving as greatly as their native-born 
congregants.736 The reluctance of DPs to contribute to the church financially was in 
opposition to the goals of the synod leadership, which placed a great deal of importance 
on laypeople to contribute to the synod’s growth. In essence, synod leaders accused 
newly arrived DPs of bringing a “lazy Lutheranism” to North America.737 Synod leaders 
worried that they would not attend church and would not contribute to the synod 
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financially. Both qualities stood in opposition to the synod’s goals of postwar growth of 
retaining church membership and remaining financially self-sufficient. While new 
members could theoretically help fill new congregations and donate their money to the 
synod, the European background of the DPs caused synod leaders to question whether the 
arrival of so many DPs would help or hinder their goals. 
 
The Arrival of DP Pastors, 1947-1950 
 
 Although discourses surrounding the “new Canadian” or “DP” problem shaped 
the general fears and anxieties of synod leaders, they also had to confront the more 
practical challenge of ministering to such an ethnically diverse group of immigrants. The 
1947-1950 period witnessed synod leaders actively debating how best to meet their 
obligations to the DPs. Synod leaders and pastors alike had few ways to communicate to 
DPs from Baltic and Scandinavian countries. While pastors could speak German and 
English, the Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages were unknown to them. If they 
wished to interact with recent arrivals, they needed to find European-born pastors who 
could speak these other languages until the DPs learned German or English, and 
integrated into their congregations. Synods depended upon these “DP Pastors” during the 
late 1940s to help them address newly arrived DPs and recruit them to their 
congregations. 
 The two synods relied upon several DPs to work as pastors preaching to the small 
communities of immigrants that started to form throughout Ontario, Quebec, and large 
American cities in 1947. These initial pastors often had theological training from when 
they lived in Europe, but simultaneously worked secular jobs in North America as the 
 315 
Missouri and Canada Synods did not yet recognize them as properly ordained pastors. 
Adolf Gaudins, for instance, arrived in Canada in 1948 as a Latvian DP and worked 
fulltime in an Ontario hydro plant. On weekends, Gaudins travelled throughout Ontario 
and Quebec preaching to other Latvian DPs. Karl Raudsepp and Rudolf Kiviranna, two 
Lutheran pastors from Estonia, did much the same for Estonian DPs in Ontario, Quebec, 
and New York.738 These men initially worked for the Missouri and Canada Synods in the 
hopes that they would be incorporated into the synods as officially recognized ordained 
pastors.  
 Working as itinerant pastors was not a financially viable long-term situation for 
these men.739 As a result of their meager wages, the first wave of immigrant pastors 
became some of the early advocates for ministering to DPs within the synods. They wrote 
to synod leaders extolling their own personal virtues and how their services as full-time 
ordained ministers might benefit the two synods. Members of the Canada Synod’s HMC 
and the Missouri Synod’s HMB needed to be convinced that the DP pastors could become 
full members of their synods. Fears about the “DP problem” ensured synod officials did 
not necessarily trust them to share the same goals, and saw little use for the Estonian or 
Latvian languages in their German-English church. DP pastors therefore specifically 
emphasized their European heritage and fluency in several different languages as positive 
attributes. Kiviranna told synod leaders that “the Estonian language is closely akin to the 
Finnish, and many [Estonian] pastors could be used to do missionary work among 
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unchurched Finns” as well as Estonian DPs.740 Oskar Puhm, another Estonian DP pastor, 
petitioned the HMB to hire Estonian pastors on the basis that “the same pastor could 
preach to the Finns as well…and there are many Estonian pastors who would be able to 
serve in different languages.”741 They encouraged synod leaders to conduct missionary 
work among the DPs in an effort to elevate their own status as fully recognized and 
ordained pastors within the Missouri and Canada Synods. In doing so, they tried to 
demonstrate how their unique skills could help the church meet its postwar goal of 
expanding home missions. 
 Synod leaders, however, had a difficult time imagining DP pastors as equal 
members of their communities. They did not conform to their linguistic traditions, nor 
were DPs easily integrated into St. Louis and Waterloo County’s localized German 
culture. The issue of language sat at the crux of synod leaders’ concerns. Latvian and 
Estonian immigrants had varying degrees of competency in conversational German or 
English, but they rarely had the fluency in these languages to preach to a German or 
English congregation. While their Estonian or Latvian language skills might be useful in 
“DP work,” synod leaders could not envision these pastors preaching to their English and 
German congregations. This, after all, was the synod’s “real” daily work and an ability to 
speak English remained instrumental to their plans to reach unchurched North Americans. 
While Kiviranna and Puhm envisioned conducting a broad range of missionary activity 
among Baltic and Scandinavian Lutherans, the synod officials struggled to see a place for 
DP work in their German-English synods. In fact, pastors conceptualized work in the 
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Latvian, Estonian, and Finnish languages to be European, not North American, work. 
Streufert believed their poor English-language skills made them unsuitable for work in 
the United States. He believed that they should instead focus their efforts on helping 
impoverished Lutherans in Europe recover from the war’s devastation. DP pastors, he 
stated, should “be advised not to forsake their homeland at a time when their own country 
and their own people are so desperately in need of faithful pastors” instead of trying to 
find work in North America.742 They did not see a future for these pastors in their synods 
until they learned enough German or English to preach services regularly. Synod leaders 
found it difficult to advocate for permanent employment for pastors that did not speak 
fluent English and German. New arrivals needed to demonstrate that they could become a 
part of the synod, as well as performing DP work.  
 Synod leaders instead believed that Estonian and Latvian pastors should have 
minor roles within the synod that rarely included missionary work. When a Latvian pastor 
wrote to the Missouri Synod looking for work, Lawrence Meyer replied that the only job 
he could possibly secure for him was to work at the synod’s radio station in St. Louis 
translating English scripts into European languages for broadcast overseas. Meyer hoped 
that he could find “some niche” for the DP pastor to work in.743 DP pastors tried to 
dissuade men like Streufert and Meyer from thinking along the synod’s German-English 
model, albeit unsuccessfully. Kiviranna, for instance, reminded synod leaders that he 
preached to Estonians “in many places on this continent” and that the synod conducted 
mission work among “American Estonians” for the last fifty years. “It is natural,” 
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Kiviranna concluded, “that we look at this problem as a problem of our Synod.”744 As 
they did not participate in the English or German life of the synod, the leadership 
relegated them to “niche” work rather an authoritative place within the synod.  
 DP Pastors did, however, employ several effective strategies in order to gain some 
limited financial and moral support for their work. Most notably, they gained support 
when they exploited the HMC and HMB’s anxieties about postwar growth and 
competition with other religious bodies. Specifically, both synods resented the frequent 
attempts made by other Protestant religions to recruit Lutheran DPs to their churches 
instead of directing them to Lutheran churches. One Missouri Synod pastor expressed 
disdain for the tactics of the “the United and Anglican church(es)” for using “teas, dances, 
folk festivals” to lure Lutheran DPs into their congregations. “We must continue to be 
concerned about the soul and the salvation of these people,” he believed.745 Albert Jacobi, 
a pastor from Kitchener, noted that these DPs should be members of the Canada Synod, 
because they were fellow Lutherans. “But when [DPs] come to Toronto,” Jacobi 
observed, they “find ULCA Lutheranism playing second fiddle to another Church.”746 DP 
pastors used knowledge of religious competition between the Protestant churches to their 
advantage. Kiviranna told Streufert that if he granted “the funds for calling [Estonian] 
pastors” he could guarantee that “the Estonian Lutherans will not be split among various 
Lutheran bodies in this country, but become members in our Synod.”747 Puhm also played 
on the HMB’s same fears for financial gain. He requested five hundred dollars from 
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Streufert in order to help sponsor more Estonian DPs to North America, noting that it 
would be “very good propaganda and would draw thousands to our Synod.”748 In 1949, 
Gaudins and Raudsepp successfully used this fear to become recognized as fulltime 
pastors in the Canada Synod. The two men sent the Canada Synod HMC field reports that 
emphasized the Missouri Synod’s activity among Toronto’s Latvian population. They 
described how the Missouri Synod recently hired a Latvian DP pastor as a fulltime pastor 
to preach to the city’s Latvians.749 The HMC worried that they were falling behind the 
Missouri Synod in reaching DPs in Toronto and hired Gaudins and Raudsepp as a 
result.750 
 Hiring Gaudins and Raudsepp marked an important first step in the Canada 
Synod’s attempt to solve the DP problem. Gaudins and Raudsepp benefited from the 
HMC’s concern that the Missouri Synod had greater success in reaching DPs than the 
Canada Synod. In an effort to make their synod seem more attractive than Missouri, the 
HMC drafted a resolution to allow DPs to form their own congregations and allow DP 
pastors such as Gaudins and Raudsepp to preach services in Latvian and Estonian. In 
February 1949, the HMC met with the Board of American Missions (BAM), the 
committee responsible for overseeing mission work in the United Lutheran Church of 
America, of which the Canada Synod was a member. Reble and Lotz attempted to 
convince Karl Henry, the BAM representative, that their model of DP autonomy should 
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receive BAM support. If they adopted a more restrictive approach, they believed, the 
Canada Synod risked losing DPs to other churches.751 While sympathetic to the religious 
competition over DPs, Henry disagreed with the Canada Synod’s approach. Henry and 
BAM believed that successfully integrating DPs into the traditions of North American 
Lutheranism would be the best way to ensure that they retained DP membership. 
Allowing DPs to form their own congregations, Henry believed, would only foster their 
less desirable traits such as not attending church or donating to the church financially.752  
Thus, Henry vetoed the HMC’s desire to let the DPs form their own congregations. While 
he agreed that DPs could initially receive religious services in their own language, he did 
so with the understanding that the DPs would be “absorbed into local congregations” that 
would eventually facilitate their assimilation into North American society.753 
 Nevertheless, the HMC did manage to gain BAM financing to hire Gaudins and 
Raudsepp as fulltime pastors. The conditions of their employment, however, reflected 
BAM’s emphasis on integration into the synod’s existing German and English practices. 
Henry approved funding for the DP pastors only on the condition that they complete a 
six-month internship with Canada Synod pastors to learn North American Lutheran 
customs.754 These pastors had very little say in the matter. Raudsepp consented to the six-
month “apprenticeship,” but requested he get to spend it in Montreal where he currently 
lived, rather than relocating to Toronto. Henry ignored Raudsepp’s subsequent protests to 
remain in Montreal and informed him that he needed to live in Toronto if he wished to 
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continue to work for BAM.755 Raudsepp had little choice but to agree. Henry later 
assigned all incoming DP pastors to German-Canadian pastors living in Toronto, 
Montreal, Kitchener, or Hamilton. These cities in Ontario and Quebec absorbed the bulk 
of central Canada’s DPs and therefore acted as appropriate training grounds for the 
incoming DP pastors.  
 The Missouri Synod’s leadership remained equally skeptical that the incoming 
pastors could acclimatize to their North American Lutheran traditions. The Missouri 
Synod’s adherence to conservative Lutheranism ensured that they shared even less 
common ground with these pastors than BAM and the Canada Synod. Consequently, the 
HMB decided that all Estonian and Latvian pastors needed proper mentorship and 
training before they could assume the full responsibilities and respect of preaching in the 
Missouri Synod. Generally, HMB members suggested that recent immigrants enhance 
their theological training at the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis before preaching in the 
Missouri Synod. Yet even this did not guarantee full acceptance into the synod. In 1950, 
for example, Streufert received notice from a Latvian DP pastor who wished to join the 
synod. After other pastors pushed him to clarify his doctrinal position, it became clear 
that he actually did not hold the same theological positions as the Missouri Synod. 
Streufert was unsurprised. “We cannot be too careful with many of the D.P.’s that came 
to the shores of our country,” he concluded.756  
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 Although synod officials monitored their theological convictions, language 
remained the most difficult barrier for the DP pastors to overcome. Pastors could 
therefore gain “a great advantage” with men like Streufert if they had some knowledge of 
English or German.757 In 1950, an Estonian pastor, Mihkel Soovik, neared graduation 
from the Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, prompting Streufert to begin to consider a 
placement for him within the synod. One of Soovik’s mentors vouched for his 
employment in the synod by telling Streufert that he “speaks English quite well and 
German very well.”758 These qualifications ensured that Streufert and the HMB took his 
candidacy and future within the synod seriously. Yet Soovik still faced suspicion over his 
qualifications due to his status as an Estonian DP. One pastor commented that Soovik 
needed to be discouraged from serving “his own people” now that he graduated. He 
believed that Soovik should serve as an assistant pastor in a congregation that consisted 
mainly of German Americans with a small Estonian population. Soovik could use his 
German language skills while ensuring the Estonians could “be assimilated into said 
congregation.”759 Streufert agreed with this assessment. He stated that “the sooner the 
foreign language groups are assimilated into our American way of life…the better it will 
be for them and their children.”760 Although Soovik’s willingness to preach in German 
and English helped guarantee his employment in the synod, it did not exempt him from 
becoming the target of the HMB’s fears about the DP problem. 
 Such instances highlight the ways synod leaders privileged their German ethnicity 
over the other European ethnicities practiced by the DPs. The localized German culture 
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embedded into most congregations did not include welcoming other ethnic identities into 
their congregations. Soovik’s mentor, for instance, noted that immigrants should be 
encouraged to adjust to their new congregations “despite their nostalgic longing for things 
Estonian and Latvian.”761 The irony of this statement escaped Streufert and the other 
synod leaders. While the Missouri Synod’s German-American leadership portrayed DPs 
wishing to speak their native tongue as “nostalgic,” they saw their own tradition of 
speaking German as continually relevant. Since the synod maintained its German 
language services since its inception in the nineteenth century, they viewed the continued 
relevance and utilitarian use of the German language in ways that they did not understand 
the European languages of the DPs. Synod leaders spoke German because it was an 
integral part of their Lutheranism. Speaking Latvian or Estonian, on the other hand, did 
not have the same spiritual necessity. As a result, it appeared that DP pastors encouraged 
speaking their own languages for nationalistic reasons rather than spiritual ones. While 
the Lutheran church as an ethnic boundary zone benefitted German DPs and their 
German-Canadian and German-American membership, it inevitably led to the 
marginalization of the Baltic DPs. 
 Synod leaders pursued a policy of assimilation when confronted with large 
numbers of Lutheran DPs. In November 1948, approximately ninety Latvian DPs arrived 
in Tate County, Mississippi, to work in the area’s cotton farms. The large number of 
Latvians in a single concentrated area meant that the Missouri Synod could, theoretically, 
undertake efforts to organize a congregation in the area. Yet the Latvian background of 
these DPs caused considerable hesitancy among synod officials. Aside from expressing 
concern for their material wellbeing, synod leaders believed that “the foremost problem” 
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in missionary work  “seems to be how these foreigners can be served with the Word of 
God.” Streufert noted sadly that the synod had “no pastors able to speak the Latvian 
language.” As a result, he believed “we cannot do anything about this situation.” He 
encouraged nearby German-English congregations “to get in touch with [the Latvians] 
and do the best they can,” but noted that they would have no official help from the 
Missouri Synod.762 As the HMB did not believe the Latvians spoke English or German, 
they did not see a place for them within the Missouri Synod.   
 The Missouri Synod revised their initial stance on what became colloquially 
known as the “Mississippi Latvians” in the summer of 1949. By June, the Missouri 
Synod’s leadership realized that none of their pastors made any efforts to address the 
needs of the Mississippi Latvians. Yet Latvian DPs continued to arrive to Tate County in 
great numbers. In fact, the number of Latvian DPs living in northern Mississippi swelled 
from ninety to nearly nine hundred in the span of several months. Mayer visited northern 
Mississippi throughout the summer of 1949 in order to assess the situation. Synod 
members noted two things throughout these visits that made them advocate for greater 
mission work among the Mississippi Latvians. First, contact with the Mississippi Latvians 
made synod officials aware that members of other religious bodies had visited the area in 
the previous months. Mayer discovered that a pastor from a rival Lutheran synod made 
several visits to the Latvians, as did Baptist and Presbyterian officials. Mayer learned that 
“two of the Latvian families in that area are Baptists and told us that there was no need 
for our Church to come in. The Presbyterian pastor in Senatobia is planning to visit all of 
the homes and offer his service.” He concluded that “some definite action should be taken 
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regarding serving these people lest they become a prey of the various sectarians about 
them...Unless all of these people are to be lost to the Lutheran Church, something must be 
done for them now.”763 Second, these visits made the Missouri Synod realize that the 
language barrier between the synod and Latvian DPs was not as wide as previously 
assumed. Synod officials were surprised to discover that nearly all of the Mississippi 
Latvians spoke German. This significantly increased the feasibility of providing them 
with a pastor. One visitor commented that any of the synod’s “German speaking pastors 
can go into that field and start to serve these neglected people” now that the two groups 
shared a common knowledge of German.764 Only through appealing to the synod’s ethnic 
culture could DPs hope to receive attention from the Missouri Synod. 
 
The Skrodelis Controversy, 1949-1950 
 
 The growing number of DP pastors in the late summer and early fall of 1949 
shifted discussion of the DP problem from abstract to reality. Waterloo County pastors 
such as Reble and Lotz maintained their belief that the spiritual care of DPs needed to be 
understood as the most important issue when discussing immigration. They believed 
certain linguistic and cultural concessions should be made to the DPs in order to prevent 
them from joining the Missouri Synod or other Protestant bodies. While not an ideal 
situation, these concessions would allow ethnic elites like Reble to maintain their control 
over the DPs and increase the size of the Lutheran church. The DP pastors shared many 
of these same goals, and therefore maintained a pragmatic alliance with Reble and Lotz in 
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these early years. However, BAM officials and pastors outside of Waterloo County did 
not always hold the same sympathetic approaches as Reble and Lotz. Local disputes in 
cities such Hamilton and Toronto inevitably involved the Canada Synod’s leadership in 
Waterloo County as Lutherans looked to them to help mediate their disagreements. 
Congregational arguments typically focused on clashes between DPs intent on 
maintaining their ethnic identities and the German-Canadian pastors who hoped they 
would adopt the German-English culture of their church. These disputes forced Reble and 
Lotz to realize that the DP pastors they previously championed conceptualized their 
ethnicity as a secular and nationalistic identity that contradicted their own ethnicity. By 
the end of 1950, early advocates for DP pastors came to favour BAM’s more hardline 
integrationist approach. The “Skrodelis controversy” of 1949-1950 represents both a 
concrete example of the DP problem as well as demonstrating the ways in which German-
Canadian Lutherans in Waterloo County conceptualized ethnicity differently than the 
recently arrived DPs.  
 Alfred Skrodelis, a Latvian DP pastor, arrived in Canada in September 1949. Prior 
to his arrival, Skrodelis ministered to a Lutheran congregation in Latvia before fleeing the 
country from Soviet persecution in 1944. He and his family fled to Marbug, Germany, 
where he spent the next several years acting as a pastor for other Latvian refugees who 
fled to Germany.765 Skrodelis was one of the first DP pastors to be accepted into the 
Canada Synod under the condition that he complete BAM’s mandated six-month 
internship program at a Canada Synod congregation. In the fall of 1949, BAM assigned 
Skrodelis to St. Paul’s Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hamilton, Ontario, because of the 
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congregation’s growing Latvian population. The German language played a less 
important role at St. Paul’s than it did in congregations in Waterloo County. The 
congregation mostly spoke English by the 1940s and its membership roll shows a greater 
heterogeneity of German, Scottish, and English members than the predominantly German 
membership of Waterloo County congregations. The Reverend Fred Mueller, the pastor at 
St. Paul’s, similarly had greater involvement with secular and Anglo-Canadian groups 
and charities in Hamilton than his contemporaries in Waterloo County.766 Influenced by 
these secular connections, Mueller initially embraced the idea that he should help 
Skrodelis and his Latvian followers integrate with greater fervor than Reble, Lotz, and the 
other Waterloo County pastors.767 Prior to Skrodelis’s arrival, BAM officials made it 
clear to Mueller that the goal of his mentorship was to “absorb” Skrodelis and the Latvian 
DPs into the North American church structure and society. “We want [Skrodelis] to be 
impressed, however, with the importance of looking forward not to the establishment of a 
Latvian church,” they told Mueller, “but to their integration into a non-national church 
like yours. His chief purpose should be to minister the Gospel to the people in the way 
they best can be reached with the idea of fitting them for the church life of their new 
land.”768 They stressed that Skrodelis should communicate in English whenever possible 
and learn “our principles and methods of exercising stewardship so that he will see how 
churches attain and maintain self support.” BAM wanted the DPs to realize that they 
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could not rely on financial support from the state as they did in Europe. If DPs and their 
pastors wanted to practice their religion, they needed to do so by financing themselves.769  
 Skrodelis, however, did not quietly conform to Mueller and BAM’s expectations. 
Rather than encouraging the assimilation of Latvian DPs in Hamilton, Skrodelis actively 
worked towards creating an infrastructure that would allow their Latvian ethnicities to 
thrive. Skrodelis made very little effort to encourage St. Paul’s Latvian DPs to integrate 
into the congregation. Instead, Skrodelis began to canvass throughout Hamilton to 
encourage Latvian DPs to attend St. Paul’s. He visited other churches in Hamilton and 
told their Latvian DPs that they should start to attend St. Paul’s where he would preach to 
them in Latvian.770 Skrodelis regularly preached in Latvian and even requested that the 
congregation offer a Latvian-language Sunday School in which to educate the 
congregation’s youth. Mueller interpreted Skrodelis’s actions as an attempt to operate 
within BAM’s restrictive framework by de facto organizing a Latvian congregation 
within St. Paul’s. Skrodelis stated as much in December 1949. He believed that the 
Latvian DPs should continue to worship at St. Paul’s, but only if they received greater 
rights within the congregation.771 Skrodelis’s insistence on implementing Latvian-
language services at St. Paul’s challenged BAM and Mueller’s authority. He essentially 
sought to replicate Latvian and European traditions and languages when BAM stressed 
complete integration into the German-English framework at St. Paul’s. In doing so, 
Skrodelis made a bid at becoming an ethnic elite in the Latvian DP community at the 
expense of Mueller’s leadership. 
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 While Reble sympathetically tried to moderate Skrodelis’s behaviour in Hamilton, 
Mueller and BAM saw Skrodelis as the embodiment of their fears about DP pastors. 
Mueller “stated that the work was not progressing as it should…Skrodelis insists on a 
Latvian Sunday School, which we are against.”772 Mueller believed that Skrodelis was an 
“extreme nationalist” who continued to remind the Latvian DPs about their homeland 
rather than encouraging their integration into Canadian life.773 Skrodelis rejected 
Mueller’s attempt to “re-educate” him and viewed his assimilationist policies as an 
“insult” to both himself and St. Paul’s Latvian DP congregants.774 According to Skrodelis 
and his congregants, Mueller and BAM members acted as though they wanted him “to 
give up everything Latvian.”775 Mueller’s hostility prompted Skrodelis to inquire 
skeptically as to whether the Canada Synod’s goal was actually to serve the religious 
needs of the Latvian DPs, or whether the synod wanted to simply recruit enough DPs to 
“pay the church tax.”776 Skrodelis warned Reble that this attitude showed the Canada 
Synod worked “against them” and that “the Canadian church will remain strange to many 
of them” if the synod did not “take more into consideration the wants of the Latvian 
souls.”777 Mueller worried that Skrodelis’s passionate “nationalism” for the Latvian cause 
would slowly weaken his grip on the congregation. He confided to Reble that “soon, if 
not already, we have more Latvian members belonging to the congregation” than St. 
Paul’s Canadian-born populace.778 Accustomed to maintaining complete control of his 
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congregation, Mueller recognized that Skrodelis jeopardized his status as a pastor and 
ethnic elite.  
 The tensions between Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s congregants became so 
contentious that Mueller called an emergency meeting to discuss how to solve their  
“Latvian problem” in April 1950. Mueller proposed that the congregation vote on 
whether the Latvians should form a “separate and independent Latvian congregation in 
Hamilton” or “stay in St. Paul’s congregation,” and continue as a single congregation. 
Mueller intended the vote to be somewhat rhetorical. By putting this question to a 
democratic vote, Mueller hoped to gain the authority to stop Skrodelis’s constant 
lobbying for a separate congregation. In order to ensure the congregation overwhelmingly 
voted to “remain,” Mueller placed strict regulations on which Latvian members of the 
congregation could vote. He decided that only the Latvians who attended services 
regularly and made financial donations to the congregation could vote at the meeting.779 
Skrodelis rejected such an obvious ploy to disenfranchise the majority of St. Paul’s 
Latvian members. Skrodelis pointed out that Mueller knew many of the Latvian DPs had 
sporadic church attendance and did not make financial contributions due to their refugee 
status.780 The strict regulations Mueller placed on voting convinced Skrodelis that the 
only way to ensure the Canada Synod would respect Latvian DPs was to “found real 
Latvian congregations” where Latvians could receive services in their mother tongue. 
“Nobody here asks for our opinion,” Skrodelis stated.781 He told both the HMC and his 
Latvian followers alike that he “shall not be neutral any more” and that he planned on 
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uniting the Latvians in Hamilton into a single congregation. This, he hoped, would help 
them “defend against the undeserved offenses” that Mueller and his policies created.782 
 Mueller subsequently mailed out voting cards to just over three hundred Latvian 
DPs associated with St. Paul’s. Skrodelis urged the Latvians not to fill out these voting 
cards in an effort to arrange a larger meeting where they could debate the issue of 
congregational autonomy. Regardless, out of the three hundred Latvians who received 
voting cards, approximately half replied. Out of those that replied, one hundred and 
twenty voted to stay with St. Paul’s. Mueller interpreted the results as a clear indication 
the Latvian DPs wished to remain with St. Paul’s, while Skrodelis was quick to point out 
that those who abstained from voting did so out of his own urging. Skrodelis also 
believed that the vote did not fully represent Latvian feeling in Hamilton. He argued that 
the voting cards should also have been mailed to Latvian members of the Missouri Synod, 
for they would likely join an independent Latvian congregation associated with the 
Canada Synod if one were to form. Thus, Skrodelis viewed Mueller’s victory as 
illegitimate.783 Skrodelis accused Mueller of trying to “swallow” the Latvian DPs into St. 
Paul’s rather than letting them form their own congregation. At the height of the 
controversy, Skrodelis went so far as to criticize the Canada Synod for acting “intolerant 
against the national groups” of Europe.784 Skrodelis’s decision to protest the vote ensured 
ethnicity and language remained a contentious issue at St. Paul’s, despite Mueller’s best 
efforts. 
  On 30 June 1950, Reble and Lotz travelled from Waterloo County to Hamilton to 
meet with the Latvians associated with St. Paul’s. Prior to attending the meeting, BAM 
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officials told the HMC that they should continue to discourage DPs from forming their 
own congregations. After all, “the D.P.’s are not in exile, but are resettled from exile” and 
therefore should not maintain their own national churches.785 Approximately fifty 
Latvians attended the meeting and listened to Reble explain to them why “the best plan 
for St. Paul’s, Hamilton under present conditions, is, for the new Canadians holding 
membership in St. Paul’s to remain members there.”786 Reble explained to the Latvian 
DPs “the full importance and financial responsibility” of establishing their own 
congregation in order to persuade them to remain at St. Paul’s.787 Skrodelis attended the 
meeting and continued to threaten to form a separate congregation, despite Reble’s 
advice. He claimed that he controlled a “Latvian Association” that was prepared to form a 
separate Latvian congregation in Hamilton. This proved false, however, as the so-called 
“Latvian Association” consisted of Latvian DPs of various religious backgrounds that had 
no interest getting involved in a strictly Lutheran matter. After Skrodelis’s outburst, 
Mueller and St. Paul’s church council declared that they wanted “no further dealings” 
with him and informed him that he had “no status whatsoever as far as the affairs of St. 
Paul’s Lutheran Church are concerned.”788 The HMC responded by transferring Skrodelis 
to Montreal to work among the city’s Latvians, and called a young Latvian DP pastor 
from Kitchener to work among the Latvians in Hamilton.789 
 The June meeting further soured relations between the Skrodelis-Latvian and 
Mueller-Canada Synod factions. Previously, Skrodelis believed that only Mueller and St. 
Paul’s church council wished to assimilate the Latvians. After Reble’s intervention, 
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however, he started to see Reble and the HMC as agents of assimilation as well. In a letter 
following the meeting, he accused Reble of trying “to take away at once everything 
latvian (sic), to deny it…I get the impression that you and the HMC would by any means 
achieve” Latvian assimilation at St. Paul’s.790 Reble left the meeting disillusioned with 
the whole “Latvian problem” as well. He confided to BAM officials that he believed 
“sooner or later separate congregations in Hamilton, Toronto and Montreal will be the 
best solution. They simply refuse to lose their identity. And we cannot force a group of 
400, 500 and even 800 into assimilation.”791 Reble’s exasperated response marked a 
decided shift from his earlier accommodating attitudes towards the DPs. The controversy 
over Skrodelis demonstrated to Reble that the Latvians at St. Paul’s continued to privilege 
their Latvian identity over their shared identity as Lutherans. By continuing to advocate 
for services based in the Latvian language, Skrodelis proved to the Canada Synod that his 
primary interest was preserving a Latvian identity at the expense of Lutheran unity.   
 Reble’s concerns proved correct. Latvian DPs continued to advocate for their own 
congregation throughout 1950, even though the HMC relocated Skrodelis to a 
congregation in Montreal. One Latvian DP wrote to Reble in order to demonstrate that the 
controversy at St. Paul’s was “not a personal quarrel between two Lutheran Pastors in 
Hamilton.” Instead, it was a fundamental misunderstanding between the Latvian DPs and 
members of the Canada Synod. He explained that Latvians did not “belong to the 
category of ordinary emigrants” but needed to be thought of as DPs. “An emigrant,” he 
explained” “has voluntarily left ones native country in order to go to some other land.” 
On the other hand, DPs “have either been expulsed forcibly from their country or they 
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have been forced to leave it because of war or political terror in order to save themselves 
and their families from imminent death. They have not sought for better conditions of life 
but only for temporary refuge in an alien country.”792 Thus, Mueller’s emphasis on 
integration made little sense to the Latvians who still conceptualized themselves as living 
in “exile” rather than living in Canada permanently. Such sentiments made even less 
sense to Reble. Although a first generation immigrant as well, Reble saw himself as a 
German Canadian, and not a German immigrant living in exile. His German ethnicity 
remained an important part of his Lutheranism, and did not have the same political or 
nationalistic connotations that the Latvians placed on their language. The DP appeals to 
their former Latvian citizenship as a reason for rights within the Canada Synod held little 
weight with Reble and the HMC.  
 By September 1950, nearly two hundred Latvian members at St. Paul’s petitioned 
the HMC to establish their own congregation in Hamilton.793 Their insistence slowly but 
surely drained St. Paul’s church council of any previous resolve about remaining as a 
single congregation. Reble visited St. Paul’s in October in an effort to boost their morale 
and reaffirm his position that the Latvian DPs and St. Paul’s remain in a single 
congregation. His speech had little impact, however, and the church council voted 
unanimously in favour of letting the Latvians form their own congregation without any 
financial support from St. Paul’s.794 The Latvian DPs also succeeded in forming the 
Canadian Latvian Federation (CLF) just a few months later. They elected Skrodelis “as 
leader of the spiritual care for all the Latvians in Canada” and hoped to work with the 
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Canadian Lutheran World Relief to provide advice on Latvian immigration to Canada. 
Upon hearing this news, Reble immediately wrote to BAM to describe how “uneasy 
about the whole Latvian situation in Canada” he had become. He worried about what 
powers Skrodelis believed he had, even though the Canada Synod had yet to recognize 
the CLF in any meaningful way.795 Reble believed the creation of the council, and 
Skrodelis’s election to a place of prominence, demonstrated the level of concern Latvian 
leaders had for the DPs, as well as their intent to control how the Canada Synod managed 
them. Despite their best efforts, Skrodelis managed to position himself as an ethnic elite 
who could challenge the Canada Synod’s authority. Reble stated that Skrodelis’s 
promotion “reveals that they do not, by far, understand and comprehend the position and 
situation in which they find themselves as new Canadians. Their attitude is rather 
assuming. They need to and must be advised and directed; but whether they will accept 
advice and direction remains to be seen.” Reble agreed to take Latvian advice on 
resettling DP families, but rejected their application to join the CLWR. He noted that only 
organized church bodies could participate in the CLWR, not ethnic associations.796 While 
Reble’s initial stance in 1948 favoured creating DP congregations, he became 
increasingly disillusioned by the nationalistic attitudes of Skrodelis and the other Latvian 
DPs by the end of 1950. The “Skrodelis controversy” demonstrated to BAM and Canada 
Synod leaders alike that the Latvian DPs offered a conception of ethnicity that differed 
greatly from their own.  
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Jacobi’s Finnish Experiment  
 
 Lutheran DPs and immigrants continued to arrive in even greater numbers 
throughout the 1950s. Their numerical strength, along with precedents established by the 
Latvians at St. Paul’s, ensured that Missouri and Canada Synod leaders often conceded 
greater rights to DPs throughout the 1950s.797 Despite the growing rise of “DP 
congregations” during the 1950s, leaders in both synods still expressed concern over the 
challenges recent immigrants posed to their synods. They remained skeptical as to 
whether DPs truly practiced Lutheranism or whether they just used synod resources to 
help maintain their ethnic communities. Synod leaders accepted German DPs as they 
easily conformed to the German-English culture of their churches, but other European 
DPs proved harder to accept. Rather than try to directly force and constrain the DPs as 
they had done in cases like St. Paul’s, synod leaders considered a new solution to address 
immigrant integration. Instead of looking towards Europe or DP pastors to meet 
immigrant needs, synod leaders started to promote young Canadian and American-born 
pastors who advocated similarly hybrid conceptions of ethnicity. In doing so, they 
avoided relying too heavily on DP pastors who sought to maintain ethnic identities for 
nationalistic rather than religious reasons. Synod leaders looked to this new generation of 
pastors to help them solve the “new Canadian” and “DP problem” in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
 The Latvian victory at St. Paul’s succeeded in creating a precedent for DPs to 
argue for their own congregations moving into the 1950s. In early 1951, the Canada 
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Synod and BAM created two distinct Latvian congregations. The Latvians of St. Paul’s 
succeeded in gaining their congregation, as did the Latvian DPs in Montreal, led by 
Gaudins.798 By the spring of 1951, the HMC started receiving petitions from Latvian and 
Estonian groups in other Ontario cities petitioning for their own congregations as well. 
Raudsepp, emboldened by the Latvian victories, told synod officials that they must 
continue to let Latvian and Estonian DPs form their own congregations. Nothing, 
Raudsepp argued, could guarantee DP church attendance “except a service in [their] 
mother tongue.”799 Regardless, the Missouri and Canada Synods still expressed 
uncertainty about the rise in DP congregations and preferred DPs to instead integrate into 
their English or German churches. “While we are eager to serve these people,” Mayer 
stated, “it is not our intention to establish foreign-tongue congregations but rather to serve 
them in their own tongue until they may be integrated into our existing congregations.”800 
Yet, DP congregations enjoyed greater rights in the 1950s, however reluctantly.  
 The financial concerns surrounding the new Canadian or DP problem continued to 
shape how the Missouri and Canada Synods interacted with the new DP congregations. 
Rather than forming separate Latvian and Estonian congregations, the HMC and HMB 
tried to encourage these separate DP groups to worship together in newly purchased 
churches.801 In 1953, for instance, Mayer rejected funding for a DP congregation in 
Montreal in favour of making the various Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian DPs worship 
in a single church. In doing so, Mayer believed “your district will have a freer hand in the 
establishment of a congregation with real Canadians later on when you are ready to 
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launch upon that program.”802 After all, Mayer believed strongly that “our greatest 
opportunities, however, do not lie with the foreign element but with the real Canadians. 
We are just now beginning to make our influence felt. This is the time to become 
aggressively active.”803 Only by incorporating DPs into Canada’s English-speaking 
congregations, he argued, could the synod “build solidly for the future.”804 The HMC 
closely monitored DP activity and permitted DPs “to organize into a separate and distinct 
parish” on the condition that they did not abuse their “aid from the Canada Synod, or the 
Board.” When approving a joint Latvian-Estonian congregation in Toronto, HMC and 
BAM members made it clear that they were not responsible for “uncontrollable 
problems” such as “national, economic depression, the return of the members of the 
congregations” to Europe or other movements.805 In fact, economic uncertainty and 
mistrust was the very reason why the HMC recommended “that the two congregations be 
incorporated” into one joint Latvian-Estonian congregation.806 Synod leadership also 
maintained the right to monitor languages in which these new congregations offered 
services. They reminded the Latvian and Estonian congregations that they needed to offer 
German-language services if German DPs subsequently joined their churches.807 Thus, 
synod leaders tried to maintain some control over shaping the German-English culture of 
DP congregations, even as DPs increasingly gained more rights within each synod. 
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 The creation of new DP congregations provoked a strong backlash within each 
synod that largely lay dormant in the 1940s. Critics of DP congregations continued to 
condemn the alternative model of ethnicity that DPs practiced that seemed to place 
citizenship and nationalism above Lutheranism. Streufert, for instance wondered whether 
the DPs who requested funds from the Missouri Synod were actually concerned with 
“spiritual care” among their people. He confessed that “I fear after the ‘fish and loaves’ 
are distributed ‘the holy desire’ with the majority has vanished.”808  Skeptical pastors 
worried that DPs wanted to maintain their language for “nationalistic rather than 
spiritualistic” reasons.809 Thus, when DPs petitioned the Missouri and Canada Synods to 
form their own congregations, pastors often “tried to impress upon this delegation that we 
are not interested in their cultural aspirations nor would we be inclined to serve them 
merely as a language group, but if they were genuinely interested in establishing a 
congregation that are interested in receiving ministrations of the Word and Sacrament, 
then we would stand behind them.”810  While not directly opposed to the DPs maintaining 
ethnic identities outside of the church, these pastors worried that DPs were using the 
church to fulfill ethnic rather than spiritual aspirations. “By all means let them keep the 
national festivals of their homeland and preserve their traditions,” an editor of the Canada 
Lutheran wrote, “but let the cause of Christ come first, let the faith take precedence to 
nationalism.”811 DPs imbedded language with nationalistic meaning, and ignored the 
spiritual reasons that members of the Missouri and Canada Synods continued to speak 
German.  
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 The hostility in which some German-Canadian and German-American members 
of the synods treated DPs contributed to Latvian and Estonian pastors often feeling 
unwelcome in their new home. DP pastors that expressed interest in working within their 
ethnic group continued to face criticism from synod leaders throughout the 1950s. Upon 
graduating from Concordia Seminary, one Latvian pastor hoped that he would be sent to 
South America rather than remain in the United States. He believed “that there is little 
opportunity that he would be employed because it is our practice to integrate the other 
language groups into existing congregations.”812 Missouri’s efforts to integrate DP 
pastors into German-English work forced particularly “nationalistic” pastors to look 
outside the United States for support. Even those who continued to work within the 
synods faced close scrutiny. Reble, for instance, insisted on “fact checking” every article 
that Skrodelis attempted to publish in order to ensure that he did not continue to advocate 
for an independent Latvian church in Canada. Skrodelis took offense at such attempts to 
“censor” him and subsequently refused to publish any more articles with the Canada 
Synod until “I am looked at as a christian (sic) brother and trusted by full confidence.”813 
DP pastors could only gain the confidence of synod leaders once they showed concern for 
Lutheranism outside of their own immediate ethnic group. Erdman, for instance, 
complimented the “very good development” among two DP pastors in Toronto because 
they showed signs “that they are thinking more and more along the line of Lutheranism as 
a whole in Toronto” rather than just showing concern for their particular ethnic group.814 
                                                        
812 CHI, EUA, Box 8, Dist. Miss. Bds. Folder, Interview with Latvians in Indianapolis, 13 July 1950. 
813 An Estonian DP pastor was also subjected to this vetting process after publishing articles that advocated 
for independent Estonian congregations. See LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Hoyer to Skrodelis, 2 May 
1950; LA, ESF, Folder 50.1.2.6.7.4, Skrodelis to Hoyer, 4 May 1950. 
814 CHI, Board for Missions in North and South America Collection, Supplement 2, Box 14, DP Work 
Folder, Erdman to H.A. Mayer, 22 February 1952. 
 341 
 If Latvian and Estonian pastors could not be relied upon to advance the interests 
of the synod, synod leaders needed to find a new solution as to who would minister to 
recent immigrants. Instead of promoting the work of DP pastors who defined their 
ethnicity by attachments to their country of origin, synod leaders started to promote North 
American-born members of their synod who had other connections to Europe. Albert 
Jacobi, who succeeded Reble as the Canada Synod’s president in 1953, first proposed the 
synod to undertake a new “experiment” in DP work by altering their approach to 
ministering to Finnish Lutheran immigrants. Rather than relying exclusively upon Finnish 
itinerant pastors, Jacobi proposed that the synod continue to supply a minimal number of 
itinerant Finnish pastors while increasing their number of Canadian-born pastors. Thus, 
Finns would be exposed to both the Finnish and English languages simultaneously.815 
Few pastors in the Canada Synod, however, spoke enough Finnish for this experiment to 
be carried out with any success. The Canada Synod’s leadership therefore called upon 
young members of Finnish congregations to attend the Waterloo Lutheran Seminary to 
receive a proper Lutheran education that could allow them to return to these 
congregations as pastors.816 Canada Synod pastors rallied behind Jacobi’s approach and 
encouraged “our Finnish brethren to send some of their fine young men to our Seminary 
for training for full-time service in the Church. This is a must if the work is to survive.”817 
“Bi-lingual men,” Jacobi argued, “are our only hope” if the Canada Synod wanted to 
retain the loyalty of Finnish immigrants without inspiring the same sort of DP revolt that 
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Skrodelis started at St. Paul’s.818 Jacobi essentially hoped to apply the synod’s hybrid 
model of ethnic elites to solve the linguistic and ethnic difficulties of DP work. Promoting 
pastors with a similar conception of ethnicity, Jacobi hoped, would help DPs reconcile 
their ethnicity, nationality, and language in ways that no longer generated difficulties in 
the synod. 
 The Reverend Alex Koski’s brief career in the Canada Synod conveyed the hopes 
synod leaders placed on pastors who mimicked their own roles as ethnic elites. Koski 
conformed to the Canada Synod’s German-English model but with a Finnish, rather than 
German, perspective. Born in Michigan to Finnish parents, Koski spoke fluent English 
and Finnish. Throughout the early 1950s, Koski worked as a pastor in Timmins, Ontario, 
and fulfilled Jacobi’s “experiment” by preaching in both Finnish and English to the area’s 
Lutheran population. Unlike other DP pastors, Koski’s status as a second-generation 
immigrant ensured that he never attempted to organize a congregation outside of the 
Canada Synod’s jurisdiction. While Koski therefore seemed to successfully implement 
Jacobi’s vision for DP work, he left Timmins in 1956 to pursue work as pastor in 
Minnesota. Jacobi lamented the Canada Synod’s loss publicly. “Pastor Koski though 
always conscious of the need for a Finish (sic) ministry among the Finns of Ontario was 
not unmindful of the equally important need of an English ministry among the Canadian 
born Finns. He was a champion of the Gospel in Finnish for those whose language was 
Finnish…He believed every Church was for all Christians regardless of national 
background.”819 Jacobi went on to praise Koski as he “deplored nationalism in all its petty 
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forms.”820 Although never expressed outright, Jacobi hinted that some of Koski’s DP 
congregants resented his insistence that he conducted bilingual instead of exclusively 
Finnish sermons. “For this deep rooted conviction,” Jacobi concluded, “he was not 
always understood or accepted by the very people he was seeking to serve.”821 Unlike 
Skrodelis’s positive relationship with Latvian DPs at St. Paul’s, Koski’s adherence to the 
Canada Synod’s model of ethnicity inevitably alienated his DP congregants who wished 
to use the church for primarily national reasons.   
 Jacobi continued to favour pastors born in North America when he looked for 
Koski’s replacement. He subsequently hired John Wetzel, an American, to fill Koski’s 
vacancy. Wetzel was born and educated in the United States and could speak English, 
German, and Finnish as a result of his mixed German-Finnish heritage. Wetzel therefore 
grew-up speaking all three languages, and even discussed possibly doing graduate work 
in Helsinki, Finland, to become even more proficient in the Finnish language.822 “I 
believe you to be the kind of person we seek for the Finnish parishes,” Jacobi informed 
him. “So often we have to depend upon Finland for pastors for these fields with the result 
that little progress is realized in implementing the kind of ministry a Canadian Parish 
should have.”823 Wetzel’s fluency in both North American, German, and Finnish cultures 
made him an ideal candidate to enforce Jacobi’s model of ethnicity that emphasized the 
spiritual utility of other languages rather than the “nationalistic” reasons of the DPs.  
Jacobi firmly believed that hiring pastors who balanced their ethnicity, religion, and 
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nationality in the same manner German-Canadian pastors did would help solve the 
contentious DP problem.  
 Although Jacobi’s experiment seemed to offer a solution to the new Canadian and 
DP problem, language continued to challenge the synod’s German-English framework 
throughout the 1950s. In 1956, Irma Lehmann, the synod’s port worker in Halifax, 
realized the synod’s emphasis on speaking English and German alienated Lutheran DPs 
from other ethnic backgrounds. Upon their arrival in Halifax, Lehmann distributed 
various promotional literature to encourage Lutheran DPs to attend Canada Synod 
congregations. Part of the synod’s “welcome package” included what became 
colloquially known as the “little blue sheets.” These small leaflets, written in the German 
language, provided a list of Lutheran churches that DPs could attend. Other material 
included handbooks and welcome brochures that introduced the immigrants to Canada, 
also published exclusively in English and German. However, as immigration from Baltic 
and Scandinavian countries increased, Lehmann encountered more Lutheran DPs who did 
not speak either of these languages. Lehmann noted that some DPs “seem to object to the 
German print” on the synod’s promotional material which therefore proved useless to 
them.824 The fact that the “blue sheets” listing Lutheran congregations were printed in 
German demonstrates the synod leadership’s assumption that incoming DPs would fit 
easily into their German-English framework. Berner, now working as Jacobi’s assistant, 
skeptically agreed to print the blue sheets in English as well, but proved slightly more 
accommodating with the general promotional material. He suggested that the synod print 
the word “Welcome” in various European languages on the front, with the remainder of 
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the material in English.825 Berner’s solution was not to include more European languages, 
therefore, but to increase the number of English-language materials. German and English 
would remain the languages of the church, and immigrants were expected to select one of 
the two beyond their token welcome.  
 Synod leaders continued to monitor the linguistic habits of DPs once they entered 
their congregations. In 1959, a newly formed Finnish-language congregation in Toronto 
printed its constitution in simple colloquial Finnish. The congregation’s pastor intended to 
rewrite the constitution in formal Finnish, but encountered resistance from the synod 
leadership. Jacobi prevented the pastor from writing the constitution in formal Finnish 
due to the “danger that the real meaning of the English version is not conveyed in a 
Finnish translation.” He therefore suggested keeping the constitution as is, lest it depart 
“from the real meaning of the English” copy.826 While Jacobi therefore supported letting 
the Finnish congregation have a copy in Finnish, the synod only recognized the English 
constitution as the “final authority.”827   
 Jacobi’s model of hybridity continued to gain currency among Canada Synod 
pastors into the 1960s. In 1961, Berner noted that the numerous languages spoken by 
Canada Synod members constituted a “constant problem besetting the synod.” Yet the 
Canada Synod’s hybridity prevented critical members of the synod like Berner from fully 
condemning the DP’s insistence that they maintain their languages. Berner recognized 
that the DP desire to speak their language mirrored the Canada Synod’s “predecessors in 
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the earlier decades” as well.828 Herbert Hartig, another young pastor in Waterloo County, 
similarly recognized that many “Canadian-born” members of the synod “have come 
through situations of ethnic loneliness such as [the DPs] may be facing.”829  The 
importance synod leaders placed on speaking whatever language was necessary in order 
to promote Lutheranism ensured that even critical members of the synod like Berner 
recognized that “the synod nevertheless seeks to minister in the languages that will best 
‘preserve and extend the Gospel’ for all.”830 While pastors could sympathize with the 
tensions that accompanied speaking several languages in Canada, they ultimately 
recognized that this desire could not come at the expense of their spirituality. DPs could 
maintain an ethnic identity if they so wished, but they needed to identify themselves as 
Lutherans first and foremost. “The new Canadian,” Hartig argued, must be “properly 
welcomed into the fold…an ethnic group shall not be regarded as a ‘foreign breed!’ We 
are one by faith even when heritage and culture differ.”831 Such declarations offered an 
idealistic view of how the DPs conceptualized themselves.832 While DP congregations 
throughout the synod still fought to preserve their languages, pastors like Hartig hoped 
they would one day embrace their Lutheran faith over their ethnic culture. 
 The attachment certain DP congregations displayed towards their homelands 
continued to pose problems for the Canada Synod into the 1960s. Most notably, the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland remained active in trying to maintain a 
relationship with Finnish congregations in North America. Unlike the Latvian or Estonian 
national churches, Finnish Lutherans had a strong organizational presence in North 
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America starting in the mid-nineteenth century. Their churches and seminaries 
maintained financial, cultural, and theological connections to Finland throughout the 
resulting decades that tied their pastors and churches much more closely to Finland than 
other North American Lutheran bodies. While the Missouri Synod developed its own 
theological texts, for instance, Finnish Lutherans still looked to Finland for spiritual 
guidance.833 Consequently, Finnish DPs and church leaders from Finland alike were in a 
stronger position to protest the Canada Synod’s dominance over Lutheran affairs in 
Ontario than their Latvian or Estonian counterparts. Although the Canada Synod 
preferred to work with pastors like Wetzel who conceptualized ethnicity the same way 
they did, the Church of Finland continued to place pressure on the Canada Synod to 
accept more itinerant pastors from Finland. Finnish representatives also hoped that their 
work in Canada would result in more Finnish DP congregations affiliating with the 
Church of Finland rather than a North American Lutheran body. 
  In 1965, the leaders of the Canada Synod and the Church of Finland reached a 
tentative agreement that they hoped would clarify any ambiguities about whether Finnish 
congregations fell under the jurisdiction of the Canada Synod or the Church of Finland. 
The final agreement stated that the Church of Finland would allow Finnish congregations 
to join the Canada Synod and grant the “ecclesiastical and shepherding functions” of the 
church firmly to the Canada Synod.834 In return, however, the Canada Synod conceded 
that the Church of Finland could sponsor guest speakers and festivals, send pastors to 
work in Canada, and publish Finnish language Bibles and newsletters. Finnish pastors, 
while welcome to periodically perform Finnish-language services in Canada, could only 
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do so on the condition that pastors spend “at least two semesters of study” in North 
America and spoke English proficiently.835 Although the agreement awarded more power 
to the Finns and DPs than the Canada Synod leaders wished, it did grant them control 
over Finnish congregations in Canada Synod territory. More importantly, it allowed the 
synod’s German-English structure to continue relatively unchallenged. The stipulations of 
the 1965 agreement confined Finnish-language activities to the strictly theological, 
thereby solidifying the connection between ethnicity and religion Canada Synod leaders 
felt most comfortable with. 
 The 1965 agreement received its first real test in late 1966 at the behest of the 
Reverend Leslie Lurvey. Lurvey worked at Toronto’s Agricola Lutheran Church, a 
Finnish-language congregation composed primarily of Finnish immigrants. As Lurvey 
was born in the United States to Finnish parents, he spoke Finnish fluently and received 
training at the Finnish-language Suomi Seminary in Michigan. He practiced the Canada 
Synod’s model of ethnicity, albeit with emphasis on preserving Lutheranism’s Finnish 
instead of German traditions. In December of 1966, Lurvey informed the various synod 
leaders in Canada that he planned on sponsoring Urpo Vainio, a longtime Finnish 
itinerant pastor, to do several weeks of mission work among Finns that did not have a 
regular pastor.836  Lurvey’s proposal provoked a backlash from the Canadian Lutheran 
leadership that highlighted the tenuous nature of the 1965 agreement. Otto Olson Jr., the 
president of the Central Canada Synod, replied that he appreciated Lurvey’s “Christian 
concern” for the Finnish DPs, but believed sending an itinerant pastor would be 
“unrealistic, and that it is poor stewardship of God’s money to try to reach them with the 
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Gospel in this manner.”837 His past experience work with Finnish DPs suggested that 
itinerant pastors had very little success in organizing dispersed populations into stable 
congregations which, in his mind, should continue to be the goal of the Canada Synod’s 
work. Olson furthermore believed that many Finns in Western Canada had a strong 
knowledge of the English language, negating any need for a Finnish-speaking itinerant 
pastor. Sponsoring Vainio, he believed, would only give “the impression…that they are 
still a part of the Lutheran Church in Finland.”838 John Zimmerman, the President of the 
Western Canada Synod, concurred. He confessed that he “was somewhat perturbed and 
uncertain” about Lurvey’s proposal. Zimmerman believed that the plan seemed “slightly 
presumptuous, rather like a neighbouring pastor announcing that he is going to start 
calling in your parish.” If Vainio actually did conduct a missionary tour, Zimmerman 
promised that he would examine his report “with a critical eye and no request will go to 
the Church of Finland from our Synod for an itinerant pastor unless there is ample 
evidence of the need” for one.839 Regardless of the 1965 agreement, Canadian-born 
pastors continued to see itinerant or DP pastors as a threat to their jurisdiction and 
authority. They represented a continued link with a European homeland rather than an 
effort to identify as Lutherans alongside their Canadian brethren. 
 Lurvey responded to his colleagues’ criticism by advocating for Vainio’s work in 
the language of ethnicity that members of the Canada Synod were comfortable with. 
Lurvey readily admitted that “these people could very well be served in English.” 
However, he urged his peers to understand the situation of first generation Finnish DPs. 
“Imagine if you will the feeling of the immigrant hearing an English sermon when all his 
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life he has heard the Gospel preached in Finnish. There is a certain theological vocabulary 
that must first be learned before the message breaks through….We who have ‘the gift of 
tongues’ feel that we have something to offer these people not only basically for their 
spiritual well-being but also for their mental well-being. To speak another language is a 
gift of the Spirit, not to be regarded lightly. Its use, too, is a stewardship.”840 Like other 
Canada Synod pastors who supported German-language services as a part of their ethnic 
traditions, Lurvey reminded his peers that “our Lutheran church has made its beginnings 
in the New World in the many languages of immigrants.” “Seminaries and colleges that 
now serve millions with great blessings were begun in these languages,” he continued. “I 
cannot forget the fact that I found my Savior in a college founded by Finns. Our request 
to help the Western Finns comes in the same spirit, although in a much later setting.”841 
Just as his German-Canadian colleagues drew on their own immigrant pasts to advocate 
assisting German DPs, Lurvey drew on his own Finnish roots to help recently arrived 
Finns. A Finnish representative also attempted to qualm the Canadian Lutherans’ fears. 
He reminded all the parties involved that financing future mission work among the Finns 
would be decided by “sociological data gathered in a reliable manner” by Vainio. 
National sentiment, he promised, would not guide the relationship between Lutherans in 
Canada and Finland.842 Although the 1965 agreement gave the appearance of religious 
cooperation, ethnic animosities still strongly governed the feelings of both Canadian and 
Finnish Lutherans.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The influx of Lutheran DPs in the postwar period made it easy for Jacobi to 
recognize the Canada Synod as a “Church of Many Nations” by 1960.843 Jacobi’s 
celebratory tone, however, masked the controversies that accompanied confronting the 
DP problem. Synod leaders and pastors expected Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants to 
conform to the hybrid German-English traditions of their churches and adopt an approach 
towards their ethnic identities that mirrored their own. Yet, DPs and their pastors defied 
these expectations and staunchly advocated for greater linguistic and congregational 
rights within the Missouri and Canada Synods despite their minority status. They did not 
do so out of a desire to maintain their faith, but rather out of a political desire to remain 
associated with their European homes and an unwillingness to recognize their American 
and Canadian circumstances. The secular and nationalistic nature of their ethnic identities 
as well as their dismissive attitudes towards their new North American community 
ensured that their German-American and German-Canadian coreligionists opposed their 
desire to maintain this form of ethnicity.  
 In articulating their opposition to DP pastors like Skrodelis, members of the 
Missouri and Canada Synods simultaneously gave voice to their own conceptions of 
ethnicity. Unlike DP advocates, they saw their German ethnicity as an identity that did 
not conflict with their Canadian and American nationalities. They continued to speak 
German as a religious calling that helped them remain true to their Lutheran teachings 
and reach their synods’ German membership. Their German ethnicities did not fade 
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during the war or the postwar period, but rather continued to find expression in opposition 
to the “nationalistic” ethnic traditions of a new generation of Baltic and Scandinavian 
DPs. The contentious relationship between German-American and German-Canadian 
Lutherans and Baltic and Scandinavian DPs illustrates the enduring role ethnicity played 
in shaping the Missouri and Canada Synods in the decades following the Second World 
War. For German-American and German-Canadian Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County, the 1940s and 1950s did not represent a deterioration of their ethnic identities. 
Rather, ethnicity and language remained dominant factors in who did and did not belong 
in the Missouri and Canada Synods. 
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Chapter 7: Pioneers and Prophets: German Lutheran Participation in Cultural and 
Commemorative Events in the Postwar Era 
 Postwar immigration and relief work in Germany created avenues for the German 
Lutheran communities St. Louis and Waterloo County to mend the wounds from the 
Second World War. Cultural and commemorative events were yet another opportunity for 
German Lutheran communities to find common ground after wartime controversies. As 
historian Frances Swyripa argues, commemorative acts allowed immigrants to “explain 
and justify who they were but also to argue for their uniqueness and importance.”844 This 
chapter studies several cultural acts as yet another opportunity to examine how German 
Lutherans constructed and articulated their ethnic identities. It details several war 
memorials constructed by German Lutherans following the war, as well as the Missouri 
Synod’s centennial anniversary in 1947. Throughout these and other events, German 
Lutherans valorized their nineteenth century ancestors as symbols of their German 
ethnicity. They commemorated their ethnic past by recounting North American moments 
in history, rather than events associated with their German homeland. They did not 
commemorate nineteenth century German military victories or politicians as previous 
generations of German immigrants did, but rather engaged in commemorative activities 
that paid homage to their immigrant ancestors in North America.845 As a result, this 
chapter argues that German Lutheran commemorative acts were based on their hybrid 
German-Canadian and German-American identities. Their commemorative events 
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followed North American histories by placing an emphasis on “loyal pioneers” and their 
participation in the Second World War. Unlike their Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-
American neighbours, however, they did not participate in these events as an expression 
of mainstream Canadian and American nationalism. Their commemorative acts focused 
on specifically German and Lutheran figures in order to address wartime tensions in their 
communities and as a way to reinforce their ethnic and religious identities. Thus, German 
Lutherans engaged in commemorative activities that highlighted their hybrid identities by 
balancing distinctly ethnic and religious events within a narrative of pioneering familiar 
to most Anglo-Canadians and Anglo-Americans.  
 Whiteness informed how German Lutherans celebrated their past. As whites, 
German Lutherans could participate in broader settler colonial narratives advanced by 
Anglo-Canadians and Americans that commemorated European explorers, nineteenth 
century pioneers, and the modern nation state.846 German Canadians, for instance, 
participated in Expo 67, a national celebration that commemorated Canadian 
Confederation. Throughout the 1960s Canada Synod members capitalized on funding 
from Expo 67 to commemorate European explorers Jens Munk and Rasmus Jensen as the 
first Lutherans to touch North American soil. Members of the Missouri Synod meanwhile 
began to commemorate German Americans in Missouri that fought for the Union during 
the Civil War. These broad stories were completely inaccessible to racialized people. 
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Japanese Americans and Canadians, for instance, could not claim the title of “pioneer” or 
trace their community’s origin back to a seventeenth century European explorer. Thus, 
German Lutherans did not celebrate an ethnic culture that was anti-racist, nor did their 
cultural acts seek to address the inequalities other racial groups encountered. Their ethnic 
culture worked comfortably within the exclusionary Canadian and American nationalism 
of the postwar era due to their whiteness. 
 
Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Anti-War Sentiment 
 
 Although the immediate threats of internment and nativist discrimination ended 
with the war’s conclusion in 1945, negative perceptions of Germans as disloyal or 
unpatriotic remained. Synod leaders in particular resented the public perception that 
German Lutherans shirked their wartime duties and did not enlist in the armed forces as 
frequently as other ethnic groups.847 The wartime project of emphasizing loyalty to 
Canada and the United States did not simply fade away overnight. Missouri Synod 
president John Behnken devised one of the synod’s first postwar commemorative events 
in the summer of 1945, shortly after the United States made peace with Germany. 
Behnken devised what he called a “Peace Thankoffering” drive to fundraise money to 
celebrate the war’s end and fund the synod’s future projects. Tensions between pastors 
and congregants continued to linger after the war concluded, and Behnken hoped a large 
fundraising endeavor through the Peace Thankoffering would help heal these wounds. He 
expected that this fundraising drive would resonate with the synod’s laity, as it celebrated 
peace instead of war. Paul Koenig, president of the Western District that oversaw 
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Lutheran affairs in the state of Missouri, embraced Behnken’s plan. “We shall need much 
money for postwar work in the mission fields and for building up our educational 
institutions,” Koenig believed. He had confidence “that all congregations and members 
will leave nothing undone to complete the task” to help the synod meet its fundraising 
goals.848 In the following months, Behnken and Koenig continued to use national and 
patriotic events as a way to inspire their followers. They hoped to capitalize on the 
postwar optimism that greeted the war’s conclusion. Peace with Germany and Japan 
became yet another excuse for synod leaders to try and collect money from their 
laypeople, as well as more somber occasions like President Roosevelt’s 1945 funeral. 
They hoped these national events would inspire Lutherans across the country to 
demonstrate their cooperative spirit and raise money for the synod’s future.  
 The Peace Thankoffering campaign failed to resonate among the synod’s 
laypeople. After four years of war, congregants had little to desire to continue giving the 
synod money for patriotic reasons. The majority of pastors in St. Louis also rejected 
another fundraising drive occupying their time and resources. Without the same fear of 
internment or discrimination so pervasive during the war, pastors no longer needed to 
voice pro-government opinions and they rejected the Peace Thankoffering campaign. 
Reversing their wartime stance on Romans 13, pastors now joined their congregations in 
rebuffing the synod’s patriotic V-Day celebrations and their participation in Roosevelt’s 
funeral. Rudolph Meyer, Old Trinity’s pastor, questioned “whether such participation was 
justifiable and if so, on what grounds. Is this not a departure from Synodical tradition and 
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sound Lutheran practice?”849 Now that they had no need to stress their patriotism, Meyer 
had no qualms about protesting a Lutheran presence at what was clearly a state function. 
The Peace Thankoffering therefore failed to even meet Behnken’s modest fundraising 
goals.  
 Community leaders in the Canada Synod had greater success healing wartime 
divisions as they, unlike Behnken, addressed the ethnic identities of their congregants in 
their commemorative acts. While the majority of Lutheran churches in Waterloo County 
chose not to commemorate or reflect upon the war, congregations that felt particularly 
discriminated against during the war did erect war memorials as a way to overcome 
negative memories of ethnic discrimination. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, for 
example, faced more than the typical wartime debates over German-language services. 
The congregation faced further strife over the death of Francis Weitzel, a member of their 
congregation, during the Battle of Normandy in July 1944. Allegedly Weitzel died single 
handedly eliminating two Nazi machine-gun posts that stalled his company from 
completing their objective.850 His regiment posthumously nominated him for the Victoria 
Cross, the highest award that a Commonwealth soldier could receive for bravery on the 
battlefield. This news brought a great deal of pride to Trinity, even if it was short-lived. 
Weitzel did not receive the award, and was rejected on the grounds that there were not 
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sufficient witnesses to confirm that he had in fact completed his task alone.851 Trinity, as 
well as Weitzel’s regiment, rejected the “official record” pronounced by the British and 
Canadian military. They could not help but feel Weitzel was denied the Victoria Cross as 
a result of his German heritage, rather than any legal stipulations. They labeled Weitzel’s 
rejection a “political” decision and that “due to politics alone” Weitzel did not receive the 
Victoria Cross.852 The decision seemed to imply that the Victoria Cross, an important 
British symbol, could not be awarded to a German.  
 Trinity’s resentment and grief over Weitzel’s death prompted its pastor, the 
Reverend Otto Stockmann, to take action to try and heal the perceived slight against the 
congregation’s ethnicity. In an unprecedented display of congregational unity, an 
overwhelming majority of the congregation attended Stockmann’s funeral service for 
Weitzel. The church quickly filled and those who did not arrive early had to listen to 
Stockmann’s eulogy outside in the church parking lot.853 The service did not put the 
rumor to rest, however. In March 1945, Stockman collaborated with the church council to 
pass a resolution to erect a small memorial for Weitzel and the other two members of 
Trinity who died fighting overseas. They decided to plant three maple trees in the 
churchyard, one for each of Trinity’s soldiers killed in action, and erect a small plaque at 
their base.854 This small act, Stockmann and the church council hoped, would assuage 
some of the grief and anger the congregation felt over Weitzel’s loss. 
                                                        
851 Snowie, Bloody Buron, 92. 
852 William Powell, Oxford Heroes: Lost But Not Forgotten (n.s., 2010); “The farmhand at war: 
Remembering the greatest hero of bloody Buron,” The Record, 11 November 2010; “Veteran challenges 
nation,” Tavistock Gazette, November 2005; Snowie, 92. 
853 “Memorial Service For Cpl. Weitzel,” Tavistock Gazette, 9 August 1944.  
854 LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 4, Church Council Minutes, 19 March 1945; LA, ESF, LM20 Trinity, reel 
4, Church Council Minutes, 31 May 1948. 
 359 
 This small commemorative act helped Stockmann accomplish two contradictory 
goals. First, the memorial gave Trinity’s Anglo-Canadian neighbours no reason to suspect 
the congregation of harboring resentment towards the military or prompt suspicions of 
disloyalty. At first glance, the memorial conformed to other Anglo-Canadian 
commemorative acts through its use of Canadian maple trees and a simple marker listing 
the names of Trinity’s war dead.855 Furthermore, Stockmann and the church council 
decided to erect the memorial in the so-called “old cemetery” where the pioneers and 
founding members of the church were buried.856 Like other churches, Trinity grouped its 
headstones and burial plots by different decades, and it therefore made most sense to 
place the memorial in the 1940s section of the cemetery behind the church. By placing it 
in the “old cemetery,” however, Stockmann met his goal of appearing loyal to the Anglo-
Canadian public. Trinity’s old cemetery was located at the front of the churchyard, 
directly beside the entrance of the church, and was viewable from the road running south 
into the town core. Viewable to all who passed, the war memorial acted as a testament to 
the dedication of Trinity’s congregation during the Second World War. Trinity’s loyalty 
could not be questioned with a clear marker demonstrating men from the congregation 
served and died overseas. Any Anglo-Canadians passing by the memorial would not 
associate the memorial with ethnic grievances. 
 Second, the memorial’s placement met Stockmann’s goal of addressing his 
congregation’s ethnic grievances. Placed in the old cemetery alongside the congregation’s 
founders, Stockmann conveyed the impression that Weitzel deserved to be remembered 
along the same lines as the “pioneers” who established Trinity. Evoking similar themes to 
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the pioneer myth, Stockmann’s placement suggests he wished to address members of the 
congregation who needed to see a fellow German Lutheran acknowledged as “loyal” or as 
a “nation-builder,” after being rejected for the Victoria Cross. If the military refused to 
recognize his heroism, then Stockmann’s small act helped elevate Weitzel’s life and 
memory to a place of prestige within Trinity’s community. Just as Trinity’s “pioneering” 
founders helped establish the community, so did Weitzel through his act of loyalty by 
dying overseas. Stockmann succeeded in crafting a landscape of loyalty that therefore met 
the demands of both his congregation and the surrounding Anglo-Canadian community. It 
successfully embodied the hybrid German-Canadian framework familiar to Trinity by 
presenting a vision of their ethnicity that did not overtly challenge or oppose mainstream 
Canadian nationalism.  
 The pioneer myth continued to function as an effective way to counter Anglo-
Canadian hostility towards German Canadians that masqueraded as patriotism. Although 
the war had ended, certain Anglo-Canadians still had a negative perception of German 
Canadians due to their associations with “the enemy.” In 1956, University of Western 
Ontario professor Hartley Munro Thomas published a history of the university’s wartime 
activities. As Waterloo Lutheran Seminary and Waterloo College were both then 
affiliated with Western, Thomas inevitably included them in his history. In contrast to the 
favourable presentation of Western and its other colleges, like the Anglican Huron 
College, Thomas critiqued Waterloo College’s patriotism on the basis of their German 
ethnicity and Lutheran faith. Like Western’s other affiliates, Waterloo College 
participated in Western’s Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) program that 
allowed students to enroll in a military training program alongside their other academic 
classes during the war. Successful applicants also took military courses that would assist 
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them in obtaining officer positions within the armed forces. Thomas included a single 
chapter on the Waterloo branch of the COTC, focusing largely on its few non-Lutheran 
members. Instead of following the general accounts of heroic deeds as per the book’s 
other chapters, Thomas continually reminded readers that Waterloo College’s soldiers 
were outsiders, both at Western and in the army more broadly. He stated that “Waterloo 
officers never felt quite at home” likely due to the fact that their unit was “never 
commanded by a Lutheran.”857 Anglo-Canadians serving with Waterloo College felt 
equally out of place, he argued. According to Thomas, Anglo-Canadians soldiers reported 
being much happier once they transferred to a different unit with less Lutherans.858 
Thomas did include heroic details, but only about these Anglo-Canadian officers. He 
concluded that Waterloo College was privileged to have an “effective leader…of the most 
influential popular and scholarly of the staff: an English Anglican to represent and 
develop before the world the German Canadian patriotism of Waterloo.”859  
 Thomas’s comments made him an enemy of Waterloo College officials such as 
Carl Klinck, a professor and former director of the COTC program during the war. His 
history not only disrespected members of their community, but also demonstrated that 
their efforts to appear loyal during the war were not enough to convince skeptics like 
Thomas. Following the war, Western’s COTC officers dissolved the program and sent its 
remaining money to the various colleges to erect war memorials honouring those who 
participated in the program. Klinck used this opportunity to refute Thomas’s negative 
portrayal of Waterloo College by emphasizing German Lutheran loyalty. Klinck felt that 
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Thomas had “not done justice to the Waterloo College unit” and sought to rectify this 
through the proposed COTC memorial.860 In order to highlight Waterloo College’s 
loyalty and success, Klinck composed a long list of those he believed should be included 
on the COTC plaque. Many of Klinck’s suggestions had little to no relationship with the 
actual COTC program. Klinck included Waterloo College students who did not enlist 
with the COTC, as well as the names of several of the Canada Synod’s pastors who 
served in the armed forced as chaplains. By including a wide range of community 
members, Klinck simultaneously was able to give recognition to the many German 
Lutherans who served in the war while also “padding” the list of names to make Waterloo 
College’s achievements in the COTC program appeared greater than they actually were. 
 Western professors that formerly served in the COTC took notice of Klinck’s 
creative liberties. Western’s faculty intended the COTC memorial to pay respect to 
members of a Western organization, funded by the program’s directors, and expressed 
shock that Klinck seemed determined to use their resources to build a community 
memorial.861 Several faculty members inquired about these additional names to Ross 
Dunford, a member Waterloo College’s Board of Governors, who just so happened to be 
one of the suspicious names that appeared on the proposed memorial. Dunford rather 
ambiguously defended his name on the plaque by stating he believed he “signed up for a 
course or two” in the COTC and that he suspected several other Waterloo College 
Lutherans “joined up” under similar terms.862 Klinck subsequently admitted that he 
allowed some of the “outside people” to be included on the COTC Memorial. Through 
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including “outsiders” on the monument, Klinck tried to give voice to the “extra-ordinary 
record for efficiently and gallantry” of Waterloo College during the war effort.863 J.M. 
Clark, a member of Western’s English Department, felt little need to hide his 
disappointment. The COTC memorial, complete with small Lutheran symbols and a 
dubious list of names, proved so contrary to the original committee’s hopes that he 
wondered whether the memorial was “worth the effort of so much preparation.”864 He 
questioned whether he and other Western professors should even attend the unveiling 
ceremony of the now perhaps incorrectly titled COTC Memorial.865 Those who did attend 
the unveiling ceremony certainly did feel out of place. Klinck made the ceremony a 
public affair that involved many diverse members of Waterloo County’s German 
Lutheran community. While he invited local political officials and former COTC 
members, Klinck also made sure to invite several prominent local families whose names 
could be traced back to Waterloo County’s nineteenth-century founding. Klinck invited 
the Eby and Shantz families, two family lines that had strong associations with the 
pioneer myth because of their ancestors. Although not necessarily Lutheran, Klinck 
invited these families to further enhance the image of loyalty that Stockmann also relied 
upon at Trinity. Though the COTC Memorial began as a monument meant to honour 
Western’s wartime achievement, Klinck’s skillful maneuvering shifted the focus on the 
monument to become a Lutheran monument that paid respects to his German-Canadian 
Lutheran community. 
 Stockmann and Klinck’s commemorative events helped unify their communities 
because they directly addressed the ethnic needs of their followers. Behnken and his 
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Peace Thankoffering failed to realize that restoring unity needed to address the German 
portion of the Missouri Synod’s German-American identity. Stockmann recognized the 
necessity of relating directly to Trinity’s German ethnicity. His congregation did not 
interpret Weitzel’s rejection as a colonial Canadian slighted by the British, but rather 
because he was a “German.” It was the German portion of their hyphenated identity that 
Weitzel’s rejection disrespected and therefore any commemorative events needed to 
address the congregation’s German ethnicity. Likewise, Klinck crafted a memorial to 
provide a patriotic counter narrative to Thomas’s condescending history. Behnken’s 
fundraising plan only accounted for the Missouri Synod’s American identity, and 
completely ignored how they interpreted wartime related patriotism through an ethnic 
lens. Stockmann succeeded by recognizing, albeit through a carefully curated public 
image, his congregation’s ethnic identity whereas Behnken failed because he did not. In 
this sense, cultural and commemorative events following the war did not diminish the 
German-Canadian and German-American identity, but actually served to showcase it. 
 
Theology and Rewriting the Past 
 
 Theology inevitably shaped how German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo 
County commemorated their ethnic past in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1947, the Missouri 
Synod celebrated its centennial anniversary of its founding in 1847 by the “Saxon 
Lutheran” immigrant C.F.W. Walther. The centennial provided Behnken and other St. 
Louis Lutheran elites with a platform to revisit their synod’s history and offer new 
directions on its future. They used the anniversary as a way to address the recent 
theological divisions that the war created over issues such as Romans 13 and the divisions 
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between liberal and conservative Lutherans within the synod. As Behnken and other 
synod leaders supported a conservative Lutheran doctrine, they used the centennial as a 
way to highlight how the Missouri Synod traditionally acted as a beacon of “true” 
conservative Lutheranism and discredit their liberal competitors. In contrast, the more 
liberal Canada Synod also found its previous emphasis on the pioneer myth waning as a 
result of ecumenical cooperative ventures like the Canadian Lutheran World Relief and 
various synodical mergers. As Waterloo County Lutherans engaged with their 
coreligionists throughout the country, they increasingly found that other Lutherans had 
their own foundational myths that stressed a Canadian, rather than ethnic German, past.  
 Behnken learned his lesson from the failed attempt to mobilize the Missouri 
Synod with American patriotism during the Peace Thankoffering. The Missouri Synod’s 
centennial anniversary in 1947 provided Behnken with another opportunity to unite the 
synod and begin to heal some of the wounds that emerged during the war. Unlike the 
Peace Thankoffering, the synod’s centennial offered laypeople a chance to celebrate their 
German and Lutheran identities. Behnken needed to address both of these identities, as 
ethnic and theological tensions born from the war still plagued his administration. Most 
notably, Behnken’s vision of a conservative Lutheranism faced criticism late in the war 
from a group of professors from Concordia Seminary and district presidents that referred 
to themselves as the “Forty-Four.” In 1945, the Forty-Four released A Statement, a 
collection of resolutions that condemned Behnken’s leadership for his wartime stance on 
unionism. They felt that the Missouri Synod needed to cooperate with other Lutherans 
during the war and that Behnken’s policies were “unevangelical 
techniques…unsympathetic legalistic practices, a self-complacent and separatistic 
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narrowness, and an utter disregard for the fundamental law of Christian love.”866 The 
synod’s insistence that there could be no union without theological unity, they argued, 
was antiquated, overly strict, and prevented the growth and power of Lutherans in North 
America. The Forty-Four mailed a copy of A Statement to every pastor in the Missouri 
Synod and published it in an edition of The Lutheran Witness. The active attempts of the 
“Forty-four” to spread A Statement demonstrated that this was not a theological debate 
limited to a few intellectuals, but a movement to drastically alter the Missouri Synod’s 
conservative policy on unionism. Conservative leaders of the synod went so far as to label 
the Forty-four “revolutionaries” with A Statement acting as their official “manifesto.”867 
Behnken organized a series of conferences between the Forty-Four and conservative 
leaders of the synod. After several meetings throughout 1946 and 1947, the Forty-four 
still refused to recant A Statement, but agreed to stop actively promoting its message. This 
compromise pleased few people. Both sides recognized the need to move forward, but 
bitter tensions remained. The conservative faction felt that Behnken should have punished 
the Forty-Four, while the Forty-Four felt bitter that their critiques essentially went 
unheard.868  
 The 1947 centennial therefore provided Behnken with an opportunity to shift 
popular discussion within the synod away from theological controversy. The theological 
challenges posed by A Statement prompted Behnken and his colleagues to craft a singular 
narrative of the synod’s history that stressed the validity of conservative Lutheranism 
over liberal interpretations of God’s word. The 1947 centennial focused largely on C.F.W 
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Walther, the synod’s original founder, and the critical role he played in bringing 
conservative Lutheranism to North America. In his public retelling of the synod’s history, 
Behnken emphasized the many “trials and bitter experiences” Walther and the original 
Saxon Lutherans endured at the hands of liberal Protestants in Europe. “Their experiences 
made them very cautious about safeguarding Biblical doctrine and Scriptural practice,” he 
told readers in the Lutheran Witness. Walther’s careful meditations on the Bible, Behnken 
argued, demonstrated that the Bible must be understood as the “Word of God” in order to 
practice as a true Lutheran.869 By focusing disproportionately on Walther, Behnken 
helped cultivate the notion that the synod’s history was the story of brave figures 
preserving conservative Lutheranism in the face of liberal Lutheran foes. Behnken ended 
his centennial history of the synod by calling on laypeople to “study the Word of God and 
the Lutheran Confessions.” As a synod, they must “become all the more deeply 
convinced that our fathers laid the only correct scriptural foundation.”870 Behnken used 
the 1947 centennial not only as a way to convey Walther’s importance in Lutheran 
history, but also as a way to refute the liberal Lutherans that sought to undermine his 
administration.  
 Behnken’s emphasis on Walther as a heroic prophet prompted several St. Louis 
congregations to associate their church with Walther and the synod’s early history. 
Bethlehem Lutheran Church, celebrating its centennial anniversary in 1949, proudly 
noted that Walther preached the first sermon at their church, while Immanuel Lutheran 
Church similarly emphasized Walther’s role in creating their church in 1847.871 The 
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emphasis Behnken placed on Walther and the Saxon Lutherans during the 1947 
centennial continued to echo in local commemorative events into the 1950s. In 1954, Old 
Trinity celebrated its one-hundredth and fifteenth anniversary and recounted their history 
in terms similar to Behnken’s 1947 outline. Walther, the “champion of sound and 
conservative Lutheranism,” turned Trinity “into a model congregation and became a 
blessing to thousands and thousands of Lutherans of our city and our whole country to 
this day.”872 The anniversary booklet went even further, however, by arguing for Old 
Trinity’s near-mythical importance in the history of Missouri Synod Lutheranism. The 
booklet concluded with a discussion to preserve the church’s slowly deteriorating 
building as “the mother church of true Lutheranism in St. Louis, as a shrine, that is, a 
sacred place of historical value.”873 Local Lutherans also gave importance to historic 
objects Walther used during his lifetime. Old Trinity still contained Walther’s pulpit that 
he, and subsequent pastors from Trinity, preached from: “To us this pulpit is a memorial 
and a symbol – a memorial since from it have spoken all the pastors who have served 
Trinity Congregation since the time of Dr. C.F.W. Walther…What an unbroken stream of 
doctrine, admonition, comfort…and pastoral guidance has proceeded from this pulpit!”874  
 Walther’s newfound prominence in the synod following the 1947 centennial 
helped St. Louis Lutherans identify with their nineteenth century German heritage. While 
congregations consisted of German immigrants from different generations, many of the 
churches in the city could trace their origins back to Walther and the Saxon Lutheran 
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immigrants. Bethany Lutheran Church, celebrating its seventy-fifth anniversary in 1949, 
wrote in their anniversary booklet that their “branch of Lutheranism was established in St. 
Louis with the advent of the Saxon Immigrants.”875 Numerous commemorative histories 
from the late 1940s endeavored to apply Behnken’s emphasis on a long unbroken history 
of conservative Lutheranism to their congregation and its founders. Bethany’s 
anniversary booklet concluded with a eulogy for the Saxon Lutherans who created their 
congregation. “Of those who were instrumental in the founding of our Congregation, not 
one remains. All such has passed on into eternity. But their descendants may readily be 
traced in our present membership,” they noted proudly.876 Immanuel went even further in 
their deification of their Saxon Lutheran founders. Their 1947 pamphlet featured a photo 
of an infant, Paul Weinhold, and described him as a “sixth generation of Saxon descent 
on his mother’s side and the descendant of Saxons who organized the Perry County 
Lutheran Churches in 1839 on his father’s side.”877  
 The theological controversies in the Missouri Synod led Behnken and other St. 
Louis Lutherans to associate their conservative Lutheranism with their German founders. 
Theological debates in the mid-twentieth century therefore had the unintended impact of 
popularizing the synod’s identity as both German and conservative. Walther, as a figure 
of conservative Lutheranism, continued to find resonance in a synod where conservative 
Lutheranism was starting to lose its firm grasp. By elevating Walther and his Saxon 
Lutheran peers, Behnken and others also simultaneously reaffirmed their synod as a 
German organization. Theology, in this instance, served to reify a certain degree of 
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belonging for the synod’s German membership by conflating the issues of conservative 
doctrine with their German immigrant origins. As long as synod and congregational 
leaders identified as conservative Lutherans, they would also identify as German. 
 The Canada Synod also found its ethnic traditions shaped by liberal Lutheranism. 
As liberal Lutherans, the Canada Synod members had few qualms about interfaith 
cooperation and paid little attention to concerns over “unionism.” Cooperative ventures 
like CLWR brought Waterloo County Lutherans into greater contact with Lutherans 
across Canada. Annual meetings and conferences, typically held in Kitchener-Waterloo, 
now occurred in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and other Lutheran centers in Western Canada. 
The joint organizations saw pastors from the Canada Synod and their prairie counterparts 
struggle and compete for various leadership positions, typically with the pastors from 
Western Canada emerging victorious. Furthermore, the Canada Synod collaborated with 
Lutheran churches in the Quebec and the Maritime provinces to form the Eastern Canada 
Synod in 1962. These changes essentially served to undermine the once central and 
authoritative center of Waterloo County in Lutheran affairs. While the pioneer myth once 
functioned as essentially the stand-in story for all of Canadian Lutherans, increased 
interactions with Lutherans elsewhere saw the rise of new origin myths that weakened the 
significance of Waterloo County’s pioneer myth. 
  As Waterloo County encountered Western Canadian Lutherans at meetings and 
conferences across the country, they realized that other synods had foundational stories of 
their own. Western Canadian Lutherans did not trace their origins back to Loyalists, but 
rather to the Danish-Norwegian Lutheran explorer Jens Munk. He navigated the Hudson’s 
Bay in 1619-1620 and his Lutheran pastor, Rasmus Jensen, received credit as preaching 
the first Lutheran sermon in North America. Western Canada Lutherans therefore claimed 
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that Munk and Jensen demonstrated that Lutherans had a North American presence “at a 
surprisingly early date.” Lutheranism in Canada did not begin with the arrival of the 
Lutheran Loyalists, but rather “back to 1619 at Hudson Bay.”878 Similarly, the 
cooperation with Lutherans in Nova Scotia exposed Waterloo County Lutherans to yet 
another foundational myth. Lutherans in the Maritimes traced their lineage back to the 
Nova Scotian community of Lunenburg, founded in the mid-eighteenth century by 
German Lutherans.879 Speeches, commemorative materials, and Canada Lutheran articles 
all started to mention these connections more frequently in the 1950s. Waterloo County 
and its “pioneers” now had to share the spotlight with other Lutheran histories due to the 
many synod mergers and organizations in the 1950s. 
 The rise of Western Canadian Lutherans in prominent positions challenged the 
hybrid German-Canadian identity that the Canada Synod prioritized. Western Canadian 
Lutherans saw the ethnic identities of their ancestors differently than the reverence often 
granted their pioneer ancestors in Waterloo County. While members of the Canada Synod 
continued to maintain their hybridity wherein their German, Lutheran, and Canadian 
identities coexisted, Western Canadian Lutheran leaders saw their ethnic past in less 
positive terms. Unlike the largely homogenous population of Lutherans in Ontario where 
“Lutheran” and “German” were essentially synonymous, Lutheranism in Western Canada 
had large Norwegian, Finnish, and Danish roots. When they examined their history, they 
largely attributed the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Western Canadian Lutheranism as 
the primary reason that prevented Lutherans from merging into one single synod or 
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church. They often blamed the fact that Lutherans did not have a single authoritative body 
until the Second World War as the reason why Lutherans had such a weak political and 
national presence in Canada. Lutherans in the West saw ethnicity and language as 
divisive traits that separated, rather than unified, Canadian Lutherans. Sidney Nelson, an 
Albertan pastor of Norwegian heritage, commented on how during the last fifty years, 
“the people and the situation” of Canadian Lutheranism “have drastically changed.” By 
the late 1950s, he wrote, “English is the main language (at last!). Cooperation is now 
possible, for we can understand one another!”880 Speaking English allowed Canadian 
Lutherans to share their “resources, our manpower and our money into a more common 
effort to reach Mr. Average Canuck.”881 Ethnicity was a relic of the past, while speaking 
English offered possibilities for the future. Pastors like Nelson envisioned a centralized 
body of Lutherans that attracted unchurched Canadians in the English language. In 
contrast, to the Canada Synod’s German-English framework, he offered a vision of the 
future that did not recognize their immigrant pasts. 
 The respect typically afforded to Lutheran pioneers and ancestors in Waterloo 
County weakened as a result of the new emphasis on “forward thinking” Western 
Canadian Lutherans. Mars Dale, from Saskatoon, described their “early pioneers” as a 
hindrance to Lutheranism’s growth. Unlike the pastors in Waterloo County that drew 
links between their own immigrant origins and the new waves of DPs to promote 
empathy and respect, Dale believed the DPs threatened Lutheranism’s newfound 
Canadian and English emphasis. “We still lack a policy of integrating Lutheran 
immigrants into an emerging core of Lutheranism,” he noted with some bitterness. “Even 
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to mention the problem in certain circles arouses defense mechanisms which turn 
otherwise sweet personalities sour,” he said with obvious reference to the Canada Synod. 
While congregations in Waterloo County promoted their German-English framework, 
Dale saw any language retention as contrary to their goal of recruiting unchurched 
Canadians. “We must recognize the barrier or insulation that language differences raise 
between people,” he concluded.882  
 This vision, however, could not receive support from members from the Canada 
Synod. Whereas Western Canadian Lutherans interpreted synod mergers through a 
teleological lens of a destiny fulfilled, Canada Synod president Albert Jacobi subtly 
worked against this notion. Speaking of their Lutheran ancestors, Jacobi believed that 
more “likely than not they were practical men who sought a home where they could live 
like free men and worship God according to the dictates of their conscience. So they lived 
and died unmindful perhaps of the possibility of a Lutheran Church extending from sea to 
sea and from the rivers to the end of the earth.”883 Contrary to the claims of Western 
Canadian Lutherans, there was nothing inherently natural or virtuous about forming a 
single organization. Ethnicity and language did not appear as stumbling blocks or 
challenges to overcome in Jacobi’s personal interpretations of Lutheran history. Canada’s 
original Lutherans “could hardly envisage the establishment of a synod of their own, 
much less the creation of other groups of Lutherans of varying national backgrounds and 
with diverse loyalties and doctrinal persuasions.”884 Jacobi dispelled Western Canadian 
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romanticism of their Lutheran ancestors by stating skeptically that there would be no way 
for them to “see visions and dream dreams of one Lutheran Church in Canada.”885  
 The widening and reframing of Canadian Lutheran history changed the once 
prominent position of Waterloo County and the pioneer myth. Whereas the community 
had once been central to the history of Canadian Lutheranism, by the mid-1960s Waterloo 
County was referred to as “the heartland of Lutheranism in Eastern Canada.”886 The 
Canada Synod headquarters and seminary ensured it remained the “heartland,” but not the 
birthplace or national scope it once was. As threats to the Missouri Synod’s leadership 
came from within the synod, Behnken and St. Louis Lutherans in contrast saw a renewed 
emphasis on their generation of pioneers. Regardless, the theological changes in the 
postwar period helped dictate and shape the importance German Lutheran communities 
placed on their ethnic ancestors. 
 
The Limits of the White Imagination 
 
 Race, alongside theology, shaped how German Lutherans commemorated their 
pasts and discussed their ethnic identities. As members of the white community, German 
Lutherans did not feel alienated by national mythologies in Canada and the United States 
that stressed national stories of pioneering, settlement, and creating new nations from the 
wilderness. Stories of explorers and pioneers resonated with German Lutherans, who did 
not grasp that these mythologies were about colonization and the displacement of North 
America’s original indigenous inhabitants. German Lutherans disagreed with portions of 
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these narratives, but not their inherent racial implications. Their whiteness allowed them 
to modify national mythologies to include immigrants, rather than upset them by pointing 
out the historic injustices the state committed against its racialized people. German 
Lutherans did not mean to challenge Canadian and American nationalism, but merely 
sought to find ways to incorporate themselves within its patriotic folds. 
 Nils Willison, the first graduate of Waterloo Lutheran Seminary, wrote several 
newspaper articles throughout the 1950s that argued Canadians needed an inclusive 
national anthem.  In a 1952 article, Willison suggested that Canadians needed their own 
national songs independent of Great Britain. “In so far as we in Canada are concerned I 
think we may be well content with the music of ‘o Canada!’” he wrote. However, his own 
immigrant background prevented him from embracing the future anthem whole-
heartedly: “Multitudes of people in Canada cannot sing of their country as their ‘native 
land’.”887 Willison clarified his views in a subsequent letter to Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker. “It is the word ‘Native’ in the first line. As immigrants they were not born in 
in Canada and therefore, without any fault of theirs, Canada is not their ‘native’ land.” In 
its place, Willison suggested including the phrase “Our home by birth or choice” or “Our 
home and honored land.”888 
 The ironies embedded in Willison’s statement are hard to miss. While contesting 
that he and his German Lutherans peers could not sing “O Canada!” because its emphasis 
on native-born Canadians, he completely missed that Canada’s Indigenous peoples may 
also take umbrage with the national anthem for erasing their presence. Willison’s 
message did not seek to change or even challenge Anglo-Canadian dominance and 
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mainstream Canadian patriotism. His request fell very much in line with literary critic 
Lily Cho’s criticisms of Canadian multiculturalism and its adherents. Rather than viewing 
Canada’s multicultural status as truly representing and respecting the voices of 
marginalized Canadians, Cho argues that Canada’s liberal multiculturalism includes the 
“presence of otherness” that “enhances rather than disturbs the liberal state…[it] enhances 
dominant culture’s sense of its own inclusive superiority.”889 Willison’s idea never gained 
traction, but it also proved unlikely to generate a great deal of opposition. His changes 
would have worked in tandem with the liberal state’s goals of making some of its white 
immigrant communities feel accepted and embraced. However, such sentiments 
cultivated an image of the state as benevolent and welcoming, despite the many 
limitations the federal government placed on racialized immigrants.890 Whiteness allowed 
Willison to ignore the state’s role in displacing indigenous people and excluding 
racialized immigrants, thereby prompting him to advocate for a vision of Canada that 
seemed welcoming. 
 Willison’s comments did not intentionally erase Canada’s racist past, although 
other German Lutheran commemorative events deliberately sought to do so. By the 
1960s, St. Louis congregations could no longer ignore their decreasing membership as a 
result of white flight. Several anniversary booklets commemorating St. Louis churches 
commented on how empty their churches seemed compared to previous decades. Holy 
Cross’s booklet mentioned that they, “like other inner-city churches, [have] transferred 
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many members to sister churches in the county and elsewhere.”891 Mount Calvary hinted 
at white flight in much the same manner. Their 1957 booklet described confronting the 
“heavy loss of the many members who were transferring their membership to sister 
congregations.”892 Despite these acknowledgements, St. Louis churches rarely explicitly 
articulated or made reference to the increased Black membership in their churches at the 
expense of white members. Nor did they give voice to the many tensions desegregation 
caused within their churches. Instead, anniversary booklets continued to reify the 
importance of their German pioneer forebears and tied their history to C.F.W. Walther. 
Zion Lutheran Church, for instance, staged a pageant in order to honour their centennial 
anniversary in 1960. Although unorthodox, the pageant followed the familiar script of 
most congregational histories. The first act was devoted to the congregation’s German or 
“Saxon” origins. It showcased C.F.W. Walther and the Saxon Lutherans leaving Europe 
for St. Louis. The second act detailed the life of Zion’s early pastors while the last two 
acts emphasized the growing church and its current emphasis on evangelical 
recruitment.893 While this last portion of the play theoretically offered an opportunity to 
include black voices and perspectives, the play instead focused on its white “missionary” 
workers and did not include any black actors. St. Paul’s 1963 anniversary acknowledged 
that its demographics changed from its original 1863 founding, but did little to 
incorporate Black perspectives or histories into the booklet. Instead, the booklet 
continued to reify the place of its German congregants. They included the list of their 
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founding members, and placed italics around the names of “persons whose descendants 
still hold membership in the congregation.”894 
 Other histories deliberately tried to excuse the synod’s longstanding and ongoing 
debates about segregation by emphasizing common myths about nineteenth century 
German-Americans. In 1964, Old Trinity in St. Louis celebrated its one hundred and 
twenty-fifth anniversary with a commemorative booklet by Walter Umbach, a descendant 
of one of the original Saxon Lutheran immigrants.895 Umbach situated Old Trinity’s 
history in the broader context of American history and included discussion of the 
congregation’s involvement in national events like the Civil War. In doing so, Umbach 
repeated the popular refrain in German-American circles that “to the predominantly high 
German population…slavery was repugnant.” When Lincoln called upon Missouri for 
volunteers, “many companies of volunteers were formed in St. Louis, especially among 
the numerous German populace….Trinity, Immanuel, Holy Cross, and Zion contributed 
manpower.”896 During a period where St. Louis congregations struggled to accept Black 
congregants, Umbach’s history tried to emphasize the congregation’s anti-racist German 
roots. Umbach’s interpretation differed from the historical reality wherein the Missouri 
Synod by no means held an anti-slavery position throughout the nineteenth century. The 
famed Walther, for instance, cited several instances where the Bible supported slavery 
and did not explicitly condemn slave-owners.897 Despite this inconvenient truth, 
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Umbach’s history attempted to minimize the synod’s racism by fabling an allegedly anti-
racist past. with its racist present.  
 In these instances, anniversaries and commemorations served to enhance the 
image of these congregations as both white and German. While Willison’s stance on the 
Canadian anthem operated as a covert nod to his own whiteness, the St. Louis anniversary 
booklets deliberately politicized their German ancestors in an effort to exclude their 
congregation’s black members. Such commemorative anniversaries conveyed a clear 
message that only white Americans of German heritage belonged in their congregations. 
Umbach’s attempts to address racial issues in the synod says more about his own 
whiteness than it does about the reality of race relations in St. Louis. He addressed racial 
tensions not by acknowledging Old Trinity’s black congregants, but rather by claiming 
Walther and their ancestors fought on the correct side of racial justice. His example of 
Walther’s supposed anti-racism intended to alleviate the guilt or racial tension current 
white congregants felt in the midst of civil rights protests, and did little to comfort black 
Lutherans facing modern racism within the synod. Although these commemorative efforts 
in the 1950s and 1960s were ethnic histories written for a distinct ethnic group, so too 
were they white histories meant for a white audience.  
 
Expo 67 and Engagement with Mainstream Nationalisms 
 
 Umbach’s history of Old Trinity was the first of many projects in the 1960s and 
early 1970s that involved German Lutherans trying to integrate their histories into the 
broader American and Canadian publics. Lutherans started to pitch their histories and 
commemorative events outside of strictly religious circles in part because of the changing 
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demographics in both synods. Appeals to unchurched Americans and Canadians led to an 
increase in members who had interests in their community’s history outside the strict 
confines of the church. Moreover, the increased emphasis on the ecumenical movement 
within the Canada Synod brought Lutherans into greater contact with their Anglican, 
Baptist, and United Church neighbors, who proved more interested in engaging with 
national histories. Moments of national celebration functioned as important opportunities 
for German Lutherans to showcase their “Canadian” and “American” qualities, and be 
recognized as such. Despite this newfound drive to celebrate a Lutheran and German 
history alongside Anglo-Canadians and Americans, Lutherans failed to convince 
outsiders that their history deserved equal celebration. The inherent ethnic and religious 
focus of stories surrounding their Lutheran ancestors made them of little interest to the 
Canadian and American mainstream public. However, their whiteness ensured that their 
histories had a minor place amidst national celebrations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 Canadian nationalism in the 1960s represented something of a paradox. On one 
hand, Anglo-Canadians became increasingly nationalistic as they sought to craft an 
identity separate from Great Britain. Under the Liberal governments of Lester Pearson 
and Pierre Trudeau, Anglo-Canadians sang a new national anthem, waved a distinctly 
Canadian flag, and participated in national moments of celebration. The centennial of 
Canadian Confederation in 1967, commonly referred to as Expo ’67, embodied this 
newfound civic nationalism as state actors put forward a vision of Canada as a mature, 
independent, country.898 Simultaneously, however, many Anglo-Canadians retained a 
close personal connection to Britain and Canada’s British past. Public celebrations of 
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Canada’s history, for example, continued to venerate symbols of Canada’s colonial past, 
such as nominally English explorer John Cabot, or its connection to the British Empire 
during the two world wars.899 Canadian nationalists in the 1960s articulated a new sense 
of Canadian nationhood while also venerating a British colonial past. 
 German-Canadian Lutherans participated in the newfound spirit of Canadian 
nationalism during popular events like Expo ’67 in ways that differed from their previous 
emphasis on the pioneer myth.900 Expo 67’s national scope prompted Canadian Lutherans 
to frame their history through this national lens. The Loyalist pioneers of Waterloo 
County had very little importance amidst the national breadth of Canada’s past. 
Commemorative events needed to somehow relate to Canada’s broad mythology that 
placed an emphasis on “exploration,” national development, and historic “firsts.” Thus, 
the story of the Munk expedition and the Lunenburg settlement shifted from marginal 
stories to the central story of Canadian Lutheranism during the 1967 events.901 Unlike 
other Anglo-Canadian groups that showcased their history, however, these 
commemorative events provided Canadian Lutherans with an opportunity to integrate 
their unique stories of faith and migration into the Canadian narrative. While other 
Canadians celebrated broad ideas of their nation, German Lutherans once again used 
these commemorative events to make the case to mainstream society that they too 
belonged in Canada.  
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 One of the most important centennial events Canadian Lutherans participated in 
was the celebration surrounding the first Lutheran church in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. 
Affectionately referred to as the “Old Dutch” or “Little Dutch” church, synod leaders 
discovered that the building was still in use by an Anglican congregation. Initially, the 
Canadian Lutheran Council (CLC), spearheaded by Earl Treusch, tried to purchase the 
church but the Anglicans refused. They therefore reached a compromise where “the 
denominations might work together to preserve the church.”902 The CLC decided to erect 
a plaque on the church’s exterior making note that it was “the first Lutheran Church in 
Canada.”903 Treusch unveiled the plaque alongside the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia in 
a public ceremony in March 1967. Marking the church, even with a small plaque, 
represented an important point for Treusch and other members of the CLC that wanted 
Lutherans recognized in the annals of Canadian history. In an announcement to the press, 
Treusch stated that his interest in the Old Church “arises primarily for the fact that this is 
the first church building erected in Canada by Lutherans and that it was constructed 
during a very interesting phase of Canada’s early history.”904 The fact that German 
Lutherans founded Lunenburg shortly after the Seven Years War proved important to the 
broader Lutheran goal of demonstrating that they too belonged in Canada. As Daniel 
Coleman suggests, settlers often emphasized what they perceived as their long lineages 
and histories in the land they now occupy in an effort to appear “indigenous” to the land 
itself.905 Although then occupied by Anglicans, the small plaque on the old church 
conveyed the impression that the church historically belonged to Lutherans. By 
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emphasizing the impact of their ancestors on the past, Treusch and the CLC made an 
argument for their belonging in the present. 
 The CLC embarked on several commemorative efforts to honour the Munk 
expedition and convince Anglo-Canadians of its importance. Many of these projects, 
however, failed. The CLC unsuccessfully tried to convince the Canadian Broadcasting 
Company (CBC) to invest in “a good TV drama” about the Munk expedition, and also 
failed to convince Canada Post to issue a commemorative stamp in his honour.906 These 
setbacks did not deter the CLC from pursuing their campaign to see Munk and Jensen 
recognized as two of Canada’s important explorers alongside John Cabot, Jacques 
Cartier, and Samuel de Champlain.907 In 1965, the CLC decided to pursue “the erection of 
a suitable memorial to Pastor Rasmus Jensen” near Churchill, Manitoba.908 Very few 
others shared their passion, however. They contacted Canada’s Historic Sites and 
Monuments Board with a proposal to erect a plaque honouring Jensen for his role in 
preaching the first Christian Christmas service on Canadian soil. Government officials 
replied that they could not help with the effort to commemorate Jensen, as they focused 
on people and places of national historic significance. Jensen, it seemed, did not quite 
make the cut. A government representative suggested that they “contact the Department 
of Northern Affairs as well as the Manitoba Historic Sites Board as I am sure they will be 
of service to you.”909 Yet, the Department of Northern Affairs proved equally 
uninterested in commemorating Lutheran history. They responded to the CLC that 
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commemorating Jensen “would create a new problem for us.” They described how many 
different groups petitioned them for such markers and they could not possibly meet all 
these various demands. “Once our rule was broken, we would be hard put to deny the 
privilege to others,” they replied.910 Government agencies simply did not see Jensen and 
Munk as national figures worth celebrating alongside Canada’s roster of national heroes. 
The two individuals were of importance only to Lutherans, and had little significance for 
other Canadians.  
 Internally, the CLC sponsored several commemorative projects intended just for 
Lutherans rather than a broad Canadian audience. These projects demonstrated a greater 
comfort with celebrating their ethnic and religious heritage than the bland efforts to create 
Jensen and Munk in the same image as other Canadian explorers. In 1966, the CLC 
sponsored a hymn-writing contest. The winner would be their official hymn for Canada’s 
centennial. Ulrich Leupold, a professor at Waterloo Lutheran University, judged the 
contest and received sixty-one entries from pastors and laypeople. Although written in 
part for Canada’s “birthday” celebration, Leupold rejected entries that praised the so-
called Fathers of Confederation. He dismissed hymns that parroted the Canadian 
nationalism exhibited elsewhere in Expo 67 celebrations. One rejected hymn described 
John A. Macdonald and his peers as respected leaders blessed by God: “Our leaders in 
Thee trusted/And never were dismayed/Thy statutes they respected/Thy righteous laws 
obeyed/Thy goodness came upon them/Thou was their strength and stay.”911 Leupold had 
no problem rejecting the entry. The hymn made “the founding fathers look like a bunch of 
narrow Puritans,” he complained. “The tone is that of Victorian moralism. It sounds 
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terribly straight-laced and self-righteous.”912 Leupold’s first choice was written by a 
pastor from Zurich, Ontario, which clearly emphasized Lutheranism’s immigrant roots. 
The hymn stated that Canada consisted of “men from lands both far and near” who “did 
lay a firm foundation/By Thy providence.”913 The hymn matched the synod’s general 
understanding of Canada as a settler colonial nation composed of white immigrants that 
helped gradually turn an empty wilderness into a thriving modern nation. Leupold and his 
peers rejected entries that honoured Anglo and French-Canadian statesmen in favour of 
an entry that paid respects to the anonymous migrant settlers to whom they claimed their 
own.  
 Although this entry touched on the desired themes, its clumsy wording prevented 
Leupold from accepting it. The committee decided not to select a winner, as they felt no 
hymn was of adequate quality. Their decision angered several of the participants, who let 
the committee know they felt their decision was particularly “unchristian.”914 Yet there 
was more at stake in the contest than mere prizes and prestige. C.N. Weber, a prominent 
Waterloo County layman, sat on the committee and felt that the hymn needed to give 
voice to the importance of Lutheranism in Canada. Promoting a poor hymn would be “an 
unfavorable reflection on our Lutheran Church.” Lutherans, he argued, could not handle 
any more bad publicity than they had already endured in the past decades. “I have felt 
many times that as Lutherans we were satisfied to accept second and third grade 
positions, whereas with our heritage, we should be in the first bracket.”915  Episodes such 
as the failure to secure a commemorative event for the Munk expedition and the failed 
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hymn contest proved to Lutherans like Weber their acceptance in Canada was far from 
secure. They could not risk further condescension from Anglo-Canadians by releasing a 
substandard hymn, even if it meant angering the contestants.  
 The Missouri Synod’s celebration of its 125th anniversary in 1972 also diverged 
from past histories by aiming for a broader American readership. That said, it continued 
to follow the typical narrative of the synod that Behnken solidified during the 1947 
centennial. Like other histories sponsored by the Concordia Publishing House, it directly 
acknowledged the synod’s German heritage and ongoing German ethnicity, while 
deifying Walther as the synod’s moral, spiritual, and personal founder. The anniversary 
book recognized that the synod’s German character would never truly leave the synod. 
The book chronicled the religious conditions in Europe that drove Walther to seek refuge 
in North America and portrayed the decades following the synod’s founding as an 
exclusively German time period. The author recognized that the First World War caused 
the synod to eliminate some visible signs of its German ethnicity because Lutherans 
“were looked upon as disloyal citizens,” but recognized that the war did not eliminate 
their German ethnicity. In one of the more humorous references to the synod’s hybrid 
German-American character, the author reported that many Missouri Synod Lutherans 
responded to the First World War with the declaration that “Ich bin ein Amerikaner.”916 
Such sentiments easily captured the ironic and contradictory German-American character 
within the synod.  
 Yet this commemorative book, The Zeal of His House, diverged from previous 
histories in several important ways that recognized the changing face of Lutheranism in 
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the 1970s. The Concordia Publishing House tended to commission the synod’s previous 
anniversary texts from established pastors and professors based in St. Louis. 
Unsurprisingly, the stories of St. Louis congregations, Walther, and the Concordia 
Seminary featured prominently in what were supposed to be synod-wide histories. The 
book’s author, Eldon Weisheit, was not a St. Louis pastor like his predecessors. Weisheit 
was born in the Midwest but spent most of his career as a popular religious writer and 
pastor in Alabama, with a brief stint as an editor for the Lutheran Witness in the 1970s. 
Unlike previous authors, Weisheit wrote his anniversary retrospective in an accessible 
tone rife with popular slang and informalities that would have shocked his predecessors. 
While previous histories conformed to contemporary scholarly standards, Weisheit 
intended his text to be read by all members of the Missouri Synod. The Zeal of His House 
was not meant just for educated laymen and pastors. Weisheit wrote the text to appeal to 
Lutheran men and women, and many of the synod’s recent displaced person, Anglo-
American, and black converts, not just its primary German-American readership. The first 
section of the book, subtitled “Let Me Talk You into Reading the Whole Thing,” 
explained Weisheit’s motivations for writing the text. He described the many “new 
members” of the church who “may have little identity with denominational history” 
because of their DP or American backgrounds. The booklet, for instance, is dedicated to 
“those who have joined the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as adults in appreciation of 
your contributions to the heritage of the synod.”917 Weisheit acknowledged that 
American, DP, and black Lutherans may feel left out of the synod’s history due to its 
focus on German pioneers and prophets. “The first part of Missouri Synod history is 
heavy with the German influence. If you are German but not a Saxon or Franconian (I’m 
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neither), you might feel that you are on the edge of the stage. If you’re not German at all, 
you might feel you missed the whole scene. But it’s not so,” he tried to reassure his 
readers.918 In order to make his readers more comfortable with an alien German past, 
Weisheit included lists of prominent German figures in the synod’s early history with a 
simple addition of how to pronounce their names phonetically.919 He also focused a great 
deal on the synod’s work among unchurched Americans, DPs, and black Lutherans in 
contrast to his predecessors fascination with Walther and the Saxon Lutherans. As a 
pastor who worked primarily in Alabama, Weisheit closely detailed the synod’s mission 
work among black Lutherans in the south. He spent seven of the booklet’s one-hundred 
and twenty pages describing the story of Rosa Young, a black Lutheran schoolteacher 
from Alabama. In contrast, Walter Baepler’s 1947 centennial anniversary publication 
devoted a single sentence to “Negro missions.”920 Weisheit’s history offered a new 
history for a synod that had changed considerably in the previous twenty years. 
 Lutheran commemorative activities in the 1960s and 1970s offered a sometimes 
contradictory look at their own communities. On one hand, they continued to stress the 
German roots of their communities and valorize the pioneers and pastors who established 
their churches in the previous centuries. They did so in a way that aligned with how 
Anglo-Canadians and Americans discussed their own storied historical figures, even if 
mainstream society did not always see their importance. Yet these commemorative events 
highlighted the possible future directions of their communities as well. The Canada 
Synod took on a secondary role in contrast the CLC and Western Canadian pastors who 
increasingly dictated that their history needed to appeal to broader Canadians and placed 
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less importance on local immigrant communities. While St. Louis histories begrudgingly 
acknowledged the changing racial make-up of their congregations, Weisheit’s history 
offered a clear indication that synod-wide histories outside of St. Louis could not simply 
tell the same story of Walther and his conservative Lutheran German pioneers any longer. 
Broad commemorative events, be they for national and synodical audiences, now 
included the voices and perspectives of Lutherans outside of the St. Louis and Waterloo 
County cores. As such, they paid attention to the different Lutheran histories throughout 
North America and included information about the recently converted and newly arrived 
Lutherans. Although none of the events broke firmly away from their emphasis on their 
German heritage, they created the conditions for a future generation of Lutherans to see 
themselves within the histories of North American Lutheranism whether or not they could 
personally connect with a German past.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Cultural and commemorative events in postwar St. Louis and Waterloo County 
demonstrate a continued engagement with their German ethnic identities. 
Commemorative events continued to pay respect to their nineteenth century immigrant 
forebears as a meaningful symbol of both their German heritage and as a way to address 
modern challenges. The Saxon Lutherans that migrated to St. Louis continued to provide 
a potent origin story for synod leaders and congregations alike. The present challenges 
from liberal Lutherans within the synod heightened the respect St. Louis Lutherans paid 
to their Saxon Lutheran ancestors as they practiced a “true” conservative Lutheranism. 
The memory of German Lutheran pioneers in Waterloo County provided them with a way 
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to combat Anglo-Canadian nationalism following the war, ensuring that their German 
ethnicity continued to resonate in the community. While Lutherans elsewhere in Canada 
started to revise the singular importance previously placed on the pioneer myth, Waterloo 
County Lutherans continued to argue for its importance, particularly in relation to DP 
work. Their German ethnicity remained an important part of postwar commemorative 
activities, regardless of external and internal challenges. 
 Whiteness played an important role in shaping commemorative events 
surrounding their immigrant ancestors. At one level, it allowed German Lutherans to 
situate their histories in broader American and Canadian commemorative events and 
histories. As members of the white community, they could locate their own explorers, 
pioneers, and settlers, alongside other white Americans and Canadians. Their whiteness 
prevented them from challenging these narratives outright. Instead, they sought to 
incorporate themselves into these pre-existing narratives and argue that their own German 
Lutheran ancestors could be just as important as other white British and American 
historical figures. Their ethnic culture co-existed comfortably within American and 
Canadian narratives of white supremacy. Furthermore, cultural events in St. Louis in the 
late 1950s and 1960s deliberately marginalized their new black congregants by ignoring 
their presence and valorizing their German ancestors. The message in these 
commemorative booklets was quite clear: German immigrants built the church and their 
white descendants continued to allow the church to thrive. In these instances, celebrations 
of ethnic diversity not only benefitted from North America’s white supremacist culture, 
but actively enforced it. 
 Postwar commemorative events continued the German Lutheran project of finding 
ways to balance their ethnic, religious, and national identities. Their attempts to situate 
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their ethnicity and religion in popular American and Canadian narratives should not be 
seen as a loss of ethnic identity. A 1967 speech by Karl Holfeld at Waterloo Lutheran 
Seminary captures how German Lutherans sought to integrate their immigrant pasts into 
national mythologies. He noted that “most of the members of our churches are of other 
national origins than British or French, the founding nations, but we do claim equality 
with them in Canadian citizenship, concern and loyalty.” Their German heritage and 
language did not somehow mean that they were not equally Canadian. German and 
Lutheran “names may sound like a roster of Europeans but they think, speak and act 
Canadian.”921 Such sentiments convey the hybrid German-Canadian and German-
American identities that Lutherans continued to practice well into the 1960s.   
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Conclusion: Welcoming Strangers 
 Ethnicity remained a powerful identity in the Canada Synod by the 1970s, even as 
the “old guard” of ethnic elites started to retire from public life. John Reble, “a fine old 
soldier of the Lord who just does not fade away,” finally retired from preaching German-
language services at St. Peter’s in 1969.922 He passed away just three years later, but lived 
long enough to see his son Otto Reble assume leadership of the Canada Synod. As synod 
president, Otto continued the work that his father started and listened to the chorus of 
German, Canadian, Latvian, and other voices in the synod. By 1974, Otto undisputedly 
labeled the Canada Synod as “a synod of linguistic ministries.” Although the “new 
Canadian” problem had certainly passed, mission outreach to unchurched German 
immigrants and their children remained a concern for Otto and other Canada Synod 
pastors. In the 1970s, Otto worked with numerous Toronto pastors in a group called the 
“German Cluster” to help ensure they provided German-language services to Lutherans in 
Toronto’s growing cityscape.923 Unlike his father, Otto sought the assistance of EKiD in 
West Germany to meet these linguistic demands. The Waterloo Lutheran Seminary 
students of the 1960s did not always have the fluency in German to help Otto and the 
German Cluster reach German immigrants.924 With his father’s generation retired or 
deceased, and new Canadian-born generation preferring the English language, Otto 
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initiated the process of reorienting the Canada Synod’s ethnic identity towards West 
Germany.  
 Theology and ethnicity remained intertwined in St. Louis in the 1970s as well. 
Under John Behnken’s presidency, Missouri Synod pastors strongly associated the 
German language with preserving their theology. Behnken’s retirement in 1962, however, 
created a power vacuum within the synod’s leadership that had repercussions for the 
synod’s ethnic character. Staunchly conservative pastors replaced Behnken’s more 
“moderate” faction with the election of Jacob Preus in 1969. Preus’s conservatism on 
theological issues, as well as cultural issues such as feminism and the Civil Rights 
Movement, alienated a number of moderate members of the Missouri Synod. These 
tensions climaxed in 1973-1974, when over two-hundred members of the Concordia 
Seminary left to form their own seminary in protest.925 Preus and his conservative 
supporters derogatorily referred to their moderate opponents as “old Germans” out of 
touch with the modern American political landscape that favoured evangelism and 
Republican politics instead of respect for their ethnic past.926 Future historians will no 
doubt have to contend with how Preus’s rule shaped the synod’s German ethnicity. 
 Unlike previous studies of German immigrants that routinely end eulogizing or 
hypothesizing the “end” of a German ethnicity, this study ends in the late 1960s on a 
different note.927 It does not conclude that Germans lost, or started to lose, their German 
ethnicity. Rather, it suggests that a new sense of hybridity may have started to emerge in 
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the 1970s, largely after the generation identified in this study retired or passed away. 
Future historians may wish to follow Otto Reble’s work among German-speaking 
immigrants in Toronto to examine what role ethnicity played in Canadian Lutheranism 
beyond the 1960s. More locally, the rise of a secular German ethnicity based on “food 
and folk” customs in Waterloo County began to develop in the 1960s. Multicultural 
initiatives sponsored by the federal government, for example, created popular secular 
events like Oktoberfest that may have shifted the community’s localized German culture 
out of the church and into the public sphere.928 Subsequent studies of the Missouri Synod 
and German-Americans in St. Louis must examine their ethnicities in the context of the 
rise of political and religious conservatism in the Missouri Synod. Scholars will need to 
examine how Preus’s leadership altered the synod’s relationship with Lutheranism in 
Germany, and how race and ethnicity became another battleground over which 
conservative and moderate Lutherans fought.929 These potential research areas show that 
the story of German immigrants and their ethnic identities did not end during the world 
wars or even in the postwar period. It remains a field open for further inquiry.  
 The first objective of this dissertation was to provide an alternative to the 
emphasis on assimilation found elsewhere in the literature on German immigrants. In his 
work on German Canadians in Winnipeg, Hans Werner found that “the concept of 
assimilation still offers explanatory power for first-generation immigrant behaviour.”930 
The majority of the ethnic elites examined in this study were first or second generation 
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immigrants that actively grappled with the question of assimilation, but did not succumb 
to it. Ethnic elites flirted with promoting integration and assimilation during the Second 
World War, but largely moved beyond such pressures once the war ended. They 
maintained their positions as ethnic elites into the postwar period by building positive 
relations with a new generation of first generation German refugees, while ensuring other 
European ethnic groups did not challenge the hegemonic status of the German-language 
in their congregations. Pressures to assimilate certainly informed the experiences of first 
and second generation ethnic elites, but it not define them.  
 Furthermore, Russell Kazal’s writing on German Americans in Philadelphia, and 
on immigrant history more broadly, places great emphasis on assimilation as “processes 
that result in greater homogeneity within a society.”931 St. Louis and Waterloo County’s 
German Lutherans shared fundamental differences with mainstream Canadian and 
American culture that prevented a high level of homogeneity from occurring. In fact, 
German Lutherans continually articulated difference in the face of exclusionary American 
and Canadian nationalism. Their churches did not reinforce Canadian and American 
values like other evangelical congregations, but rather functioned as ethnic boundary 
zones that allowed their German laity to connect with their ethnic identities.932 They 
greeted the Second World War with trepidation and fear over ethnic discrimination, not 
with expressions of solidarity with the Allied armies. They became advocates for ex-Nazi 
German refugees when American and Canadians largely believed these former “enemy 
aliens” should be left in Europe. Rather than participating in the middle-class attempts to 
                                                        
931 Russell A. Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American 
Ethnic History,” American Historical Review 100, no. 2 (1995): 438-439. 
932 See for example, Robert Wuthnow, The Reconstructing of American Religion, 80-81; Wade Clark Roof, 
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University Press, 1999), 77-79.  
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assimilate postwar newcomers, ethnic elites responded by solidifying the Lutheran church 
as an ethnic boundary zone. They purchased German-language prayer books, elevated the 
status of DPs, and continued to educate their followers at church and Sunday schools in 
the German language. Their efforts to protect their German ethnicity within the church 
ran counter to the national emphasis on homogeneity in Canadian and American society, 
during both the war and the Cold War consensus that emerged afterwards. 
 Rather than emphasizing the ways in which German immigrants assimilated, this 
dissertation examined how they maintained their ethnic identity despite pressures to 
assimilate. German Lutherans constructed an ethnicity rooted in hybridity as a result of 
their attempt to reconcile their immigrant heritage with their new homes in North 
America. They constructed this unique ethnic identity in several ways. Language, 
however, was one of the most important ways German Lutherans identified with their 
ethnic heritage. By the mid-twentieth century, the German language did not have a 
practical or conversational purpose. As Barbara Lorenzkowski’s earlier work on the late 
nineteenth century demonstrates, most German immigrants spoke a hybrid dialect that 
combined English and German words and syntax.933 While true, the German language 
still remained important as a powerful symbol of ethnicity and faith. As chapter one 
illustrated, German Lutherans fought to speak German on days of religious importance. In 
order to properly worship and understand the word of God, German Lutherans believed 
they needed to preach, speak, and pray in the language of C.F.W. Walther and Martin 
Luther. This belief remained dominant in the Missouri and Canada Synods until at least 
the 1960s, with synod leaders like John Behnken continually reminding their pupils that 
they needed to master religious texts in the German tongue. Chapter six demonstrated this 
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belief most obviously, as ethnic elites opposed speaking Latvian, Estonian, and other 
European languages in their churches as they felt it did not have a spiritual necessity. For 
German Lutherans, speaking German in church did not represent a connection to a 
European homeland, but rather a commitment to their faith. For ethnic elites in St. Louis 
and Waterloo County, strengthening the German language had personal and political 
motivations as well. Chapter five demonstrated that encouraging German refugees to 
speak German instead of English at church allowed pastors to grow their congregations 
and, as a result, their authority within the community. Instead of losing their new German 
refugee followers to English clubs and social circles, pastors kept their authority as ethnic 
elites by allowing refugees a place to speak German within the ethnic boundary zone of 
the church.  
 Yet this was not the “pure German” heard in the streets of nineteenth century St. 
Louis and Waterloo County. German Lutherans heard English spoken at church just as 
frequently as German, most notably during the Second World War. This does not, 
however, signify their assimilation into Canadian and American society. Rather, it 
highlights the careful balancing act German Lutherans performed to ensure that they 
maintained both their old ethnic and new national identities. Speaking German 
emboldened their ethnic and religious identities, whereas speaking English recognized 
their North American circumstances. As Lorenzkowski wrote of an earlier generation of 
German immigrations, “the duality of their worlds resonated in the hybrid tongue they 
spoke. Their speech acts told of lives that were shaped in a series of exchanges.”934 The 
exchange of English and German language heard in Lutheran congregations across St. 
Louis and Waterloo County embodied their German-American and German-Canadian 
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Lutheran hyphenated identities during a period in which these ideas seemed incompatible. 
Lutherans justified speaking German on the grounds that it embodied their faith and thus 
found a way to continue their ethnic traditions within the ethnic boundary zone of the 
church while still participating in the English-speaking world of North American life. 
 German Lutherans moreover expressed an ethnic identity throughout the 1940s 
and early 1950s when they expressed sympathies and solidarity with their brethren living 
overseas in Germany. Chapters one and two detailed how German Lutherans opposed 
another world war with Germany, albeit to different extents. German Lutheran women in 
St. Louis worried the war bonds they purchased would be used to bomb other German 
women working in the war effort, while the women in Waterloo County organized events 
at their churches to advocate for peace and neutrality instead of war. Pastors like Behnken 
and C.H. Little largely had to downplay their qualms with the war in favour of a patriotic 
image, whereas others eventually lost faith that appeasing Anglo-Canadian and 
Americans was worth ethnic and theological compromises. Certain pastors resented the 
anti-German caricatures in the People Come First pamphlet that stereotyped members of 
their ethnicity, while others conducted private German-language services to ensure that 
they did not break decades of tradition. As chapters three and four explored, German 
Lutherans maintained a vested interest in helping Germany recover from the war. While 
international organizations like the United Nations largely felt German refugees were 
Germany’s obligation, German Lutherans in St. Louis and Waterloo County mobilized to 
alter immigration laws that would facilitate refugee passage from Europe to North 
America. These were not “enemy aliens” or “Nazis,” but rather members of their ethnic 
and religious community that desperately needed assistance.  German Lutherans refused 
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to abandon their brethren, even during a time in which most Canadians and Americans 
had little interest in becoming further involved in German affairs. 
 Although German Lutherans sympathized with Germans abroad, they did not 
construct an ethnicity rooted in diasporic sentiments or a German homeland. As chapter 
four highlighted, ethnic elites in the Missouri and Canada Synods were motivated by their 
German sympathies to perform missionary work in West Germany throughout the late 
1940s and 1950s. While they eagerly expected to be greeted as distant cousins and fellow 
Germans, West Germans saw them strictly as “Amerikaners.” First-generation 
immigrants like John Reble felt a renewed connection to their German roots when visiting 
Germany, but most West Germans used their new Canadian and American friends 
exclusively as a way to better their material circumstances. They were not interested in 
forming a diasporic connection between their West German home and St. Louis and 
Waterloo County, but instead used these connections to secure financial aid for 
themselves and their followers. Missionary trips to Germany seemed to confirm the 
hybrid identities of the Missouri and Canada Synod’s ethnic elites. Americans and 
Canadians labeled them “Germans” while they were in North America, while Germans 
told them they were “American” while in Germany. . 
 Ethnic elites had little choice but to focus on creating an ethnicity rooted in their 
St. Louis and Waterloo County homes as a result. Nineteenth century German immigrants 
participated in commemorative and festive events that linked them closely with political 
events in German states. They celebrated German unification, the Franco-Prussian War, 
and erected humble monuments to political leaders such as Kaiser Wilhelm II.935 
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Although German Lutherans in the mid-twentieth century did place some importance on 
Martin Luther and the Reformation, their ethnic celebrations largely valorized the 
immigrant experience in North America instead of myths and figures rooted in their 
German homeland. Their celebrations placed their hybridity at the forefront. The pioneer 
myth in Waterloo County and commemorative events surrounding C.F.W. Walther in St. 
Louis emphasized their German and Lutheran identities while also acknowledging the 
fact that these were Canadian and American stories. As several chapters made clear, the 
pioneer myth took pre-existing Anglo-Canadian myths surrounding the British Loyalists 
but modified them to include people of German heritage. In doing so, German Lutherans 
could articulate an ethnicity without offending or challenging Anglo-Canadian 
conceptions of nationhood and history. Similarly the Missouri Synod’s preoccupation 
with Walther and the synod’s creation provided an important symbol for preserving their 
German traditions, theology, and language, while still conforming to popular narratives of 
nineteenth century settlers and pioneers. Their stories confirmed their North American 
realities while still allowing room to express their ethnicity. These were not the Anglo-
Canadian and American national mythologies that valorized British politicians and 
founding fathers, nor were the events that connected German Lutherans to an imagined 
German homeland. Instead, they were stories of hybridity that situated German Lutherans 
firmly as an ethnic and religious community in St. Louis and Waterloo County.   
 German Lutheran expressions of ethnicity demonstrate a community that grappled 
with demands to assimilate and integrate, but ultimately found a way to preserve portions 
of their ethnicity in the face of such challenges. Although they adopted some Anglo-
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Canadian and American norms, such as speaking English in public and using national 
frameworks for commemorative acts, German Lutherans simultaneously maintained their 
own ethnic and religious traditions. Although this generation of German Lutherans in the 
mid-twentieth century may appeared assimilated compared to their nineteenth century 
forerunners, this dissertation has tried to portray a more holistic definition of ethnicity 
that sought to define a community of immigrants on their own terms. While German 
Lutherans may have embraced their Canadian and American citizenship, these national 
identities did not eclipse their established ethnic or religious traditions. War, postwar 
immigration, theological disputes, and the changing demographics of the church all 
provided opportunities for German Lutherans to shed their immigrant identities and 
embrace their national communities. However, they chose not to do so. Ethnic elites and 
laypeople fought to preserve their churches as ethnic boundary zones wherein they could 
continue to articulate ethnic and religious identities that differed from mainstream society. 
German Lutherans did not articulate an identity that placed them firmly in either 
“German” or “Canadian/American” camps. Hybridity, and not assimilation, defined their 
experiences in the mid-twentieth century. 
 Broadly speaking, the second goal of this dissertation was to apply developments 
in whiteness studies to the experiences of German Lutherans. This dissertation argued 
that “whiteness” or a white racial identity is essential for understanding how German 
Lutherans constructed an ethnic identity. German Lutherans articulated a white racial 
identity that served to bolster their ethnic identity in several ways. First, their whiteness 
allowed them to form bonds with political leaders that helped ensure their safety during 
periods of anti-German sentiment. Chapters two and three examined how ethnic elites 
established working relationships with high ranking politicians like Prime Minister 
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William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Office of War Information in order to advocate 
for their loyalty to the Canadian and American states. Although their German ethnicity 
prompted some suspicion, ethnic elites successfully courted these politicians and largely 
convinced them that their immigrant communities posed little threat to national security 
during and after the war. Unlike the widespread incarceration of Japanese Canadians and 
Americans and the hostility expressed towards black protestors, Germans escaped acts of 
systemic violence. Their whiteness allowed them to be treated as individuals rather than a 
monolithic group. While government officials may have believed some “bad apples” 
existed within German communities, they by and large accepted Germans as decent 
citizens because of their whiteness. While racialized North Americans experienced state-
sanctioned discrimination on account of their race, German Lutherans could maintain 
controversial ethnic allegiances due to the privileges whiteness afforded them. 
 Moreover, German Lutherans celebrated their ethnic past through myths, 
commemorative acts, and foundational stories as a result of their white privilege. As 
several chapters made clear, German Lutherans mimicked other settler colonial narratives 
that normalized the presence of whites in North America. These narrative frameworks 
proved particularly useful for German immigrants as they allowed white settlers to appear 
“indigenous” or “entitled” to the land in which they lived. These narratives bolstered 
settler regimes in North America by erasing the presence of indigenous peoples and 
normalizing their marginalization while propping up German immigrants as members of 
the newly-native settler class, or as the “natural” owners of the land. Racialized North 
Americans simply could not access these narratives. Asian immigrants, for example, were 
“temporary sojourners” or, worse still, represented a hostile attempt by China and 
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Japanese to “take over” white countries.936 Celebrations of ethnic culture like the pioneer 
myth persisted because the ethnic elites advancing such myths were white. Moreover, 
ethnic elites occasionally advanced these narratives to directly ignore or minimize their 
complicity in racial discrimination and white supremacy. Popular myths about nineteenth 
century German immigrants fighting to abolish slavery helped ethnic elites in St. Louis 
ignore the Missouri Synod’s pro-slavery past. During the decades in which debates about 
segregation engulfed the synod, these myths helped ethnic elites portray the synod as a 
benevolent and progressive institution. It masked their contemporary racism by valorizing 
a historically inaccurate past. In St. Louis and Waterloo County, celebrations of ethnic 
culture and white culture overlapped.  
 Lutheran churches moreover remained ethnic boundary zones because they were 
segregated spaces. The Missouri Synod in particular actively kept their congregations 
white, and therefore German, by barring black Lutherans from worshipping alongside 
them. Chapter five demonstrated that Lutheran congregations impacted by white flight 
made few efforts to rebuild their churches with new black members. Instead, they kept 
their churches white by either relocating or replacing old members with white Anglo-
American laypeople instead. In doing so, the Missouri Synod maintained its English and 
German-language traditions without including other minority groups in the church. 
Although the Canada Synod never directly enforced a policy of segregation, chapter six 
showcased that Ontario congregations remained German spaces only because of their 
hostility towards Baltic and Scandinavian immigrants. Ethnic elites hoped to eliminate 
Latvian, Estonian, and other “foreign” language services and effectively integrate DPs 
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into their German-English churches. In doing so, ethnic elites acted as the gatekeepers 
they otherwise resisted. The Missouri and Canada Synods kept their churches as ethnic 
boundary zones by excluding their racialized neighbors and other marginalized 
immigrants from their German churches.  
 In drawing connections between whiteness and ethnicity this dissertation engaged 
with previous American historians who critiqued whiteness studies and pushed the field 
in new directions. Most notably, it has provided nuance to the established narratives of an 
“ethnic reverie” in postwar United States. This narrative purports that immigrants largely 
adopted racial identities as whites and as Americans during the Second World War and its 
resulting decades. Immigrants only reverted back to their ethnic identities in the late 
1960s and early 1970s as part of the “white ethnic revival.”937 As this narrative remains 
dominant in the field, historian Ronald Bayor asked future scholars to answer the 
following question: “After World War II, did a white identity dominate or did the 
prevalence of national identities persist and, if so, for how long?”938 This study has 
addressed Bayor’s question by suggesting the ethnic reverie narrative does not adequately 
capture the experiences of German Lutherans. Ethnicity continued to inform community 
debates and decisions throughout the 1940s and onwards. Simply put, there was no ethnic 
reverie that witnessed German Lutherans ignoring their ethnic heritage. A white identity 
did not dominate among Germans in St. Louis and Waterloo County. Rather, whiteness 
provided a vehicle for German Lutherans to continue their ethnic identities. Race and 
ethnicity did not function as binary identities in German Lutheran communities, but rather 
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worked in tandem to reinforce the other. Whiteness created the cultural and social 
conditions necessary for Germans to continue an ethnic identity during the decades with a 
strong anti-German bias.      
 This dissertation also addressed the critiques of Peter Kolchin, among others, that 
have criticized the field’s forerunners for producing national histories of whiteness that 
span over centuries. Due to their lack of temporal and geographic constraints, Kolchin 
suggested that whiteness often appears as ahistorical, always present but never changing, 
and is not properly grounded in specific communities during precise time periods.939 By 
using a case study approach, this dissertation found that German Lutherans 
simultaneously maintained ethnic and racial identities within their churches. Future 
historians hoping to address Kolchin’s critiques and Bayor’s questions would do well to 
examine how immigrants expressed their identities via religious institutions. As Kolchin 
notes, many previous whiteness studies focus on immigrants in the public sphere. Yet, 
within their ethnic boundary zones, this dissertation has argued that immigrants 
articulated white and ethnic identities in the midst of the “ethnic reverie.” 
  More significantly, this dissertation is one of the first studies in Canadian history 
to effectively racialize white European immigrants in the twentieth century. Many 
Canadian historians of ethnicity evaluate immigrants using the “new social history” 
approach of examining their subjects along the lines of class, gender, ethnicity, as well as 
region and sexuality. Race, however, appears notably absent among discussions of white 
immigrants.  While other scholars have started to address whiteness and white supremacy 
in the nineteenth century, Canadian historians of the twentieth century typically use 
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“white” as an adjective to describe their immigrant subjects rather than an analytical 
framework employed to understand how race shaped immigrant lives. Too often 
Canadian historians examine white supremacy through a legal or political lens that points 
out the ways in which the Canadian desire for a white settler nation shaped anti-Asian 
immigration policy, cultural genocide in residential schools, and enacted settlement 
policies that favoured white migrants at the expense of indigenous peoples.940 Yet this 
dissertation has demonstrated that whiteness existed outside of nativist calls for 
exclusionary immigration policies or a preference towards other Commonwealth 
countries.941 It also operated at cultural and ideological levels in immigrant communities 
like Waterloo County’s German Lutheran population. While this community never 
directly called for subjugation or exclusion of racialized peoples, they advanced a white 
ethnic culture that was inherently based around their racial status as whites. In doing so, 
this dissertation has addressed historian Constance Backhouse’s remark that Canadian 
historians believe race “is generally understood as something that affixes itself only to 
marginalized groups.”942 German Lutherans did articulate a white racial identity, even if it 
remained couched in the language of ethnicity.  
 The German Lutheran experience demonstrates how important it is that future 
historians racialize white immigrants. Recent studies on ethnic diversity, largely centered 
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in Western Canada, have adopted a rather celebratory tone that takes pride in Canada’s 
multiculturalism. In their overview of prairie immigrant history, Royden Loewen and 
Gerald Friesen suggest that immigrants “shaped a distinct variation on the Canadian 
model of cultural diversity” in the prairies as a result of their “hybrid cultures [and] the 
vibrant ethnic networks developed by the immigrant communities.”943 In a similar vein, 
historian Frances Swyripa commends the various European immigrants that settled in 
Western Canada and made the prairies “a place of remarkable ethno-religious diversity, 
making it unique in the history of Canada.” After surveying how immigrants came to 
populate the prairie landscape with various commemorative acts including cemeteries, 
churches, parades, and memorials, she concludes that prairie immigrants “bred visibility 
and confidence” through their commemorative works.944 While I do not dispute the 
findings of previous scholars that have unearthed examples of immigrants successfully 
creating cultures of diversity, this dissertation has raised the question as to whether such 
celebrations of ethnic diversity were predicated on their whiteness. Indeed, German 
Lutherans helped “set the tone” in St. Louis and Waterloo County through a localized 
German culture in each of these communities, but only because of the privileges 
whiteness conferred upon them. The German Lutheran experience provides an important 
reminder that celebrations of ethnic and religious diversity can work comfortably within a 
culture that celebrates whiteness and reinforces the marginalization of racialized others. 
While proponents of a German Lutheran identity in North America provided a 
counterpoint to the exclusionary Anglo-Canadian and “100% American” identities 
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popular in the early and mid-twentieth centuries, their identities did seek to overhaul the 
inherently exclusionary basis of these nationalisms. Multiculturalism and ethnic diversity 
are not necessarily anti-racist philosophies, nor can they be relied upon to challenge the 
white supremacist identity that hides behind notions of nationality. These foundational 
myths were vitally important to white ethnic groups. German Lutherans successfully 
mobilized them to advocate for their loyalty, convince government officials to change 
their refugee legislation, and helped them feel more comfortable in their communities. It 
does not detract from this importance, however, to understand that this only occurred 
because of their white privilege. I hope future Canadian historians are more conscientious 
of whiteness as a category of historical analysis and can use it to shed light on the 
country’s racial disparities, both past and present. 
 I titled this work “Welcoming Strangers” as it conveys how race and ethnicity 
functioned in St. Louis and Waterloo County’s German Lutheran communities in the 
mid-twentieth century. Their ethnicity often made them “strangers” in communities they 
had long called home. The Second World War and attempts to regulate aspects of 
immigrant life in the postwar period often put German Lutherans at odds with their 
Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American neighbours. Yet, their whiteness simultaneously 
ensured that these “strangers” were ultimately welcomed in their communities in ways 
that other racialized peoples were not. Whiteness helped cultivate bonds with political 
leaders that ensured they avoided large-scale internment during the war, and moreover 
allowed them to create ethnic foundational myths that parroted Anglo-Canadian and 
American narratives of pioneering and settlement. Whiteness helped German Lutherans 
justify their at-times controversial ethnic identities and heritage. Only by looking at the 
ways in which race and ethnicity interacted does it become fully clear how German 
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Lutherans were able to maintain a hybrid ethnic identity and successfully negotiate the 
pressures to assimilate.  
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